a large sum as due to him for compensation and disbursements. Neither the bondholders nor their trustees took any part in these proceedings in the State court. An application by the receiver to have the sum which he had been previously obliged to pay into the Federal court appropriated in part payment of the amount which the State court had allowed him was denied.13

§ 259. Removal of Receivers. - A receiver may be removed for misconduct in office, or because his original appointment was obtained by collusion or fraud,2 or was improper on account of his interest in the subject of the receivership or connection with the parties in interest. Instances of such misconduct as will be a cause for the removal of a receiver are unlawful discrimination in charges between different shippers upon a railroad; the purchase of supplies for the purpose of the receivership from a firm or corporation in which he is largely interested; and in the case of two receivers, where they are unable to act in harmony, and the interests of the estate suffer from their discord. A receiver will not be removed or discharged at his own request except for good cause shown, nor ordinarily for a reason which he knew or had ground to anticipate when he accepted the receivership. Thus the court refused to remove, at his own request, a receiver upon the sole ground that the duties of his office interfere with his private business. A receiver may be removed at his own request when by reason of blindness he has become physically incapable of performing the duties of his receivership. Ordinarily, a receiver can only be removed by the court which appointed him,10 upon an application made in the

13 In re Hinckley, 3 Fed. R. 556. § 259. 1 Handy v. Cleveland & Marietta R. R. Co., 31 Fed. R. 689; Atkins v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 29 Fed. R. 161.

6 Meier v. Kansas Pacific R. R. Co., 5 Dill. 476. But see Conner v. Belden, 8 Daly (N. Y. C. P.), 257.

7 Richardson v. Ward, 6 Madd. 266; Beers v. Chelsea Bank, 4 Edw. Ch. (N.Y.)

2 O'Mahoney v. Belmont, 62 N. Y. 133; 277; In re Lytle, 3 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 251;

8. c. 37 N. Y. Superior Court, 223.

Smith v. Vaughan, Ridg. temp. Hardw.

8 Atkins v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. 251; Beach on Receivers, § 782. Co., 29 Fed. R. 161.

4 Handy v. Cleveland & Marietta R. R. Co., 31 Fed. R. 689; Atkins v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 29 Fed. R. 161. But see Central Trust Co. v. Ohio Cent R. R. Co., 23 Fed. R. 306.

5 Atkins v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 29 Fed. R. 161.

8 Beers v. Chelsea Bank, 4 Edw. Ch. (N.Y.) 277. But see Purdy v. Rapalye (N. Y. Chancery, 1835); Edwards on Receivers, 661; Beach on Receivers, § 782.

9 Richardson v. Ward, 6 Madd. 266. 10 Young v. Montgomery & E. R. R. Co., 2 Woods, 606, 618; Alabama & C. R. R.

suit in which his appointment was made." A Federal court may, however, after the removal of a suit, remove a receiver therein appointed by a State court.12 And it has been held that when a Circuit Court of the United States has appointed a receiver of a line of railroads running through another circuit, as well as through that wherein the appointment is made, his authority in the other circuit is recognized merely by judicial comity, and he may be removed from all control over property therein by the Federal court there held, upon a bill there filed.13 When a receiver is removed, the court may appoint another in his place. A delay of ten months after knowledge of the facts upon which the motion is founded, in moving for the discharge of a receivership and the removal of a receiver, has been held a sufficient reason for denying the application.14 The successor to a receiver can usually enforce, at least in equity, contracts made with his predecessor in his official capacity,15 and is usually responsible in his official capacity for liabilities incurred by his predecessor in the same manner as if he were a corporation sole.16 Whether a receiver who is not a party to a suit can appeal from an order for his removal is doubtful.17

§ 260. Discharge of a Receiver. - The discharge of a receiver is a termination of the receivership, and no successor to him is then appointed. It will be ordered when the court is satisfied either that no occasion for a receivership existed when the appointment was made, or that in the course of subsequent events the necessity for the receivership has ceased. Ordinarily, a receiver can be

Co. v. Jones, 7 N. B. R. 145, 169; Beach on Receivers, §§ 777, 778.

11 Davis v. Michelbacher (S. C. Wis ), 31 N. W. R. 168; Beach on Receivers, §§ 777, 778.

15 Thompson v. Phenix Insurance Co., 136 U. S. 287.

16 McNulta v. Lochridge, 141 U. S. 327.

17 See Conner v. Belden, 8 Daly (N. Y.

12 Texas & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Rust, 17 C. P), 257; Wilson v. Barney, 5 Hun

Fed. R. 275. See infra, §§ 260, 391.

13 Atkins v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co, 29 Fed. R. 161. But see Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 29 Fed. R. 618; Muller v. Dows, 94 U. S. 444; Young . Montgomery & E. R. R. Co., 2 Woods, 606, 618; Alabama & C. R. R. Co. v. Jones, 7 National Bankruptcy Register, 145, 169.

(N.Y.), 257; Connolly v. Kretz, 78 N. Y. 620.

§ 260. 1 Beach on Receivers, § 791. 2 Lavender v. Lavender, Irish Rep. 9 Eq. 593; Furlong ». Edwards, 3 Md. 99; Sage v. Memphis & L. R. R. R. Co., 18 Fed. R. 571: s. c. 125 U. S. 361.

8 Davis v. Duke of Marlborough, 2 Swanst. 108, 168; Bainbrigge v. Blair, 3

14 Brown v. Lake Superior Iron Co., Beav. 421. 134 U. S. 530.

discharged only by the court that appointed him. After the removal of a case from a State to a Federal court, the Federal court may discharge a receiver therein appointed. Any person injured by the appointment of a receiver can move for his discharge although not a party to the suit in which he was appointed. The motion should be made on notice to all parties interested. A motion for the discharge of a receiver may be denied on account of the laches of the moving party.8 A receiver of the estate of an infant will not be discharged until a year after the infant's majority, unless the ward after majority consents to his discharge.9 The receiver will not be discharged, as of course, at the motion. of the party who procured his appointment, if other parties who have acquired an interest in the receivership object.10 The entry of a final decree which does not provide for the continuance of a receivership supersedes the appointment of a receiver." A receiver may be discharged from the control of real estate, and the rents and profits which he has collected be continued in his control until the termination of the litigation.12 It has been held that the discharge of a receiver by a decree cannot be set aside upon a motion entered after the term at which it was made.13 The discharge of a receiver terminates his liability for acts done in his official capacity.14 After a receiver's discharge damages to the estate resulting from his mismanagement cannot be recovered from the sureties upon an injunction bond concurrent with his appointment.15 Where a decree discharged a

Young v. Montgomery & E. R. R. Co., 2 Woods, 606; Beach on Receivers, § 791.

5 Texas & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Rust, 17 Fed. R. 275; Mahoney Mining Co. v. Bennett, 4 Saw. 287. As to the disposition of the money in the hands of a receiver thus discharged, see Mack v. Jones, 31 Fed. R. 189, 196.

Thomas v. Brigstocke, 4 Russ. 64; Grenfell v. Dean of Windsor, 2 Beav. 544; Milwaukie & Minnesota R. R. R. Co. v. Soutter, 2 Wall. 510.

7 Davis v. Duke of Marlborough, 2 Swanst. 108, 118; Bainbrigge v. Blair, 3 Beav. 421, 423.

8 Allen v. Dallas & W. R. R. Co., 3 Woods, 316, 331; National Mechanics' Banking Assn. v Mariposa Co., 60 Barb. (N. Y.) 423; Hazard v. Credit Mobilier of

America, 38 Fed. R. 195; Brown v. Lake
Superior Iron Co., 134 U. S. 530.

9 Matter of Van Horne, 7 Paige Ch. (N. Y.) 346; Wildridge v. McKane, 2 Molloy, 545. See also Bainbrigge v. Blair, 3 Beav. 421.

10 Bainbrigge v. Blair, 3 Beav. 421; People v. Globe Mutual Life Ins. Co., 57 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 481; Fay v. Erie & K. R. R. Bank, Harring. (Mich.) 194. See, however, Davis v. Duke of Marlborough, 2 Swanst. 108, 168; Whiteside v. Prendergast, 2 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 471.

11 Daniell's Ch. Pr. (5th Am. ed.) 1765. 12 Jones v. Smith, 40 Fed. R. 314. 18 Davis v. Duncan, 19 Fed. R. 477. 14 Davis v. Duncan, 19 Fed. R. 477; White v. Keokuk & D. M. Ry. Co., 52 Iowa, 97.

15 Lehman v. M'Quown, 31 Fed. R. 138.

receiver upon condition that he should file a release from the person to whom the property was given by the decree, it was held that his omission to file the release did not make him liable to strangers for former injuries by his employees.16

16 Davis v. Duncan, 18 Fed. R. 477.

§ 261.

will Issue.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE WRIT OF NE EXEAT REPUBLICA.

Definition of the Writ of Ne Exeat Republica, and when it The writ of ne exeat republica is a writ which issues from a Federal court of equity to restrain a defendant to a suit therein from departing from the United States without the leave of the court. In England it was called ne exeat regno, and was considered a writ of high prerogative. It was originally applicable to purposes of state only, but afterwards extended to private transactions. In the United States the writ has hitherto been issued only at the request of a private party. The Revised Statutes provide that "writs of ne exeat may be granted by any justice of the Supreme Court, in cases where they might be granted by the Supreme Court; and by any circuit justice or circuit judge, in cases where they might be granted by the circuit court of which he is a judge. But no writ of ne exeat shall be granted unless a suit in equity is commenced, and satisfactory proof is made to the court or judge granting the same that the defendant designs quickly to depart from the United States."3 It is unsettled whether the writ can now issue from a Federal court held in a State which has abolished imprisonment for debt. It has been held that the writ cannot be granted by a judge of the District Court,5 except when holding a court of equity. The intention of the defendant to depart from the judicial district is not enough to authorize the issue of the writ. The claim of the party applying for the writ must be one enforceable by a suit in a court of equity; except where a decree for permanent alimony has been entered and no appeal therefrom is pending, in which case the English rule was that the writ might issue

8