hands, notwithstanding failure to show the requisite number of votes in their favor, Milner v. Pensacola, 2 Woods, 637, F. C. 9,619, State ex rel. v. City Council, 74 Ala. 231, and Fulton v. Town of Riverton, 42 Minn. 397, 44 N. W. 258; notwithstanding irregularities in the method of calling or conducting the election, Louisville, etc., R. R. v. State, 8 Heisk. 788, Greeley v. City of Jacksonville, 17 Fla. 179, City of San Antonio v. Lane, 32 Tex. 413, 414, Huidekoper v. Buchanan County, 3 Dill. 180, F. C. 6,847, Supervisors v. Schenck, 5 Wall. 784, 18 L. 559, Grand Chute v. Winegar, 15 Wall. 373, 21 L. 174, and Jefferson County v. Lewis, 20 Fla. 1007; though the municipal officers authorizing them were de facto merely, City of Vicksburg v. Lombard, 51 Miss. 127; though requirement as to recording of written consent of taxpayers and of assessment-roll was neglected, Miller v. Berlin, 13 Blatchf. 247, F. C. 9,562; though some of the conditions to be performed by the aided railroad, were disregarded, Deming v. Houlton, 64 Me. 262, 18 Am. Rep. 258; where the currency which they were to redeem was illegal, Black v. Cohen, 52 Ga. 629; or where other similar defect was urged against them, Kenicott v. Supervisors, 16 Wall. 465, 21 L. 320, City of Lexington v. Butler, 14 Wall. 296, 20 L. 813, and County Commrs. v. King, 13 Fla. 463. The syllabus rule has been relied upon in holding such bonds presumptively valid, Smith v. Tallapoosa County, 2 Woods, 577, F. C. 13,113, and, therefore, that a complaint thereupon need not aver municipal compliance with necessary steps, Chicago, etc., R. R. v. Otoe County, 1 Dill. 342, F. C. 2,667. The rule has also been applied in upholding other municipal bonds challenged as void for various defects, such as street-paving bonds, Memphis v. Brown, 1 Flipp. 196, 198, F. C. 9,415; school bonds, Wiley v. Board of Education, 11 Minn. 379; and municipal bridge bonds, State ex rel. v. Commissioners of Kiowa Co., 39 Kan. 659, 7 Am. St. Rep. 570, 19 Pac. 926.

But the cases are by no means uniform in support of the rule in its broadest application. Where such bonds show irregularity on their face, they have been held void even in bona fide hands; as where containing a recital that they were authorized in aid of railroad A, and were in fact issued to a consolidated concern formed by A and B, Kennard v. Cass County, 3 Dill. 150, note, F. C. 7,697. So where they have been issued without any vote at all even a bona fide holder cannot enforce them, Steines v. Franklin County, 48 Mo. 186, 8 Am. Rep. 97, or where issued by strangers absolutely without authority, Town of Lyons v. Chamberlain, 89 N. Y. 587. And elsewhere it has been held that no presumption arises against the municipality where the bonds are issued for a wholly unauthorized purpose, Hopper v. Covington, 118 U. S. 150, 30 L. 192, 6 S. Ct. 1026, and Bissell v. City of Kankakee, 64 Ill. 251, 16 Am. Rep. 556. Other cases question the applicability of the rule in any circumstances except where the bonds contain recitals which amount to an

estoppel, Hawkins v. Carroll County, 50 Miss. 764, Lewis v. Commissioners of Bourbon County, 12 Kan. 209, 217; and on this ground refuse to enforce school bonds issued for an unauthorized school purpose, Hopper v. Covington, 10 Biss. 492, 8 Fed. 781. An Illinois case has held bonds invalid where the bond election was called by the County Court instead of the board of supervisors, Marshall County v. Cook, 38 Ill. 56, 87 Am. Dec. 290; but see contra, Supervisors v. Schenck, 5 Wall. 784, 18 L. 559, and an Iowa decision criticised and denies the doctrine in toto, Chamberlain v. City of Burlington, 19 Iowa, 405.

Aside from the authorities concerned with bonds of public corporations, other citing cases rely upon the syllabus rule in holding private corporations bound by their accommodation paper executed in excess of their powers, National Bank v. Young, 41 N. J. Eq. 535, 7 Atl. 489, Farmers' Nat. Bank v. Sutton Mfg. Co., 52 Fed. 196, 6 U. S. App. 312, 17 L. R. A. 598, Ex parte Estabrook Co., 2 Low. 549, F. C. 4,534; or by an ultra vires guaranty, Louisville, etc., R. R. v. Louisville Trust Co., 174 U. S. 574, 19 S. Ct. 825; and in holding a loan society estopped to dispute a note signed by its vice-president, Grommes v. Sullivan, 81 Fed. 47, 53 U. S. App. 364; or a bank to dispute its cashier's power to buy and sell exchange, Merchants' Bank v. State Bank, 10 Wall. 645, 19 L. 1018. Others rely upon it as follows: Atchison, c., R. R. v. Fletcher, 35 Kan. 248, 10 Pac. 605, holding railroad bound by its guaranty of another's bonds, though proper method of executing it not pursued; Asphalt Pav. Co. v. Gogreve, 41 La. Ann. 268, 5 So. 857, indulging presumption that a repaving petition was signed by legal number of voters; National Exch. Bank v. White, 30 Fed. 416, holding partnership bound by negotiable paper fraudulently issued; Breyman v. Ann Arbor R. R., 85 Fed. 583, applying rule in construing contract for railway filling; Budd v. Walla Walla Pub. Co., 2 Wash. Ter. 353, 7 Pac. 898, corporate trustees' meeting will be presumed regularly called. Cited in In re Shelbourne, 21 Fed. Cas. 1234, 1235, and Hening v. United States Ins. Co., 2 Dill. 36, F. C. 6,366, to point that Federal courts will not follow local decisions on questions of general commercial law. Affirmed also in Sala v. New Orleans, 2 Woods, 195, F. C. 12,246, County of Randolph v. Post, 93 U. S. 514, 23 L. 959, dissenting opinion, and Smith v. Sac County, 11 Wall. 156, 20 L. 107. Cited, arguendo, Heard v. Dubuque Bank, 8 Neb. 15, 30 Am. Rep. 813, note reciting Its execution for purchase price of mower is not non-negotiable; Fogg v. Supreme Lodge, 156 Mass. 434, 31 N. E. 290, stockholders of corporation performing unlawful act, not in pari delicto; Miners Ditch Co. v. Zellerbach, 37 Cal. 588, 99 Am. Dec. 315, discussing ultra vires acts; German Ins. Co. v. Manning, 78 Fed. 903, affirmed incidentally. Cited in 64 Am. Dec. 428, note on coupon bonds; 12 Blatchf. 60, note, F. C. 3,178, 98 Am. Dec. 678, 688, valuable note on municipal bonds.

Aside from the cases respecting municipal bonds, supra, the syllabus holding is distinguished in Eaton v. Berlin, 49 N. H. 224, holding unauthorized order by town selectmen for payment of State aid military warrants, not binding in bona fide hands; Clark v. City of Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 213, 217, 87 Am. Dec. 429, 431, holding city and county warrants not negotiable instruments freed from equities in hands of bona fide holders; and qualified in City Elect. Ry. v. First Nat. Bank, 62 Ark. 39, 54 Am. St. Rep. 285, 34 S. W. 90, 31 L. R. A. 537, holding corporate president and secretary have no inherent power to issue negotiable notes, and no presumption of validity will attach.

Municipal corporations.— Irregularities in issuance of municipal railroad aid bonds may be cured by subsequent legislative ratification, p. 203.

Cited and relied upon to point that legislative ratification is equivalent to prior authorization in Beloit v. Morgan, 7 Wall. 624, 19 L. 207, Thompson v. Perrine, 103 U. S. 815, 26 L. 616, St. Joseph Township v. Rogers, 16 Wall. 665, 21 L. 338, and Schneck v. City of Jeffersonville, 152 Ind. 217, 52 N. E. 216, holding municipal railroad aid bonds so validated. Cited, arguendo, Griffin v. Cun. ningham, 20 Gratt. 110, and Williams v. Duanesburgh, 66 N. Y. 137.

Municipal corporations, including those of the State of Iowa, may issue bonds and subscribe stock in aid of railroads, according to the prevailing doctrine in the various States, pp. 205, 206.

Cited approvingly upon this point in Meyer v. City of Muscatine, 1 Wall. 390, 393, 17 L. 566, 567, United States v. Baltimore, etc., R. R., 17 Wall. 330, 26 L. 600, affirming 24 Fed. Cas. 979, Douglas v. Town of Chatham, 41 Conn. 234, Leavenworth County v. Miller, 7 Kan. 506, 510, 12 Am. Rep. 439, 443, Davidson v. County Commrs., 18 Minn. 490, and Schneck v. City of Jeffersonville, 152 Ind. 217, 52 N. E. 216, collecting cases, all upholding municipal aid in similar cases. Followed in Talcott v. Pine Grove, 1 Flipp. 177, F. C. 13,735, notwithstanding State decisions contra; Rogers v. Keokuk, 154 U. S. 547, 18 L. 75, 14 S. Ct. 1162, affirming rule as to Iowa municipalities; Stockton, etc., R. R. v. Stockton, 41 Cal. 183, and Hallenbeck v. Hahn, 2 Neb. 421, both quoting remarks of Swayne, J., that cases contra "stand out in unenviable solitude." See notes, 59 Am. Dec. 783, and 68 Am. Dec. 695, collecting cases on this point. Cited in Bound v. Wisconsin, etc., R. R., 45 Wis. 568, as to argument on repudiation, denying power of municipality to donate bonds to rail

road.

Municipal corporations.- In this case municipal railroad aid bonds, upheld as valid, were issued in aid of a railroad beyond the limits of the municipality, pp. 178, 205.

Relied upon as authority for the validity of such bonds under such circumstances in Railroad Co. v. County of Otoe, 16 Wall. 677,

21 L. 381, reprinted, 2 Neb. 501, Quincy, etc., R. R. v. Morris, 84 Ill. 419, and Town of Bennington v. Park, 50 Vt. 206.

Courts.- Supreme Court will not follow mere oscillations in the course of settlement of questions in the State courts, p. 205.

Cited and relied upon in Myrick v. Heard, 31 Fed. 243, where State decisions did not really reach the point at issue; Braxon v. Bressler, 64 Ill: 493, holding, by analogy, State court may elect to follow earlier of two conflicting Supreme Court decisions.

Courts. If a contract when made is valid under State Constitution and laws as then expounded by the government, and administered in its courts, it cannot be impaired either by subsequent legislation or a change in judicial construction of existing law. Accordingly where Iowa municipal railroad aid bonds were sold to innocent parties at a time when the Iowa Supreme Court upheld the constitutional power of the legislature to authorize them, in suits upon such bonds, later Iowa decisions denying this power will not be followed by the Supreme Court, pp. 205, 206.

This holding has been fraught with some curious consequences. It was subsequently decided that the Supreme Court might thus depart from the latest State adjudications only in cases coming up from the inferior Federal courts; while on error to a State Supreme Court the latter's exposition of its State law under its State Constitution is binding under all circumstances. This is for the obvious reason that a State decision can be reversed in the Federal court only if infringing some Federal limitation and not at all because of incompatibility with the State Constitution; and in cases similar to the Gelpcke case there is no Federal question involved no contention that a State law impairs the obligation of a contract; Bacon v. Texas, 163 U. S. 221, 222, 41 L. 137, 138, 16 S. Ct. 1029, Turner v. Wilkes Co. Commrs., 173 U. S. 463, 19 S. Ct. 465, and dissenting opinion, McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U. S. 130, 19 S. Ct. 144. It results that a State law may be enforced as binding in one instance and disregarded as nugatory in another; that there is one kind of law for certain litigants and a different kind for others similarly circumstanced the difference in the law administered resting upon no more rational basis than the accident of the citizenship of the contracting parties. All this was very clearly pointed out by Mr. Justice Miller in his very able dissenting opinion in the principal case, 1 Wall. 209-210, 17 L. 526, 527, and again in later decisions, Riggs v. Johnson County, 6 Wall. 202, 18 L. 778, Butz v. City of Muscatine, 8 Wall. 586, 19 L. 494; and it may, we think, safely be affirmed that it will require circumstances quite as exceptional as those involved in cases of which Gelpcke v. Dubuque is a type, to move the Supreme Court to an application of this doctrine in future cases where the binding nature of the latest State adjudication is in question. Other courts, particularly the Supreme Court

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of Iowa, have attacked and combatted the doctrine with considerable vigor, Chamberlain v. City of Burlington, 19 Iowa, 400, 401, McClure v. Owen, 26 Iowa, 253, 256, 257, 258, Ex parte Holman, 28 Iowa, 123, 165, 168, 187, and Storrie v. Cortes, 90 Tex. 288, 290, 38 S. W. 156, 157, 35 L. R. A. 668, 669; though the Iowa court thereafter attempted to reconcile its decisions as consistent throughout, with the earlier holdings favoring their validity, Stewart v. Board of Supervisors, 30 Iowa, 38, 39. And see also County of Wapello v. B. & M. R. R., 44 Iowa, 600. The principle is strictly in the nature of an exception to the general rule. Some of the citing cases note this and show no disposition to extend it, Braun v. Board of Commrs., 66 Fed. 479, Blossburg, etc., R. R. v. Tioga R. R., 5 Blatchf. 392, F. C. 1,563, Van Bokelen v. Brooklyn R. R., 5 Blatchf. 381, F. C. 16,830, Lavin v. Emigrant, etc., Bank, 18 Blatchf. 12, 1 Fed. 550; another refuses to apply the principle where there was no contract resting upon the earlier overruled decision, Town of Hardinsburg v. Cravens, 148 Ind. 9, 47 N. E. 155; and others deny its applicability where the later decision merely misconstrues, without impairing any contract, Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U. S. 111, 112, 40 L. 94, 95, 16 S. Ct. 82, and McLure v. Melton, 24 S. C. 568, 58 Am. Rep. 276. So also it has been held that the change in the judicial decisions must affect the construction of written law to render the Gelpcke doctrine applicable, Ray v. Natural Gas Co., 138 Pa. St. 591, 21 Am. St. Rep. 927, 20 Atl. 1067, 12 L. R. A. 293, and n. Other cases decline to recognize the applicability of the rule where the earlier decision is isolated or not based upon full examination of the point, McLure v. Melton, 24 S. C. 568, 58 Am. Rep. 276, and Keokuk, etc., R. R. v. County Court, etc., 41 Fed. 310. The court will follow the latest rather than the earlier decisions, also where the earlier deny the validity of railroad or other municipal bonds and the subsequent cases affirm them, Wade v. Travis County, 174 U. S. 509, 19 S. Ct. 719, King v. Wilson, 1 Dill. 558, 568, F. C. 7,810; and in Mitchell v. Lippincott, 2 Woods, 470, F. C. 9,665, the Federal court followed later State cases denying a wife's power to mortgage her separate estate for her husband's debts, although the earlier decisions, at the time of the mortgage, affirmed this power.

But aside from the foregoing authorities militating against an extension of the doctrine of the Gelpcke case to decisions lacking the salient features there presented, the citations leave no room to question the controlling and authoritative force of that adjudica tion in cases respecting municipal aid bonds sold upon the strength of favorable State court judgments. The Federal courts have uniformly upheld these obligations, whether in the nature of railway or plankroad or other bonds, when in the hands of citizens of other States, notwithstanding subsequent denial of their binding force by the State judiciary, Mitchell v. Burlington, 4 Wall. 275, 18 L. 352, Lee County v. Rogers, 7 Wall. 183, 19 L. 161, Havemeyer v. Iowa