afterwards; N. Y. Indians v. United States, 170 U. S. 18, 42 L. 933, 18 S. Ct. 534, holding that treaty passed a present legal title to Indians; Denny v. Dodson, 13 Sawy. 79, 32 Fed. 907, holding congressional grant of odd-numbered sections to railway passed present legal title; Farmers, etc., Co. v. Henning, 8 Fed. Cas. 1047, where Congress donates lands to a State to aid in building railroads, there is a beneficial interest vested; Hutton v. Frisbie, 37 Cal. 497, holding that Congress has power of withdrawing land from pre-emption; Johnson v. Ballou, 28 Mich. 383, holding that grant of land to build railroad, divested title of United States.

Corporations.- Privileges granted to a corporation are to be construed strictly against the corporation and in favor of the public, p. 380.

This well-established principle has been followed in many cases in construing powers of corporations: Holyoke Co. v. Lyman, 15 Wall. 512, 21 L. 137, after manufacturing corporation had constructed dam, paying damages to owners, of fishing rights above, it may be required by legislature to construct a fishway; Leavenworth, etc., R. R. Co. v. United States, 92 U. S. 740, 741, 23 L. 637, 638, construing strictly grant to a State to aid in building railroads; Railway Co. v. Philadelphia, 101 U. S. 540, 25 L. 915 though charter imported a contract, the legislature could raise the license fee; Hannibal, etc., R. Co. v. Packet Co., 125 U. S. 271, 31 L. 736, 8 S. Ct. 880, holding bridge a little short of required length, an unlawful structure; Coosaw Min. Co. v. South Carolina, 144 U. S. 562, 36 L. 542, 12 S. Ct. 691, holding that corporation's exclusive right was limited by the general statute; Goodfellow v. Muckey, 1 McCrary, 243, F. C. 5,537, construing grants and reservations claimed under Indian treaties strictly against grantee; Camblos v. Phila., etc., R. R. Co., 4 Fed. Cas. 1107, holding that absence of limitation in charter did not enable railroad to make unreasonable charges; Nor. Pac. R. Co. v. Sanders, 46 Fed. 247, holding that act did not withdraw lands indicated, until line of road had been definitely fixed by filing a map; Bartholomew v. Austin, 85 Fed. 364, 52 U. S. App. 523, and Rockland Water Co. v. Water Co., 80 Me. 563, 15 Atl. 788, 1 L. R. A. 394, both holding ordinance granting privilege is not exclusive unless so expressed; Swann v. Jenkins, 82 Ala. 482, 2 So. 137, holding act of Congress, granting public land to railroad, did not apply to sections in Alabama within prescribed distance of that part of the road which was in Georgia; Mayor, etc., of Macon v. Cent. R. Co., 50 Ga. 622, holding railroad not exempt from taxation; President, etc., of Kaskaskia v. McClure, 167 Ill. 39, 47 N. E. 77, holding that inhabitants of Kaskaskia are entitled, as riparian owners, to islands formed in Mississippi; Bridge Co. v. Kan. P. R. Co., 12 Kan. 413, construing grant by Congress; Dennis v. Vicks. & S. R. Co., 34 La. Ann. 956, holding railroad not exempt from taxation, until after road was

completed; State v. Helms, 136 Ind. 133, 35 N. E. 897, holding that any subsequent law affecting the remedy, impairs the contract; Kiefer v. German-Amer. Sem., 46 Mich. 640, 10 N. W. 51, holding donation of government for buildings, could be used for general need of the school; Chicago, etc., Ry. v. Pfaender, 23 Minn. 222, holding that exemption from taxation was not a personal privilege, but a conditional grant; Springfield v. Smith, 138 Mo. 655, 60 Am. St. Rep. 574, 40 S. W. 759, 37 L. R. A. 448, holding right of city to exact license will not be denied unless expressly denied; At. & P. R. Co. v. Mingus, 7 N. Mex. 375, 34 Pac. 597, holding that act was not intended to extend time within which company should complete road; New York v. Broadway, etc., R. R. Co., 97 N. Y. 282, holding that city had right to collect highest license paid by the other companies; People v. Newton, 112 N. Y. 407, 19 N. E. 835. 3 L. R. A. 178, and n., construing strictly privileges granted corporation; Turnpike Co. v. Davidson Co., 91 Tenn. 295, 18 S. W. 627, holding that obligation of charter contract is not impaired by creating new roads, etc., tending to divert travel; Richmond v. R. & D. R. Co., 21 Gratt. 614, holding exemption of land of railroad within Richmond, did not conflict with charter giving city power to tax real estate.

Cited also in 67 Am. Dec. 485, note, what powers are conferred by act of incorporation, collecting authorities; dissenting opinion, Nor. Pac. R. Co. v. Barden, 46 Fed. 612, majority holding provision excluding "mineral lands" in grant to railroad, applied only to known' mineral lands.

Distinguished in Black v. Del. & R. Canal Co., 22 N. J. Eq. 402, holding that statute authorizing corporation to lease or transfer its franchise does not require a strict construction.

Miscellaneous.- Miscited in Lowry v Weaver, 4 McLean, 88, F. C. 8,584, and Rahilly v. Wilson, 20 Fed. Cas. 177. Cited in County of Cass v. Morrison, 28 Minn. 261, 9 N. W. 763.

1 Black, 386-414, 17 L. 122, WOODS v. LAWRENCE COUNTY. Municipal corporations.- Under Pennsylvania act of 1853, municipalities of that State were authorized to issue railroad aid bonds, and a majority of the commissioners might make the issue. pp. 407-409.

Cited and principle applied in State v. Tomahawk Com. Council. 96 Wis. 84, 71 N. W. 90, holding valid, provision that issuance of bonds for payment of subscription to stock of railroad may be accepted by signatures of a majority of taxpayers, without an election.

Municipal corporations.- Sale of county bonds by railroad, at a discount, does not avoid them in the hands of purchaser, although charter forbids their sale at less than par value, p. 414.

ANN

Reaffirmed in Mercer Co. v. Hacket, 1 Wall. 96, 17 L. 550, and Richardson v. Lawrence Co., 154 U. S. 536, 17 L. 559, 14 S. Ct. 1157. This principle has been applied by following citing cases: Grand Chute v. Winegar, 15 Wall. 372, 21 L. 174, Miller v. Merlin, 13 Blatchf. 247, F. C. 9,562, Deming v. Houlton, 64 Me. 262, 18 Am. Rep. 258, Ellsworth v. St. L., etc., R. Co., 98 N. Y. 557, 558, and Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Tennessee, 8 Heisk. 788, if corporation had authority to issue bonds, it cannot defend against a bona fide purchaser by showing want of compliance with formalities required by statute, or fraud of its agent; Memphis v. Brown, 1 Flipp. 217, F. C. 9,415, declaring that corporate securities, under seal, payable to bearer, are fully negotiable; Stanton v. Ala., etc., R. Co., 2 Woods, 512, F. C. 13,296, holding that certificates issued by receiver, under authority of court, to borrow money, were not commercial paper; Stanton v. Ala., etc., R. Co., 2 Woods, 527, F. C. 13,297, holding railway bonds are commercial paper, and are binding upon the railroad and the State by reason of its indorsement; Woodward v. Calhoun Co., 30 Fed. Cas. 546, holding first election did not exhaust the power of the board to subscribe; Commrs. v. Rather, 48 Ala. 445, holding that failure of commissioners to assess and collect tax within prescribed time, to pay interest on bonds, did not destroy their power to do so; Commrs. of Roads v. Shorter, 50 Ga. 508, if paper is right upon its face, a purchaser cannot be charged with irregularities in issue of which he has had no notice; New Albany, etc., Plank-Road Co. v. Smith. 23 Ind. 355, holding that corporate bonds, payable to bearer, were negotiable; Leavenworth Co. v. Miller, 7 Kan. 506, 12 Am. Rep. 439. holding that term legislative power," includes power to authorize municipal aid to railroad corporations, collecting authorities and classifying them according to States; County of Beaver v. Armstrong, 44 Pa. St. 69, holding that coupons of railroad bonds are negotiable, and may be sued on separately; Lynchburg v. Slaughter. 75 Va. 60, holding bona fide holder of bonds will not be affected if council has applied proceeds to different purpose. Cited in 64 Am. Dec. 430, note on definition, form and nature of coupons, collecting authorities; 64 Am. Dec. 433, note on failure to designate payee by name, or bearer, or to use negotiable words in coupons as affecting negotiability, collecting cases; 98 Am. Dec. 680, note on municipal bonds, reviewing many cases.

66

Distinguished in Jackson v. Vicksburg, etc., R. Co., 2 Woods. 143. F. C. 7,150, holding that purchaser of stolen bonds holds subject to any defect of title arising from manner in which they were put in circulation.

Municipal corporations.— Under Pennsylvania act of 1853, it was not necessary that a part of the railroad be built in a county before it could grant aid thereto, p. 413.

Miscellaneous.- Miscited in Younger v. State, 2 W. Va. 584, 98 Am. Dec. 795. Form of coupon is cited illustratively in Arents v. Commonwealth, 18 Gratt. 755, 772.

1 Black, 414-419, 17 L. 217, THE SHIP MARCELLUS.

Appeal and error.- To obtain reversal of a judgment in a collision case, founded on issue of fact and affirmed in two courts, appellant must show some error in court below; raising a doubt founded on the number or credibility of witnesses, is insufficient, p. 417.

Cited and principle applied in The Grace Girdler, 7 Wall. 204, 19 L. 117, refusing to reverse, because of difference of opinion as to weight of evidence, where both District and Circuit Courts have agreed; as also in The Juniata, 93 U. S. 339, 23 L. 931, The Richmond, 103 U. S. 543, 26 L. 451, Stuart v. Hayden, 169 U. S. 14, 42 L. 643, 18 S. Ct. 278, and Baker v. Smith, 1 Holmes, 85, F. C. 781, holding likewise; Ayer v. The Steamer Glaucus, 4 Cliff. 168, F. C 683, holding that facts as well as law are open to revision in the Circuit Court; The Oregon, 55 Fed. 673, 6 U. S. App. 581, reviewing the evidence; The Coquitlam, 77 Fed. 748, 48 U. S. App. 111, holding act of 1875, relieving Supreme Court of necessity of deciding questions of fact on appeals in admiralty, does not apply to the Circuit Court of Appeals.

1 Black, 419-426, 17 L. 93, CLEVELAND v. CHAMBERLAIN.

Appeal and error.- Where it is shown by affidavits that appellant has become the sole party in interest on both sides, and continues appeal in order to obtain a decision affecting third parties, appeal will be dismissed, p. 426.

Cited and principle applied in Dakota Co. v. Glidden, 113 U. S. 226. 28 L. 982, 5 S. Ct. 430, holding that a compromise, whereby a new agreement is substituted, extinguishes the cause of action, and leaves nothing for the exercise of appellate jurisdiction; Amer. Wood Paper Co. v. Heft, 131 U. S. xciii, appx., 19 L. 379, permitting a third party to intervene and show by affidavits that further prose cution of suit is collusive; Meyer v. Pritchard, 131 U. S. ccix, appx.. 23 L. 961, dismissing suit where letters-patent were surrendered after appeal; Little v. Bowers, 134 U. S. 557, 33 L. 1020, 10 S. Ct. 623, and California v. San Pablo, etc., R. Co., 149 U. S. 314, 37 L. 749, 13 S. Ct. 878, dismissing writ where municipal tax was paid pending appeal; South Spring Gold Co. v. Amador Gold Co., 145 U. S. 301, 36 L. 712, 12 S. Ct. 921, remanding cause for further pro ceedings; Mills v. Green, 159 U. S. 654, 40 L. 294, 16 S. Ct. 133, dis missing appeal where, during its pendency, an event occurs rendering relief impossible; Harp v. Inv. & Const. Co., 33 S. E. 1001 (Ga.), where suit for administering assets of an insolvent cor

poration became vested in receiver alone, a creditor could sue to subject its equitable assets to his debts; Allen v. Georgia, 166 U. S. 140, 41 L. 950, 17 S. Ct. 526, upholding action of court in dismissing writ of error sued out by party convicted, who has escaped; American M. P. Co. v. Vail, 15 Blatchf. 318, F. C. 308, where, after motion for preliminary injunction had been heard, but not decided, defendants withdraw their opposition, the court granted the injunction; Weaver v. Kelly, 92 Fed. 421, dismissing suit where a defendant purchased plaintiff's interest; People v. Pratt, 30 Cal. 225, refusing to decide question not presented in good faith; In re Burdick, 162 Ill. 53, 44 N. E. 414, and Haley v. Eureka Co. Bk., 21 Nev. 136, 26 Pac. 66, 12 L. R. A. 818, and n., both holding that collusive suit may be dismissed at instance of a party or person in interest, or by the court; State v. McCullough, 20 Nev. 157, 18 Pac. 757, dismissing fictitious controversy as to appointment of a warden of State prison; Ward v. Alsup, 100 Tenn. 740, 743, 46 S. W. 574, 575, holding suit will be dismissed if plaintiff's object is not for relief, but to obtain a decision that will affect third persons litigating same question in another court; Franklin v. Peers, 95 Va. 604, 29 S. E. 321, holding that where controversy is ended, appeal will be dismissed; Smith v. Junction Ry. Co., 29 Ind. 551, receiving affidavits of third parties interested, in support of motion to dismiss appeal, because there is no real controversy. Cited but not applied, in O'Connor v. Irvine, 74 Cal. 441, 16 Pac. 238.

Distinguished in Loan & T. Co. v. G., etc., R. Co., 10 Biss. 215, 6 Fed. 112, it cannot concern bondholders how service of process on a railroad is obtained; State v. Philips, 97 Mo. 338, 10 S. W. 857, 3 L. R. A. 479, and n., holding defendant, pending appeal, could not abate action by cancelling tax bills, plaintiffs having prosecuted suit in interest of other persons similarly situated for the purpose of obtaining an adjudication upon the legality of the tax bills.

1 Black, 427-431, 17 L. 168, VANCE v. CAMPBELL.

Patent.- Inventor, suing for an infringement of patent on a com bination; cannot charge infringement of part of his combination; the combination is an entirety; if one element is given up, the whole of the invention fails, p. 429.

This rule has been followed in Gould v. Rees, 15 Wall. 194, 21 L. 41, holding that introduction of a newly-discovered element, or one not known to be an equivalent, would not constitute an infringement; Gill v. Wells, 22 Wall. 25, 26, 31, 22 L. 710, 711, 712, and Herring v. Nelson, 14 Blatchf. 297, 303, 304, F. C. 6,424, both holding reissue invalid, where an element of original patent was omitted; Reedy v. Scott, 23 Wall. 367, 23 L. 111, supporting cited case; Dunbar v. Myers, 94 U. S. 202, 24 L. 40, holding, where party omits one of the ingredients of the combination, he does not infringe the patent; as also in Fuller v. Yentzer, 94 U. S. 297, 24 L.