the number of members something like one hundred-ninety-four-I believe; and not only that, but it prevents its indefinite extension hereafter, at least so far as the thirty-nine members from the new and fractional towns may be entitled to seats. I must confess that I not fully understand the practical operation of the sliding scale in the proposition of the gentleman from Lowell; but one thing is clear, it does not diminish the House of Representatives, or confine it to anything like the present number, but it positively increases it to something like ninety-four over the present basis. I think it is a very serious objection, when we are undertaking to make a new basis, that it should increase the number of members instead of reducing them.

There is another objection to his proposition, and that is, that it will put the government into the hands of a minority of the people of the Commonwealth. I suppose it is too late in the day-that it is quite unnecessary-for me to say, that the minority who reside in the rural districts ought not to have the whole power of the Commonwealth; no one claims that they should have it, expressly; but this system will give it to them. This plan which is proposed by the gentleman from Lowell assuredly puts the power into the hands of the minority of the people. I have looked at it carefully, and I will give the Convention the result of my investigation. I find, as I | have already said, that there will be forty-six cities and towns which are entitled to more than one representative each, and which, in the aggregate, contain a population of 511,870, and which will be entitled to one hundred and forty-seven representatives. Then, Sir, if we add forty-seven to that number, for forty-seven towns which contain a population of 143,420, and which are entitled to one representative each, we shall have one hundred and ninety-four representatives for a population of 655,290. Here is more than twothirds of the population of the State, and they would have just one less than half the representation of the State; while sixty-four small towns having a fractional representation, and one hundred and sixty-four towns choosing one representative each, with a population of only 318,425, would choose one hundred and ninety-six representatives, being a majority of the House of Representatives; and thus, as I have stated, the majority of the House would be chosen by less than one-third of the people of the Commonwealth. But I need not extend my remarks on this point; I will simply re-state these facts, in order that they may be impressed upon the minds of gentlemen of this body. I want every member of this Convention to remember that if we

[June 29th.

adopt this proposition, 318,425 of the inhabitants of the Commonwealth will choose a majority of the House of Representatives, while 655,290, or more than double that number, will choose less than half of the members of the House. This is not the whole inequality of the system, that it effectually puts the whole control of the House of Representatives in the hands of a minority of the people of the Commonwealth. I find a still greater inequality when I come to ascertain the ratio by which these different parts of the Commonwealth will be represented. Forty-six cities and towns, which choose one hundred and fortyseven representatives, will only have one representative for 3,482 inhabitants, while two hundred and twenty-eight towns, which will choose one hundred and ninety-six representatives, will have one representative to every 1,114 inhabitants. The towns which thus hold the control of the House of Representatives, and which choose a majority of its members, will thus have a representative to every 1,114 inhabitants, while the forty-six cities and towns, embracing more than half the population of the State, will only have one representative to 3,482 inhabitants-less than one-third their equal proportion with the small towns! Now, I do not wish to argue to an intelligent body like this, that such a proposition is unjust, or that it is unequal. There is no reason, I apprehend, that gentlemen can assign for such a proposition, unless it is designed to base the power of government upon something else besides the people. Unless such a principle is assumed, there is no reason whatever in giving the control of the House of Representatives to a minority of the people, and of giving the representatives of the country three times as much political power as you give those who represent the cities and the large towns.

There is another objection to the proposition,that it violates the true democratic principle-the principle upon which the government and the institutions of our country are recognized as being founded. And in order, Mr. President, that there may be no misapprehension as to what I understand to be the democratic principle, which is the foundation of all republican institutions, I am happy to have the authority of several gentlemen upon this floor, who have laid down what I conceive to be the correct doctrine upon this subject. I am not, therefore, compelled to go back to the "fathers of our country," nor even to those "fossils," who have been alluded to as yet living among us; but I am very happy in being able to find authority for the position which I take, among the progressive democracy in this body. It has been said, Sir, upon this floor,

"that the principle of republicanism is that the | majority shall govern. The moment you depart from that principle and place the government in the hands of one man less than a majority, you have no republican government."

I consider this good doctrine, and I quote it, not for the purpose of making objections to it, but I adopt it as embodying my own views and opinions upon this matter.

We have heard it said here in different quarters, that the majority should govern, and the idea has been often repeated in different forms, that the moment we depart from this principle, and place the government in the hands of one man less than a majority, we have no republican government. I believe that, Sir; and now I would inquire, if this system of representation which is proposed by the gentleman from Lowell, illustrated as I have endeavored to illustrate it by a reference to figures and to the facts, does not conflict with this principle? I cannot reconcile it with this principle at all. It appears to me that any fair exhibit of the proposition of the gentleman from Lowell will show that the adoption of that system would place the government in the hands of more than a hundred thousand less than a majority of the people of this Commonwealth; and by so doing it would be "departing from the very fundamental principle upon which a republican government is based." There is the declaration, and I hold it to be incontrovertible, that "if we adopt a rule which puts the power into the hands of one man less than a majority, we have no republican government," because the fundamental principle upon which it rests is departed from and abandoned. Now, Sir, I ask, whether this Convention, which claims to be a reform Convention, is disposed to take a step backwards and give this power to a minority of the people, although they may be landholders? We have more agriculturists in the town I represent than any other class; we have no manufacturing corporations there-not one, Sir; and that place has grown all that it has grown (which is very little, I admit) within the last ten years, it has managed to keep along at any rate, through the farming interest, and to send abroad its products-not of manufactures but minds-to fertilize and enrich other fields of human thought and action. I come from one of the rural districts, where, if the power is to be placed in the hands of the few, I agree it ought to be put; but is it right to give it to the few even there? There is no desire, in my judgment, in the rural districts, to have a system perpetuated which is to war with the fundamental principles of republican government; and which, as I believe, would be

[June 29th.

the tendency and effect of the introduction of any system similar to that which is proposed by the gentleman from Lowell. Another branch of the same doctrine of republicanism is as eloquently and ably laid down in the argument of the gentleman for Wilbraham, (Mr. Hallett,) before quoted. He said, "that the people may prescribe that less than a majority shall rule, is not a republican doctrine." I agree to this. And it is a direct answer and refutation of the position taken by the gentleman for Berlin, (Mr. Boutwell,) the other day. Now, Sir, suppose that this Convention should adopt a rule that the minority of the people of the Commonwealth, living in the rural districts, and in the small towns, should have a predominant influence and vote in the legislature of the Commonwealth, and suppose that a majority of the people should assent to it; if the principle here laid down is correct, it could not be a republican government, because it is not a republican doctrine that the representatives of a minority may exercise the power to make changes in the laws even if the majority should consent to give the minority power to elect them. The executive and administrative functions of government are, of course, performed by a small part of the people; but it is the exercise of power delegated by a majority of the whole, and not a minority. But when you come to organize a body whose powers and acts affect the rights of all within the State by the exercise of sovereignty in the institution of laws for the government of all, I apprehend that that can never be justly done by less than the will and choice of a majority of the people; and that a majority of the people can not now deprive any future majority of their rights by saying that any minority may govern by the institution of laws. But that is not the only authority which I can produce among the able and eloquent speakers of this body, to prove that the system of representation which is proposed by the gentleman from Lowell conflicts directly with the principles of democratic government and our republican institutions. We have the same doctrine laid down by the gentleman from Natick, as follows:

"Government exists by the consent of the people -the majority of the people-who alone can give their consent.

"Whenever or wherever we depart from that idea, whether we adopt the plurality rule, or any other rule which allows less than a majority to rule, we depart from that fundamental democratic principle-that American idea-underlying all our American institutions. Nor would the assent of the people to have a minority of the people govern make it any the less anti-democratic." I cordially agree to that doctrine; and I ask if

it is not the effect of the proposition of the gentleman from Lowell to "allow less than a majority to rule?" Does not that basis depart from "the American idea underlying all our American institutions?" I have stated that the doctrine quoted is my belief exactly; and now all I ask is, that gentlemen in this Convention who have advanced such views will adhere to that principle when they come to vote upon this question. But in order to get rid of this difficulty, gentlemen tell us that if the people adopt what we do, no matter whether it places the power in the hands of a majority or of a minority, it is democratic, because the majority of the people assent to it.

I deny this proposition, Sir, altogether. Suppose we should choose an emperor, and submit our action to the people, and the people assent to it and agree to his authority, that would be a democratic and republican institution and government! That is just what the argument amounts to. The principle leads to that conclusion. Now I think that the inference based upon that argument is wholly unfounded. I fully agree with the propositions which have been again and again repeated here, that the government must rest in a majority of the people; and I ask those gentlemen who have advanced this idea, to act in accordance with it, and show, by their vote on the proposition of the gentleman from Lowell, that they mean to abide by their professions; or, at any rate, if they do not concur with me in my deductions, as to the effect of that proposition, I wish them to show how the principle and proposition can be reconciled, that we may have the benefit of the rule of their action to aid us. As it seems to me, it conflicts directly with the democratic principle "underlying" our form of government, and it cannot be denied that it gives the government to a minority of the people. I believe the most of us claim to be reformers, (and I have been classed with them); we have come here to reform the Constitution, and I believe this is one of the points where a reform is needed; and I hope, therefore, that in the formation of the fundamental law of the Commonwealth, we shall not take such a long, disproportionate stride backwards, as to let the minority of the people have the control of the legislature. I am not ready for that. I object to the proposition of the gentleman from Lowell, upon that ground, and I hope it will be rejected.

There is still another objection to it, and that is that it is unjust. It is well, Sir, for communities as well as for individuals, to look occasionally-once in a while, at least-at fundamental principles, that we may direct our steps aright,

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and shape our course in wisdom. If we neglect to do so, we soon wander in darkness and doubt.

Now, we all know that, owing to the peculiar constitution of this Convention, having come here, as we have, on the basis of valuation year, the small towns hold the balance of power, and control the proceedings of this body; and let me appeal to gentlemen representing those towns-is it right and just for us, from the small towns, having the power as we have here, to say to our neighbors from the cities and large towns, "you shall not have as much power in the legislature of the Commonwealth as we have?" For one, Sir, I am not ready to say this. I think the interest and prosperity of the large towns and cities are infinitely more connected with, and dependent upon, the legislation of the State, than the interest of the small towns is. We care but little if you do reduce the representation of the towns to its just and fair proportion, if you leave us the township system in all its integrity and power. And I do not consider the choosing of a representative a necessary function of a town, or a right of a municipality, as I understand it. Let all the power which we have in the legislature, be that which justly belongs to us, and it is all that we ask. For if we have the township system we can get along very well without any legislature. All the great interests of the social state would be protected, without the aid of a legislature. The country towns are not so much affected by the action of the legislature as the cities are. Indeed, we are in the habit of boasting-or I am-of our independence of the legislation of the State, and that it makes but little difference to us what they do or undo. We do not care much what goes on here generally. Now and then they pass a liquor law or a railroad loan, that excites us a little; but, with few exceptions, the proceedings of the legislature affect us but little, either for the better or worse. The great and general amount of legislation, (and a great deal too much,) is for the interest and business of the inhabitants of the cities and large towns, which are a great deal more affected by the results of the legislation of the Commonwealth in their welfare and their pursuits, than the inhabitants of the rural districts can be. Is it then just or right, for us from the rural districts, to control the legislature? Can any member from the rural districts reconcile it with his conscience, to say that these small towns shall hereafter hold and exercise the power of the House of Representatives, and that the large towns and cities shall have only one-third their equal right and power? I do not know how he can justify himself in so doing; I cannot justify myself for

"In advocating town representation, we have nothing to say of corporate rights. It is the people whom we would have represented, and not corporations. If our districts ought to be smalland the little we have said shows plainly that they should be-towns, on every consideration, ought to constitute those districts."

The minority of the Committee then go on to sayThe amendment proposed by us, so far as relates to the House of Representatives, is nearly the same with that of the Convention of 1820. That highly respectable assembly, second to none which ever convened in this Commonwealth, in either talent or intelligence, in their address to the people of Massachusetts, used the following language: We are all agreed that representation should be according to population, in this branch. It was the general opinion that the number should be reduced, that town representation should be preserved,' &c. And again: We will not say that this system is the best that could be; but we may justly say that we have spared no exertion to form, and to present to you, the best which we could devise.'"

That Convention substantially recommended in 1820 the same system which now exists, with the single exception that towns not having population sufficient to entitle them to one representative, (1,200,) should have a representative each other year and be classed in two divisions, and that the House should not exceed two hundred and seventy-five. The whole tenor of the argument contained in that report of the committee in 1839, is to show that the large towns ought not to complain that they were deprived of a part of their power. They did, however, complain at the time, and there was some reason for it, though the system was not as unjust as either of the plans which are now before us.

Now, Sir, I submit that it is hardly just to say that the present system is so full of iniquity and injustice as some seem to think, when it has had the deliberate sanction of the Convention of the 1820, and of two legislatures, and of the people of the State. True, it was at first rejected by the people when submitted in 1820, but it has since been ratified by them, with a slight modification.

The point to which I particularly desired to call the attention of this Convention was this, that according to the principles upon which the Commonwealth of Massachusetts had before acted, the right of representation in the Senate according to taxation had, up to 1839, been recognized, and under it, Suffolk was entitled to one-third of the senators, and the counties of Essex and Middlesex absorbed a good proportion of the rest. It was found necessary, therefore, that the basis

[June 29th.

should be changed from valuation to population, and Suffolk, Essex and Middlesex fell in with the proposition upon the ground that these corporate rights, as they have been termed—though I take

a different view of the matter from some gentlemen-were relinquished in some degree by the small towns. I, therefore, think it unjust to undertake to deprive the large towns of their right to representation according to population, since we have heretofore taken from them their rights under the old system, upon the ground that population was the proper basis.

I do not justify or defend the ancient basis of the Senate. I do not say it should have been preserved. But it was the "practice of the fathers," and was sanctified by the " usage of centuries;" it had been a part of the policy of the government from the earliest settlement of the Commonwealth, to base representation, in part, upon taxable estates; it was, in 1839, the right-the constitutional right-of Suffolk, and the wealthy counties to insist upon that basis. They held it to be as sacred as that of town representation, as it exists under this present, or as it had existed under any prior Constitution; they surrendered it for a population basis in both branches; and is it just that we should now deprive them of the benefits which fell to them, and claim those which accrued to us, under the basis thus established? I think not.

Now, Sir, I prefer the present system, in answer to the question of the gentleman from Lowell, (Mr. Butler,) unless we can have an equal system, which shall materially reduce the House-which shall give to every voter a representation every year, and a right to vote for an equal number of representatives, and by which each representative shall be the representative and exponent of the political power of the same number of population, or legal voters. Do this, and for one, I am indifferent whether these results are secured by a town or district system, or whether the districts are large or small, or whether representation is based upon population or upon legal voters; though, I think, the latter the proper basis for representation in both branches of the legisla

ture.

Mr. HUNTINGTON, of Northampton. I merely wish to say, that when I was upon the floor before, I expressed an inclination to withdraw the amendment which I offered last evening. I assigned the reason for it, and that was, that in the first place, when I offered the amendment I thought it might present a test question as to the number which should be required to entitle a town to one representative, whether it should be one thousand or twelve hundred.