93 C. Cls.


ESTATE TAX-Continued.

limit in any way the finality and conclusiveness
of the decision of the Board as to the entire tax
liability for the said taxable year, under the
applicable provisions of the Revenue Act of
1926. Id.

LXIII. (9) Where it is shown that decedent during his entire
life made relatively small gifts to his wife, and
prior to a first stroke of paralysis, at the age
of 66 years, made only small gifts to his sons
and daughter; and where after a second stroke
of paralysis decedent transferred approximately
two-thirds of his property to his wife and chil-
dren; it is held that plaintiffs, executors of
decedent's estate, are not entitled to recover
estate taxes assessed upon said estate after
inclusion by the commissioner of the transfers
so made, under section 302 of the Revenue Act
of 1926. Russell, 675.

LXIV. (10) Where decedent made no provision for his family

with the exception of small amounts given to
his sons and daughter previous to his sudden
affliction, and then after a second stroke of pa-
ralysis disposed of a large portion of his estate
by transfers to members of his family; it is held
that the thought of death was the impelling
motive for the transfers, thereby seeking to
avoid testamentary dispositions. Id.

LXV. (11) The burden was on plaintiffs seeking to recover
estate taxes paid by them as executors to es-
tablish by preponderance of evidence that the
decision of the Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue finding that transfers were made in con-
templation of death was erroneous. Id.

LXVI. (12) In deciding whether gifts were made as substi-
tutes for testamentary dispositions, and thus
provided an evasion of the estate tax, motive
which induced the transfers must be determined.

LXVII. (13) Transfers in contemplation of death are included
within the same category, for the purpose of
taxation, with transfers intended to take effect
at or after the death of transferor; the domi-
nant purpose is to reach substitutes for testa-
mentary dispositions and thus to prevent the
evasion of the estate tax. United States v.
Wells, 283 U. S. 102, 116, 117, 118, cited. Id.

93 C. Cls.


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LXVIII. Where the Commissioner of Internal Revenue as-
sessed against plaintiff tax as a manufacturer
of adulterated butter and where the plaintiff de-
nies that it manufactured butter, adulterated or
otherwise; it is held that the proof sustains the
allegation that plaintiff did manufacture adul-
terated butter and the estimate by the Commis-
sioner of the amount so manufactured is assumed
to be correct in the absence of any proof to the
contrary. Arrow Dairy Company, 449.


LXIX. (1) Where plaintiff, a corporation engaged in the man-
ufacture and sale of bakery products, was as-
sessed and paid processing taxes on the
processing of coconut oil under section 6022
of the Revenue Act of 1934, which oil had been
previously processed in the United States by
the vendor thereof prior to the effective date of
said act; it is held that the plaintiff is not
entitled to recover, following the decision of the
Circuit Court of Appeals in Loose-Wiles Biscuit
Company v. Rasquin, Collector, 20 Fed. Supp.
805; certiorari denied, 305 U. S. 611. Tasty Bak-
ing Company, 667.
LXX. (2) Where the intention of Congress in a Revenue

Act is in doubt, and where on two different
occasions after the issuance of Treasury Regu-
lations interpreting the doubtful language used
in the act, Congress enacted subsequent legis-
lation on the same subject without disapproving
the Treasury interpretation; it is held that
there was a sufficient basis for holding "that
the Treasury Regulations promulgated under the
statute were a reasonable construction of the
statutory language." Id.

LXXI. (3) While the Supreme Court has stated that denial

of a writ of certiorari adds no authority to the
opinion sought to be reviewed, where the ques-
tion involved in the petition for certiorari was
upon a final judgment of the lower court and
was narrowly defined; it is held that such denial
is of some persuasive value in the determina-
tion of said question. Id.

LXXII. (4) Where an exporter who was also the processor
brings suit in the Court of Claims to recover




processing taxes levied under the Agricultural
Adjustment Act on goods subsequently exported;
it is held that the court is without jurisdiction
to review the determination of the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue denying such refund, under
the provisions of section 601 (e) of the Revenue
Act of 1936. Swift and Company, 705.

LXXIII. (5) Courts are loath to ascribe to Congress an inten-

tion to clothe an administrative officer with
uncontrolled authority to adjudicate a claim,
without judicial review, but there is no doubt
of the power of Congress to do so. Id.

LXXIV. (6) Where Congress expressly provided for review
of the Commissioner's determinations on ques-
tions of law involving a claim for refund filed
by a processor under title VII, section 906 (b);
and where Congress in section 601 (e), title IV,
expressly denied to all courts jurisdiction to
review the Commissioner's determination on a
claim by an exporter, or by one claiming a refund
of floor stock taxes, without making any ex-
ception to this denial of jurisdiction; it is held
that Congress intended to deny jurisdiction in
such cases to the courts for all purposes. Id.

LXXV. (1)

93 C. Cls.

Where a national bank in 1934 issued shares of
its preferred stock to the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation, on which stamp taxes were col-
lected under section 800 of the Revenue Act of
1926, amended by section 722 of the Revenue
Act of 1932 (47 Stat. 169, 272); it is held that
plaintiff is not entitled to refund of said stamp
tax under the provisions of the Act of March
20, 1936 (49 Stat. 1185) exempting from taxa-
tion shares of preferred stock of national banks
(and others) held by the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation. Merchants National Bank, 464.

LXXVI. (2) Where the stamp tax on the issue of preferred

stock of a national bank acquired by the Recon-
struction Finance Corporation was not levied
against nor collected from the said Reconstruc-
tion Finance Corporation but from said national
bank, such issue of preferred stock was not
exempt from said stamp tax under the Act of
March 20, 1936. Id.

93 C. Cls.


STAMP TAX-Continued.

LXXVII. (3) It is a well-established rule that an exemption from

taxation must be clearly declared by the lan-
guage of the statute which it is claimed confers
such exemption. Id.

LXXVIII. (4) The statute under which exemption is claimed in
the instant case was enacted in order to re-
move not only the inequality of treatment as
between State and national bank stocks but
also because of the varying rates of taxation
levied by the several States. Id.


LXXIX. (1) Where a life insurance company, organized under

the laws of Illinois, exercised its option under
the insurance laws of said State to deposit with
the Director of Insurance of said State securi-
ties equal in value to the reserves on a certain
group of policies to be designated as "regis
tered policies," and where such policies were
thereupon registered by the Director of Insur-
ance, and appropriately stamped to certify such
registration, showing that approved securities
equal in value to the legal reserves thereon
were "held in trust" by the insurance depart-
ment for the benefit and security of the mem-
bers, policyholders, or creditors of said insurance
company; it is held that such transactions con-
stituted transfers of legal title to such securities
so deposited and as such were subject to the
Federal stamp tax imposed under title VIII of
the Revenue Act of 1926, as amended. Frank-
lin Life Ins. Co., 259.

LXXX. (2) Where under the laws of the State of Illinois it

was optional with an insurance company organ-
ized under the laws of said State to register
with the State Director of Insurance its policies
by the deposit of securities equal in value to the
legal reserve of such policies; it is held that
such registration by the State was not an essen-
tial governmental function exercised pursuant
to the police power of the State, and a Federal
tax imposed on such transaction was not un-
constitutional as imposing a direct burden upon
the exercise by a State of its governmental
function. Ambrosini v. United States, 187 U. S.
1, distinguished. Id.



LXXXI. (3) The courts should not declare a statute unconsti-
tutional unless its unconstitutionality is free
from doubt. Id.

LXXXII. (4) It is well settled that the mere fact that some
benefit is conferred by State law does not make
the acts done in connection therewith by another
party, or even the acts of the State itself, im-
mune from Federal taxation. Id.

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LXXXIII. (5) Any State has the right under its police powers
to regulate and control the issuance of life in-
surance policies in such a manner as to protect
the interests of the policyholders. Id.
See also Internal Revenue III, IV, V, VII.

See Taxes LXIX, LXX.

See Pay and Allowances IV.

See Contracts VI, VII.

See Pay and Allowances XII, XIII.

See Contracts III.

93 C. CIS.


See Patents VII, XI, XII, XIII.

See Contracts XII.

See Contracts XV.

See Taxes LXXI.


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