citizens, the nature of those duties, and the consequences of their violation.

The Minister of France, Mr. Genet, who arrived about this time, by his public declarations, confirmed the idea, that France did not desire us to quit the ground we had taken. His measures, however, were calculated to destroy our neutrality, and to draw us into the

war.

The principles of the proclamation of neutrality, founded on the law of nations, which is the law of the land, were afterwards recognized by the National Legislature, and the observance of them enforced by specific penalties, in the act of Congress, passed the 5th of June, 1794. By these principles and laws, the acts of the Executive, and the decisions of the Courts of the United States, were regulated.

A Government thus fair and upright in its principles, and just and impartial in its conduct, might have confidently hoped to be secure against formal official censure, but the United Statrs have not been so fortunate. The acts of their Government, in its various branches, though pure in principle and impartial in operation, and conformable to their indispensable rights of sovereignty, have been assigned as the cause of the offensive and injurious measures of the French Republic. For proofs of the former, all the acts of the Government may be vouched; while the aspersions so freely uttered by the French ministers, the refusal to hear the minister of the United States, specially charged to enter on amicable discussions on all the topics of complaint, the decrees of the Executive Directory and of their agents, the depredations on our commerce, and the violences against the persons of our citizens, are evidences of the latter. These injuries and depredations will constitute an important subject of your discussions with the Government of the French Republic, and for all these wrongs you will seek redress.

In respect to the depredations on our commerce, the principal objects will be, to agree on an equitable mode of examining and deciding the claims of our citizens, and the manner and periods of making them compensation. As to the first, the 7th article of the British, and the 21st of the Spanish treaty, present approved precedents to be adopted with France. The proposed mode of adjusting those claims, by commissioners appointed on cach side, is so perfectly fair, we cannot imagine that it will be refused. But when the claims are adjusted, if payment in specie cannot be obtained, it may be found necessary to agree, in behalf of our citizens, that they shall accept public securities, payable with interest, at such periods as the state of the French finances shall render practicable. These periods you will endeavor, as far as possible, to shorten.

Not only the recent depredations, under color of the decrees of the Directory, of the 2d of July, 1796, and the 2d of March, 1797, or under the decrees of their agent, or the illegal sentences of their tribunals, but all prior ones, not already satisfactorily adjusted, should be put in this equitable train of settlement. To cancel many or all of the last mentioned claims, might be the effect of the decree of the Execu

tive Directory, of the 2d of March last, reviving the decree of the 9th of May, 1793; but this being an ex post facto regulation, as well as a violation of the treaty between the United States and France, cannot be obligatory on the former. Indeed, the greater part, probably nearly all the captures and confiscations in question, have been committed in direct violation of that treaty, or of the law of nations. But the injuries arising from the capture of enemies property in vessels of the United States, may not be very extensive; and if for such captured property, the French Government will, agreeably to the law of nations, pay the freight and reasonable demurrage, we shall not, on this account, any farther contend. But of ship timber and naval stores, taken and confiscated by the French, they ought to pay the full value, because our citizens continued their traffic in those articles under the faith of the treaty with France.

On these two points we ought to expect that the French government will not refuse to do us justice and the more, because it has not, at any period of the war, expressed its desire that the commercial treaty should in these respects be altered.

Besides the claims of our citizens for depredations on their property, there are many arising from express contracts made with the French government or its agents, or founded on the seizure of their property in French ports. Other claims have arisen from the long detention of a multitude of our vessels in the ports of France. The wrong hereby done to our citizens was acknowledged by the French government, and in some, perhaps in most of the cases, small payments towards indemnifications have been made: the residue still remains to be claimed.

All these just demands of our citizens will merit your attention. The best possible means of compensation must be attempted. These will depend on what you shall discover to be practicable in relation to the French finances. But an exception must be made in respect to debts due to our citizens by the contracts of the French government and its agents, if they are comprehended in any stipulation; and an option reserved to them, jointly or individually, either to accept the means of payment which you shall stipulate, or to resort to the French government, directly, for the fulfilment of its contracts.

Although the reparation for losses sustained by the citizens of the United States, in consequence of irregular or illegal captures or condemnations, or forcible seizures or detentions, is of very high importance, and is to be pressed with the greatest earnestness, yet it is not to be insisted on as an indispensable condition of the proposed treaty. You are not, however, to renounce these claims of our citizens, nor to stipulate that they be assumed by the United States as a loan to the French government.

In respect to the alterations of the commercial treaty with France, in the two cases which have been principal subjects of complaint on her part, viz enemies' property in neutral ships, and the articles contraband of war; although France can have no right to claim the annulling of stipulations at the moment when by both parties they were originally intended to operate; yet, if the French government press for alterations. the President has no difficulty in substituting the princi

ples of the law of nations, as stated in the 17th and 18th articles of our commercial treaty with Great Britain, to those of the 23d and 24th articles of our commercial treaty with France: and in respect to provisions, and other articles not usually deemed contraband, you are to agree only on a temporary compromise, like that in the 18th article of the British treaty, and of the same duration. If, however, in order to satisfy France now she is at war, we change the two important articles before mentioned, then the 14th article of the French treaty, which subjects the property of the neutral nation fonnd on board enemies' ships to capture and condemnation, must of course be abolished.

We have witnessed so many erroneous constructions of the treaty with France, even in its plainest parts, it will be necessary to examine every article critically, for the purpose of preventing, as far as human wisdom can prevent, all future misinterpretations. The kind of documents necessary for the protection of the neutral vessels should be enumerated and minutely described; the cases in which a sea-letter should be required may be specified; the want of a sea-letter should not of itself be a cause of confiscation, where other reasonable proof of property is produced; and where such proof is furnished, the want of a sea-letter should go no further than to save the captor from damages for detaining and bringing in the neutral vessel. The proportion of the vessel's crew which may be foreigners should be agreed on. Perhaps it will be expedient to introduce divers other regulations conformably to the marine laws of France. Whenever these are to operate on the commerce of the United States, our safety requires that, as far as possible, they be fixed by treaty. And it will be desirable to stipulate against any ex post facto law, or regulation, under any pretence whatever.

Great Britain has often claimed a right, and practised upon it, to prohibit neutral nations carrying on a commerce with her enemies which has not been allowed in time of peace. On this head, it will be desirable to come to an explicit understanding with France; and, if possible, to obviate the claim by an express stipulation.

Such extensive depredations have been committed on the commerce of neutrals, and especially of the United States, by the citizens of France, under pretence that her enemies (particularly Great Britain) have done the same things, it will be desirable to have it explicitly stipulated, that the conduct of an enemy towards a neutral Power shall not authorise or excuse the other belligerent Power in any departure from the law of nations or the stipulations of the treaty: especially that the vessels of the neutral nation shall never be captured or detained, or their property confiscated or injured, because bound to or from an enemy's port, except the case of a blockaded port, the entering into which may be prevented according to the known rule of the law of nations. And it may be expedient to define a blockaded place or port to be one actually invested by land or naval forces, or both, and that no declaration of a blockade shall have any effect without such actual investment. And no commercial right whatever should be abandoned which is secured to neutral Powers by the European law of

nations.

The foregoing articles being those which the French government has made the ostensible grounds of its principal complaints, they have naturally been first brought into view. But the proposed alterations and arrangements suggest the propriety of revising all our treaties with France. In such revision, the first object that will attract your attention, is the reciprocal guarantee, in the eleventh article of the treaty of alliance. This guarantee we are perfectly willing to renounce. The guarantee, by France, of the liberty, sovereignty, and independence of the United States, will add nothing to our security; while, on the contrary, our guaranty of the possessions of France in America, will perpetually expose us to the risk and expense of war, or to disputes and questions concerning our national faith.

When Mr. Genet was sent as the minister of the French Republic to the United States, its situation was embarrassed, and the success of its measures problematical. In such circumstances it was natural that France should turn her eye to the mutual guarantee: and accordingly it was required, in Mr. Genet's instructions, to be an essential clause in the new treaty," which he was to propose and on the ground that it nearly concerned the peace and prosperity of the French nation, that a people whose resources increase beyond all calculation, and whom nature had placed so near their rich colonies, should become interested, by their own engagements, in the preservation of those islands." But, at this time, France, powerful by her victories, and secure in her triumphs, may less regard the reciprocal gua rantee with the United States, and be willing to relinquish it.

As a substitute for the reciprocal guarantee may be proposed a mutual renunciation of the same territories and possessions that were subjects of the guarantee and renunciation in the sixth and eleventh articles of the treaty of alliance. Such a renunciation on our part would obviate the reason assigned in the instruction to Mr. Genet before cited, of future danger from the rapidly growing power of the United States. But if France insists on the mutual guarantee, it will be ne cessary to aim at some modification of it. The existing engagement is of that kind which, by writers on the law of nations, is called a general guarantee; of course the casus fœderis can never occur except in a defensive war. The nature of this obligation is understood to be, that when a war really and truly defensive exists, the engaging nation is bound to furnish an effectual and adequate defence, in co-operation with the Power attacked: whence it follows, that the nation may be required, in some circumstances, to bring forward its whole force.

The nature and extent of the succors demandable not being ascertained, engagements of this kind are dangerous on account of their uncertainty there is always hazard of doing too much or too little, and of course of being involved in involuntary rupture.

Specific succors have the advantage of certainty, and are less liable to occasion war. On the other hand, a general guarantee allows a latitude for the exercise of judgment and discretion.

On the part of the United States, instead of troops or ships of war, it will be convenient to stipulate for a moderate sum of money or quan

tity of provisions, at the option of France: The provisions to be delivered at our own ports, in any future defensive wars. The sum of money, or its value in provisions, ought not to exceed two hundred thousand dollars a year, during any such wars. The reciprocal stipulation, on the part of France, may be to furnish annually the like sum of money, or an equivalent in military stores and clothing for troops, at the option of the United States, to be delivered in the ports of France. Particular caution, however, must be used, in discussing this subject, not to admit any claims, on the ground of the guarantee, in relation to the existing war; as we do not allow that the casus fœderis applies to it. And if the war should continue after your arrival in France, and the question of the guarantee should not be mentioned on her part, you may yourselves be silent on the subject, if you deem it most prudent. It will be proper here to notice such articles of the treaty of amity and commerce, between the United States and France, as have been differently construed by the two governments, or which it may be expedient to amend or explain.

Art. 2d. The assent of the United States, in their treaty with Great Britain to the doctrine of the law of nations respecting enemies property in neutral ships, and ship timber and naval stores, and in some cases provisions, as contraband of war, the French Government has chosen to consider as a voluntary grant of favors, in respect to commerce and navigation, to Great Britain, and that consequently the same favors have become common to France. This construction is so foreign from our ideas of the meaning and design of this article; it shows the necessity of reviewing all the articles, and however clear they may appear, of attempting to obviate future misconstructions, by declaratory explanations or a change of terms.

Art. 5th. France has repeatedly contended, that the imposition of fifty per cent. per ton, on French vessels arriving in the United States, is contrary to the fifth article of the treaty. The arguments in support of this pretension are unknown; but it is presumed to be unfounded. The reciprocal right of laying "duties or imposts of what nature soever," equal to those imposed on the most favored nations, and without any other restrictions, seems to be clearly settled by the third and fourth articles. The fifth article appears to have been intended merely to define or qualify the rights of American vessels in France. It is however desirable that the question be understood, and all doubt concerning it removed. But the introduction of a principle of discrimination between the vessels of different foreign nations, and in derogation of the powers of Congress to raise revenue by uniform duties on any objects whatever, cannot be hazarded. The naturalization of French vessels will of course be considered as inadmissible.

Art. 8th. The stipulation of doing us good offices, to secure peace to the United States with the Barbary Powers, has never yet procured us any advantage. If therefore the French Government lays any stress on this stipulation, as authorizing a claim for some other engagement from us in favor of France, it may be abandoned; and