of offering bank individually, and bear his indorsement, followed by that of the bank, affixed by him as president, does not give discounting bank notice that notes are individual property of such president; Mayberry v. Morris, 62 Ala. 117, Texas Banking Co. v. Turnley, 61 Tex. 369, and Blackman v. Lehman, 63 Ala. 550, 35 Am. Rep. 60, holding possession of negotiable paper indorsed in blank carries with it the title to the holder; First Nat. Bank v. Dawson, 78 Ala. 71, bank acquiring commercial paper in due course of trade, without knowledge of restrictions placed on its use by an indorser, may recover from the indorser; Trustees v. Lewis, 34 Fla. 428, 43 Am. St. Rep. 212, 16 So. 326, 26 L. R. A. 745, and Bailey v. County of Buchanan, 115 N. Y. 301, 22 N. E. 156, 6 L. R. A. 564, and n., where interest coupons payable to bearer were held to possess all the attributes of negotiable paper; Tiedeman v. Knox, 53 Md. 615, holding like rules apply to bills of lading; Ringling v. Kohn, 4 Mo. App. 63, and Tucker v. Bank, 58 N. H. 85, 87, 42 Am. Rep. 580, 583, where bonds deposited with a bank were pledged by cashier, held, pledgee could hold against depositor; Walters v. Tielkemeyer, 72 Mo. App. 377, where owner of notes was held estopped from asserting title thereto, when she had left same with an agent, who had transferred them for value to an innocent purchaser; Merritt v. Duncan, 7 Heisk. 160, 19 Am. Rep. 615, holding bona fide purchaser for value of bill conditionally accepted, but disposed of in violation of condition, may recover on same; Bank v. Johns, 22 W. Va. 524, 46 Am. Rep. 510, where bona fide purchaser of note enforced payment of same, although maker had been induced to sign same by fraud, he intending to sign a paper of entirely different character.

The following cite this case as authority for rule that the holder of a negotiable security transferable by delivery can give a title which he himself does not possess to person taking same, bona fide. for value; Railroad Co. v. National Bank, 102 U. S. 40, 26 L. 71, holding bona fide purchaser unaffected by prior equities; Gilbough v. Norfolk, etc., Ry. Co., 1 Hughes, 412, F. C. 5,419, where title to stolen railroad bonds was held to pass by delivery to purchaser, except as to such coupons as were past due; First Nat. Bank v. Johnston, 97 Ala. 661, 11 So. 692, and Coors v. German Nat. Bank, 14 Colo. 206, 23 Pac. 329, 7 L. R. A. 847, where A., having indorsed drafts in blank to B. for collection, B. wrongfully assumed to be owner and sold same to C.; dissenting opinion in Bristol Knife Co. v. Bank, 41 Conn. 430, 19 Am. Rep. 522, the majority holding, under circumstances of case, that wrongdoers could give no title; Doll v. Rezotti, 20 La. Ann. 264, 96 Am. Dec. 400, where purchaser of lost note before maturity was held to acquire good title against maker, although maker had once paid note: Consolidated Association v. Avegno, 28 La. Ann. 552, where municipal bonds were sold by party who had no title thereto; dissenting opinion in Pugh v.

Moore, 44 La. Ann. 245, 10 So. 723, the majority holding State not liable for its negotiable bonds fraudulently issued by its treasurer; Miller v. Finley, 26 Mich. 254, 12 Am. Rep. 310, holding note executed by intoxicated person valid in hands of bona fide purchaser for value; Nichols v. Sober, 38 Mich. 681, where paper was transferred to bona fide purchaser in fraud of one's partner; Robinson v. Smith, 62 Minn. 63, 64 N. W. 91, holding possession of a negotiable promissory note payable to bearer is prima facie evidence of ownership, and such is rule, whether note is transferred before or after maturity; Franklin Savings Inst. v. Heinsman, 1 Mo. App. 339, where stolen promissory notes had been negotiated; Allen v. Harris, 79 Mo. App. 494, notes wrongfully pledged by bailee held enforceable against maker; National Bank of Republic v. Young, 41 N. J. Eq. 537, 7 Atl. 490, bona fide holder of negotiable paper issued by a corporation has a right to presume that it was issued under requisite authority; Magee v. Badger, 34 N. Y. 249, 90 Am. Dec. 693, and State Bank v. Hoge, 35 N. Y. 69, and the law does not impose upon purchaser the duty of inquiry; Taft v. Chapman, 50 N. Y. 448, and Seybel v. Bank, 54 N. Y. 300, 13 Am. Rep. 591, where stolen bonds had been negotiated; Thompson v. St. Nicholas Bank, 113 N. Y. 336, 21 N. E. 59, where bonds deposited with broker were by him transferred for value; Mason v. Frick, 105 Pa. St. 167, 51 Am. Rep. 192, where finder of lost bond pledged same as security for a loan; Memphis Bethel v. Bank, 101 Tenn. 134, 45 S. W. 1073, where bonds were deposited with trustee, who pledged them for his individual debts, held pledgee will be protected to extent of amount due on debt.

Cited, arguendo, in dissenting opinions in Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U. S. 362, 24 L. 201, and Morgan v. United States, 113 U. S. 491, 28 L. 1049, 5 S. Ct. 593, in discussion as to effect that will be given rule where notes or bonds are purchased after maturity; King v. Doane, 139 U. S. 173, 35 L. 87, 11 S. Ct. 467, holding further as to rule when purchase price is greatly disproportionate to value; dissenting opinion in State ex rel. Bank v. Funding Board, 28 La. Ann. 257, as authority for holding railroad bonds guaranteed by State governed by law relating to commercial instruments; New Orleans, etc., R. R. Co. v. State, 52 Miss. 893, and Etheridge v. Gallagher, 55 Miss. 465, without special application; Lynch v. Kennedy, 34 N. Y. 152, and Chase Nat. Bank v. Faurot, 149 N. Y. 537, 44 N. E. 166, 35 L. R. A. 610, and n., in discussion as to what paper is negotiable within the meaning of the law merchant. See monographic note reviewing authorities, 64 Am. Dec. 430, 434, 435, 436; note, 98 Am. Dec. 685, and 23 Am. Rep. 16, 17.

Distinguished in Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 735, 19 L. 240, and Greenwell v. Haydon, 78 Ky. 334, 343, 39 Am. Rep. 235, 240, where bonds were purchased after date at which they became redeemable: Shaw v. Railroad Co., 101 U. S. 564, 566, 25 L. 894, 895, holding rule

not applicable to a stolen bill of lading; Lytle v. Lansing, 147 U. S. 71, 37 L. 84, 13 S. Ct. 259 (affirming S. C., 38 Fed. 212), where purchaser of municipal bonds knew their validity was being contested by municipality; Davis v. Bradley, 26 La. Ann. 556, where bill of exchange was purchased after maturity; Duckett v. National Bank, 88 Md. 23, 41 Atl. 163, where purchaser of county bonds was informed before his purchase of non-negotiable character of bonds; Arents v. Commonwealth, 18 Gratt. 779, where interest coupons were purchased after maturity.

Miscellaneous. Cited in collection of authorities in Turnbull v. Thomas, 1 Hughes, 176, F. C. 14,243, as to who is a bona fide holder of negotiable paper; State v. Bank, 5 Baxt. 97, not in point; Helfer v. Alden, 3 Minn. 336, to point indorsee must sue in his own name.

2 Wall. 123-134, 17 L. 759, HECKERS v. FOWLER.

Covenant.- Declaration in covenant setting out a contract under seal, in which defendant agreed to pay plaintiff a certain royalty for use of a patented invention, and that covenant had been broken, states a good cause of action, p. 127.

Reference.- Circuit Court has power, with consent of parties, to refer a cause to a referee to hear and determine all issues therein, p. 127.

Cited and approved in Robinson v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 16 Blatchf. 201, F. C. 11,961, in sustaining a reference. Approved, arguendo, in St. Louis Light Co. v. Edison Co., 64 Fed. 1004. Cited in Bollman v. Bollman, 6 S. C. 42, holding, in States where provision is made by statute for arbitrament of cause, common-law right is not impaired; note, 79 Am. Dec. 207.

Distinguished in Howe Co. v. Edwards, 15 Blatchf. 403, F. C. 6,784, holding court has no such power when consent of parties is not given.

Appeal and error.- Where judgment is entered in Circuit Court, pursuant to report of referee, the facts found by him are conclusive on Supreme Court on error from judgment of Circuit Court, p. 131.

Cited and principle applied in Bond v. Dustin, 112 U. S. 606, 28 L. 836, 5 S. Ct. 297, where parties in action at law in Circuit Court waive trial by jury, and no stipulation, as is required by section 649 of revised statutes, is filed, rulings of court as to admission of evidence will not be reviewed on appeal; Roberts v. Benjamin, 124 U. S. 72, 31 L. 336, 8 S. Ct. 396, and Shipman v. Straitsville Co., 158 U. S. 361, 39 L. 1016, 15 S. Ct. 887 (reversing S. C., 70 Fed. 654. 37 U. S. App. 471), both holding only questions open to review are whether there was any error of law in judgment rendered upon facts found by referee. Cited, arguendo, in Town of Lyons v. Lyons Nat. Bank, 19 Blatchf. 286, 8 Fed. 374, without special application;

Duncan v. Atchison, etc., Ry. Co., 72 Fed. 811, 44 U. S. App. 427, and note, 28 Am. Dec. 244.

Reference.- Where cause is referred to referee to hear and determine all issues, it is unnecessary that he report his finding on all issues; a report of the result is sufficient, p. 132.

Principle reaffirmed in Bancroft v. Grover, 23 Wis. 467, 99 Am. Dec. 197.

Judgments.- A judgment may be entered without application to the court upon the report of a referee, where such is the stipulation of the parties and the order of the court making the reference, p. 133.

Cited and applied in Fourth Nat. Bank v. Neyhardt, 13 Blatchf. 394, F. C. 4,991, holding it not irregular to enter a judgment, on report of a referee, without application to court; Neafie v. Cheesebrough, 14 Blatchf. 314, F. C. 10,064, holding court has no power to grant a new trial after such a judgment has been entered; note, 17 Am. Dec. 205.

Miscellaneous.- Erroneously cited in Nolan v. Colorado Min. Co., 63 Fed. 934, 27 U. S. App. 427.

2 Wall. 134, 17 L. 871, EX PARTE DUGAN.

Certiorari.- Court will refuse to hear a case on its merits at the time petition for certiorari is made, even though counsel for petitioner produces copy of record admitted by other side to be true, p. 134.

Cited to this point in Ex parte McCardle, 6 Wall. 324, 18 L. 817, and American Const. Co. v. Jacksonville Ry. Co., 148 U. S. 388, 37 L. 492, 13 S. Ct. 765.

2 Wall. 135-160, 17 L. 796, THE CIRCASSIAN.

War.- Capture and occupation of New Orleans by the blockading forces in 1862 did not terminate the blockade, p. 149.

Cited and applied in Perkins v. Rogers, 35 Ind. 151, 9 Am. Rep. 660, and Murrell v. Jones, 40 Miss. 577, in holding the occupation of city of New Orleans by Federal army did not restore to citizens thereof all rights of citizenship. Cited in Mail Co. v. Flanders, 12 Wall. 134, 20 L. 250, without special application.

War Blockade.- What will be considered as evidence of an intention to run a blockade, discussed, p. 153.

War.- Blockade may be made effectual by batteries ashore as well as by ships afloat, p. 149.

War.- Distinction between simple and public blockade, stated, p. 150.

War.- A public blockade exists until notice of its discontinuance is given, p. 150.

War.- A vessel, in sailing from a neutral port, with intent to enter a blockaded port, commits an illegal act, and is liable to capture and condemnation as prize, p. 151.

Cited and rule applied in The Admiral, 3 Wall. 615, 18 L. 60, holding a vessel which sailed from England with knowledge that certain ports were blockaded had no right to sail up to a blockaded port for purpose of seeing whether actual blockade existed; The Adula, 89 Fed. 359, following rule and condemning vessel.

Distinguished on facts in The Newfoundland, 89 Fed. 101, 103. Miscellaneous.-Cited, arguendo, in dissenting opinion in Billgerry v. Branch, 19 Gratt. 405, 100 Am. Dec. 685, the majority holding the rules of international law apply to transactions between citizens within limits of the Confederacy and residents in territory under Federal authority.

2 Wall. 160-177, 17 L. 922, FREEBORN v. SMITH.

Courts.- Territorial courts are courts of the United States, p. 173. Cited to this effect in In re Osterhaus, 18 Fed. Cas. 895, 896, where they are held to be so within meaning of act of May 12, 1864. Cited. arguendo, in Hastings v. Johnson, 2 Nev. 193, 195, and Sparrow v. Strong, 2 Nev. 365, where it is held State court has jurisdiction to hear and determine causes left pending in late United States territorial courts.

Constitutional law. Where Territory has been admitted to Union, but no provision made for disposal of cases pending on appeal in the Supreme Court, Congress may pass a subsequent act making provision for such cases, p. 175.

Cited in Koenigsberger v. Richmond Silver Min. Co., 158 U. S. 48, 39 L. 892, 15 S. Ct. 754, in construction of statute providing for admission of the Dakotas into the Union, and the erection of Federal courts therein; Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U. S. 478, 19 S. Ct. 734, holding it within power of legislature to grant a new remedy by way of review of adjudged case; Ames v. Colorado Ry. Co., 4 Dill. 257, F. C. 324, as construing statute relative to admission of territories and establishing of courts therein; dissenting opinion in Aycock v. Martin, 37 Ga. 185, as authority for holding there is no restriction on retrospective legislation so long as it does not impair the obligation of a contract; Freeland v. Williams. 131 U. S. 420, 33 L. 199, 9 S. Ct. 768, discussing retrospective legislation; note, 8 Am. Dec. 140.

Appeal and error.— Ruling of trial court on motion for new trial will not be reviewed in appellate court, p. 176.