"had been forced into it. This may be briefly touched upon as the "path of prudence, with respect to ourselves, and, also, with respect "to France, since we are unable to give her aids of men and money. "To this matter, you cannot be too attentive; and you will be amply "justified in repelling, with firmness any imputation of the most "distant intention to sacrifice our connexion with France to any "connexion with England."

When we expressed a wish to remove all jealousy with respect to Mr. Jay's mission, it could not have been intended to abandon selfdignity, by submitting, to the pleasure or animadversions of France, any part of his instructions, with which France had no concern. A contrary conduct would have been irreconcileable, also, with the independence of the United States, and would have put them in leading strings. It would have been little short of trepidation under a master. 1. A treaty of commerce was, altogether, eventual: it was to be kept out of sight, until the posts and depredations should be so adjusted as to promise a continuance of tranquillity. 2. It was eventual in another sense being to be concluded, or not, according to the degrees of advantage. 3. It was deemed important that Mr. Jay should com'municate, or not communicate, his commercial powers to the British Ministry. 4. Every commercial privilege, which Great Britain should acquire, would devolve on France on like conditions. What would France say, if we were to insist that every embryo of her commercial treaties, every possibility of new commercial arrangements, should be laid before our Government? Certainly this, that no fellowship between the two countries authorizes an expectation that one will throw itself upon the discretion of the other, to mar, or not, its negotiations; and that national honor is an ample guardian of our treaties. Among the numberless disgusts, which nations have entertained against each other, I do not remember that a treaty of commerce, which did not undermine the rights of some party, was ever magnified into complaint by foreigners. Let me cite only two when Portugal, early in this century, surrendered many of her commercial advantages to Great Britain, and France, not ten years ago, contracted a disadvantageous treaty with the same power, who remonstrated but their own subjects and people? If we are told that we ought not to draw our connexion closer with Great Britain, and that France will be jealous, the answer is, that if we can multiply the markets for our great staples; if we can purchase our foreign goods cheaper, by having many manufacturing nations to resort to; or, if even in the maintenance of neutral privileges, we can, by a stipulation, not derogatory from the rights of others, avert vexations; this is a connexion unassailable by any reasonable opposition. The romantic extent to which contrary ideas may be carried, would abolish our trade with every nation, in whose institutions appeared false government, false religion, false morals, false policy, or any other political defect. Your instructions justify you in affirming, that Mr. Jay 'is positively forbidden to weaken the engagements between this country and France.' After vesting a general latitude of powers in him, this case is declar

ed to be an exception and immutable: that, as the British ministry will doubtless be solicitous to detach us from France, and may proba bly make some overture of this kind, you will inform them, that the Government of the United States will not derogate from our treaties and engagements with France.'

You intimate, however, that your instructions amount to an exclusion, from Mr. Jay's mission, of every object, except compensation for plundered property, and restitution of the posts. For a moment, let me entreat you, to call to mind the different topics for negotiation, which were actually before the Senate, at the time of Mr. Jay's nomination, and which were not included in either of these points. Were not Mr. Jefferson's animadversions upon the refusal of Great Britain to enter into a commercial treaty, and his plan for commercial repris als, before you? Would it not have been extraordinary to pass by so fair an opportunity of bringing forward ALL our discontents? Was it not urged as an objection to the measure, that the terms of the nomination were sufficiently broad for any purpose of negotiation? But appeal to the words: You may declare the motives of that negotia tion to be' so and so. These were the motives: for if they had been away, it is probable, that our minister in London would have been directed to pursue his efforts in the ordinary track, as to every thing else. This was the true idea when your instructions were prepared.

We were desirous of repelling any imputation of the most distant intention to sacrifice our connexion with France to any connexion with England.' It was enough to assign the leading motives of Mr. Jay's errand; which were of a nature warranting the assertion that we would not sacrifice the one connexion for the other. Mr. Jay was instructed to this effect: one of the causes of your mission are the vexations and spoliations committed on our commerce, by the authority of instructions from the British Government.' A second cause of your mission, but not inferior in dignity to the preceding, though subsequent in order, is to draw to a conclusion all points of differences between the United States and Great Britain, concerning the treaty of peace.'

It is referred to your discretion, whether, in case the two preceding points should be so accommodated, as to promise the continuance of tranquillity between the United States and Great Britain, the subject of a commercial treaty may not be listened to by you, or even broken to the British ministry. If it should, let these be the general objects.

Your instructions, therefore, were commensurate with fact and propriety.

1st. They were literally true; because the motives were the vexations of our commerce, and the posts.

2d. The declaration of two cardinal propositions does not exclude another, which is subordinate aud eventual.

3d. The confidential proceedings of the United States are not demandable by another nation, except where that nation is injured by them.

4th. Otherwise, every modification of a direct and peremptory challenge of our rights; every compensation, but the downright payment of money; every mode of restitution which was not instantaneous and unqualified ought to have been avoided by Mr. Jay; because they were not stated in your instructions as motives to his mission.

But, 5th. To scout the suspicion of a deception on the French Republic, what manœuvre could have been more paltry, than one which a few months must certainly exhibit in open day? What emotions could the French Republic have shewn, if Mr. Jay's instructions had been inspected by them? Would they have hazarded a hint. that we must have no treaty of commerce with Great Britain? We should have quoted their own example, in having repelled by arms the meddling of other nations in their internal affairs; we should have quoted our own independence, which will not tolerate the control of any human authority. Would they have pronounced a treaty of commerce with Great Britain to be necessarily a contravention of our treaties with France? We should have searched in vain for such a provisionin those treaties. Would they have argued that a treaty of commerce with Great Britain contributed to uphold her warlike operations? Not a syllable in the instruction can be so tortured.

Mercantile advantages to ourselves, and a security for neutral rights, were our aim in a commercial treaty. It remains to be disclosed whether the contents of that treaty are inconsistent with our relation to the belligerent parties. Would the French Republic have requested us to interdict our trade with Great Britain? They could not have been gratified. Rather ought they, as friends, seriously to have reflected on the prejudicial footing of our trade with Great Britain.

The British statesmen have, for many years, been conscious that Great Britain enjoyed an immense harvest from its loose situation. Our own statesmen have incessantly lamented it, and sought a remedy. France was no stranger to our early opinion that the remedy was to be found in a commercial treaty. She was no stranger to the facts already enumerated, as to Mr. Adams's powers; to Mr. Jefferson's report to the commercial propositions in Congress; to the pressure on Mr. Hammond; and to the resentful speeches and motions of every session, predicated on the reluctance of Great Britain to treat with us on commerce. And yet, that France has ever lisped a dissatisfaction on the score of injury, is hidden from me. On the contrary, some who were privy to the French Councils, have endeavored to rivet an odium on Great Britain, because she would not negotiate. 4th, You are, by this time, probably acquainted with the treaty with Great Britain, through the communications of Colonel Trumbull, and must have determined, in your own mind, its probable effect upon the French Republic. Until it shall be ratified, it will be a waste of time, which I can little spare, to comment upon it. If it is ratified or rejected, you shall receive an immediate and copious communication, and more particularly in relation to the 4th inquiry, whether the treaty with Great Britain affords just cause of offence to France. I am the rather in clined to waive this inquiry for the present, in consequence of inform

ation, that the French Minister is concerting an attack on the ratification of the treaty; and that sentiments no less eccentric than fatal to our independence, are to be scattered at random, from a confi dence in the popularity of the French cause.

Be the issue of this business what it may, our government will neither renounce its professions and friendly conduct to the French Republic, nor ascribe to them any intemperateness, which their agent may display. But you ought to put them on their guard. The vicissitudes in their parties have already (if newspapers may be credited) revived the old machinations and malicious stories of Genet. The fuel which his successor may add, from considerations and sources which I may, perhaps, hereafter explain, will receive a direction best calculated to excite a flame. A late letter from him bears every symptom of an inflamed temper. My answer to it, which will accompany this letter, is our refutation. We acknowledge nothing to be undone, on our part, which friendship would dictate, our faculties could accomplish, and our neutrality would permit. If injuries are complained of let us reason together like cordial allies; and compensate where either may have been in fault. But let it be the last blot in the annals of the world, that the United States and France cease to be, what they ought to be, friends, who will endure no separation. I now quit this lengthy subject, and shall, in other despatches, more precisely reply to the different letters which I have lately received from you.

I am, &c.

EDMUND RANDOLPH,

Secretary of State.

No. 60.

Mr. Monroe, to the Secretary of State, dated Paris, June 26, 1795,

[EXTRACT.]

"Since my last, it is reduced to a certainty that the British government has revived its order of the 6th of November, 1793, and commenced, on this side of the Atlantic, the same system of warfare and pillage upon our commerce, that was practised on it by that government at that very calamitous era.

Between thirty and forty sail, destined for the ports of this Republic, charged with provision, have been already taken from their destination, and carried into those of that Island; and, as the period has arrived, when the invitation which the distresses of this country gave to our merchants, here and at home, to embark their fortunes in this supply, is likely to produce its effect, it is more than probable that other vessels, and to great amount, will share the like fate. Among those of our merchants who are here, this measure has created a kind

of panic: for they think they see, in its conseqences, little less than the ruin of their trade, and under which impression, many are about to abandon it for the present, and send their vessels home in ballast.

What effect this measure will produce upon this government, under existing circumstances, I cannot pretend to determine. Formerly it adopted the same measure for the purpose of counteracting its enemy, but the impolicy of that procedure was afterwards discussed and demonstrated, and the measure itself, in consequence, abandoned. At present, the distress of the country is great, and the government will no doubt be mortified to find that, whilst our flag gives no protection to its goods, nor even to our goods destined for the ports of this Republic, the whole of which become the spoil of its enemy, that it does protect not only our goods destined for the English ports, but likewise British goods destined equally for those and the ports of other countries. The measure has obviously excited a kind of ferment in their councils, but which, I presume, will be directed against their enemies only. Be assured, I shall do every thing in my power to give it that direction, and to enforce those arguments which were used upon the former occasion. But should they fail, in producing the desired effect, and a less amicable policy be adopted, which, however, I think, will not be the case, I shall deem it my duty immediately to advise you of it by a vessel (in case none other offers) to be despatched for that purpose.

It will obviously attract your attention, that this measure was so timed by the British cabinet that it might have no influence in the decision of the Senate upon the treaty of Mr. Jay: nor can the motive for such an accommodation be less doubtful for in case it be rejected, they will deem the stroke a lucky one, since thereby they will say they had fortunately gained so much time; and if it be adopted, they will probably presume that so much time will be consumed in convening the Congress, should that measure be deemed expedient, that the course of events here may render it impossible for our efforts to produce a favorable effect, and which consideration, they will likewise infer, will be an argument against convering the Congress. This kind of policy, however, shews not only the profligacy, but the desperation of that government, and will probably precipitate the crisis, which, notwithstanding all its follies and enormities, might yet have been postponed for some time to come.. I think the measure will give new vigor to the French Councils, and will probably bring immediately upon its authors Denmark and Sweden.

Upon this latter point, however, I am authorized to say nothing: for, as I was not instructed to confer with the representatives of those Powers here, I have carefully avoided several conferences that were sought of me by Baron Stahl, from Sweden. soon after his arrival, because I knew nothing could result from them, and was fearful, as I presumed the result would be known to the committee, it might produce an ill effect there."