BANKRUPT ACT (continued).

And if a sale be made without any notice to him, his mortgage is not
discharged. Ray v. Norseworthy, 128.

8. What cases are cases in equity within the eighth section of the Bank-
rupt Act, which gives an appeal to the Circuit Court from cases in
equity, and what are not cases for the general supervisory jurisdiction
given in the second section of the act. Stickney v. Wilt, 150.

4. What cases, on the other hand, are not "cases in equity" and capable
of being taken on appeal into the Circuit Court as cases in equity
under the eighth section of the Bankrupt Act, but must be taken
there, if taken at all, under the supervisory jurisdiction given by the
second section of the act. Sandusky v. National Bank, 289.

5. The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to review the action of the Cir-
cuit Court when acting under this general supervisory jurisdiction,
given by the second section of the Bankrupt Act. Ib.

6. The Circuit Court has no jurisdiction under this second section to re-
view a case which is really a case "in equity." Stickney v. Wilt, 150.
7. Neither does an appeal to hear and determine the merits lie to this
court from the action of the Circuit Court, if it undertake to review
such a case; though where a party against whom the District Court
has decreed, has taken into the Circuit Court a case really one in
equity, taken it, as above said, improperly,-and obtained a reversal
of such decree, this court, to prevent injustice, will so far take cogni-
zance of the case as to reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court and
remand the case with directions to dismiss the suit. Ib.

BANKS. See National Banks.

BILL IN EQUITY,

Cannot by colorable allegations be made the means of recovering land
open to an action of ejectment. Lewis v. Cocks, 466.

BOUNDARY. See Alluvion.

Where a survey begins "on the bank of a river" and is carried thence
"to a point in the river," the river-bank being straight and run-
ning according to this line, the tract surveyed is bounded by the river.
It is even more plainly so when it begins at a post "on the bank of
the river, thence north 5 degrees east up the river and binding there-
with." County of St. Clair v. Lovingston, 46.

CAPTURED AND ABANDONED PROPERTY ACT.

A mere factor cannot be considered "owner"—at least not beyond the
extent of his lien, in a proceeding to recover the proceeds in the
treasury of property sold under this act; the act giving to "the
owner” alone a right to recover them. United States v. Villalonga, 85

CHANCERY. See Equity; Laches.

COLLISION. See Anchor-ground; Anchor-watch.

1. In cases of, where there is a great conflict of testimony, the court must
be governed chiefly by undeniable and leading facts, if such exist in
the case. The Great Republic, 20.

COLLISION (continued).

2. A pilot, when he is close to a vessel before him making movements
which are not intelligible to him, ought not, in a case which is in
the least critical, to be governed by his "impressions" of what the
vessel is going to do; but should make and exchange signals, and
ascertain positively her purposed movements and manœuvres. The
Great Republic, 20.

8. A steamer close to the right bank of a broad river-one, ex. gr., half
a mile broad-which means to cross over and land on the left shore, is
not bound, in the first instance, to give three or more whistles, which
is the signal for landing. It is enough that she give two whistles,
which is the signal that she is going to the left. Ib.
4. Constructions not favorable put on the testimony and manœuvres of a
pilot who, it was proved, was "addicted to drinking when ashore,"
and who confessed to having been drinking on the day when his vessel
left port, and within an hour of which time a collision occurred;
though he swore that he had not taken any drink for six hours be-
fore his boat left its dock. Ib.

5. Similar constructions put on the conduct of a captain whose watch it
was, but who, instead of being engaged in a proper place in superin-
tending the navigation of his vessel, was on the lower deck convers-
ing with a passenger. Ib.

6. A large and fast-sailing steamer is bound to act cautiously when over-
taking and getting near to a small and slow one; and a collision
having occurred between two steamers of this sort, a minor fault of
the small and slow steamer was held not to make a case for division
of damages where such fault bore but a little proportion to many
faults of the large and fast one. Ib.

7. When, in a case of collision, it appears that one of the vessels neglected
the usual and proper measures of precaution, the burden is on her to
show that the collision did not occur through her neglect. Ib.

8. A steamer held to be exclusively responsible for a collision with a sail-
ing-vessel; the collision having occurred on a night when the stars
were plainly visible, and when, though a little haze was on the water,
the night was to be called clear; there having apparently been some
want of vigilance in the lookout of the steamer, who did not discern
the sailing-vessel until the steamer was close upon her, at which time
orders, which, as the result proved, tended to bring on a collision,
were given on board the steamer. The Sea-Gull, 165.

9. Two steam vessels, one an iron steamship (an ocean vessel of twenty-five
hundred tons), coming from sea up the Mississippi to New Orleans,
and the other a small river steamer of one hundred and thirty-five
tons, trading up and down the river below New Orleans from planta-
tion to plantation, and carrying passengers, and getting market pro-
duce for the city just named, held, in a case of collision, to be equally
in fault for running at full speed in a very dark and foggy night,
after they had learned by signals from each other of their respective
existences in the river, and while they were in doubt as to what re-
spectively were their courses and manœuvres. The Teutonia, 77.

COLLISION (continued).

10. The rule of navigation prescribed by the act of Congress of April
29th, 1864, "for preventing collisions on the water," which requires
"when sailing-ships are meeting end on, or nearly so, the helms of
both shall be put to port," is obligatory from the time that necessity
for precaution begins, and continues to be applicable so long as the
means and opportunity to avoid the danger remain. The Dexter, 69.
11 In a collision at sea, happening on a bright moonlight night, and
when the approaching vessel was seen by the officer in charge of the
deck long before the collision: Held, that the absence of a lookout
was unimportant, if his presence would have done nothing to avert
the catastrophe. Ib.

COMMERCIAL BROKER. See Internal Revenue, 8.

The "succession tax," imposed by the acts of June 80th, 1864, and July
18th, 1866, on every "devolution of title to any real estate," was not
& "direct tax," within the meaning of the Constitution; but an "im-
post or excise," and was constitutional and valid. Scholey v. Rew, 881.
CONSTRUCTION, RULES OF.

I. AS APPLIED to StatutES OR CONSTITUTIONS.

A badly expressed and apparently contradictory enactment interpreted by
reference to the Journals of Congress, where it appeared that the
peculiar phraseology was the result of an amendment introduced
without due reference to language in the original bill. Blake v. Na-
tional Banks, 308.

II. AS APPLIED TO CONTRACTS.

Where on the sale of a steamboat whose then owners had contracted
various debts in building and furnishing her, some of which debts
were liens on the boat and some not-certain persons, friends of the
purchaser, agreed to "defend and save the said vendor, free and harm-
less of any and all claims and demands that may arise or be brought
against said steamboat,” held, that the expression referred to debts
existing at the date of the sale, and not to debts that might be con-
tracted after it; and meant to protect the owner from all liability
arising from his part-ownership of the boat, irrespectively of the fact
whether the debts were liens on the boat or not.
Prather, 492.

CONTRACT. See Evidence, 2-4; Life Insurance.

Moran et al. v.

When to be interpreted by the light of surrounding circumstances.
ran et al. v. Prather, 492.

COSTS.

Mo-

Where confessedly the title of a party claiming land as owner, and who
has agreed to sell, is denied by the vendee and a dispute has taken
place about title, so that a tender of a deed would be a useless cere-
mony, costs on a bill filed to enforce the payment of the purchase.
money must abide the result of the suit. Lewis v. Hawkins, 119.

COURT OF CLAIMS. See Practice, 11.

CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA. See National Banks, 2.
CUSTOMS OF THE UNITED STATES.

1. The act of May 22d, 1846, enacting that "in all computations at the cus-
tom-house, the franc of France . . . shall be estimated at eighteen
cents and six mills," is repealed by the act of March 3d, 1873, “to
establish the custom-house value of the sovereign or pound sterling of
Great Britain, and to fix the par of exchange." Held, accordingly,
that the Director of the Mint having, in pursuance of the latter act,
estimated the value of the franc of France at nineteen cents and three
mills, and the Secretary of the Treasury having on the 1st of Janu-
ary, 1864, proclaimed it as of that value accordingly, goods invoiced
in French francs and entered in a custom-house here in March of that
year, were to be charged at the new valuation of the franc.
lector v. Richards, 246.

The Col-

2. "Silk ties" are chargeable under the Tariff Act of July 30th, 1864, with
a duty of 50 per cent. ad valorem. Smythe v. Fiske, 374.

DAMAGES. See Liquidated Damages.

A company having coal-mines at a place on the Mississippi, eighty miles
above Cairo, agreed to deliver at the mines a quantity of coal, the
product of the mines, to P. & S., during the year 1870.
There was

no other market at the place for the purchase of coal but that of the
company itself. The company broke its contract. No coal was de-
livered. On suit by P. & S. against the company, for breach of con-
tract, Held,

1st. That the measure of damages (in view of the fact that there was no
market for the purchase of coal at the place of delivery but that of
the company itself) was the price which P. & 8. would have had to
pay for coal of the sort in the quantities in which they were entitled
to receive it from the company under the contract, at the nearest
available market where it could have been obtained. Grand Tower
Company v. Phillips et al., 471.

2d. That the cash value of similar coal, at Cairo, or at points below it on
the Mississippi River, after deducting the contract price of it, and the
cost and expenses of transporting it thither, was not a true measure
of value, and that it was error to allow such value to be shown to the
jury, so long as any more direct method was within reach. Ib.

DECREES IN FORECLOSURE.

This court calls the attention of the Circuit Courts to what was said by
Taney, C.J., in Forgay v. Conrad (6 Howard, 201), as to the care which
ought to be exercised in the preparation of decrees of foreclosure; and
observes that much time of this court and much expense to litigants
will be saved if more attention is given to the form of decrees when
entered. Railroad Company v. Swasey, 406.

DEED. See Feme Covert.

DIRECT TAX. See Constitutional Law.

DISCHARGE OF LIEN. See Bankrupt Act, 1, 2.
DUTIES. See Customs of the United States.

EJECTMENT. See Bill in Equity.

EMINENT DOMAIN

1. The taking of private property in order that a railroad may be made,
belongs to the class of things which in proper cases are to be regarded
as public necessities. Secombe v. Railroad Company, 109.

2. The mode of exercising the right of eminent domain, in the absence of
any provision of organic law prescribing a contrary course, is within
the discretion of the legislature, upon whose power in this respect
there is no limitation if the purpose be a public one, and if just com-
pensation be paid or tendered to the owner for the property taken. Ib.
8. A judgment of condemnation in a matter of eminent domain rendered
by a competent court, charged with a special statutory jurisdiction,
and when all the facts necessary to the exercise of the jurisdiction
are shown to exist, is not subject to impeachment in a collateral pro-
ceeding. Ib.

EQUITY. See Bill in Equity; Costs; Feme Covert; Laches; Vendor's Lien.
In a court of conscience deliberate concealment is equivalent to deliberate
falsehood. When a living man speaks in such a court to enforce a
dead man's contract with himself against parties who he knows are
ignorant of the facts, he must be frank in his statements, unless he is
willing to take the risk of presumptions against him. Crosby v. Bu
chanan, 420.

ESTATE FOR LIFE. See Shelley's Case, Rule in.

ESTOPPEL. See Omnia præsumuntur rite esse acta; Pleading; Practice, 18.
An alien to whom a devise of an interest in real estate has been made,
and who has received its value in proceedings for partition, is estopped
to set up against a demand for a succession tax thereon, that by the
law of the State where the estate is, the devise is absolutely null and
void. Scholey v. Rew, 881.

EVIDENCE.

1. Where there is great contradiction in the testimony in a case (a thing
very common in causes in admiralty for collision), the court must be
governed chiefly by leading and undeniable facts, if any such exist in
the case. The Great Republic, 20.

2. The right of a partner to sign the firm name to a contract of indem-
nity in favor of third persons must be strictly proved; but it need
not necessarily be proved by a written authority to him. Moran et
al. v. Prather, 492.

8. Where a firm, with several persons styling themselves, as a firm in the
case now here indexed did, “creditors of the steamboat .," agreed
to release P. (owner of parts of the boat, the rest being owned by
two other persons)" from all indebtedness due us by the said steam-
boat so far as the said P. is concerned," and where, on P's being
about to sell to C. for a price greatly below its value had it been