er said coupons became due, and before suit | brought, payment thereof was demanded of defendant and refused. The petitioners asked judgment. There was an answer filed and an amended answer, the substance of which is: The plaintiff's ought not to have and maintain their action, because defendant is a municipal corporation, created by and having the power and authority set forth in the Act of the General Assembly of the State of Iowa, approved Feb. 1, 1851, entitled, "An Act to Incorporate the City of Muscatine," a copy of which is made part of said answer. And because, in said Act, no authority is given to the City of Muscatine, to "borrow money for a term of years not exceeding twenty, on the bonds of the City, at a rate of interest, not higher than ten per cent. per annum, the sum of $130,000 to be subscribed as stock in the name of the City to the capital stock" of the Mississippi & Missouri Railroad Company. That said City has no authority to assist in building railroads, or to take stock in the same, nor to issue the bonds of the City to pay for stock in the same, nor to pass ordinances authorizing the issuing of bonds or borrowing of money for such purpose; and defendant avers that the said bonds from which the coupons in this cause were taken, and of which they form a part, were issued to borrow money to pay for stock in the Mississippi & Missouri Railroad Company, to be subscribed as stock in the name of the City; that, at the time the said bonds were received by plaintiffs, they had full knowledge of the fact that said bonds had been issued for the purpose of aiding in the construction of said Mississippi & Missouri Railroad, and for no other purpose whatever. The above embraces the main defense; that the validity and authority to issue said bonds are also questioned, because, first, the interest and principal of said bonds are made payable in the City of New York; second, the interest of said bonds is at a higher rate than plaintiffs could be legally authorized to receive; third, the vote, which is claimed to authorize the issuing of said bonds, was illegal and void, because it united three distinct propositions in such a way as to deprive of the right of suffrage all voters who were opposed to all plans having in view the borrowing of money or the issuing of bonds for the building of railroads. The plaintiffs demurred to defendant's an swer. Upon a full hearing by the court, of counsel on both sides, upon the questions raised by the demurrer of the plaintiff to the answer of defendant, the demurrer was overruled; and the plaintiff's electing to stand on their demurrer, a final judgment was rendered in favor of the defendant in the court below, in September, 1861. To reverse said judgment, the plaintiffs have brought this cause before this court by writ of error. Section 19 of the charter of the City of Muscatine confers upon it its specific power, among others. 15. To borrow money for any object in its discretion, if at a regularly notified meeting, under a notice stating distinctly the nature and object of the loan and the amount thereof as nearly as practicable, the citizens determine in favor of the loan by a majority of two thirds of the votes given at the election." Messrs. J. P. Cook, for plaintiffs in error: The recital of the bonds is entirely conclusive on the defendants, and they are estopped from urging informalities in the proceedings and vote. See Knox Co. Com. v. Aspinwall, 21 How., 539, 16 L. ed., 208. The laws of Iowa authorize the taking of interest at the rate of 10 per cent per annum, and that rate is legal, whether taken in advance semi-annually, or at the end of the year. Sharpless v. The Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa., 158. Courts will declare an Act of the Legislature void, only when it violates the Constitution clearly, palpably and plainly, and in such manner as to leave no doubt or hesitation in the mind of the court. Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 128; Cooper v. Telfair, 4 Dall., 18; Commonwealth v. Smith, 4 Bin., 123. The Legislature of Iowa, in positive terms, delegated the power to the City, to "borrow money for any object in its discretion," and we fail to see anything in our Constitution which has been violated by the charter creating the municipal powers of the City of Muscatine. During the past ten years, that court has decided, not less than seven times, that county and municipal corporations, in Iowa, had the constitutional right to subscribe stock in railroad corporations, issue bonds to pay for such stock and that such bonds were valid, legal and binding upon the county or city issuing them. Clapp v. Co. of Cedar, 5 Ia., 46; McMillen v. County Judge of Lee Co., 6 Ia., 391. From 1853 to 1862, the Supreme Court of Iowa has held such bonds constitutional. The universal ruling of this court is, that where a state court has put a construction upon its Constitution holding the validity of contracts and afterwards repudiates it, this court follows the first interpretation. S. Bank v. Knoop, 16 How., 369; Bank v. Skelly, 66 U. S. 1 Black, 436 (ante, 173). Sixteen States of this Union had decided that all these questions of municipal interest belonged to the popular or legislative branch of the state government, unless specially restrained by the organic law of the State. Goddin v. Crump, 8 Leigh., 120; Harrison Justices v. Holland, 3 Gratt., 247; Bridgeport v. Housatonic R. R. Co., 15 Conn., 475; Nichol v. Mayor of Nashville, 9 Humph., 252; L. & N. R. R. v. Davidson, 1 Sneed, 637; Cotton v. Com. of Leon, 6 Fla., 610; Talbot v. Dent, 9 B. Mon., 526; Clarke Co. v. P. W. & K. R. T. Co., 11 B. Mon., 143; Slack v. M. & L. R. R., 13 B. Mon., 1; Maddox v. Graham, 2 Metc. (Ky.), 56; Shaw v. Dennis, 5 Gilm. (Ill.), 405; Ryder v. Alton & S. R. R. Co., 13 Ill., 516; Prettyman v. Supervisors, 19 Ill., 406; Johnson v. Stark Co., 24 Ill., 75; Thomas v. Leland, 24 Wend., 65; People v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419; Grant v. Courter, 24 Barb., 232; Clarke v. Rochester, 24 Barb., 446; Bank of Rome v. Rome, 18 N. Y., 38; Com. v. McWilliams, 11 Pa., 61; Sharpless v. Mayor, &c., 21 Pa., 147; Moers v. Reading, 21 Pa., 188; Com. v. Com. of Allegheny Co., 32 Pa., 218; Griffith v. Crawford Co., 20 Ohio, 609; C. W. & Z. R. R. v. Clinton Co., 1 Ohio, 77; S. & I. R. R. v. Trustees North T., 1 Ohio, 105; Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio, 607; State v. Van Horne, 7 Ohio, 327; State v. Union T. Trustees, 8 Ohio, 401; Stein v. Mayor of Mobile, 24 Ala., 591; Taylor v. New Berne, 2 Jones, Eq., 141; Police Jury v. Succession of McDonough, 8 La. Ann., 341; V. S. & T. R. R. Co. v. The Parish of Ouachita, 11 La. Ann., 649; Parker v. Scogin, 11 La. Ann., 629; St. Louis v. Alexander, 23 Mo., 483; Stricklan v. Miss. R., 21 Miss., 209; Copes v. City of Charleston, 10 Rich., 491. Messrs. Jacob Butler and J. S. Richman, for defendant: The powers conferred upon a corporation must be strictly construed. 2 Cranch, 127; 4 Wheat., 686; 12 Wheat., 64; 11 Pet., 544; 13 Pet., 519. A municipal corporation has not the power in general to make ordinances for the construction of railroads beyond its territorial limits; nor to borrow money, and pledge and incumber the individual property of its citizens for that purpose. Oebricke v. Pittsburgh, 7 Am. Law Reg., 725; Wilcox, Corp., 26; Kirk v. Norwill, 1 D. & E., 124. The General Assembly of the State of Iowa could not confer the power claimed upon the City of Muscatine. Const. of Iowa, art. 9, sec. 2. The cases of Knox County v. Aspinwall, 21 How., 539, 16 L. ed., 208; and Zabriskie v. C. C. & C. R. R., 23 How., 381, 16 L. ed., 488; are expressly decided upon the ground that the defendants were authorized by legislative authority to do what they attempted to do. The late decision of the Supreme Court of the State of Iowa, and the cases of Oebricke v. Pittsburgh, 7 Am. L. Reg., 725; and Gould ▼. Town of Sterling, 23 N. Y., 439, are decisive of this case. Mr. Justice Swayne delivered the opinion of the court: The demurrer of the plaintiffs in error in the court below to the amended answer of the defendant, brings under examination the objections taken by the defendant, of the validity of the coupons upon which this suit is founded. These objections will be considered as we proceed. I. "That there is no authority in the charter of the City of Muscatine under which money may be borrowed to aid in the construction of railroads." The charter gives the City authority "to borrow money for any object in its discretion, if at a regularly notified meeting under a notice stating distinctly the nature and object of the loan and the amount thereof, as nearly as practicable, the citizens determine in favor of the loan, by a majority of two thirds of the votes given at the election." When the bonds and coupons were issued, the Acts of the Legislature of Iowa of the 25th of January, 1855, were in force. These Acts, in connection with the provision of the charter furnish, in our judgment, a conclusive answer to this objection. The effect of the Acts was considered in the case of Gelpcke v. Dubuque (1 Wall 175, ante, 520), decided at this term, to which we refer. *II. "Because the interest was made [*301 payable in New York City, instead of at the treasury of the City" of Muscatine. It was according to the general usage to make such bonds and coupons payable in the City of New York. It added to the value of the bonds and was beneficial to all parties. No legal principle forbids it. The power of a municipal corporation to make any contract, does not depend upon the place of performance, but upon its scope and object. A city, authorized to establish gas works and water works, and to gravel its streets, may buy water, coal and gravel beyond its limits and agree to pay where they are found or elsewhere. The principal power, when expressed, draws to it, by necessary implication, the means of its execution. This is a settled rule in the construction of all grants of authority, whether to governments or individuals. If the subject admitted of doubt, we should hold that the City, having acted upon its own construction, and drawn in others to take the securities and advance their money upon it, is now concluded from denying that construction to be the true one. Van Hostrup v. Madison (1 Wall. 296, ante, 538). III. "Because in the stipulation to pay the interest semi-annually at the rate of ten per cent the authority conferred by the vote which limited the rate of interest to 'not higher than ten per cent per annum,' was transcended, and an usurious rate agreed to be paid." When a This objection has no foundation. statute fixes the rate of interest per annum, it has always been held that parties may lawfully contract for the payment of that rate, before the principal debt becomes due, at periods shorter than a year. Mowry v. Bishop, 5 Paige, 98. IV. "Because the stock of the Mississippi and Missouri Railroad Company, for which said bonds and coupons were issued, was, without authority from the City, placed in the hands of a trustee, and entirely beyond its control." This objection, though urged in the argument, does not arise upon the record. All that appears touching the subject is, that the bond of $1,000, as set out in the exhibit attached to the complaint, besides binding the [*392 City to pay, provides that the holder, upon surrendering it at any time before maturity "to A. C. Flagg, trustee," should be entitled to ten shares of the stock of the Railroad Company. To such an arrangement there is no legal objection. The City had a right to apply the stock for which the bonds were given, or its proceeds, at any time, in discharge of the bonds. V. "Because, under the authority to borrow a sum of money, no money was ever borrowed by the City; but instead, these bonds were delivered to the officers of the Mississippi and Missouri Railroad Coupany, and by their agents and brokers sold to the plaintiff at a price greatly below their par value. The amended answer avers, "That the said bonds were by the officers of said Railroad Company, and their agents and brokers, sold to the plaintiffs at a price greatly below their par value; that at the time said bonds and coupons were received by said plaintiffs, they had full knowledge of the fact that said bonds had been issued for the purpose of aiding in the construction of said Mississippi and Missouri Railroad." The City was authorized to issue the bonds in order to borrow money to pay for the stock. If the Company chose to receive the bonds in payment for the stock, retaining a lien on the stock until the bonds were paid, and there was no legal obstacle in the way of their doing so. The object of issuing the bonds was thus accomplished, and no injury was done to those who were to pay them. It is neither averred in the answer, nor claimed in the argument, that the Railroad Company took them at less than their face. It does not appear that anyone objected then, and no one can object now. After the bonds passed into the hands of the Railroad Company, the company was at liberty to sell them on such terms as it might deem proper. The act of January 25, 1855, chap. 128, by a clear implication, authorizes cities to give their bonds in payment of their subscriptions of railroad stock, and expressly authorizes the 393*] *bonds to "be sold by the Company at such discounts as may be deemed expedient." What is implied has the same effect as what is expressed. U. S. v. Babbit, 1 Black, 55 (ante, 94). VI. "The ordinance on which the vote for a loan was taken was void, because it submitted three distinct propositions in one, and in such a manner as to cut off an effective opposition from all voters who were against the whole of the propositions." The record shows that all the votes cast, except five, were in favor of the loan. The City and citizens adopted and acted upon the ordinance as valid and sufficient. The citizens voted, and the city authorities issued the bonds. No one interposed to prevent their issue. It is not questioned that all the parties acted in good faith, and the City cannot now be heard to object to the regularity of its own proceedings. A party taking the bonds was bound to look to the legal authority under which the public agents acted. If that were sufficiently comprehensive, he had a right to presume that those empowered to act and acting under it had complied with its requirements. Com's of Knox Co. v. Aspinwall, 21 How., 539, 16 L. ed., 208. VII. "It is insisted that the Legislature had no constitutional power to authorize the issue of such bonds and that, hence, they are void." This is sufficiently answered by the opinion of this court in Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque (1 Wall. 175, ante, 520). Rowan v. Runnels, 5 How., 134; Pease v. Peck, 18 How., 599, 15 L. ed., 518; Bank v. Knoop, 16 How., 392; Bank v. Skelly (1 Black, 436, ante, 173). The judgment below must be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings, in conformity to this opinion. Mr. Justice Miller, dissenting: I dissent from the judgment and opinion of the court just delivered. In the case of Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque (1 Wall. 175, ante, 520), I have given the rea394*] sons which I thought required *this court to follow the recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Iowa, in holding that all bonds given by municipal corporations for stock in railroad companies were void, for want of any constitutional authority in the Legislature of that State to enact the laws under which said bonds were issued. I do not now propose to add anything to what I there said upon that subject, but refer to it as fully applicable to the present case. In the case now before us, however, it is not claimed that there was any Act of the Legisla ture authorizing the City of Muscatine to take stock in railroad companies. The principle on which the validity of the bonds is sustained is, that the charter of the City confers on it an unlimited right to borrow money, and that having issued its bonds, which have been sold in the market, they must be held to be valid, although the purchaser knew they were issued for railroad stock. The plea of the defendant is, that the City of Muscatine "had no authority to assist in building a railroad, nor to take stock in the same, nor to issue the bonds of the City to pay for stock in the same," and that at the time said bonds were sold to plaintiffs by the officers of the Railroad Company, they had full knowledge that said bonds had been issued for the purpose of aiding in the construction of the Mississippi and Missouri Railroad. The plaintiffs demurred to this plea, and the district court overruled the demurrer. This court holds the plea to be bad, and the demurrer well taken. The authority to borrow money by the City of Muscatine, is found in the 19th section of its charter. That section undertakes to enumerate, in sixteen subdivisions, all the powers intended to be conferred on the city council. They are those which are usually conferred on such bodies, and none others. Among them is the authority to establish fire companies and provide them with engines; to build wharves; to provide for the establishment and support of schools; to audit all claims against the City; to establish the grade of streets and alleys and wharves, and cause them to be paved. The *fifteenth subdivi- [*395 sion is in the following language: "To borrow money for any object in its discretion, if at a regularly notified meeting, under a notice stating distinctly the nature and object of the loan, and the amount thereof, as nearly as practicable, the citizens determine in favor of the loan, by a majority of two thirds of the votes given at the election." It seems to me that the discretion here confided to the council as to the objects for which money may be borrowed, must be construed in one or the other of two modes. 1. That the discretion is, in its largest sense, unlimited, except by the voice of two thirds of the voters. This construction would authorize the City to borrow money to enter into the banking business, to speculate in gold, or flour, or grain, to establish mercantile houses, or to build steamboats and enter into the trade which flows past the City, on the waters of the Mississippi River, or to organize mining companies of Colorado. In short, to take the money or property of the citizen against his will, and employ it in any of the diversified pursuits by which the individual man makes, or fails to make, money. A proposition which leads directly to such consequences cannot be supposed to have_entered, for a moment, into the minds of the Legislature. It makes every man's entire property, within the limits of the City, the common property of the community, and converts the citizen against his will, into a member of one of those Shaker or French communities in which the individual merges his rights into those of the association. No such construction can be tolerated, unless it is impossible that the Legislature could have meant nothing else. 2. That the objects on which this discretion may be exercised must be limited to the execution of some of the powers granted in the charter. I do not propose to cite the numerous authorities which settle that, as a matter of law, this is the rule of construction applicable to the case. It is so well known that it would be a waste of time to refer to adjudged cases. To establish fire companies, and provide them 396*] with engines, *is a proper and indeed a necessary object to which the money or the credit of the City may be applied. The building of wharves also requires more money than can be well levied at one tax in such a town as Muscatine. And in building school houses, and other expenditures necessary to establish schools, the citizens may well be consulted, whether the credit of the City may be used. So of grading and paving the streets of the City. All these are purposes, and perhaps there are others enumerated in the Act, about which this discretion may be well exercised. It is not necessary, then, to impute to the Legislature the injustice and absurdity of intending the first construction of the charter above mentioned. Here are certain powers conferred, objects to be accomplished by the council named in fourteen paragraphs. The fifteenth authorizes them to borrow money for any object in their discretion, if sustained by a two thirds vote of the citizens. Nothing can be more reasonable than to suppose that the discretion so conferred was limited to the objects enumerated in the fourteen preceding paragraphs. None of these include railroads; nor does any of them include anything from which railroad enterprises can possibly be implied. In order to get the power to borrow money to build railroads, some other authority than that given by this section must be shown. I do not think any such exists, nor has any been pointed to by counsel, unless it be that such a power is inherent in municipal corporations without regard to their charters. I do not think, at this day, any court can be found to hold such a doctrine. It is obvious that the whole purpose of the statute was to relieve such bonds as might have been or might hereafter be issued, from liability to the charge of usury. This is not the language in which the Legislature or anyone else would undertake to make valid bonds, issued without any authority whatever in the municipal body. The bonds in this case were issued before the Act passed. It says never a word about ratifying them or confirming them, or making good the want of power to issue them. It is said, however, that the Act itself implies that there was authority to issue such bonds in the cities and counties. This is a clear non sequitur. An examination of the Acts of the Legislature will show that the cities of Dubuque of Keokuk, of Davenport, and perhaps many others, had been authorized by the Legislature to take stock in railroads, and to issue bonds in payment of it, and the Supreme Court of the State had then twice decided that, by a general law, all the counties in the State could do so. These cities, then, and all the counties having the authority to issue bonds for stock, and some of them having done so, and others intending to do so, the Legislature meant no more than to say, that in the cases where they had been or might hereafter be, issued lawfully, in other respects, they should not be held usurious because of the rate of discount at. which they might be sold. To infer from this Act that the Legislature intended to make valid the bonds of the City of Muscatine, issued without any authority, is a stretch of fancy, only to be indulged in railroad bond cases, and which, it is hoped, may be confined to them as a precedent. The Act applies to bonds issued after its passage as well as before, and in precisely the same terms. Its effect is the same on both. Now, will it be urged that this was intended to confer on all the cities whose charters had theretofore denied them such power, the right to take *stock in railroad enterprises? Is this [*398 the language in which an Act of such importance, and affecting so many persons and so much property, would be framed? Yet it is by such latitudinary construction of statutes as this that it is attempted to fasten upon owners of property, who never assented to the contract, a debt of $20,000,000, involving a ruin only equaled in this country by that visited upon the guilty participants in the current rebellion. But what is wanting in original power to issue these bonds is supposed to be supplied as a ratification or confirmation of them, by the Act of January 25, 1855, which may be seen on page 223 of the Revision of 1860 of the Laws of Iowa. This is entitled, "An Act Regulating the Interest on City and County Bonds." The 1st section declares that railroad companies may issue their own bonds at such a rate of interest, and sell them at such discount as may BENJAMIN S. HALLOCK, Claimant of Pil be necessary, and they shall remain legal and binding. Section 2-the one relied on in this case is as follows: "That whenever any com397*] pany shall *have received, or may hereafter receive the bonds of any city or county, upon subscription of stock by such city or county, such bonds may have interest at any rate not exceeding ten per cent., and may be sold by the company at such discount as may be deemed expedient." THE UNITED STATES, Appt., v. grim and Cargo. Vessel and cargo, attempting to run blockade, liable to confiscation, although partly owned by citizens of Northern States. Where a vessel was captured in attempting to run the blockade of New Orleans and two thirds of the vessel belonged to owners in New Orleans, the other third to the master and another, citizens of New York and Connecticut; held, that the cargo and two thirds of the vessel were liable to confisca tion as enemy's property, and the remainder for il-A l'Outre and was captured by the blockading The United States appealed to this court. The case sufficiently appears in the opinion. Messrs. Edward Bates, Atty-Gen., and Charles Eames, for the appellants: 1. Independently of all questions of blockade, it would seem that under the decision of this court last term, in the cases of The Amy Warwick and Crenshaw (ante, 459), 2 Black, 665, this vessel and her cargo must be condemned as enemy property, so far as owned in New Orleans; and for illicit trading with the enemy, in so far as the bark was owned by citizens of the loyal States. The enemy ownership of three fourths of the vessel is clear; and in his claim the claimant states, under oath, that he believes the cargo to belong to its consignees, all of them residing and doing business in New Orleans. No other ownership of any part of the cargo is disclosed or even hinted at in the testimony. It is the familiar rule of law, that cargo in such a predicament is to be considered as the property of the enemy consignee, the capture being equivalent to delivery, even when the shipment, in time of war, is made at the risk of the consignor. The Sally, 3 C. Rob., 179; DeBilboa, 2 C. Rob., 133; Sally Griffiths, 3 C. Rob., 300, note. She left Bordeaux, in France, about the 8th The cargo was consigned to owners in New The decree of the court below is, therefore, reversed, and record remitted, with directions to enter a decree in conformity to this opinion. Mexican grant, effect of decree-jurisdiction of Where grant of Mexican Governor was for a cer- tract. The District Court has no jurisdiction to revise the action of the Surveyor-General and correct his survey. 2. But the breach of blockade in the case is manifest. By what occurred at Bordeaux before he sailed, the master was bound to know that he would find the Port of New Orleans blockaded; and the knowledge of that blockade was clearly brought home to him when he was at the Bahama banks, by the direct and positive information which he there received. The blockade then became a matter well understood by himself and notorious among all the ship's company. His persistence in his illicit voyage, Argued Jan. 25, 1864. Decided Feb. 8, 1864. after being affected by such knowledge, must subject the ship and cargo to condemnation If the survey does not conform to the decree of under the rule laid down by this court in the APPEAL from the District Court of the case of The Hiawatha, 2 Black, 639 (ante, 459). If it be assumed that the master sailed from Bordeaux without sufficient knowledge of the blockade to subject the property to condemnation, then the knowledge subsequently acquired by him at the Bahamas, brings the case fully within the doctrine applied by Lord Stowell in the case of The Columbia, 1 C. Rob., 154; and also in that of The Neutralitet, 6 Rob., 30. United States for the Southern District of The case is stated in the opinion. An exception of a thing not included in a Shep. Touch., 78, 79; Perkins, sec. 639; Dyer, 59; Plowd., 361, 67, 370; Broom's Leg. Max., 286. Mr. Justice Field delivered the opinion of the court: In November, 1852, the respondents presented their petition to the Board of Land Commissioners created by the Act of March 3d, 1851, for the confirmation of their claim under a grant issued to them by Pio Pico, formerly Gov |