merely political general, over the head of Scott. That this proposition, coming from the political friends of the President, should excite the sensibilities of Scott, with the idea that he was to be supplanted in the command of the army, was most natural. That such an idea was not unjust to the President or his friends in Congress, was sufficiently shown by subsequent events, when the attempt was openly made and nearly succeeded,1 to appoint a lieutenant-general to the command of the Ameri can army. About the same time-although but one week after Congress had declared that "war existed,"-Scott was informed by the Secretary of War, that much impatience was already felt, that he had not placed himself on the route to the Rio Grande. It was under these circumstances, which candor will admit, were well calculated to irritate a sensitive mind-that Scott, in one of his communications to the Secretary of War, wrote the following passage: "Not an advantageous step can be taken in a forward march, without the confidence that all is well behind. If insecure in that quarter, no general can put his whole heart and mind into the work to be done in front. I am therefore not a little alarmed, nay, crippled in my energies, by the knowledge of the impatience in question, and I beg to say I fear no other danger. 66 My intentions have been, after making all preliminary arrangements here, to pass down the Ohio and the Mississippi, to see, or to assure myself by correspondence, 1 Proceedings of the 2d Session of the 29th Congress. that the volunteers, on whom we are mostly to rely in the prosecution of the existing war, are rapidly assembling for the service; to learn the probable time of their readiness to advance upon Mexico; to ascertain if their supplies of every kind are in place, or are likely to be in place in sufficient time; to hasten one and the other; to harmonize the movements of volunteers, and to modify their routes, (if necessary,) so that all, or at least a sufficient number, shall arrive at the indicated points on the Mexican frontier at the best periods, and as far as practicable about the same time. All that I have but sketched, I deem to be not only useful to success, but indispensable. As a soldier I make this assertion, without the fear of contradiction from any honest and candid soldier. "Against the ad captandum condemnation of all other persons, whoever may be designated for the high command in question, there can be no reliance, in his absence, other than the active, candid, and steady support of his government. If I cannot have that sure basis to rest upon, it will be infinitely better for the country, (not to speak of my personal security,) that some other commander of the new army against Mexico should be selected. No matter who he may be, he shall at least be judged and supported by me, in this office and everywhere else, as I would desire, if personally in that command, to be judged myself and supported. "My explicit meaning is, that I do not desire to place myself in the most perilous of all positions—a fire upon my rear from Washington, and a fire in front from the Mexicans." 1 Scott's Letter, 21st of May, 1846.-Appendix to the Congressional Globe, p. 650. In a reply to this communication, Mr. Marcy, Secretary of War, in a letter of the 25th of May,' assumed that this passage referred to the President only, said that the country would feel impatient if the volunteers were to remain. inactive on the Rio Grande till the 1st of September, and finally concluded by informing Scott that his services would be confined to the city of Washington, and to the preparations for the vigorous prosecution of hostilities. against Mexico. The letter of Marcy, dated May 25th, General Scott did not receive till the close of the day, and it was immediately replied to. In his answer, Scott denied that he intended to charge either the President or Secretary with any unworthy motives or indirect designs. He acknowledged the courtesy and kindness of both, but explained that he meant other persons in high quarters, who might be willing enough either to misrepresent him to the President, or impair his public influence. He also asked to be ordered to the army on "the following, or any other day the President might designate." In the commencement of his reply to Mr. Marcy, Scott had used an expression which is now memorable as an example of the ease with which the public mind may be abused, of the malignity with which partisans pursue 1 Appendix to the Congressional Globe, 651. The sufficient answer to this impatience, and the crude ideas of war formed by Mr. Secretary Marcy, is contained in the fact that the advance of the army, under General Worth, did not leave the valley of the Rio Grande till the 20th of August, and General Taylor could not leave Camargo till the 5th of September. From May till September nothing was done, as Scott had anticipated, but prepare for the coming campaign. their objects, and of the final triumph of true greatness over all the malice and the intrigues of jealous or hostile politicians. The expression was caught up, and repeated, and returned, in squibs and witticisms, by hostile newspapers and by doubtful friends, till, for a time, the fame of the Hero of Niagara, alike dear to his country and to martial renown, seemed obscured in the mists of folly and of prejudice. Even the justice of the country seemed about to depart, and leave to a ribald ridicule the pen of history and the decrees of government. But such an ingratitude and so gross a malice could not endure. The same administration, which had thus coolly confined Scott to Washington, was compelled, in its necessities, to demand his services. He hurried to the Gulf of Mexico, and, in the splendid siege of Vera Cruz-the storm of Cerro Gordo-and the well-ordered and successful march to the city of the Montezumasbrushed away and obliterated forever the memory of the recent past, and silenced the voice of ridicule in the shouts of applause. The once celebrated phrase now remains only as a monument to the folly of those who used it to pervert the sense and abuse the justice of the people. It points a moral, if it does not adorn a tale. CHAPTER IV. Campaign on the Rio Grande continued.-Movement of the Army.March to Monterey.-Battle of Monterey.-Armistice.-March to Saltillo.-Wool's Corps.-Tampico.-Occupation of Victoria.-Conclusion of the Campaign.-General Tayior's Despatches.-Results. FROM the period at which the American army occupied Metamoras, after the battle of Resaca de la Palma, both the general government at home, and the officers of the army on the Rio Grande, were busied with preparations for an advance into the interior of Mexico. The Rio Grande was assumed as the military base-line of operations, although the real base was necessarily the Mississippi. Quartermasters and Commissariat Departments became at once very active: wagons, horses, provisions, and supplies of all sorts were to be found and purchased chiefly in the valley of the Ohio; while military equipments were to be furnished from the Atlantic arsenals. More than three months were consumed in these preparations. In the mean time, the Mexican villages of Reinosa, Comargo, Mier, and Revilla surrendered, and were occupied. Comargo, a town about one hundred and eighty miles above the mouth of the Rio Grande, was the point selected as the depot of supplies. Here the various It is due to General Jessup Quartermaster-general-to say, that the official correspondence proves that he was most assiduous, industrious, and successful in the performance of the very responsible duties of his office. |