help, and turn to these small towns as to the Mecca of their political hopes. So, Sir, is it with regard to the mutual dependence of towns upon each other. I have seen efforts made by gentlemen of strong party politics, and doubtless for the accomplishment of party ends, to endeavor to throw seeds of discord between the towns in various portions of the State; and gentlemen from the city here have made strong animadversions in their comparisons of the relative representation of Franklin and Bristol. What is Bristol to them, or they to Bristol? They do not represent Bristol.

Again, Sir, let me tell gentlemen that the small towns or the middle sized towns in Bristol feel no jealousy towards the small towns in Franklin. They hail each other as brethren. And why? Because they know that the centre of population is within three miles of Boston, and that there it aggregates; and, while they do not mean to have any injustice done, they mean to protect their own rights, and expect their neighbors who are similarly situated in Franklin, to come and help them, so that they may mutually help each other.

Now let us see if, by any system of town representation, we are going to injure the rights o population, as such; for it has been argued here as if we were about to commit some great injustice, and gentlemen ask you, with long faces and palpitating hearts, "Are you going to vest the whole political power in the towns?" No, Sir. But they reply, "you put a negative power in the hands of a few voters in towns." Why, Sir, every Constitution in the United States, and every incorported city, so far as I know, vests a negative power in one man. We all grant that we have tolerably equal laws now; and having them, what happens? Why, Sir, that they cannot be changed; that no law can be passed without the agreement of all. The voters must agree to a proposed law through the governor, the population through the Senate, and the family of municipalities must agree through their representatives in the Assembly. If a law is passed by the House of Representatives which is obnoxious to the people, then, when it goes into the Senate, which is, as we have based it, strictly the people's house, it is there rejected; and if the Senate and the House of Representatives pass a law which is obnoxious to the voters, then, when it goes to the governor, he vetoes it; and thus, when the municipalities through the House, and the population through the Senate, and the voters through the governor, are all convinced that any proposition is one which should be adopted as a law, then it becomes the law of the land, and not till then; and thus no injustice can be done.

Holding these views, and as I believe there is

[June 23d.

no amendment now pending, I have prepared an amendment to the Majority Report, which amendment, with the permission of the Convention, I will read. It is to strike out all after the word "Resolved," in the Report, and insert the following:

That the Constitution be so revised, and altered, that the representation of the Commonwealth be apportioned as follows:

Every town, of a less number than one thousand inhabitants, shall be entitled to five Representatives, in each ten years, with an additional Representative for the year when the valuation of estates shall be settled.

Any two of such towns may, by a vote of a major part of the legal voters of each, at legal meetings thereof, unite together in a District, which shall be entitled to a Representative each year, and which shall continue for a period of not less than five years, excepting the year in which the valuation of estates is settled.

Every town of one thousand inhabitants, and of less than four thousand, shall be entitled to one Representative each year.

Every town of four thousand inhabitants, and of less than eight thousand, shall be entitled to two Representatives each year.

Every town of eight thousand inhabitants, and of less than twelve thousand, shall be entitled to three Representatives each year.

Every city or town of twelve thousand inhabitants, and of less than fifteen thousand, shall be entitled to four Representatives each year.

Every city or town of fifteen thousand inhabitants and upwards, shall be entitled to one Representative, and as many additional in each year as the number of times five thousand may be contained in the whole number of the inhabitants thereof.

Resolved, That this apportionment be based upon the census of 1850, until a new census be taken.

Resolved, That the Senate, at its first session after this Constitution shall have been adopted, and at its first session after the next State census shall have been taken, and at its first session next after each decennial State census thereafterwards, shall apportion the number of Representatives to which each town and city shall be entitled, and shall cause the same to be seasonably published; and in all apportionments after the first, the numbers which shall entitle any city or town to two, three, four or more Representatives, shall be so adjusted, in proportion, as hereinbefore provided, that the whole number of Representatives, exclusive of those which may be returned by towns of less than one thousand inhabitants, shall never exceed three hundred and seventy.

Resolved, That no town hereafter be incorporated with a privilege of representation as such, containing less than fifteen hundred inhabitants.

Resolved, That each city in this Commonwealth shall be divided, by such means as the legislature may provide, into districts of contiguous territory, as nearly equal in population as may be, for the

election of Representatives, which districts shall not be changed oftener than once in five years: provided, however, that no one district shall be entitled to elect more than three Representatives.

If the Committee will allow me, I will call their attention to the various reasons on which these departures--as they may, perhaps, seem to be departures-from the principles on which town representation is based. I have generally stated them, and I propose to state them in detail, so that the proposition may be fully understood.

The first proposition is that every town having a less number than one thousand inhabitants shall be entitled to five representatives in each period of ten years. I have not proposed alternate years because of difficulties which might arise when their local interests are at stake at any given time, thus tying up a town in regard to its representation at the very time when it most needs a representative.

Then, in the year in which the valuation is settled I propose that every town shall have a representative to look after its affairs.

Of these towns having less than one thousand inhabitants, there are sixty-four, which would give thirty-two representatives to these towns. There are then two hundred and eleven towns having between one thousand and four thousand inhabitants, each of which has a representative every year. There are then thirty towns having a population varying from four thousand to eight thousand, each entitled to two representatives. There are then seven towns having between eight thousand and twelve thousand inhabitants each, entitled to three representatives, and three is the largest number of representatives which any town is entitled to send, which has not population sufficient to entitle it to be made a city, and that, I will state in passing, is one reason why I have chosen that the representative districts in the cities may have a representation equal to the largest number of representatives which any town can elect, and no more. There will then be seven towns having four representatives each, one town having seven representatives, and one having twenty-eight, making in all a House containing three hundred and eighty-seven members.

The next provision is that the Senate, to be provided for hereafter, shall, in the course of apportionment, provide such a number that the House of Representatives shall not, as apportioned, exceed four hundred at any time. Thus giving an opportunity for increase on one side, and cutting down the House to a proper size, and at the same time seeing to it, that the power shall be kept in the hands of the country, and in the hands of the middle-sized towns, as against the large

[June 23d.

aggregations in cities. It is so provided that when, from the increase of the population of the State, it is necessary to cut down the House, that diminution shall fall upon the cities and larger towns in proportion. It is, at the same time demonstrated to be a fact, that the small towns are decreasing in size from year to year, so that, by the natural process of events, they cut themselves down. Therefore, I have said that the numbers shall be apportioned so that the House shall never be larger than three hundred and seventy, exclusive of those sent by the small towns. Taking thirty-two from four hundred leaves three hundred and sixty-eight, but in order to give a lee-way of two more, for the increase of cities, more than the thirteen already allowed for the increase of the next ten years, I have put the number at three hundred and seventy. And by no manner of means, in all time to come, through which this Constitution shall last, can the House, exclusive of the small towns, ever exceed in any one year, the number of three hundred and seventy-four, and that can only be the case by the small towns all sending representatives the same year. The average will be from three hundred and sixty to three hundred and seventy, judging the future by the past. That is neither too large nor too small.

I see at once by their countenances, that gentlemen from the large towns say to me, why put this in this form; why make the loss fall upon us? As we increase the ratio increases. I think if they will look over the history of the past they will thank me for it. It is because I do not mean that they shall swallow up the small towns. I have many times heard of the whale swallowing the shoals of small fishes about, but never of the small fish swallowing the whale. I am not afraid of that. I am quite sure that cannot be done, but I know the other can be. Boston can take care of herself, but the small towns cannot take care of themselves.

I have then proposed that "four" shall be the divisor until we come up to fifteen thousand inhabitants, and then I have changed it to "five." And then it is proposed that this basis shall be upon the present apportionment until a new census is taken. When the new census is taken at the next intermediate period, say in 1855, it will be found that the census will operate to the advantage of the middle sized towns, not against the small, not for the cities, but in favor of the middle sized towns. And probably it would be impossible to bring this number up to four hundred before 1870, and it cannot then go beyond it, because it is cut down by the proportionate number up to one hundred before 1880. If we

can make a Constitution which shall last until 1880, if it works well, the system will then be continued, and if not, then there will be those who will have had the benefit of our experience, and what light they may have gathered in the mean time, towards framing a new system of government.

Well, Sir, to prevent an evil, which every man will see to be an evil, and one which every man will agree ought not to be, I have put in a provision that no town which shall be incorporated hereafter, shall be entitled to a representative, unless she has fifteen hundred inhabitants. I balanced a long time between fifteen hundred and one thousand, though I do not consider it of much practical consequence. Why? Because every new town made, prevents a new representative being gained by a large town, and I think besides, they will be a little careful how they make new towns, because if the incident related by my friend from Lynn, is true, Boston will be careful how she makes a Whig town of Lynn by cutting off the democratic town of Swampscot, thereby losing one representative herself, and failing in the object she had in creating the new town.

I speak of it as an illustration they gave, and I trust I do not speak of it offensively. But to prevent the mischief we have taken the number fifteen hundred, as the number of inhabitants which shall give a new town a new representative, and that will add but a slowly increasing number, because few towns can be cut in two and leave the requisite number of inhabitants to each of them, to entitle them to a representative.

This is the best plan I can hit upon, and I hope it may receive some degree of favor at the hands of the Committee. I trust that while it will be found to guard carefully the rights of the small towns, it does not take away from the large towns that portion of power which belongs to them, especially when we reckon the large power they have outside of representation. In every State in this Union it is found that the city where the legislature sits, has more power than belongs to it according to its population. That is the case with all the States of New England.

I do not believe that any injustice is done in this matter, because, I say again, these representatives can pass no laws themselves. If a law is unjust to the aggregate population, the Senate checks it; if unjust to the voter, the governor checks it. No wrong can be done. But this is not a question of justice. It is a question of giving to the country a check upon aggregated capital and aggregated population. I find, from the history of the discussion of every constitu

[June 23d.

tional Convention, from the history of both the New York Conventions, that the greatest minds of both those Conventions were exercised upon the subject, as to how they should get the power away from the city and place it in the hands of the country, and I think we should guide ourselves by the light of their experience.

I am aware that this plan is not exactly in accordance with any plan which has been presented heretofore, but it differs in no material respect from the plan offered by the gentleman from Quincy, (Mr. White,) and so in reference to the gentleman from Seekonk, (Mr. Gardner). It is a plan which nearly equalizes the counties, much more so than any other; yet it may not be acceptable to every man. Each man for himself, thinks, no doubt, as I did for myself, that he can draw up a plan satisfactory to himself, and can make a more perfect plan than anybody else. But notwithstanding, if we do not compromise, come together and give up this idea upon this side, and that favorite idea upon the other, and above all lay aside the feeling that we are men here struggling to see how much each can get-to see if our town cannot get a little more than the others, we shall agree upon no proposition which shall meet with our united support, or the united support of the people. For myself, I believe that the Majority Report, as proposed, could have been carried before the people, and such, I have no doubt, was the general sense of the Convention. I have offered this plan in the spirit of compromise, and as one of the friends of reform I am willing to take my stand upon it, am willing— feebly at best, perhaps,-to go before the people with it, and to say to my constituents that though they lose three representatives, yet I think they have no cause of complaint, because these three do not pass from your hands into the hands of anybody but your friends, those who are quite willing to see right and justice done. They will go to no foreign nation, they give up nothing to any foreign potentate, they only go back to your native hills, and the old homestead. You place them back in the place of your fathers, where you have left your dearest hopes and best affectionsgone back to the country, where you yourself are longing to go. I am willing, I say, to try this plan with my constituents, though living in the second town, in point of size, in the Commonwealth, and I believe they are willing to make these sacrifices.

I am sorry to have detained the Committee so long, but I propose to hear, after this explanation, such objections as may be made against it, and undoubtedly there will be thousands of them, for it is easier to pull down than it is to build up; it

[June 23d.

Thursday,]

is much easier to batter down than it is to erect. I say, I have no doubt thousands of objections will be started, but at the same time I pray every gentleman before he starts his objection, to stop and make a better plan, and then he may throw his stone at mine, and not until then. One may say that this number is too large, and that too small, but let him tell me, if, upon the whole, he can find any number which will give more general satisfaction, and which will better subserve the purposes of the State, and better commend itself to the people, who are ultimately to pass upon it. Mr. BRINLEY, of Boston. Do I understand the gentleman from Lowell, to offer his proposition as an amendment now?

Mr. BUTLER. I offer it as such.

Mr. BRINLEY. I believe, Mr. Chairman, according to parliamentary usage, I should have been entitled to the floor this morning; under the circumstances, I do not regret that I did not obtain it, although I find myself obliged to address the Committee at this late hour, and under the disadvantage of following the gentleman from Lowell, and encountering his proposed amendment; that, however, will not seriously embarrass my course.

About ten days since I gave notice that at the proper time I should introduce an amendment, the purport of which was, to strike out from the Majority Report all after the word "Resolve," and substitute the proposition which I had then the honor to submit, and which now, in a different state of affairs, offer as an amendment to the amendment of the gentleman from Lowell, (Mr. Butler.) It will be found in printed Document No. 42 of the Convention, and is in the following words:

"That it is expedient so to alter and amend the Constitution as to provide for the election of three hundred and fifty members of the House of Representatives, in districts composed of towns and cities, and of contiguous towns and districts, as nearly as may be, on the principle of an equality of numbers of population, according to the last State census; the apportionment to be revised on the same principle according to future State decennial censuses."

I make that motion, Mr. Chairman. I trust I do not assume too much confidence, when I say, that although I never heard of the proposition of the gentleman from Lowell, (Mr. Butler,) until it was read this afternoon, yet I am prepared to state that it meets my disapprobation, and that I am ready to move to strike it out. might be considered, under many circumstances, rather presumptuous to judge of so complex a proposition as that now before us, as soon as an

It

nounced; but in this instance, I trust I can do it with perfect propriety.

I concur entirely in the opinion which has been so generally expressed in the Committee, that this is a subject of exceeding delicacy and importance, and that it is not only one of very great delicacy and importance, but one which involves great difficulty-so difficult, indeed, is it, that the friends of the Report of the majority tried in vain, for a series of years, to force a similar proposition upon the legislature as a proposed article of amendment to the Constitution, to be adopted in the manner prescribed by that instrument. Had they been successful, in my judgment, this Convention would not have been summoned. We should have heard nothing of the necessity of revising the fundamental law of the State; we should have been at home, quietly performing our several duties, instead of being obliged to sit here in this sultry season, heated by the atmosphere, and warmed with the satisfaction of having stripped the governor and lieutenant-governor of their ancient and respective titles, of having curtailed the treasurer of his aristocratic appellation of receiver-general,” and saved “notaries public" from being placed in the same category with the attorney-general, the judges of probate, and other minor officers, whose appointment is no longer to be trusted in the hands of the governor and Council. What they could not do through the agency of the legislature, it is now proposed to accomplish through the instrumentality of the Convention

66

Most, if not all of us, have been chosen to this body, as members of some political party; but there are certain questions which do not appropriately and legitimately fall within the scope of party arrangements. Such I apprehend to be the question now before the Committee-the mode of apportioning the House of Representatives. This subject was referred to a large and most intelligent Committee, consisting, if I remember rightly, of twenty-one members; a bare majority of that Committee offer us a plan which may be called the system of "town representation;" while the minority favor us with a Report in favor of the "district system." The former provides "that every town or city may elect one representative. Every town or city containing five thousand inhabitants, may elect two representatives; and five thousand inhabitants shall be the number which shall entitle it to an additional representative; provided, however, that no town or city shall be entitled to more than thirty representatives." The minority plan (if I may be permitted very cursorily to advert to a plan which has been defeated in Committee) provides that