object was not to inform the absentees as to what had been said in their absence. But I soon learned that his object was quite different, for if my recollection serves me rightly, that gentleman spent over an hour in defending the consistency of the Whig party, and maintaining its claims to be considered the party of reform. Now, Sir, I would address to that gentleman and his friends the sentiment if not the language, addressed to the Woman's Rights Convention a few years since by Sojourner Truth, that if he and his friends are so much in favor of reforms, why do they not act it out "and not make such a long linkum about it?"

Sir, what is the business before us? We are now assembled for the purpose of fixing the basis of representation for the people in the House of Representatives of the Commonwealth.

Now what are the principles that should govern us on this occasion? Let us suppose that the whole people of this Commonwealth could be assembled in one mass meeting, without previously existing institutions, for the purpose of transacting their business, and providing for its future transaction. What would be the position of each person? Would not every individual stand upon a perfect equality? Do not all your laws regard every human individual as being upon a perfect equality Is not the murder of the smallest child, or of the greatest idiot punished with the same severity as the murder of the greatest statesman? Certainly, so your law regards it. They are each, as individuals, equally recognized and protected so far as legal enactments go. But in such an assembly as I have supposed what would be the natural condition of things? would not the heads of familes, from the position in which they are placed by Providence, and indeed from the very nature of things, be those who would speak for their families? Most certainly; the heads of families are the natural representatives of those families.

By our laws, and by common consent, male inhabitants of the age of twenty-one years are competent to act for themselves, and here you give them, by common consent, a potential voice in public affairs, and they speak for the rest. Now let us suppose that this class of persons come together, and they find their assembly too numerous for the transaction of business with despatch, and it becomes necessary therefore to institute a representative system by which each can be equally represented. What course would they then pursue? Of course they would hit upon some plan or arrangement by which these representatives could be elected, and what would it be? If ten or a dozen of them, or as many hundred,

[June 23d.

lived out one side by themselves, fenced in by hill or rivers or artificial lines, and fifty thousand in another place, would these ten or a dozen, or as many hundreds, come forward and claim that they ought to have the right to elect as many representatives as the fifty thousand in the other place? Would any man think of making such a suggestion in such an assembly? I believe not. I believe it would not suggest itself to an individual of them. But what would be the principle which would govern them? They doubtless would take into consideration all the circumstances of the case, and if the population is divided into towns, districts and neighborhoods, where they could conveniently come together in their respective localities to elect their representatives, they would endeavor to arrange the matter upon that convenient basis, and it is possible that they would not attempt the formation of a system of perfect equality. They would sacrifice something of this to answer the purposes of convenience, and to render the plan feasible, at the same time keeping in view a certain degree of practicable equality.

Now, Sir, it strikes me that we should follow out some plan similar to that. I, for one, am no Utopian, I do not believe in carrying out the principle of perfect equality in all respects, and under all circumstances, though it should never be lost sight of, and should have its weight in the formation of any system.

Now if we attempt to fix upon any unjust system in which equality is wholly disregarded, or greatly outraged, what will be the result? Will it stand? I was pleased to hear the gentleman from Adams, the other day, allude to the case of Rhode Island, and approvingly too. It was something new to hear it approved from that quarter, as the party with which he acts took such strong ground against it. I happen to come from a section of the Commonwealth which is near to one portion of that State which participated to a large extent in that controversy, and I cannot forget the lesson then taught me, and which I promulgated; and I feel myself committed upon the doctrine then put forward.

What were the circumstances which brought about the Rhode Island contest? Under the old Charter they had a town representation, which was fixed and unchangeable. That was well enough in the first period of her existence. But in the process of time, manufacturing and commercial interests centered in one end of the State, and the towns there grew out of all proportion, compared with those located in the other end of the State, and it finally resulted, this system of town representation continuing, that less than one

third of the inhabitants of the State, those residing in the southern portion of it, held the whole power of legislation in their hands. And the people of the northern part of the State, who resided in towns newly built up by manufacturing interests were nearly disfranchised. They had not their legitimate share of voice and influence in conducting the affairs of state. They had petitioned their legislature again and again upon the subject, but in that case, as in all others of a similar nature, those having the political power would not relinquish it. They called several conventions, but they were based upon the system of representation contained in the old Charter, the same system upon which their legislature was based, and of course they failed of redress, because those who composed the conventions held the same opinions as the legislature which called them together, and they always consisted of a majority elected by a minority of the people. That majority never would yield anything. The towns in the south part of the State never would give up to the towns of the northern part of the State, any of the power which they held in their hands. This was one of the prominent causes, and perhaps the strongest which lead to the trouble in that State.

Another was that under the Charter the right of suffrage was limited to those possessing a freehold estate, and to the oldest sons of freeholders, and that comprised not more than one-fourth part of those who, under the laws of Massachusetts would be entitled to vote.

These were the two points of issue, on which the people of that State raised the cry of equal suffrage and equal representation. They found they could not achieve their objects through the legislature, or through conventions called by the legislature, and they put themselves upon the great American doctrine, which is expressed in the seventh article of your Bill of Rights,-the right of the people to reform their government when and how they choose. They called a mass meeting of the people and that sent out a call for a Convention. The towns sent in their delegates, and they proceeded to frame a Constitution of government, and a very good Constitution it was. It was submitted to the people, and nearly threefourths of all the men in the State voted for it. Even a majority of the landholders, and legal voters under the old system voted for the new Constitution. Yet that did not prevent those who before had the power, from holding on to it, and they did hold on. Both claimed the power, and both elected their governor. What was the result? Here was a conflict and your State was called in to decide it. Your governor loaned the

[June 23d.

arms of the State to put down the suffrage party, The federal government was called in too, and it assumed to decide which was the true government of the State, and it decided against the people and the suffrage party was, for a time, put down. Notwithstanding they failed for the time being, they have at last triumphed, and now they have the control of the State, and this very season they are about to have another Convention to revise the imperfect Constitution extorted from their opponents, the legislature having already passed a preliminary act for that purpose.

Now, Sir, that case presents a striking lesson to us. It shows that it will not answer to commit great injustice, and if you undertake to put the political power into one part of the State, and into the hands of the minority in one section, you will find that trouble will ensue, because the majority in other parts of the State will not peaceably submit.

Now, what is the objection to the Report presented by the majority of the Committee. It is not, in my opinion, simply that it makes a distinction between the large and the small towns in favor of the latter, and not because there is an inequality of political rights as between the inhabitants of the two, for that, under any system we can adopt, and especially if we preserve town lines, must exist; but it is because it takes the political power from one section of the State, and puts it into another section. Let us look at its operation. Take the five western counties of the State. They have a population of 292,904, and under this majority system they would elect one hundred and seventy representatives, which is one representative for about every 1,722 individuals. Then take the six south-eastern counties,

They have a population of 254,121. Under this syitem they would elect only ninety-six representatives, which is one for every 2,647 individuals. So that it takes about one and two-thirds of a man in the south-eastern section to be equal to one man in the western part of the State.

Now, Sir, it seems to me that a system so unjust as this cannot be adopted, and that the people will not sanction it, not because there is a difference between towns lying side by sidefor that I consider of no great importance, for their interests are usually nearly identical-but because you take from one section of the State the political power which belongs to it, and carry it into another, creating thereby a sectional inequality. I think that is unjust and I do not believe it will be assented to by a majority of the people of this Commonwealth. I do not doubt that the population of the western part of the State is as safe a depository of power as any

population of the State. I have the highest opinion of the character of the rural population of the western counties, but at the same time I do not think they ought to have this disproportionate share of influence and voice in the affairs of the State. What is the duty of your legislature? It is to legislate for the whole State. Now is it to be presumed that the rural population of the western counties can legislate better than the mechanics, the artizans and the tradesmen of the eastern portion of the State? I think not. I think that that portion of the State is the least affected by the laws of the State, and whose interests demand the least legislation. The farmers working upon their farms think little about the laws, and, indeed, hardly need them. They wish to violate no other man's right. They live and labor in simplicity and happiness in their domestic homes, and do not come in contact with the rights and interests of others, as much as men do in large towns and cities, where there is a constant jostling and clashing of rights and interests, and where individual rights are constantly liable to be trampled upon. Nor are they able to comprehend as well, what the rights and interests of the population of the eastern part of the State are, as those who immediately represent those rights and interests? There are great questions coming up which affect the rights of labor in particular, and which will constitute the great mass of legislation in the future, and which can only be understood by those immediately interested such as the rights and interests of labor in our manufacturing establishments, our banking institutions, and the like. These questions hardly touch the farmers, while they interest every one of the large towns to a greater or less extent.

It seems to me that we should adopt a system which should be, as far as it can be without inconvenience, practically equal; and I think our western friends will not demand more of us, as a matter of justice. What reason can they present, why they should have more? The idea that they should have it because they live in small towns, is wholly untenable. I cannot see that any right grows out of that. The right belongs not to the locality but to the man, as such.

Now, Sir, I for one, am willing to concede something for the matter of convenience, and I am in favor of adopting a plan which shall in fact give to those very people more than they can justly elaim upon the score of equality. I will adopt a system which shall be different from the present one, and better, if possible-otherwise it strikes me we had better not touch the subject at all. But what is the objection to the present system? It has been shown here, that between counties, for

[June 23d,

instance, the present system is very equal, taking one year after another for a period of ten years. But why take ten years together? Why not take fifty years or a hundred years? Why let a portion of the towns exhaust the right of representation in the two or three first years of the decennial period, and be debarred from all representation thereafter? That system is not just. You have one hundred and twenty-seven towns which can send representatives during the first portion of the decennial period, and then cannot send any during the remainder of the time. Now suppose the section of the State, sending those representatives, have the majority, and with it the power, at the commencement of that decennial period, before the end comes round, the power has passed into another portion of the State, and the majority is in another quarter. Now this thing does and must work evil, and nothing but evil.

Another great evil of the present system is the general ticket system in large towns and cities, because it gives to them disproportionate influence and power. Now, I am in favor of districting your cities, all of them. They have no claim to corporate representation, because they were broken up as towns the moment they adopted a city government. In the outset, then, I go for districting all cities.

Then, as a matter of convenience, I would take a portion of the towns sufficiently large to work a practical degree of equality, and make districts of them also; and those below that size I would group into districts. What may be the precise number to work out that plan I am unable to say. I have been in hopes of seeing some gentleman bring forward a scheme which would answer that purpose.

Again, there is a general expectation that we should somewhat reduce the number of the House, and I, for one, am in favor of such reduction. I would not have a small House, for I do not be, lieve anything would be gained by it, and too large a number renders it inconvenient to transact business. I am ready to approve of a plan for a House which shall contain from three hundred to three hundred and fifty members, more or less, and I think we should reduce it to about that number. I have been endeavoring for a day or two past to hit upon some plan, and I have finally adopted as a basis, eighteen hundred as the minimum number of inhabitants which should entitle a town to one representative. Taking that as the basis, and four thousand as the mean increasing ratio, and I believe we shall arrive at a House of from three hundred to three hundred and fifty. I have not carried it out to ascertain exactly how the fractional towns will stand. But upon that

Thursday,]

[June 23d.

The

(I think,) that any actual representation existed in the boroughs or towns of England. same gentleman also told us that for three hundred years the municipalities and towns of Hungary enabled that nation to withstand the power of the House of Austria. Now, the towns of Hungary were never represented, as such, in their national diet or general assembly at all. That body was composed of representatives from the counties and not from the towns. Both of the illustrations which the gentleman has drawn to show the strength of corporations from the incident of representation therefore, entirely fail.

The gentleman for Erving has said that you would destroy the corporations by taking away from them the right of representation. Well, Sir, of course if the preceding part of my remarks be true, this position cannot be correct.

But the gentleman for Erving, the gentleman for Wilbraham, (Mr. Hallett,) and several other gentlemen have attempted to show that the right of representation has always existed in the towns of this Commonwealth. Now, it seems to me that this is equally an error as to the matter of fact. For several years after the settlement of the State there was no representation by towns at all. At first it was a representation by a body of freemen comprising only a small portion of the population, and which had no reference whatever to towns. Afterwards it was a representation by plantations or settlements, without any reference to corporate rights. In fact, the whole argument of the gentleman for Erving, (Mr. Griswold,) seems more in point to prove that we should have a representation of freeholders, or a representation by churches, than it is to prove that we should have a representation by towns. There is certainly no argument to be drawn in favor of representation by towns, from any usage of the Colony or Province of Massachusetts Bay. The representation in this province was always limited to the freeholders, and the right of voting and the right of representation was confined to the church members. I repeat, the whole argument to be drawn from the history and usage of this Commonwealth is much stronger in favor of adopting a basis of representation founded upon church membership and upon freehold than it is in favor of adopting town representation. But the gentleman might as well undertake to argue that because a child went upon all fours when it left its mother's arms, it should go upon all-fours after it has grown up to be a man, as to argue that we should adopt any system because it was practised in the Colony of Massachusetts Bay, two hundred years ago. Afterwards, in 1692, there was a representation of towns, it is true, but it

was a representation also of property, of freeholders, and confined to the church.

But without dwelling upon this matter longer, I wish to show something in relation to the first Constitution of the State in 1780, which the gentleman for Berlin did not state. The idea that reference is made to town representation in that Constitution is entirely a fallacy; it is all a mistake. The gentleman for Wilbraham, after attempting to show from history and usage, that we have always had town representation, after showing, as he said, that corporations have always had the right of representation, comes to our State Constitution, and undertakes to prove from that the same right. Now, Sir, the Constitution of 1780 is as plain as words can make it, that there is no right of corporate representation, nor anything of that kind, recognized by that Constitution. If it had been in these words: "there shall be no right of corporate representation or representation by towns" it could not have been more explicit than it is now to my mind. This view of the subject was referred to by the gentleman from Cambridge, (Mr. Sargent,) in part, but he did not quote quite far enough to give its full force. The chapter upon this subject commences:

"HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

"Article 1. There shall be in the legislature of the Commonwealth, a representation of the PEOPLE, annually elected, and founded upon the principle of equality.

"Art. 2. And in order to provide for a representation of the CITIZENS of this Commonwealth, founded upon the principle of equality, every corporate town containing one hundred and fifty ratable polls, may elect one representative," &c.

This representation by towns is here adopted, as a means merely, as a convenient mode of producing an "equal representation of the PEOPLE of the Commonwealth." That is what the representation is. It is a representation of the CITIZENS of the Commonwealth, and the representation by towns is only a mode for accomplishing that end. It might as well have said that in order to bring about a "representation of the citizens of the Commonwealth, founded upon the principle of equality," there should be a representation from districts, or from counties, or from churches, or from any other association of men; yet if it had been so, no man would have supposed that gave a particular district or church, the right to have a representative here. And no such meaning can possibly attach to the expression here used, as to make it give the right of representation to the towns.

Representation of corporations is not a right inherent in them. It does not belong to them in