and that defendant authorized and directed Cohen to receive the money for him. It tended to show a conspiracy or confederacy, and the declarations and statements of each were competent evidence against defendant, whether made in his presence or not. Circumstantial evidence is as legal and competent in criminal as in civil actions, and the inferences to be drawn from the facts we have stated all point with unerring certainty to the conclusion that Cohen was the representative of defendant in the receipt of this money, and was a co-conspirator in the whole infamous transaction. There was therefore no error in the ruling of the court permitting the witness Mills to testify that she paid Cohen the sum of $15 at about the time charged in the indictment, nor any error in permitting testimony as to the declarations and statements made by him concerning the same, or when previously directing her when and where to make the payment. State v. Palmer, 79 Minn. 428, 82 N. W. 685; People v. McKane, 143 N. Y. 455, 38 N. E. 950; State v. Gardner, 88 Minn. 130, 92 N. W. 529; State v. Winner, 17 Kan. 298.

It is also contended, in connection with the testimony of witness Mills, that it was error to permit her to testify to the conclusion that the money was paid for protection. There was no error in the ruling of the court on this subject. It appeared from her testimony that defendant had agreed to protect her in consideration of such payment. It was also shown that she was not indebted to Cohen in any way, or to any person connected with the city administration. The objection to the question for what purpose she paid the money was properly overruled. Ganser v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 38 Minn. 74, 35 N. W. 584. At any rate, it in no way prejudiced defendant. Her answer was not conclusive, and the question was submitted to the jury to determine from all the evidence before them.

3. The state was permitted to prove, over the objection and exception of defendant, payments of money to Cohen by the other women referred to, and to relate conversations had with him in reference thereto. It is claimed by defendant that this testimony tended solely to prove the commission of other separate, independent offenses, and was incompetent and inadmissible. The decision in State v. Fitchette, 88 Minn. 145, 92 N. W. 527, is relied upon as sustaining the position.

The question as to the admissibility of evidence of this character has

been before the courts often, and the rule permitting its introduction is variously stated by judges; but, reduced to its narrowest compass, the true rule is that evidence of the commission of other crimes is admissible when it tends corroboratively or directly to establish the defendant's guilt of the crime charged in the indictment on trial, or some essential ingredient of such offense. As stated by Chief Justice Parker in People v. Molineux, 168 N. Y. 264, 343, 61 N. E. 286: "Does the evidence of the other crime fairly aid in establishing the commission by defendant of the crime for which he is being tried? And that test, and none other, is fairly established by the authorities."

What was said in the general discussion of the subject in the Fitchette case was not with a view of laying down any hard and fast rule in such cases. As applied to the facts there before the court, the decision in that case is in accord with the authorities generally, and we adhere to it. It is in line with other cases in this court. In State v. Madigan, 57 Minn. 425, 59 N. W. 490, the court said: "If the evidence offered tends to prove the commission of the crime charged in the indictment, it is not incompetent because it also tends to prove the commission by the accused of another crime." See also State v. Hayward, 62 Minn. 474, 65 N. W. 63; State v. Wilson, 72 Minn. 522, 75 N. W. 715; State v. Bourne, 86 Minn. 426, 90 N. W. 1108; State v. Gardner, 88 Minn. 130, 92 N. W. 529. The evidence of the commission of some other crime directly tends to show the guilt of defendant of the crime charged when it discloses a motive, a criminal intent, guilty knowledge, the absence of mistake, identifies the defendant, or is a part of a common scheme or plan embracing two or more crimes so related to each other that the proof of one tends to establish the other. The Fitchette case is distinguishable in at least two respects: A. It was necessary for the state to establish a connection between Cohen and defendant in respect to payments of money by the women, and to show that Cohen was authorized by the latter to collect and receive the same for him. That it tends to show a confederacy between the officers and Cohen is clear, and, that fact being established, it was competent for the state to show the declarations, statements, and acts of any one of the conspirators. Defendant directed Officer Wirtensohn to accomCohen to the various houses in question, and Cohen, on meeting pany each woman, informed her that he had been sent by defendant, with di

rections to notify them to make all further payments of protection money to him, instead of to Gardner, as they had theretofore been doing. The evidence tended to corroborate, confirm, and establish the contention of the state that Cohen represented defendant in the receipt of the money, and comes fairly within the general rule above stated. No such issue or question was presented in the Fitchette case. In that case the money was paid direct to Fitchette.

B. It is also distinguishable from the Fitchette case in that it tended to establish a scheme or system of crimes, intimately associated and connected, so that proof of the other payments was corroborative, and tended directly to the truth of the charge made in the indictment. The evidence leaves no room for reasonable doubt on this subject. It established beyond question a scheme concocted by defendant to put the abandoned women of Minneapolis under tribute to him in return for his official protection, and each and every payment was a part of the one scheme. It was practically one transaction-each act, each payment, an essential part of the whole plan of corruption-and the evidence was competent. Swan v. Com., 104 Pa. St. 218; Mason v. State, 42 Ala. 532; People v. Gray, 66 Cal. 271, 5 Pac. 240; People v. Cobler, 108 Cal. 538, 41 Pac. 401; Mayer v. People, 80 N. Y. 364; People v. Peckens, 153 N. Y. 576, 47 N. E. 883; State v. Eastwood, 73 Vt. 205, 50 Atl. 1077. There was no attempt to establish a scheme or plan in the Fitchette case.

4. It is contended that the court erred in refusing to give certain requests of defendant in respect to evidence relating to his good character. We have examined these requests, together with the general charge of the court on the subject, and conclude that their refusal was not error, for the subject was fully and sufficiently covered by the general charge. The court instructed the jury that evidence of defendant's reputation for honesty, integrity, and truthfulness was competent, as tending to show that he would not be likely to commit the crime charged against him, and that if the jury believed from the evidence that defendant had previously borne a good reputation for honesty, integrity, and truthfulness among his acquaintances and neighbors, that fact was proper to be considered by them, in connection with all the other evidence in the case, in determining the question of his guilt or innocence. It was not necessary for the court to go further, and say

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to the jury that they must consider such evidence. The court had previously charged them that they were the exclusive judges of the facts and of the credibility of the several witnesses, and that it was their duty to consider all the evidence bearing upon the questions at issue.

It is well settled, both on principle and authority, that the court should not single out and give undue prominence to particular items of evidence, and instruct the jury that they might or might not create in their minds a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of defendant. Such instructions would be argumentative in character and improper. II Enc. Pl. & Pr. 185. Its full duty is performed when the general rules of law applicable to the issues are given to the jury, and they are charged to consider all evidence in the case.

5. Defendant was sworn as a witness in his own behalf, and gave testimony in support of his plea of not guilty. The court instructed the jury, in connection with the charge, that they should consider all the evidence; that they should not ignore the testimony of defendant merely because he had a vital interest in the outcome of the case. It is urged that this was reversible error. It is the province and right of the court to instruct the jury in any action, civil or criminal, that they should take into consideration, in weighing the testimony of the several witnesses, the interest each is shown to have in the result of the action, their appearance and demeanor while on the stand, and all facts and circumstances tending to their credit or discredit; but the court must not charge as to the credibility of particular witnesses. State v. Hoy, 83 Minn. 286, 86 N. W. 98; Harriott v. Holmes, 77 Minn. 245, 79 N. W. 1003. We think the rule was followed, and not violated, by the charge of the court in the case at bar.

In the case of State v. Lucy, 41 Minn. 60, 42 N. W. 697, the court, speaking on this subject, said: "The defendant availed himself of a statutory privilege, and gave to the jury his version of the unfortunate encounter. In referring to this fact, the court charged that such weight should be given his testimony as the jury believed it entitled to, in view of all the facts and circumstances proved on the trial, and that the defendant's interest in the result of the prosecution might also be considered. This is unquestionably the law applicable to the testimony of all witnesses, in civil or criminal cases, who have any interest what

soever in the result of the litigation, and consequently there was no error in this portion of the charge."

In the case of State v. Borgstrom, 69 Minn. 508, 72 N. W. 799, 975, the trial court instructed the jury that they should take into consideration the interest which the defendant, as a witness, had in the result of the litigation, and the instruction was held not error.

In the case at bar, counsel, in discussing the issues before the jury, had, no doubt, referred to the interest defendant had in the result of the prosecution; and the court, with that in mind, and thoughtful of the rights of defendant, instructed them that they should not fail to consider his testimony merely because he was vitally interested in the result. There was no intention to reflect upon defendant, or to suggest in the remotest degree just what weight the jury should give his testimony. The court intended only to remind the jury that they should not, because he was interested, ignore his testimony. They were explicitly directed to apply to him the same rules of credibility as they applied to other witnesses.

6. Upon the question whether Cohen was authorized by defendant to collect and receive the money from the women referred to, the trial court instructed the jury as follows:

"It is the law generally that any act by an assumed agent, and a recognition of his authority by the alleged principal, may, in a proper case, prove the agency to do other similar acts. And if you find in this case that Cohen was authorized or directed by defendant to collect in his behalf money from one or more of these women, other than Addie Mills, such fact is proper to be considered in determining whether or not defendant authorized Cohen to collect money from her. Indeed, if you find that Cohen had general authority to collect protection money from abandoned women, or from a certain class of them, which included Addie Mills, then you would be justified in finding that in receiving money from Addie Mills, if in fact he received it, he received the same for the defendant, and in that event will find that he himself received the money."

It is urged that this instruction was error, for which a new trial should be granted; that it, in effect, stated to the jury that the au