County, 3 Wall. 303, 18 L. 42, The City v. Lamson, 9 Wall. 486, 19 L. 730, Commissioners, etc. v. Thayer, 94 U. S. 642, 24 L. 135, Louisiana v. Pillsbury, 105 U. S. 295, 26 L. 1096, Smith v. Tallapoosa County, 2 Woods, 578, F. C. 13,113, Burleigh v. Town of Rochester, 5 Fed. 672, and Union Bank v. Board of Commrs., 90 Fed. 8. The Supreme Court has gone even further, and upheld municipal railroad aid bonds although the State court decisions thereupon had been uniform and numerous the other way, basing its conclusions upon the ground that it was not properly a question of local law but of general jurisprudence upon which the Federal courts were at liberty to decide for themselves, Township of Pine Grove v. Talcott, 19 Wall. 678, 22 L. 233, affirming S. C. sub nom. Talcott v. Township of Pine Grove, 1 Flipp. 129, 132, 176 F. C. 13,735; and the Circuit Court has declared that the Federal courts, having upheld such bonds, will not change their ruling upon the strength of subsequent State decisions contra, Foote v. Johnson County, 5 Dill. 285, F. C. 4,912. In the State courts the principle under discussion has been susceptible of a qualified application, and in a number of cases it has been held that municipal bonds sold under the protection of favorable State decisions will be upheld and enforced although a contrary rule had come to prevail at the time of suit brought, Walker v. State, 12 S. C. 271, 282, State ex rel. v. C. & L. R. R., 13 S. C. 314, County Commrs. v. King, 13 Fla. 463, Harmon v. Auditor, 123 III. 136, 5 Am. St. Rep. 509, 13 N. E. 165, Stallcup v. Tacoma, 13 Wash. 152, 52 Am. St. Rep. 32, 42 Pac. 544, Ex parte Selma, etc., R. R. 45 Ala. 730, 6 Am. Rep. 730, and Commissioners Court v. Rather, 48 Ala. 445, 447. So also the Gelpcke doctrine has been relied upon in holding that bonds issued payable in New York, could not thereafter be declared payable only elsewhere, Carr v. State ex rel., 127 Ind. 214, 22 Am. St. Rep. 632, 26 N. E. 781, 11 L. R. A. 374, and n.; and another case credits the notion that municipal railroad bonds might be valid on the strength of current favorable decisions, though issued without the previous formality of any election at all, Smith v. Clark County, 54 Mo. 75. And see dissenting opinion, State ex rel. Garroutte, 67 Mo. 469.

The struggle over the enforcement of municipal railroad aid bonds in States where their validity was denied, did not always end with the decisions of the Supreme Court sustaining them. State laws were passed restricting the amount of taxes which municipal officers were authorized to levy, and exhausting the amount collected in meeting ordinary municipal expenses, with the result that the Federal judgments were uncollectible, Butz v. City of Muscatine, 8 Wall. 585, 19 L. 494. And see cases infra. The Federal courts responded by adjuding such laws void as interfering with the remedy upon valid contracts, and ordering mandamus against county officers to compel the levy of an additional tax to meet the creditors' judgments, Sibley v. City of Mobile, 3 Woods, 540, F. C. VOL. VI-20

12,829. In one instance the clash between Federal and State authority culminated in an injunction from the State courts prohibiting the levy of taxes to satisfy these judgments, and mandamus from the Circuit Court to the same officers ordering the performance of this very act. The result was contempt proceedings in the Circult Court, whose writ the county officers had elected to disobey, and habeas corpus in the State court to free them from the Federal custody. In the end the State courts yielded and the bondholders carried their cause to ultimate and costly victory, Ex parte Holman, 28 Iowa, 123, 165, 168, 187. In another instance a State law was passed declaring payment of these bonds not a public use for which taxes might be levied; but after a vigorous contest the Supreme Court declared this obstruction nugatory, Olcott v. The Supervisors, 16 Wall. 690, 21 L. 386. In a certain county in Missouri there developed a much more protracted and bitter fight, the county judges, against whom ran the Federal mandate for the collection of the judgment, going to jail and staying there rather than lay a tax to meet the debt, which had, meanwhile, "swollen to fearful proportions," In re Copenhaver, 54 Fed. 664, 668.

There are but few citing cases in the Federal courts which rely upon the doctrine under discussion, in decisions other than those involving municipal bonds. One of them applies the principle in refusing adherence to a Missouri decision under a Missouri statute, holding a pledgee of corporate stock liable as a stockholder, Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 34, 27 L. 365, 2 S. Ct. 22; another de clined to be bound by an Ohio decision adjuding void the State sub-contractors lien law, where the lien in question had attached before any authoritative State decision, Jones v. Great Southern Hotel Co., 86 Fed. 372; and a third in following the earlier of two conflicting decisions respecting a California corporation law, Southern Pac. R. R. v. Orton, 6 Sawy. 195, 32 Fed. 477, 478.

The principle of the Gelpcke case has had its influence in a number of State court cases not involving any question as to municipal bonds; and comes in for a qualified application as authority for the doctrine that the decisions of courts enter into and become a part of contracts made in reliance thereupon, and must be adhered to in actions upon such contracts, notwithstanding their subsequent modification or overthrow. This application of the principle has been made in adhering to an early decision as to vendor's equitable lien, Napier v. Jones, 47 Ala. 96; to an early law as to sale of decedent's real estate, Smitha v. Flournoy, 47 Ala. 360; to an early decision affirming right of action against municipality for tort, Davis v. City Council, 51 Ala. 146, 23 Am. Rep. 549; or respecting married women's rights, Farrior v. New England Mtg. Co., 92 Ala. 180, 9 So. 533; or respecting the rights of heirs to sell decedent's realty, where rights of bona fide purchasers required protection, Haskett v. Maxey, 134 Ind. 191, 33 N. E. 360, 19 L. R. A. 382, and

Stephenson v. Boody, 139 Ind. 66, 38 N. E. 333; or the validity of a sale of a ward's real estate, Hall v. Wells, 54 Miss. 301; or of partition proceedings, Herndon v. Moore, 18 S. C. 354; or as to the assignment of mortgages, Nashville Trust Co. v. Smythe, 94 Tenn. 518, 45 Am. St. Rep. 750, 29 S. W. 904, 27 L. R. A. 665. Other State courts citing cases have relied upon this principle in upholding rights of third parties under a decree afterwards reversed, Wadhams v. Gray, 73 Ill. 423; in adhering to decree adjudging the validity of the exercise of certain powers of appointment conferred by a will, Wickersham v. Savage, 58 Pa. St. 369; in upholding settled construction of bank license law, State v. Comptoir Nat., etc., 51 La. Ann. 1278, 26 So. 94; in protecting a contract formed under the law when it allowed recovery of costs by creditor, Long v. Walker, 105 N. C. 110; in holding payments of taxes at time when law was adjudged valid could not be recovered upon its subsequent annulment, Vermont, etc., R. R. v. Central, etc., R. R. 63 Vt. 23, 21 Atl. 267, 10 L. R. A. 565; in deciding that refusal of coupons in payment of State taxes, in conformity with the decisions of the courts, could not be affected by their subsequent abrogation, Whaley v. Gaillard, 21 S. C. 572; and in holding a tenyear tax exemption valid under the decisions, when conferred, could not be affected by later change in rule, Opinion of Judges, 58 N. H. 625. One case argued from the Gelpcke decision that the State courts had the same election as to which of conflicting Federal authorities it should follow, State ex rel. v. Doyle, 40 Wis. 215. The principle case is cited also upon the syllabus point here under discussion in Verdin v. St. Louis, 131 Mo. 174, 33 S. W. 520, dissenting opinion, arguing that a previous decision on the validity of a paving tax should be adhered to; in dissenting opinions in State ex rel. v. Pilsbury, 31 La. Ann. 29, and Gage v. Gage, 66 N. H. 301, 29 Atl. 552, 28 L. R. A. 864, and n., arguendo; and also, arguendo, in Boyd v. State, 53 Ala. 608. Cited in 14 Am. Rep. 288, note, and in valuable note on conflict of State and Federal decisions, in 98 Am. Dec. 681.

Gelpcke v. Dubuque is distinguished upon this point by three State court cases: Jessup v. Carnegie, 80 N. Y. 448, 449, 36 Am. Rep. 648, following latest Iowa decision on question whether Iowa corporation was properly organized; Boyd v. State, 53 Ala. 614, declaring valid an act authorizing a lottery affirmed as valid in several instances; Allen v. Allen, 95 Cal. 200, 30 Pac. 216, 16 L. R. A. 653, and n. (but see dissenting opinion, p. 206, 30 Pac. 218, 16 L. R. A. 655, and n.), refusing, after the court had abandoned the doctrine that an absolute deed intended as a mortgage passed title, to enforce the contrary rule in the case of such a deed exe cuted while such contrary rule prevailed.

Municipal corporations.- Municipal bonds and coupons have all the qualities of commercial paper, p. 206.

Cited and principle followed in Arents v. Commonwealth, 18 Gratt. 754, 766, holding State's guaranty of railroad bonds passed in equity to transferee of the bonds; Evertson v. National Bank, 66 N. Y. 18, 23 Am. Rep. 11, purchaser of railroad bond coupons from thief gets good title; Chesapeake, etc., Canal Co. v. Blair, 45 Md. 110, decreeing issuance of duplicates to replace stolen bonds, upon security given; Callanan v. Brown, 31 Iowa, 337, applying doctrine of warranty of personal property to a sale thereof; City of Memphis v. Brown, 1 Flipp. 217, F. C. 9,415, holding rule of damages for failure to deliver same as for other chattels; Stanton v. Alabama, etc., R. R., 2 Woods, 527, F. C. 13,297, railroad bonds valid, though excessively issued; Bonner v. City of New Orleans, 2 Woods, 136, F. C. 1,631, indorser on municipal bonds is liable if municipality fall to pay; New Albany, etc., Plank Road v. Smith, 23 Ind. 355, upholding plank road bonds, notwithstanding irregularities; Durant v. Iowa County, Woolw. 72, F. C. 4,189, holding bona fide holder of municipal bonds protected against proceedings to compel their surrender. Affirmed in Supervisors of Cumberland Co. v. Randolph, 89 Va. 619, 16 S. E. 724, holding legislature might authorize their issue payable to bearer; Grannis v. Cherokee Township, 47 Fed. 430, holding some coupons may be good and some bad; Conger v. City of New Orleans, 32 La. Ann. 1255, holding payment of coupons not an admission of validity of bonded debt; Greenwell v. Haydon, 78 Ky. 334, 39 Am. Rep. 235, and McKim v. King, 58 Md. 504, 42 Am. Rep. 341, both holding one taking after maturity takes subject to equities. Cited in dissenting opinion in Smith v. Sac County, 11 Wall. 150, 20 L. 105, majority holding, on issue of fraud, burden is on holder to prove their validity. Affirmed, arguendo, Hitchcock v. Galveston, 2 Woods, 281, F. C. 6,532. Cited also in the following notes: 14 Am. Dec. 425, 64 Am. Dec. 430, 98 Am. Dec. 683, and 23 Am. Rep. 16.

Cited, but not followed, in Stanton v. Alabama, etc., R. R., 2 Woods, 512, F. C. 13,296, holding railway receiver's certificates wrongly issued, not binding in bona fide holder's hands.

Municipal corporations.— One recovering in suit upon coupons of municipal bonds is entitled to interest and exchange at the place of payment, p. 206.

The following subsequent cases have relied upon Gelpcke v. Dubuque in making the same ruling: Mills v. Town of Jefferson, 20 Wis. 56, Arents v. Commonwealth, 18 Gratt. 776, City of San Antonio v. Lane, 32 Tex. 415, City of Jeffersonville v. Patterson, 26 Ind. 16, 89 Am. Dec. 449, Trustees, etc. v. Lewis, 34 Fla. 428, 43 Am. St. Rep. 212, 16 So. 326, 26 L. R. A. 746, Huey v. Macon County, 35 Fed. 482, Pana v. Bowler, 107 U. S. 546, 27 L. 431, 2 S. Ct. 718, Aurora City v. West, 7 Wall. 105, 19 L. 50, and Koshkonong v. Burton, 104 U. S. 677, 26 L. 889. The same rule has been applied by citing cases to mortgage coupons in Harper v. Ely, 70 Ill. 586,

and New England Mtg. Co. v. Vader, 12 Sawy. 71, 28 Fed. 272. Affirmed also in Amy v. Dubuque, 98 U. S. 473, 25 L. 230, holding Iowa statute of limitations runs against coupons as they mature and not principal debt; United States Mtg. Co. v. Sperry, 138 U. S. 341, 34 L. 979, 11 S. Ct. 330, affirming 26 Fed. 729, but holding guardian's interest warrant not within rule. See note in 50 Am. Dec. 291, remarking conflict of authorities on this point; 64 Am. Dec. 441, 442, valuable note on bonds.

Distinguished in Hoyle v. Page, 41 Mich. 535, 2 N. W. 666, holding interest cannot be compounded in Michigan unless statute expressly authorizes it. Denied in County Commrs. v. King, 13 Fla. -479.

Courts. Supreme Court will follow State court's construction of its laws and Constitution, p. 206.

Cited and followed in First Nat. Bank v. Arlington, 16 Blatchf. 58, F. C. 4,806, Moore v. Young, 4 Biss. 135, F. C. 9,782, State v. Grand Trunk Ry., 3 Fed. 889, and Tioga R. R. v. Blossburg, etc., R. R., 20 Wall. 151, 22 L. 337. Cited in Perry v. Wheeler, 12 Bush, 551, refusing to be bound by Supreme Court case on Kentucky title, at variance with Kentucky decisions; First Nat. Bank v. Bennington, 16 Blatchf. 55, F. C. 4,807, following State decision on municipal railroad aid bonds.

Courts.- Supreme Court, in seeking to follow the State court's construction of its local law, will never immolate truth, justice and the law, pp. 206, 207.

Quoted in Faulkner v. Hart, 82 N. Y. 423, 37 Am. Rep. 581, Blossburg, etc., R. R. v. Tioga R. R., 5 Blatchf. 392, F. C. 1,563, and Union Bank v. Board of Commrs., 90 Fed. 8, upholding municipal bonds notwithstanding later State cases contra.

Courts.- Federal courts must follow latest State decisions on question under State law, though the earlier decisions were contra, and contracts were made in reliance upon them, per Miller, J., dissenting, pp. 207-220.

Cited and relied upon in Storrie v. Cortes, 90 Tex. 288, 290, 38 S. W. 156, 157, 35 L. R. A. 668, 669, dissenting opinion in Meyer v. City of Muscatine, 1 Wall. 393, 17 L. 567, and dissenting opinion in Riggs v. Johnson County, 6 Wall. 200, 18 L. 777, criticising majority ruling; King v. Wilson, 1 Dill. 561, F. C. 7,810, arguendo.

Statutes. What is implied in a statute is as much a part of it as what is expressed, p. 221.

Cited and principle followed in County of Wilson v. National Bank, 103 U. S. 778, 26 L. 491, implying power to issue railroad aid bonds; McKay v. Hill, 1 Hask. 286, F. C. 8,845, construing stockholders' liability act; Buckner v. Street, 1 Dill. 257, F. C. 2,098, upholding retroactive effect of amendment abolishing slavery;