population should be reckoned at about 42,000, instead of 34,000, in determining her proportion of representation. Hampden has about 70,000, instead of 50,000; Franklin has about 43,000, instead of 30,000; Berkshire has 68,000, instead of 48,000, expressing it in round numbers. Take the tables as furnished us yesterday by the gentleman from Lowell, (Mr. Butler,) and apply the principle. Reduce the population in your large cities and counties by that scale, and you leave a basis for a fair representation. You may give Boston a representation of one for every 6,000 of population. Based on voters, it would be one for about 4,815. Where is the great injustice and inequality in that? Above all, considering the other great interests which predominate and prevail in the country, I submit that we should be doing ample justice to Boston and the large towns, by putting them upon this basis of 6,000 as to population.

It is to be borne in mind also, as to much of this floating population in large cities and towns, that it is made up of transient persons,-emigrants, foreigners not naturalized, male and female operatives,-persons whose interests can be as well protected, and as rightfully belong to the country, as to the city.

The country is quite as much interested as the city, in a cargo of destitute emigrants just landed, when the question arises as to what almshouses shall receive those that cannot take care of themselves.

For no other purpose, unless it were to swell and inflate the basis of population, would the large cities be likely to claim them as their peculiar constituency.

This excess, therefore, of population, found in cities and large manufacturing towns, beyond the healthy and legitimate ratio of population and voters, should, for the purpose of determining the representative basis, be distributed among all the cities and towns of the Commonwealth.

To recapitulate, then, in conclusion. As to a basis of 1,200 population for the small towns, to entitle them to an annual representation, I am willing to adopt it as a compromise, if you please to call it such, already sanctioned by the people, as it was in 1840. I am willing to agree, that the smaller towns shall be secured there. As experience shows, that these smaller towns do not increase as the large towns and cities do, and as a constant and advancing ratio is to be applied to them, I am willing that every town up to 1,200, shall be secured in having one representative every year, and that they shall stand as well as ever they stood. This is the basis which was sanctioned by the Convention of 1820. It had the sanction of two-thirds of the legislatures of 1839

[June 29th.

and of 1840, and was adopted by almost unanimous consent. I think it will fully secure the smaller towns in their rights. While the large towns and cities have increased in wealth and numbers, they have, most of them, remained stationary, and thus fallen behind in the race. Our Commonwealth, like the solar system, has been advancing towards some distant and unknown centre of centres among the constellations, but the smaller planets have been somewhat thrown from their orbits. I would restore them to their appropriate paths and balance-power in our political system. Give them full, and ample, and generous security on the old recognized and established basis of twelve hundred, but below that basis, in my judgment, we should not go.

As to towns entitled to more than one representative, I submit, the ratio ought to be increased, to meet the additional strength gained by the general ticket system, so far as it is adopted, so that if 3,000 is the additional number required for one representative, four thousand should be the additional number required for two, and five thousand for three.

Then, beyond that, I would adopt the district system, on a basis still higher, for the reasons already assigned. Such a system of corporate representation, with a limit as to the number of representatives, and a proportionally advancing ratio that shall not affect small towns, I can defend here, or before my constituents, and the people.

Mr. HASKELL, of Ipswich. Notwithstanding the diversity of opinion, upon the subject now under consideration, I suppose we shall all agree to one proposition- that unless some plan may be devised, which shall be more just, equal, and more acceptable to the people than the present system, it will be better for us to retain the old system as it is. Most of the gentlemen who have addressed the Convention, seem to have taken it for granted that the present system is obnoxious, in a great degree, to the people, and that there is no danger of our framing a worse system. I do not concur in that view, or in the opinion which has been so frequently expressed, that there is great injustice and inequality in that system. I propose now to make a very brief examination of the plan proposed by the gentleman from Lowell, (Mr. Butler,) compare it with the existing system, and see if it obviates any of the objections which have been urged by the gentleman for Erving, (Mr. Griswold,) against the existing system. The first objection to the present system, which was suggested by the gentleman for Erving, if I recollect aright, was, that it was too complicated. Is it as complicated as the

proposition now submitted by the gentleman from Lowell, (Mr. Butler)? I contend that it is not.

By the present basis, one sum is given as the number to entitle a town to one representative; another sum is fixed as the mean increasing ratio for additional representatives, and another sum is given, by which the population of towns not entitled to one representative, is to be divided, and the quotient thus obtained determines the number of representatives they are to be entitled to in each ten years. We have, then, three fixed or certain numbers given for these purposes, and the provision is, that for every 70,000 increase in the population of the State, (10 per cent. on the census of 1840,) 10 per cent. is to be added to each of these given numbers. I submit, there is not any great complication in this matter, and that any man can sit down with the census and Constitution of Massachusetts before him, and operating with the simple rules of arithmetic, can apportion the representation in a very short time. Can it be done as easily by the plan of the gentleman from Lowell? I must confess that I have given this subject a careful and candid attention, and I am hardly able to see the results, which the gentleman from Lowell is inclined to think will be realized, from the adoption of his system. The provision of the first resolution in his plan is, that every town of a less number than one thousand inhabitants, shall be entitled to five representatives in each ten years, &c.; then there are four degrees of the sliding scale in the ratio of increase, by which the representation increases, not by any regular percentage, according to the increase of population in the State, but by an arbitrary rule, in which the town is in some measure deprived of its power in proportion to the increase of its population.

The second resolution in the plan of the gentleman from Lowell, (Mr. Butler,) is a very complicated one indeed, and I would defy any gentleman of this Convention, except the gentleman from Lowell, to sit down and tell me what the result will be ten years hence, of the sliding-scale part of the basis laid down there. It provides, that "in all apportionments after the first, the numbers which shall entitle any city or town to two, three, four or more representatives, shall be so adjusted in proportion as herein before provided, that the whole number of representatives, exclusive of those which may be returned by towns of less than one thousand inhabitants, and towns incorporated after this provision shall be adopted, shall never exceed three hundred and seventy." Now, Sir, there are various ways in which this I have apportionment may be "adjusted."

[June 29th.

found that it might be "adjusted," (not proportionately increased,) as "in the manner before specified," so as to present very different results. There are two or three other elements which must always enter into the apportionment of the House, upon the plan proposed by the gentleman from Lowell. The date of the incorporation of a town must be ascertained; the population of towns subject to loss, on their representation, must be computed, so as to have the ratio increased to such an extent as to keep the number below the maximum. It is more complicated—infinitely more so, than any system we have yet had, as experience will show, if it is adopted, and decidedly more complicated than the present sys

tem.

Again, it is suggested by the gentleman for Erving, that there is a great loss by fractions under the present system. He made out the loss to be 140,000. Now, I take it for granted, that we do lose by the present system, and I am willing to take the estimate at 140,000. I have made an estimate of the loss by fractions under the system proposed by the gentleman from Lowell, and I find that the loss by fractions is nearly double what it is under the present system. I have all the details, and they are more surprising than the aggregate. I find that, according to the proposition of the gentleman from Lowell, the loss, in the aggregate, will be 277,060, nearly double the loss by fractions under the present system.

But I ask the attention of the Convention for a moment or two to the details of this comparison. Where does the loss chiefly fall under the system now proposed? In general terms, I may say that two hundred and eleven towns, entitled to one representative each will lose in the aggregate 205,089, making a fraction of nearly one thousand on an average, for each town; while the city of Lowell, which sends eight representatives, loses only a fraction of six hundred and twenty. If this is equal representation I must confess I have not been able to understand it. Lowell seems to be entitled to the lion's shure in the system proposed by the gentleman from Lowell, as the county of Franklin was in that proposed by the delegate for Erving. Lowell loses by a fraction, only 620, while the two hundred and eleven towns which send only one representative each, lose nearly one thousand each, or almost double what is lost by Lowell, which sends eight.

To carry the matter further;

Wednesday,]

Salem & Roxbury, 5 Reps. each have

Five cities, having 4

66

66

66

66

277,060

The proposition of the gentleman from Lowell, does, in a measure, correct that evil in the present system; but it still leaves some 45,000 inhabitants unrepresented half the time. The same objection exists, then, to the proposition of the gentleman from Lowell as to the present system, and I do not see that the amendment is any better in principle, in this respect, than the present system.

Then there is another objection to the present plan, suggested by the gentleman for Erving. I refer to his objections because he stated them with more particularity than other gentlemen have stated their's. The objection is, that all the towns are not represented. This, I think, is a very serious objection to any system. I agree in what has been said as to the right of every portion of the community to be represented every year. I believe it is their right, and I think it is the duty of this Convention to make such a provision, that every portion of the Commonwealth shall be represented on the floor of the House of Representatives every year. I do not know by what right the majority of this Convention may prescribe that any portion of the people shall not be represented half the time. I do not see the philosophy of the principle, or the justice of the doctrine upon which such a system is supported. But does the proposition, submitted by the gentleman from Lowell, obviate the objection to the present system entirely, in this respect? I do not know the precise number of the towns which are entitled to representation by their fractions; I know, however, that under the present system it is larger than it would be under the system proposed by the gentleman from Lowell. But, if the principle is bad in one case it is just as bad in the other. The plan submitted by him docs, perhaps, obviate the evil in a measure, but it permits the pernicious principle still to remain as a portion of the Constitution of the Commonwealth. As a member of the legislature in 1839, when the present system was discussed and adopted, I voted for it;

marks, just now made, with regard to the objection that all are not represented, apply here. The amendment now proposed, contemplates that there shall be a provision in the Constitution by which one man may vote for two or three representatives, and another, in the small towns, may vote for only one, and that a citizen of a fractional town shall only vote for a representative once in two years, or for half a representative each year, if the power is distributed over a term of ten years. It seems to me there is an inequality here; and though the proposition submitted by the gentleman from Lowell, lessens this evil in some degree, it is still permitted to remain. He proposes that in the cities districts shall be formed, and the voters have the right to vote for two or three representatives. Under this system, as now, there will be a very unequal power exercised by the voters. One person will have a right to vote for three representatives, another for two, and another for only one, and another for one every other year. I think the present system is obnoxious to this objection, and that a citizen of Boston ought not to have a right to vote for forty-four representatives, while I have the right to vote for but one. I know of no rule of logic or mathematics by which these capacities can be reduced to an equal power. But the objection applies to one system as well as the other, and if the principle is wrong in the present Constitution, it is equally wrong in the system proposed by the gentleman from Lowell; and, although his plan reduces the evil, it is still objectionable in principle.

Then, again, it is objected that by the present basis all the power will be absorbed by the large towns and cities. Why so? Not because the

principle is wrong? The gentleman from Northampton, (Mr. Huntington,) and others who have stated this objection, have complained of the result, but have not objected to the principle or claimed that it is not equal, for if it is unequal it is clearly so to the disadvantage of the large towns only; and, Sir, when it was adopted in the legislature of 1839, the gentleman from Boston, whom I do not see in the hall, (Mr. Gray,) objected that it was prejudicial to the rights of the city.

But it is said that the results are different from what was contemplated, and that its operation was not understood by its framers. I believe the legislature that passed it discussed it for a long time, and I think that they understood it as well as gentlemen here who have condemned it so severely. It was before that legislature for several months and thoroughly considered; and it was finally carried, as the gentleman from Northampton (Mr. Huntington) has said, as a compromise between the opinions and wishes of the city and country members.

But it is said that, by the present system, the large towns will absorb all the electoral power. Why so? How? Only by the increase of population. Well, ought not the power to go where the people go? I have been used to hearing the doctrine taught, and especially by the teachers of democracy throughout the Commonwealth, that the power resided in the people, that it is inherent in the people, and derived from the people. I do not know what consistency there is in conduct which undertakes to exclude the people from the exercise of that power, or how the action of any political party, which professes to act in accordance with this principle, can prevent the power from going where the people go. If it is inherent in the people, it must go where the people go, and dwell where they dwell, whether it be in town or city. By the very great increase of population in the cities and large towns, it seems to be feared that they will absorb all the political power in the Commonwealth, and acquire a majority of the representation in the House of Representatives. There is a limit to this. Boston cannot double her resident, domiciled population. Her limits forbid it. Already she begins to overflow. A large portion of her population is already seeking its abode in the surrounding towns, not only in the suburbs but in more remote localities.

Almost all the future increase of the population in the Commonwealth must be in the middling sized and small towns. By the basis adopted in 1839 there is an inequality, and it is against the cities. By the basis then adopted, a town of 1,200 inhabitants was entitled to one representative; one of 3,600 inhabitants was entitled to two, and so

[June 29th.

on. Thus, by a sliding scale and different ratio for the small and large towns, the disparity of representation increases, to the disadvantage of the large towns as the population increases.

It starts with a disparity of 1,200 to 3,600, (one to three,) and these numbers are to be increased together by a uniform percentage. It must follow, that as these numbers of 1,200 and 3,600 are augmented the disparity increases.

Suppose that in 1860, or 1870, or 1880, the population of the State should be double the amount that it was when the ratio was fixed in 1840. Then twenty-four hundred will be the number which will entitle any town to one representative every year, and seventy-two hundred to send a second representative. The small town must gain 1,200 to retain its one representative, and the large town must gain 3,600 to retain its two representatives, and so on. That is the only inequality after all. A large town will have to gain two inhabitants to get an additional representative, or hold its number; whereas a town which has only one representative, or a fractional representation, has to gain one inhabitant only to retain its representation. The large towns and cities will have to increase twice as fast as a small town to maintain their relative position. How is this objection, as to the absorption of power, obviated by the proposition of the gentleman from Lowell? He limits it so that there is no danger of the large towns gaining too much power. That is effectually guarded against. But the predominance of the small towns is just as effectually secured. The proposition as to the large towns is, that "in all the apportionments after the first, the numbers which shall entitle any city or town to two, three, four, or more representatives, shall be so adjudged, in proportion, as hereinbefore provided, that the whole number of representatives, exclusive of those which may be returned by towns of less than one thousand inhabitants, and towns incorporated after this provision is adopted, shall never exceed three hundred and seventy."

Now, Sir, what will be the effect of this provision? Will it prevent the accumulation and absorption of power in some portions of the Commonwealth, at the expense of other portions? I find, upon the basis submitted by the gentleman from Lowell, that forty-six cities and towns, entitled to more than one representative, will send one hundred and forty-seven representatives, according to the first apportionment; and there are sixty-four towns which will, at first, be entitled to but thirty-two representatives, but which will, undoubtedly, become large enough in population, before long, to entitle them to one representative

each; which result will take them from the exception as to the maximum, and it will require thirty-two representatives more to supply their constitutional quota; and then there are seven towns, incorporated since 1850, for which no provision is made, as I understand, in the proposition submitted by the gentleman from Lowell, and which are not in the exception as to the maximum of three hundred and seventy. That will make thirty-nine rights of representation hereafter to be provided with representatives, and the representatives to supply which, must be taken from the three hundred and seventy now granted to the large towns and cities. But the provision is, that they must be taken from towns entitled to two or more, and these thirty-nine must therefore be taken from the forty-six towns and cities having one hundred and forty-seven representatives; and that will cut down the number, one hundred and forty-seven, to one hundred and eight, leaving to such towns and cities, having more than one-half the population, but little more than onefourth of the representation. The large towns and cities will then, in the course of time, and that not far distant, be deprived of a large amount of their representation, and it will be awarded to the smaller towns which have succeeded in mustering one thousand inhabitants. The objection of the gentleman for Erving, that by the operation of the present system, the power is to go to the large towns and cities, where the population has been tending for many years past, is, after all, more than counterbalanced by a similar objection to the proposition of the gentleman from Lowell. The political power, by that system, is going to the small towns, and the injustice will be done to the large towns and cities, which may have increased in a greater proportion than the small ones. I submit, that there is no improvement here; that the political power is going from the many to the few, from the large towns to the rural districts, and the very small towns, which contain only one thousand inhabitants. It is more unequal, in my opinion, than the present basis can ever be.

But, Sir, the objection that the amendment submitted by the gentleman from Lowell, will be ineffectual to obviate the difficulties which exist in the present system, is but a small part of the objection which I have to this amendment; this is a trifling objection, compared with the objection which, to my mind, will be, of all others, the one that will have most influence against that proposition in the minds of the people; and that is, it does not reduce the size of the House. Now, Sir, I think I know something of the desire and expectation of the people in that part of the country

[June 29th,

in which I reside, both of the large towns and the small towns, as well in the rural districts as in the cities; and although I do not wish to make any prediction with regard to the matter, as the gentleman who sits near me, (Mr. Keyes,) often does — and if I could succeed in making predictions as well as he does, I certainly would make the attempt-yet I may be permitted to express the opinion, that whatever basis of representation may be adopted by this Convention, and submitted to the people, if it does not reduce the number of the House materially, it will be rejected by them. I think there is danger that we shall lose other desired reforms in our Constitution, if we adopt some of the propositions which have been submitted here, by a failure to meet the expectations of the people upon this point. I must confess, Mr. President, that I have been surprised by the remarks which have fallen from some gentlemen here, as to the advantage of having a large number of members in the House of Representatives. I think that those gentlemen who express that opinion, cannot have been here when we have had such large houses, as I have sometimes seen; for, on some occasions there has been a great deal of inconvenience experienced from this cause, upon this floor. I have been here when there were five hundred and thirty-nine members in the House, and I would not want to come here again, if I come at all, to sit in a House of that size. There has been a change in the accommodations since that time, and the seats have been enlarged and widened, so that gentlemen do not now sit so close and crowded, by a great deal, as they did then. As to the despatch of public business, I cannot agree with those who think that it was more expeditiously or properly performed in a House consisting of five or six hundred members, than it would be in a House of only half that number. I think, Mr. President, that it is a very serious objection to the proposition now before the Convention, that it increases the number by reducing the basis. By the present existing provisions of the Constitution, the number is necessarily limited; I do not mean that there is any express provision on the subject, but as the ratio is fixed, it is impossible that the number should exceed certain limits. The ratio will increase just in proportion to the increase of population, which must necessarily keep it down to just about the existing number. Or, if anything, it tends to keep down the size of the House, because, as the ratio entitling a town to representation increases, the fractions may be larger, so that under the existing system the tendency is to reduce the House. But the proposition now submitted will increase