versation, I have no other clue to it than the letter of August 23d, 1793, the nature of the subject, and the circumstances of the period, as explanatory of the postponement of the negotiation.

It is of no consequence to inquire whether it was, or was not, more agreeable to Mr. Genet, that the negotiation should lie over, when he heard that a definitive answer must be delayed until the meeting of the Senate. Notwithstanding it has the appearance of being the voluntary act of both; especially as Mr. Genet suffered it to rest upon an oral discourse, and never had, nor asked, a written answer; yet, let it be conceded to have been, on the part of Mr. Jefferson, an act of the Government, and on the part of Mr. Genet, a respectful submission. What Mr. Jefferson asserted is true; because the President can make treaties only with the advice and consent of the Senate. A definitive answer was therefore necessarily deferred. He did not allege that intermediate discussions could not take place; nor indeed does it appear that either of those gentlemen turned their attention to the preliminary negotiation; which might have been opened before the assembling of the Senate.

But if Mr. Genet had even pressed an immediate negotiation, weighty obstacles, very different from evasion, or alienation from France, stood in the way. 1. On the declaration of war between “France and England, the United States being at peace with both, "their situation was so new and unexperienced by themselves" that it was extremely desirable to exclude any business which would absorb much time, and might be postponed: in order that the Executive might be unembarrassed in its superintendence of our neutrality. Although the labors of my predecessor, from the commencement of the war, to the early part of September, 1793, have been seen by the world, yet cannot they judge of the perplexities and researches which were the foundation of the documents published, and which hourly occupied not only the President himself, but those officers also who were around him. History had forewarned us, that as a neutral nation, encompassed by the ministers of belligerent Powers, inflamed with a jealousy of the public functionaries, not a day would pass without a complaint, a demand, a suspicion, and a thousand temptations to irritability. Piles of papers, verifying these predictions, are now before my eyes. 2. It was not to be supposed that a new treaty of commerce could be entered into without much reflection. In this view, every hour gained was beneficial. 3. The power of the President to authorize the Secretary of State, or indeed any other person, to digest the matter of a treaty, has been recognized in practice, in several forms; one of which is barely to nominate, with the advice and consent of the Senate, and occasionally to consult them. The last was the course which was observed, in the only treaty which has been negotiated at the seat of Government, the treaty with the Creek Indians, at New York, in 1790. The Senate being on the spot, and therefore convenient to the negotiation, were asked. as the subject was passing, whether they would ratify certain clauses, if inserted in the treaty. In the readjustment of the treaty of commerce with France, it was probably wished to repeat the same measure.

What would have been gained by France by precipitating the negotiation? The preliminary discussions might perhaps have been closed a few months sooner on the side of the President; but it is entirely uncertain whether the affair would have been expedited by any step so much as by consulting the Senate upon points of particular magnitude before the whole work was submitted to them. This is among the advantages which may be embraced in a negotiation in the United States, and is unattainable in a negotiation elsewhere. However, if a commencement had been made, I question whether, from the time which is indispensable for so grand a transaction, and the unavoidable interruption incident to the new state of things, we should not have been obliged to interrupt the progress upon a plea similar to that of the French ministry, that we were too much employed in steering clear of the war to attend for the present to the remoulding of the treaty.

Had the Executive been indisposed to the treaty, why did he in a manner pledge himself to negotiate when the Senate should meet? Why was our Minister in Paris instructed, on the 23d August, 1793, "to explain to the Executive of France this delay, which has prevented as yet our formal accession to their proposition to treat; to assure them that the President will meet them with the most friendly dispositions, on the grounds of treaty proposed by the National Convention as soon as he can do it in the forms of the constitution; and of course to suggest, for the purpose, that the powers of Mr. Genet be renewed to his successor." A formal "accession to the proposition to treat," and a negotiation in the forms of the constitution," appear to be still preferred to informal discussions, for the reasons already assigned. It is impossible to look into the subject without remarking that other principles may be conceived upon which the Executive might have refused to treat immediately, but which do not appear to have influenced his decision.

His attention must have been arrested by the diction of Mr. Genet's overtures. The President and the French Republic had hitherto agitated a change in commercial regulations only, when Mr. Genet announces a desire to modify the political connection also. The precise meaning of the term political was not very obvions, though the most natural interpretation was, that the political relation established by the treaty of alliance was proposed to be revised."

The movements which have been noticed of Mr. Genet before his arrival in Philadelphia from Charleston, were in perfect unison with this interpretation. The very decree of the 19th of February, 1793, liberal as it was in its language, manifested that the recent and existing war was a chief cause in declaring the concessions; for the French colonies could not be fed without supplies from the United States; and the suspension of the law of May 15th, 1791, which had inhibited the Americans from introducing, selling, and arming their vessels in France, and from enjoying all the privileges allowed to those built in the ship-yards of the Republic, was calculated to convert our ships into French privateers.

To confirm the real views of the Executive Council of France in the regeneration of the treaty, recollect these passages in Mr. Genet's instructions:

"That the Executive Council are disposed to set on foot a negotiation upon those foundations, and that they do not know but that such a treaty admits a latitude still more extensive in becoming a national agreement, in which two great people shall suspend their commercial and political interests, and establish a mutual understanding ; to befriend the empire of liberty wherever it can be embraced; to guaranty the sovereignty of the people, and punish those Powers whe still keep up an exclusive colonial and commercial system, by declaring that their vessels shall not be received in the ports of the contracting parties. Such a pact, which the people of France will support with all the energy which distinguishes them, and of which they have already given so many proofs, will quickly contribute to the general emancipation of the New World. However vast this project may be, it will not be difficult to execute, if the Americans determine on it; and it is to convince them of its practicability that Citizen Genet must direct all his attention: for, besides the advantages which humanity in general will draw from the success of such a negotiation, we have at this moment a particular interest in taking steps to act ef ficaciously against England and Spain. if, as every thing announces, these Powers attack us from hatred to our principles; if the English ministers, instead of sharing in the glory of France, instead of considering that our liberty as well as that of those people whose chains we have broken, forever establishes that of their own country, suffer themselves to be influenced by our enemies, and by those to the liberty of mankind, and embark with every tyrant against that cause which we are defending. The military preparations making in Great Britain become every day more and more serious, and have an intimate connection with those of Spain. The friendship which reigns between the Ministers of the last Power and those of St. James proves it; and, in this situation of affairs, we ought to excite, by all possible means, the zeal of the Americans, who are as much interested as ourselves in disconcerting the destructive projects of George the Third; in which they are probably an object. Their own safety still depends on ours, and if we fail, they will, sooner or later, fall under the iron rod of Great Britain. The Executive Council has room to believe that these reasons, in addition to the great commercial advantages which we are disposed to concede to the United States, will determine their government to adhere to all that Citizen Genet shall propose to them on our part. As it is possible, however, that the false representations which have been made to Congress of the situation of our internal affairs; of the state of our maritime force; of our finances, and especially of the storms with which we are threatened, may make her Ministers. in the negotiations which Citizen Genet is entrusted to open, adopt a timid and wavering conduct, the Executive Council charges him, in expectation that the American Government will finally determine to make a common cause with us, to take such steps as

will appear to him exigences may require to serve the cause of liberty, and the freedom of the people.

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The projects therefore of a treaty on the basis of Mr. Genet's propositions ought to have been well explored before the first advance.To assent to them, if it would not have been a departure from neutral1 ity, would at least have magnified the suspicion of our faith, without a confidence in which that neutrality must always be insecure: To reject them, was to incur discontent. possibly a breach with our ally. The councils of nations ought to be superior to the passions which drive individuals. Permanent good being the polar star of the former, they will often have to encounter the impetuosity of the latter who substitute occasional feelings for sound policy.

Admitting that the non-establishment of a constitution, and the rapid successions in the administrative bodies, could not weaken an agreement once fixed, even under the pressure of war, there was no probability that the party whose missionary Mr. Genet was, would much longer tread the stage; nor any security that his overtures would equally please those who should rise upon the ruin of his friends. We knew from letters, that as far back as August, 1792, the movers of the Re. volution on the 10th of that month were sooner or later destined to be victims: That in January, 1793, they were conscious of the downfal which awaited them: That in March. 1793, an insurrection was brewing for the destruction of the Gironde ; and that the revolutionary tribunal, vast and unbounded in its domination, had been erected. Was this, then, a season for modifying the political connection;" when we might have drawn hostility upon our heads, by betraying a spirit not impartial, and by taking measures which, amid the fluctuations in the leaders of the French politics, might not have been sanctioned? and what did actually happen? The conduct of the Robespierrian faction was directly the reverse of the Brissotine. The one encouraged, the other abolished private trade. For the evidence of this fact, I refer you to your own knowledge; to the vexations of our commerce; to the decrees which violated our treaty; and to the decree of October, 1793, which took all trade into the hands of government. Nor can I omit the demonstration of a general instability as it was delivered in a late report of the five committees.

Let us be persuaded, and let us proclaim it openly; it is to that "perpetual change that all our evils are owing. Our republican an"nals do not yet include three years, and by the multiplicity of events "twenty centuries appear required to contain them. Revolutions have "followed Revolutions; men, things, events and ideas,-all have "changed: every thing changes yet, and in this continual ebb and "flow of opposite movements, in vain would the government pretend to "that confidence which can only be the result of a steady and wise "conduct and of a constant attachment to principles."

"Commerce necessarily disappeared through this astonishing suc❝cession of contrarieties; and in a country where individuals, inca"pacitated for making any sure calculations, see around them nothing "but a wide prospect of changes.

"Credit is a tender plant, which needs gentle and regular winds, "and cannot grow in a tempestuous clime, or soil, often disturbed.

"It is time we should put a period to the reign of uncertainties, and "fix invariably the principles of justice, equity, and loyalty, which "should be the guides of our conduct. Let us hasten to subject the "internal administration to a regular system: Let us especially take "care that no measure ever gives rise to fears concerning the solidity. "of the mortgage of our assignats.

"When the government, steady in its march, shall have shewn the "real end they aim at; when it shall have rendered an account to it"self and others, of the system it intends to adopt; when the conven"tion, dismissing those unfortunate bickerings which have too often "impeded their progress, shall attend solely to the happiness of the "people; when they shall not cease to reject, with indignation, all measures which can infringe, in the least degree, the principles of "justice and good faith which should direct them;-then all alarms "will be at an end; and the restoration of the finances, of credit, and "of commerce may be undertaken with assurance of success."

Why the subject was not resumed with Mr. Genet, is well known to every body, who has heard of his excesses, and our declaration to the French Republic, that we should expect his successor to be charged with similar powers. His letter of the 30th of September, 1793 written after the application for his recall was announced to him, was prevented by the malady of Philadelphia from being received by this Department until the 5th November, 1793. We were then counting upon a return of the vessel sent to France on that errand. Congress met in December, 1793. Our Minister's letter notifying his recall, came to hand January 14th, 1794 and Mr. Fauchet actually replaced him. on the 21st of February, 1794. Let me observe, however, in passing from Mr. Genet to Mr. Fauchet. that his threat to withdraw the privileges in the decree of March 26th, 1793, and the decree itself, are strong symptoms of the design of the negotiation being more than one merely commercial. For the different altercations between him and Mr. Jefferson, I refer you to the printed correspondence.

Mr. Fauchet demanded the arrest of Mr. Genet for punishment. Our co-operation was refused upon reasons of law and magnanimity. A bill passed, at his instance, for relief of the vessels which had taken refuge in the ports of the United States.

We have advanced money faster than was due; and full as fast as prudence, in respect to our own wants, would permit.

The stoppage of the Camilla, a provision vessel of the French Re public, was the effect of the embargo, which operated equally on all. Our Minister was recalled as he desired. Mr. Fauchet complained of British vessels being suffered to depart during the embargo, with Frenchmen who meant to act against their country in the West Indies. Occasional relaxations of the embargo were made in favor of all nations: French, English, &c. In the particular case complained of, the passports were supposed to be granted to American bottoms: for the humane purpose of returning to the Islands some of the unhappy