son. He must have known that, under the cir- | transferee's obligation to pay it when due. Incumstances, equity would coerce the respond- deed, we doubt, without intending ourselves to ents to pay the amount done upon the certi- be finally concluded on the point, as it has not ficate, as the condition upon which they been so decided by the courts of Illinois, if, could ever get the sheriff's title to the under the law of Illinois giving to a debtor land. Moreover, he knew that there were the right to redeem his land sold under executhen persons offering to buy the land, tion, if even an agreement had been made beat a larger sum than the certificate called for, tween these parties, which did make the right amply securing his principal, Mr. Stuart, and to redeem conditional upon the payment of a himself and his partner, from all loss. And, consideration in money, after the time to refurther, he might have concluded that any one deem had passed, and that, if not then paid, purchasing, either from Mr. Stuart or Mr. that the creditor should have the right to exAdams, with a full knowledge of all the cir- clude the debtor from doing so, whether a cumstances of the transaction before he bought, court of equity, if called upon to adjust the could not acquire any right in himself, by the rights of the parties under such a contract, purchase, to defeat the previous. equity which would not, in consideration of the intentions of had been obtained by the representatives of the the legislature in giving to debtors the right to judgment debtor, in the exercise of their legal redeem, feel itself bound to dispose of the case, right to redeem the land from the operation of by making the debtor pay the amount due, the certificate of sale. The evidence also shows with interest, and all costs which might have that the complainant, Mr. Laflin, knew all of accrued in the litigation. the particulars of the judgment; the subsequent proceedings upon it; the sale of the property to satisfy it; how the certificate of sale had been given by the sheriff, and to whom, and for what purpose; the subsequent assignment of it to A. M. Herrington, in behalf of himself and his father's family; the agency of his counsel, Mr. Burgess, in the whole affair; and the course of Mr. Stuart and Mr. Adams, in respect to it, when the former conveyed to the complainant his interest in the land. But how, in addition to what has been said of the disability of Mr. Stuart to convey, at the time it was done, any right to the land to the complainant, and the latter's inability to obtain any such right, in consequence of his knowledge of the circumstances, when [*335 he took Stuart's conveyance, there were incidents in this affair, happening subsequently to the assignment of the certificate to Herrington, produced by the course taken by the complainant and his counsel, Mr. Burgess, and by Mr. Adams and Mr. Smith, who now appears for the first time in this business, which are certainly not calculated to strengthen the complainant's claim to the certificate of sale against the better equity of the respondents. In our opinion, there never was, either by Mr. Stuart or Mr. Adams, or by their counsel, any effective disaffirmance of the assignment of the certificate to Mr. Herrington; and if either of them meant to do so, we think that no act of theirs, either separately or conjointly, The course taken by the complainant to get could, under all the circumstances, have de- the ownership of the land was to buy it from feated, in favor of Mr. Laflin, the previous Mr. Stuart, expecting, if he succeeded in doing equity to the land, which had been acquired so, that Mr. Adams, having no interest or claim by the respondents. Laflin stands in no better upon it, would, as Stuart's agent, transfer to condition than Mr. Stuart did, when his equity him the certificate of sale which the sheriff in the certificate had been conveyed to others made in his name only, as he says in his tesby those who represented him, for a consid- timony, for the benefit of Stuart. The case, eration, which they chose to retain, with his however, shows that Mr. Adams would not or knowledge, if not strictly with his consent, in did not do so, and that he assumed, in eight 334*] *expectation of its payment, until after days afterwards, and when he knew that his the time when the right of the assignees of it to principal had conveyed to Laflin, to be the ownredeem the land had passed. The latter, by that er of the certificate, and conveyed the same course, might well have supposed, and as they land to Julius C. Smith, authorizing him to redid think, that they had an equity in the cerceive a deed for it, in his own name and to his tificate, not liable to be annulled at the pleasure of those from whom they had acquired it, upon the plea that there had been a failure to pay the money on the day stipulated, and that its non-payment at that time, of itself, revested Mr. Stuart with the original, but contingent equities to the land, which the purchase of it, at sheriff's sale, had given to the judgment creditor. The non-redemption of the land would have made Mr. Stuart's right absolute, upon the expiration of the time allowed; but having made the certificate of sale the subject of speculation and sale before that day, with a postponement for the payment of the consideration of the transfer for a longer time, neither Mr. Stuart nor Mr. Adams, as his agent, can, with any propriety, be considered as having had a right to retain, at the same time, both Mr. Stuart's claims upon the land, if the money should not be punctually paid, and also their own use, from the sheriff, in virtue of the certificate of sale, and then remitted himself to Mr. Stuart $1,600, the consideration which Laflin was to have paid Mr. Stuart, but which had not been done, though said in the deed that it had been. Now, there are certain facts in connection with Stuart's deed to Laflin and Adams' to Smith, which must be mentioned, and particularly so, as they are mostly derived from the testimony of Mr. Adams: 1. Mr. Burgess acted as the agent of Walter Laflin, the complainant, in the negotiation between Smith and Laflin, for the purchase of the property, and for the procurement of the deed from Stuart to Laflin. "Do not recollect who informed him so, but thinks it was Mr. Burgess." 2. The deed from Mr. Adams to Smith was executed, the latter being acquainted with the dispute that had arisen concerning the property, | have been just mentioned and, of course, beand with the circumstances attending the transfer of the certificate to the Herringtons. fore the letter of the 23d of October was writ ten to Herrington. Further, we find in the record proof of his representation of Laflin and Smith, and with their consent at the same time, in the fact that after Smith's suit had been al lowed to stand for six weeks, that Smith consented to give a quitclaim deed for the land to Laflin, for which the latter was to pay $30,000, and that the litigation between Smith and Herrington was immedately transferred to Laflin, under the professional direction of Mr. Burgess. All the foregoing facts, in connection with the evidence that this land had then become very valuable, convince us that there was a combination to deprive the Herringtons of their equity in it, by using the fact of the note of A. M. Herrington not being paid at its maturity as a pretense for doing so. Mr. Allen, engaged in the real estate business, says that he knew the land; that he knew it as the property contested between Matthew Laflin and Herrington's heirs, and thirteen acres of it, running from State street to the lake, comprising what was known as the Herrington tract; that it had seven fronts-one on State street, two on Wabash avenue, two on Michigan avenue, and two on Indiana; he thinks that in each front there was about six hundred feet, and that its value in March, 1856, was $125 per front foot. *That may have been an exaggerated [*338 3. Smith knew when Adams made his deed, 336*] and when he *accepted it, that Adams was only the agent of Stuart; that he had nothing in the land to convey; that the certificate of sale, which he was then professing to sell him, had been issued to him only as the agent and for the benefit of Stuart; that it had been already assigned, with his signature, to A. M. Herrington, and when the deed was made to Smith, on the 9th of October, that both himself and Adams were then aware of the fact of Stuart having sold his interest in the land to Laflin on the first of the same month. The title to the land, then, as between Stuart, Laflin, Adams and Smith, stood thus: that the second had the first title to it, and the latter, that of Mr. Adams, the agent of Stuart, who had not at the time any property in the land, or any delegated authority from Stuart to convey it to Smith. We know not what were the inducements of Mr. Adams to make a transfer, under such circumstances, to Smith; but when he gave his testimony in this case, it would have been better for all parties concerned if he had given a full explanation of the transaction. It was, however, not done. But Smith accepted the conveyance, and brought a suit against Augustus M. Herrington and others for the property; and he states in his bill, that William H. Ad-estimation; but whether so or not, it serves to ams, for a valuable consideration paid, and agreed to be paid, had assigned the certificate to him. His suit was filed two days after the date of the conveyance to him. Thus matters stood until the 20th of November of the same year, just one month, when he conveys the property to Walter Laflin, the complainant, for the sum of $30,000 for which he had agreed to give $1,600, the exact sum which Adams remitted to Stuart when he conveyed to Smith. Our object in giving the narrative of the transfers of this land has not been to ascertain whether all of the persons who have been mentioned were in combination to devest the Herringtons of their equity in it, but to show the fact that there was such a combination for speculation, which a court of equity will not countenance. The conveyances to Laflin and Smith were made by Mr. Stuart and Mr. Adams before the letter of the 23d of October, 1856, was written to A. M. Herrington by Farnsworth and Burgess, letting him know that Mr. Stuart 337*] *had refused to ratify their arrangement for the transfer to him of the certificate of sale. Mr. Smith's suit was also brought before that letter was written. Mr. Burgess had negotiated the sale from Stuart to Laflin on the first of October, and in that letter, of the 23d of the month, calls the land, for the first time, the Laflin property. show, especially as it was not controverted as to the amount, that all the persons concerned in defeating the equity of the Herringtonsand they were also dealers in land-were in combination to effect that object for a speculation, and that Mr. Burgess gave to them his professional services to accomplish it. Now, it is not meant by us, that the buying of land, with the expectation of selling it at an advance in price, is wrong of itself, any more than that the purchase of merchandise is so, when made by the anticipation of its rise by the happening of political events, or by foresight of what will be the demand for consumption at a future day, and a deficiency of supply; but the difference between them is, that the latter is a triumph of sagacity, which gives life and energy to all trade; but that to buy land for speculation, upon a combination to devest the right of another to it, is a contrivance to fulfill the designs of selfishness. We have given the facts of this case plainly, in connection with the assignment of the certificate of sale to Herrington; and the subsequent attempts which were made to devest his interest and that of his family in it, and necessarily with the names of all the persons concerned in them. That of Mr. Burgess occurs frequently, under circumstances that call for a further remark. We do not mean it to be inMr. Burgess also knew that Adams' transfer ferred, from any thing that has been said, that, to Smith was executed on the 9th, and, as early in the combination to make the speculation out as the lith, he became the counsel of Smith in of the property, he had any prospective pethe suit against the Herringtons, notwithstand-cuniary expectation or interest in its results. ing he had before bought the property for Laf- There is no evidence of that in the record, and lin, then being at the same time the counsel of there is that he advocated zealously the causes Laflin and Smith, in respect to land for which of his new clients-perhaps from temperament they had to all appearance antagonist claims, of character, perhaps from resentment to the which was acquired through his agency, his sit- Herringtons for the non-payment of the note uation as to each of those persons being known at its maturity, which A. M. Herrington had to Adams when the incidents occurred which given to Farnsworth and himself for the certifi cate of sale; but, be that as it may, we think, We ought to have said, also, that there was no error in receiving the letter of Mr. Stuart to Farnsworth and Burgess as evidence, complaining of their want of fidelity as his lawyers. It was not confidential, or meant to be so, in the sense of its having any connection with the merits of the case, for Mr. Stuart had authorized it to be communicated to another lawyer, for the purpose of obtaining from Farnsworth and Burgess an immediate settlement of the debt. Judgment affirmed. JAS. SINGLETON et al., Plffs. in Err., v. GUSTAVE TOUCHARD. (See S. C. 1 Black, 342-345.) be correct, the verdict rendered for the plaint below was correct, and the judgment of t court thereon must be affirmed. The plaintiff in ejectment claimed under patent from the United States; the defendan under a claim confirmed by the District Cour on which an appeal had been entered by t Attorney General. This claim had not be surveyed; its boundaries were not officially a certained, nor had any patent been issued for The court instructed the jury, "that in the a tion of ejectment the legal title must prevai that the plaintiff had a legal title by his paten and the defendants', if any, was but an inchoa and equitable title, which might avail in a cou of chancery, but it could not avail the defen ants in action of ejectment.' This instruction was in exact accordance wit numerous decisions of this court (see [*34 Greer v. Mezes, 24 How. 268), and justified th verdict, even if there had been error in the othe instructions given. There is another and important question i It relates to the nature of the title the case. a pueblo to its common or pasture lands, an whether, under the laws and customs of Spai and Mexico, the government of the Colony coul make valid sales within the boundaries of th common so claimed. This question is now for the first time pr sented to this court. The defendants in err have filed their brief, containing an elaborat argument; but the plaintiffs in error have no furnished us any. As it is not necessary to ou In ejectment, legal title must prevail. Equita- judgment of affirmance of this case, to give an ble title, not a defense. Where the plaintiff in ejectment claimed under a patent from the United States; and the defendant, under a claim confirmed by the District Court, on which an appeal had been entered by the Attorney General, but which had not been surveyed, nor any patent issued; the instruction to the jury, that "in the action of ejectment, the legal title must prevail; that the plaintiff had a legal title by his patent, and the defendant's, if any, was but an inchoate and equitable title, which could not avail the defendant in action of ejectment," was correct. Submitted Dec. 11, 1861. Decided Jan. 6, 1862. N ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United fornia. opinion on this point, we decline any examina tion of the question on an ex parte argument. We may give, as an additional reason for thi course, that the question depends on the loca law, and on the history and customs of the Me ican Government and the Governors of Califo nia. And since the appeal in this case, it seem to have been adjudged by the local tribunal See Hart v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 544; and Brow v. San Francisco, 16 Cal. 452. This decision of a question of local law b these domestic tribunals may well have bee considered by the plaintiffs in error as a suf argument here. Judgment of the District Court affirmed. This action was commenced in the court below, by Touchard, present defendant in error, to recover a certain tract of land in Santa Clara County, California, known as Yerba Buena JOHN P. INGLE, Executor of Ann R. Dermot Rancho. The trial resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant brought the case to this court. The pleadings and evidence were voluminous, but the point on which the case turned is stated by the court. Mr. M. Blair, for plaintiffs in error. Messrs. E. M. Stanton, Henry McCrea, Henry Wilkins and H. P. Hepburn, for defendant in error. Mr. Justice Grier delivered the opinion of the court: There were two several instructions given by the court below to the jury. If either of them NOTE. What title or interest will support the action of ejectment--see note, 18 L. R. A. 781. Deceased, Piff. in Err., v. CHAS. S. WALLACH. (See S. C. 1 Black, 96-98.) Plaintiffs in replevin-traverse of property i plaintiff-evidence under-what a mistric -omission of similiter omission cure after verdict. The plea of property in replevin, is a good plea i bar of the action. NOTE.-Replevin picas of property in defendan or a stranger, and of noncepit. In replevin, the defendant may plead propert lach, supra; Hall v. Henline, 9 Ind. 256; Edward either in himself or a stranger. Dermott v. Wa v. McCurdy, 13 Ill. 496; Ingraham v. Hammond, Hill, 353; Dover v. Rawlings, 2 M. & Rob. 544. Plea of property in a stranger must name him Anstice v. Holmes, 3 Den. 244. The form is, to plead property in the defendant or in a stranger, traversing property, in the plaintiff, which traverse raises the material issue to be tried; the averment of property in the defendant or a stranger being by way of inducement. Either plea constitutes a good defense, because It shows property out of the plaintiff; and prima facie, therefore, he is not in condition to maintain the action. Under the plea, that the goods and chattels in the declaration mentioned are not the property of the said plaintiff. it is competent for the defendant to prove property in himself, or in a stranger. Where the record shows that the plea of property has not been tried or found by the jury. there has been a mistrial below, for which the judgment must be reversed, and the case sent down and a new renire ordered. The similiter to the plea of property, is now regarded as matter of form, and its omission does not affect its validity. The omission to join issue upon a second avowry, or to notice it in the finding of the jury or in the judgment of the court, is cured after verdict. Argued Dec. 19, 1861. Decided Jan. 6, 1862. N ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of th The case is stated by the court. The jury found a special verdict, that no rent was due or in arrear upon the issue joined on the first avowry, and assessed the damages; and judgment was given that the plaintiff recover the goods and chattels, and have a return of the same, etc. No notice is taken in the verdict or judgment of the plea of property. The plea of property in replevin is a good plea in bar of the action. It is true, the plea in this case is not in due form, and might have been held defective on demurrer; but it is good in substance. The form is to plead property in the defendant, or in a stranger, traversing property in the plaintiff, which traverse raises the material issue to be tried-the averment of property in the defendant or a stranger being by way of inducement. Either plea constitutes a good defense, because it shows property [*98 out of the plaintiff; and prima facie, therefore, he is not in condition to maintain the action. 12 Wend. 30, 34, 35. The plea in this case avers the fact directly, by stating that the goods and chattels in the declaration mentioned are not the property of Mr. R. J. Brent, for plaintiff in error. S. Cox, for defendant in error. Mr. Justice Nelson delivered the opinion of the court: This is a writ of error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Columbia. The action was replevin, brought by the plain tiff below, Wallach, against the defendant, for taking certain goods and chattels of the plaintiff from a house called the Avenue House, situated in the City of Washington. The defendant pleaded: 1. That the goods and chattels in the declaration mentioned were not the property of the plaintiff. 2. Avowed the taking, by way of distress, for rent due and in arrear, under special circumstances stated, concluding with a verification. 3. Like avowal for rent due and in arrear generally. The plaintiff replied to the first avowry, no rent in arrear and unpaid. No notice is taken in the pleadings of the second avowry. This latter plea is good either in abatement or har, and the party is entitled to a return without avowry. 2 Lev. 92; 1 Salk. 94; Harrison v. McIntosh, 1 Johns. 380; Marsh v. Pier, 4 Rawle, 283; Rogers v. Arnold, 12 Wend. 36. Defendant must, in plea of property, whether in bimself or another, traverse plaintiff's right to possession. Rogers v. Arnold, 12 Wend. 30; Prosser V. Woodward, 21 Wend. 205; Curtis v. Jones, 1 How. App. Cas. 137; 3 Den. 590; Pringle v. Phillips, 1 Sand. 292. Plea of property in one of several plaintiffs and Hill & D. 426. a stranger is good. Under such a plea, the defendant may show legal title to the property, no matter how it was derived. O'Connor v. Union Line, &c., Co. 31 III. 230. Plea of property puts plaintiff upon proof of his right to the property. McIlvaine v. Holland, 5 Harr. 10. Upon plea of property, if each succeeds in part, each is entitled to costs. Field v. Post, 38 Ñ. J. Law, 346. The substantial matter upon the plea of property at issue is the plaintiff's right to the property and his right of possession. Upon the issue the plaintiff holds the affirmative and must sustain his rights or fail in the action. Pope v. Jackson, 65 Me. 162; Atkins v. Byrnes, 71 Ill. 326; Peake v. Conlan, 43 Iowa, 297 Reynolds v. McCormick, 62 III. 412; Kennedy v. Clayton, 29 Ark. 270. Unless property in the defendant is pleaded, f: cannot be given in evidence. Dickson v. Mathers, Hemp. 65: Whitwell v. Wells, 24 Pick. 25; Dover v. Rawlins, 2 M. & Rob. 544. petent for the defendant to have proved property in herself, or in a stranger, as this would have tended directly to support the issue; and if the defendant had sustained her plea, and proved property out of the plaintiff, she would have been entitled to a return of the goods and chattels without an avowry, as it would appear the plaintiff, at the time, had no right to take or detain them. As this plea of property is a good bar to the action, and as the record shows it has not been tried or found by the jury, there has been a mistrial below, for which the judgment must be reversed, and the case sent down, and a new venire ordered. There is a good bar to the action remaining untried, and not yet found for the plaintiff, and hence he is not entitled to the judgment rendered in his behalf in the court below. It appears that the similiter was not added to the plea of property; but this is now regarded Property in defendant or a stranger may be pleaded with non cepit, and defendant may have a judgment on either issue. Cooper v. Bakeman, 32 Me. 192; Cummings v. Gann, 52 Pa. St. 484; Smith v. Morgan, 8 Gill. 133; Sprague v. Kneeland, 12 Wend. 161. It The general issue in replevin is, unless otherwise by statute, non cepit, which puts at issue merely the taking and detention. It is a plea in bar. admits the property in the plaintiff, and there can be no judgment for defendant for damages, nor for a return to him under it. 1 Chitty on Pleading, 490, 1 Str. 507; Seymour v. Billings, 12 Wend. 286; McFarland v. Barker, 1 Mass. 153; Smith v. Snyder, 15 Wend. 324; Ely v. Ehle, 3 N. Y. 506; 1 Addison on Torts (Wood's ed.) 829; Vose v. Harris, 12 Ill. 378; Rowland v. Mann, 6 Ired, 38; Carrol v. Hart, 19 Ark. 237; Bourk v. Riggs, 38 III. 320; Vickery v. Sherburne, 20 Me. 34; Harper v. Baker, 3 T. B. Mon. 421. If the taking is established, it follows from the admission of property in plaintiff that it was wrongful. Van Namee v. Bradley, 69 Ill. 299; Hopkins v. Burney, 2 Fla. 42. Where the general issue is "not guilty," every material fact is put in issue, including the question of property in plaintiff, and under it defendant may show property in himself. Dillingham v. Smith, 30 Me. 370; Heeron v. Beckwith, 1 Wis. 17: Scudder v. Worster, 11 Cush. 573; Gibson v. Mozier, 9 Mo. 256; Ashby v. West, 3 Ind. 170; Loomis v. Foster, 1 Mich. 165; Child v. Child, 13 Wis. 17. The plaintiff in ejectment claimed under a patent from the United States; the defendants under a claim confirmed by the District Court, on which an appeal had been entered by the Attorney General. This claim had not been surveyed; its boundaries were not officially as certained, nor had any patent been issued for it. cate of sale; but, be that as it may, we think, | be correct, the verdict rendered for the plaintiff considering what had been the relations be- below was correct, and the judgment of the tween himself and partner with A. M. Herring- court thereon must be affirmed. ton in this matter, in appearing in court against him and his family for others in the same business, that he was not sufficiently mindful of the restraints imposed, by prudence, upon lawyers in making engagements with their 339] clients, which cannot be disregarded without subjecting them to misconception and suspicion, and the profession to the already too prevalent impression that it is not practiced with all the forbearance of the strictest honesty, or of the highest moral principle. With these views, we shall direct the judgment of the court below to be affirmed. We ought to have said, also, that there was no error in receiving the letter of Mr. Stuart to Farnsworth and Burgess as evidence, complaining of their want of fidelity as his lawyers. It was not confidential, or meant to be so, in the sense of its having any connection with the merits of the case, for Mr. Stuart had authorized it to be communicated to another lawyer, for the purpose of obtaining from Farnsworth and Burgess an immediate settlement of the debt. Judgment affirmed. JAS. SINGLETON et al., Piffs. in Err., v. GUSTAVE TOUCHARD. (See S. C. 1 Black, 342-345.) The court instructed the jury, "that in the action of ejectment the legal title must prevail; that the plaintiff had a legal title by his patent, and the defendants', if any, was but an inchoate and equitable title, which might avail in a court of chancery, but it could not avail the defendants in action of ejectment." This instruction was in exact accordance with numerous decisions of this court (see [*345 Greer v. Mezes, 24 How. 268), and justified the verdict, even if there had been error in the other instructions given. There is another and important question in the case. It relates to the nature of the title of a pueblo to its common or pasture lands, and whether, under the laws and customs of Spain and Mexico, the government of the Colony could make valid sales within the boundaries of the common so claimed. This question is now for the first time presented to this court. The defendants in error have filed their brief, containing an elaborate argument; but the plaintiffs in error have not furnished us any. As it is not necessary to our In ejectment, legal title must prevail. Equita- judgment of affirmance of this case, to give any ble titie, not a defense. Where the plaintiff in ejectment claimed under a patent from the United States; and the defendant, under a claim confirmed by the District Court, on which an appeal had been entered by the Attorney General, but which had not been surveyed, nor any patent issued; the instruction to the jury, that "in the action of ejectment, the legal title must prevail; that the plaintiff had a legal title by his patent, and the defendant's, if any, was but an inchoate and equitable title, which could not avail the defendant in action of ejectment," was correct. Submitted Dec. 11, 1861. Decided Jan. 6, 1862. N ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United I fornia. opinion on this point, we decline any examination of the question on an ex parte argument. We may give, as an additional reason for this course, that the question depends on the local law, and on the history and customs of the Mexican Government and the Governors of California. And since the appeal in this case, it seems to have been adjudged by the local tribunals. See Hart v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 544; and Brown v. San Francisco, 16 Cal. 452. This decision of a question of local law by these domestic tribunals may well have been considered by the plaintiffs in error as a suffireason for their case without argument here. Judgment of the District Court affirmed. This action was commenced in the court below, by Touchard, present defendant in error, to recover a certain tract of land in Santa Clara County, California, known as Yerba Buena JOHN P. INGLE, Executor of Ann R. Dermott, Rancho. The trial resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant brought the case to this court. The pleadings and evidence were voluminous, but the point on which the case turned is stated by the court. Mr. M. Blair, for plaintiffs in error. Mr. Justice Grier delivered the opinion of the court: There were two several instructions given by the court below to the jury. If either of them NOTE. What title or interest will support the action of ejectment--see note, 18 L. R. A. 781. Deceased, Piff. in Err., v. CHAS. S. WALLACH. (See S. C. 1 Black, 96-98.) Plaintiffs in replevin-traverse of property in The plea of property in replevin, is a good plea in bar of the action. NOTE.-Replevin pleas of property in defendant or a stranger, and of noncepit. In replevin, the defendant may plead property lach, supra; Hall v. Henline, 9 Ind. 256; Edwards either in himself or a stranger. Dermott v. Wal v. McCurdy, 13 III. 496; Ingraham v. Hammond, 1 |