Approved, arguendo, in Hayner v. Stanly, 8 Sawy. 223, 13 Fed. 224. Referred to, arguendo, in dissenting opinion in Mahn v. Harwood, 112 U. S. 365, 28 L. 669, 6 S. Ct. 451, and Michigan Land Co. v. Rust, 168 U. S. 593, 42 L. 592, 18 S. Ct. 209, after issue of patent the matter becomes subject to inquiry only in the courts and by judicial proceedings; Sharp v. Stephens, 6 Sawy. 50, F. C. 12,710, holding patent cannot be avoided for matter dehors the record, except by suit in equity, where fraud or mistake is directly pleaded; dissenting opinion in Morton v. Green, 2 Neb. 476, and Miller v. Donahue, 96 Wis. 504, 71 N. W. 902, without special application. See note, 12 Am. Dec. 565.

Public lands.- One officer of land office is not competent to cancel or annul the act of his predecessor, p. 535.

Cited and relied on in Noble v. Union River Ry. Co., 147 U. S. 176, 37 L. 127, 13 S. Ct. 274, holding a decision of secretary of interior that a railroad company is entitled to a right of way over public lands cannot be revoked by his successor; Emblen v. Lincoln Land Co., 94 Fed. 714, holding the decision of the secretary of the interior in a contested land case cannot be reviewed by his successor; St. Louis Pub. Schools v. Walker, 40 Mo. 401, where the government has determined a party is a rightful claimant to land and has confirmed his title, a subsequent surveyor-general has no power to review the action of the higher political authority. Principle applied in Stenberg v. State, 48 Neb. 308, 67 N. W. 191, holding, in absence of statutory authority, one county board cannot review or reverse an act of a prior board. Cited, arguendo, in Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Wright, 51 Fed. 71, without special application; United States v. Winona, etc., Ry. Co., 67 Fed. 956, 32 U. S. App. 272, in general discussion as to judicial power of officers of United States land department.

Distinguished in New Orleans v. Paine, 147 U. S. 267, 37 L. 164, 13 S. Ct. 306 (affirming S. C.. 51 Fed. 837, 2 U. S. App. 330), holding no approval of a subordinate officer can operate as a finality; Beley v. Naphtaly, 169 U. S. 364, 365, 42 L. 779, 18 S. Ct. 358 (affirming S. C., 73 Fed. 123, 44 U. S. App. 232), holding the rejection by secretary of interior of application for patent does not prevent a subsequent rehearing and issuing of patent.

Public lands.- Patents, when issued by officer who has no authority in law to grant, or where another party has a higher equity, will be pronounced void in courts of law, p. 535.

Cited and relied upon in Chamberlain v. Marshall, 8 Fed. 410, where bill in equity was dismissed because controversy, as made out, appeared to be purely legal; Richards v. Griffith, 1 Kan. App. 524, 527, 41 Pac. 198, 199, holding patent void issued by governor for school lands which had previously been sold to another party. Cited, arguendo, in Parker v. Duff, 47 Cal. 562, in discussion of powers of officers of land department.

Public lands.- Where patent has issued through ignorance or mistake of government officials, it may be set aside in equity at suit of government, p. 536.

Cited and followed in Mowry v. Whitney, 14 Wall. 440, 20 L. 859, and United States v. Leavenworth, etc., R. R. Co., 1 McCrary, 613, F. C. 15,582, both holding bill in chancery at suit of government, and not by private party, is proper mode for annulling a patent or grant by the government; Moore v. Robbins, 96 U. S. 533, 24 L. 850, and United States v. Schurz, 102 U. S. 396, 26 L. 171, both holding all control by the executive department of government over title to public lands ceases after the issuance of a patent; Mullan v. United States, 118 U. S. 278, 30 L. 173, 6 S. Ct. 1045 (affirming S. C., 7 Sawy. 475, 10 Fed. 792), where coal lands had been selected and listed as school lands, contrary to the statute permitting the listing of school lands; United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., 128 U. S. 364, 365, 369, 32 L. 461, 462, 9 S. Ct. 96, 97, applying rule to patent for invention; McCormick Machine Co. v. Aultman, 169 U. S. 609, 42 L. 876, 18 S. Ct. 444, holding the patent office has no power to set aside or annul a patent regularly issued; Le Roy v. Clayton, 2 Sawy. 501, F. C. 8,268, holding a patent for land regularly issued cannot be attacked in collateral proceedings; United States v. Tichenor, 8 Sawy. 149, 12 Fed. 421, United States v. Curtner, 11 Sawy. 414, 26 Fed. 298, Brewster v. Kansas City, etc., Ry. Co., 25 Fed. 243, and United States v. Williams, 12 Sawy. 148, 30 Fed. 315, all reaffirm the rule: United States v. Colgate, 22 Blatchf. 412, 21 Fed. 318, holding, where suit is brought by United States to repeal a patent for an invention, an injunction will not be granted, pendente lite, to restrain the commencement or prosecution of suits for infringement; United States v. Culver, 52 Fed. 83, and United States v. Central Pacific Co., 84 Fed. 220, where patent has issued for mineral lands as for agricultural lands; Houck v. Kelsey, 17 Kan. 336, holding, where pre-emption has been fraudulently obtained, a third party having no interest or equity in land cannot disturb title Cited, arguendo, in Maxwell Land Grant Case, 121 U. S. 380, 30 L. 958, 7 S. Ct. 1028, holding further as to necessary averments and proofs in such cases; Wright v. Roseberry, 121 U. S. 517, 30 L. 1047, 7 S. Ct. 998, Bank v. Duncan, 52 Miss. 750, and Consolidated Light Co. v. Edison Co., 23 Blatchf. 413, 25 Fed. 720, without special application; United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U. S. 281, 31 L. 750, 8 S. Ct. 854, holding, when it is apparent the only purpose of bill is to benefit claimants other than the government, it will be dismissed; Wisconsin Cent. Ry. Co. v. United States, 164 U. S. 207, 209, 41 L. 405, 406, 17 S. Ct. 50, 51, holding the government is not bound by the act of its officers, making an unauthorized payment, under misconstruction of law; Stimson Land Co. v. Rawson, 62 Fed. 429, holding patent obtained fraudulently or unlawfully cannot be annulled by an officer of the executive branch of government

Approved, arguendo, in Horsky v. Moran, 21 Mont. 356, 53 Pac. 1068, and United States v. San Pedro Co., 4 N. Mex. 291, 17 Pac. 403, officer who issues patent acts ministerially, not judicially.

Boundary. Boundaries of Indian grant, when survey was made in presence of representatives of both parties to grant, and has been acquiesced in for more than thirty years, cannot be made the subject of dispute by reference to courses and distances called for in patent, p. 537.

Cited and relied on in Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U. S. 523, 37 L. 544, 13 S. Ct. 736, holding a boundary line acquiesced in by States or Provinces for a great number of years is just as binding on them as such a boundary would be on private parties.

Public lands.- Lands lying within limits of Fort Leavenworth military reservation, as surveyed in 1830, are not subject to patent, p. 537.

Cited in Benson v. United States, 146 U. S. 331, 36 L. 994, 13 S. Ct. 62, holding jurisdiction of United States extends over entire reservation and is not limited to portion occupied for military purposes.

Miscellaneous.- Cited in United States v. Payne, 147 U. S. 690, 37 L. 333, 13 S. Ct. 443, as authority for holding a scire facias to annul a patent is an original cause. Cited incidentally in United States v. Bell Telephone Co., 167 U. S. 240, 42 L. 154, 17 S. Ct. 810, and Sanborn v. Vance, 69 Mich. 226, 37 N. W. 274. Cited in Gibson v. Chouteau, 39 Mo. 594, and in Magwire v. Tyler, 40 Mo. 437, but not in point.

2 Wall. 538-550, 17 L. 833, THE ANN CAROLINE.

Collision.- Vessel on starboard tack, if closehauled, has a right to keep her course, and one on port tack, although closehauled, must give way or be answerable for consequences, p. 544.

Reaffirmed in Bentley v. Coyne, 4 Wall. 511, 18 L. 459.

Collision.- Rule, that when two vessels are approaching each other on opposite tacks, both having wind free, one on port side shall give way and pass to right, does not apply when its observ. ance would likely produce a collision, p. 545.

Admiralty. The obligation of a stipulator is the same as that of a surety, and consequently his liability is limited by the terms of his contract, p. 548.

Cited to this effect in The Steam Propeller Belle, 5 Ben. 59, F. C. 1270, holding, where decree was rendered against vessel, libellant was entitled to interest from date of stipulation, the terms of stipulation having made the rules of court a part of contract. Cited in The Sydney, 47 Fed. 262, 263, holding, under stipulation for value

upon the release of a vessel, obligors are not liable for interest on sum stipulated, except on default in complying with terms of stipulation; The Glide, 72 Fed. 203, 25 U. S. App. 636, stipulators are not technically parties to a cause, though bound by decree.

Admiralty. Stipulators on bond for release of vessel attached under libel for collision cannot be made liable for more than the amount assumed in stipulation as value of vessel, with costs as stipulated, p. 549.

Rule reaffirmed and followed in The Steamer Webb, 14 Wall. 418, 20 L. 777, and The Wanata, 95 U. S. 605, 615, 24 L. 464, 466. Cited in In re Harris, 57 Fed. 244, 14 U. S. App. 506, holding court may require bond shall contain a stipulation for interest from date thereof; extended in The Manitoba, 122 U. S. 102, 30 L. 1097, 7 S. Ct. 1161, holding obligors on bond are liable for interest from date of decree of District Court.

Collision. Measure of damages incurred by party whose vessel has been sunk by collision is the value of vessel, p. 550.

Cited, arguendo, in The Baltimore, 8 Wall. 385, 386, 19 L. 465, holding the maxim restitutio in integnum applies as measure of damages in admiralty cases; Place v. The Steamship Norwich, 1 Ben. 99, 100, F. C. 11,202, where act of 1851 is carefully examined and its provisions construed.

Admiralty.- Where decree against stipulators in Circuit Court is affirmed in Supreme Court, libellants are not of right entitled to interest on judgment rendered in Circuit Court, p. 550.

Cited to this effect in The Alaska, 44 Fed. 503, and The North Star, 62 Fed. 87, 22 U. S. App. 242, whether libellants shall be allowed interest is a matter within discretion of appellate court.

Miscellaneous.- Cited in United States v. Ames, 99 U. S. 41, 25 L. 299, and in The Oregon, 158 U. S. 211, 39 L. 954, 15 S. Ct. 814, as containing a discussion of powers of Admiralty Courts.

2 Wall. 550-561, 17 L. 862, THE MORNING LIGHT.

Collision.- A vessel in rear of another will not be held strictly to rule which obliges her to keep out of way of one ahead, when it is so dark that vessel ahead cannot be seen by former, pp. 555, 557.

Cited in The City of Merida, 24 Fed. 234, but burden of proof rests on rear vessel to show that she used every reasonable precaution to avoid collision.

Collision.- Inevitable accident, as applied to a case of collision at sea, defined, pp. 556, 560.

Cited with approval in The Mabey and Cooper, 14 Wall. 215, 20 L. 882, want of due care having been shown, the defense "inevitable

accident," was not sustained; The Lady Pike, 21 Wall, 17, 22 L. 504 (overruling S. C., 2 Biss. 144, F. C. 7,985), The Mary Powell, 36 Fed. 599, The Columbia, 48 Fed. 326, and The Michigan, 52 Fed. 507, holding defense cannot be sustained where it is shown the person in charge of the deck was incompetent, unskilful or negligent; The Wanata, 95 U. S. 610, 24 L. 464, a vessel which has failed to display proper signal lights cannot set up accident was inevitable; Killam v. The Schooner Erie, 3 Cliff. 459, 461, F. C. 7,765, holding collision caused by failure to display proper lights and to keep a properly appointed and stationed lookout, was not inevitable accident; Ayer v. The Steamer Glaucus, 4 Cliff. 169, F. C. 683, where collision was caused by failure of both vessels to observe rules of navigation prescribed by Congress, it could not be considered an inevitable accident; The Ship John Tucker, 5 Ben. 370, F. C. 7,431, holding accident not inevitable; Arbo v. Brown, 9 Fed. 319, and The Mary L. Cushing, 60 Fed. 111, where steamer, safely moored for all ordinary purposes, broke loose during storm and caused damage, accident was held inevitable; The Florence P. Hall, 14 Fed. 416, and The Ohio, 91 Fed. 553, 62 U. S. App. 100, holding further as to burden of proof where inevitable accident is alleged; The Lilian Vigus, 22 Fed. 748, where injury is caused by one vessel pounding against another in a storm, and master of vessel knew that storm was approaching, accident will not be considered inevitable; The Olympia, 61 Fed. 122, 127, 22 U. S. App. 69, where accident was due to breaking of steamer's tiller rope, the burden is on her to rebut presumption of negligence. Cited, arguendo, in The B. B. Saunders, 19 Fed. 120, The Normandie, 43 Fed. 153, and The Leland, 19 Fed. 777, as to burden of proof where action is brought for a marine tort; also, Union Steamship Co. v. Nottinghams, 17 Gratt. 120, 91 Am. Dec. 380, holding, in action for damages for collision on the water, negligence on part of defendants in doing injury is the gravamen of the action.

Collision. When respondent alone is in fault libellant may recover; if libellant, then libel must be dismissed; if both, then damages must be apportioned, p. 557.

Cited and relied upon in The Maria Martin, 12 Wall. 43, 20 L. 253, holding, where one vessel did not observe every precaution to prevent a collision caused by a flagrant fault of the other, the damages caused thereby should be equally divided between them; to same effect is The Continental, 14 Wall. 361, 20 L. 804, The Sunnyside, 91 U. S. 215, 23 L. 305, and The America, 92 U. S. 438, 23 L. 727, all holding likewise; The Clarita and Clara, 23 Wall. 13, 23 L. 149, where injury was held to be due entirely to carelessness in management of one vessel; The Atlas, 93 U. S. 313, 319, 23 L. 865, 868, holding, where the cargo of a vessel not at fault is lost through the collision of two other vessels equally at fault, the owner of same may proceed against either of offending vessels, and