ler,) which has been adopted, shall eventuate in anything which I can deem a substantial improvement upon the present system, I shall go for it, though it does not square entirely with what I believe to be right and desirable. I am willing to do so. I would say that I think it is the duty, and I am happy to see that it has been the disposition thus far, on the part of the Convention, to receive all these propositions made by various gentlemen in a friendly spirit. I believe all the propositions have been offered with a sincere desire to make,—and a belief on the part of the gentlemen who have offered them,-that they made a substantial improvement upon the present system, and, therefore, they have all been received in a friendly spirit. At the same time, I wish to be at liberty to express my views and principles, without being thought to criticize harshly any plan before us.

What is the evil which now exists in regard to this matter, and what have we to do in reference to it? For what have the people sent us here in regard to this matter of representation? The first evil complained of, is that the House of Representatives is too large. The maximum now may be 445. Large and small are relative terms; but, I think, it is a fixed fact, that a House, the maximum of which may run up to 400, is, in the judgment of the people of the Commonwealth, too large a House. That is the first evil which is, to be cured, and we must devise a plan that shall remedy that defect. No plan is perfected to that extent which I believe it should be, until it does remedy that defect. What is the second evil? It is this, and it touches a matter of principle, that, under your present system, at this moment, one hundred and thirty-nine of your towns are disfranchised. They have not a constant representation, which of right they are entitled to have. I say it is a right of every inhabitant in Massachusetts to be constantly represented. This is a thing which the people want and which they will have. It is a thing that they ought to have, and which we are bound to give them. Through the kindness of the officers in the treasury department, I have a list, taken from the pay-roll of all the towns that have failed in representation for the last thirteen years. I do not feel at liberty to ask the Committee to print it, though it affords information, which is worth printing. It is a formidable list, making seven large folio pages of tables and columns, and it shows that there were 1,035 towns which failed in being represented from 1840 to 1852, inclusive.

But, at the same time, the friends of the district system may say, you are taking the representative power from us and locking it up. Our friends in

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the country do not use it, and it is lost to them now, practically, to a great extent. I would rather have the power used by the yeomanry of the country, even if they do it in derogation of my right, than not to have it used at all. I believe the power of representation to be good in itself, to be beneficent, and that it is to be exercised so as to improve and bless the community. Therefore, I do not wish to lodge this power in dead hands, under the mortmain principle, where the land of England once went. Now I accord to the plan which the Convention adopted in Committee yesterday much merit. I believe it to have been made, in good faith, to improve the present system; I believe it does improve the present system; I believe it accomplishes all, or nearly all, that can be accomplished upon that principle; but the principle I do not assent to.

Now, Sir, what does it accomplish in reference to the first evil, to wit, a large House? It does reduce the large House from its present maximum of four hundred and forty-five, to a possible maximum of four hundred and twenty-five. It does that. Practically, three years out of ten it would do more.

But it does not remove that first difficulty, to wit, the large House sufficiently, in my judgment, to go before the people and say to them: we have remedied that evil. I think the people will turn upon us and say that we have not, that they sent us here to reduce the House and we have not done it. Therefore, I wish to see that plan, if it is to be adhered to, so far perfected as to reduce the possible maximum. I am willing that the House should range somewhere near three hundred in number, and I should be glad not to have it go beyond three hundred and twenty. I think that eight representatives to one senator would make things safe, and sound, and pure.

In reference to the second evil: does it enfranchise all your towns which are now disfranchised? Does it give to every man who is an inhabitant of Massachusetts a constant representation? No, Sir, it does not. Of the one hundred and thirtynine towns now disfranchised it will enfranchise all but sixty-four, and leave them in precisely the same predicament in which the one hundred and thirty-nine are now left. It does not, therefore, completely cure that evil, and that is an evil, in my judgment, of principle. One word upon that principle. As far as the future growth of the population is concerned, the plan, as it now stands,-and I understand my friend from Lowell is in favor of improving it, if it can be done in his judgment, and therefore he will not take my criticisms in an unfriendly spirit, for they are not meant so,-the plan, as it now

stands, says, that as to future growth, every inhabitant in sixty-four of your smallest towns is but a sixth part of a man, as compared with the inhabitants in two hu dred and twenty-two other towns; and it says to the inhabitants of twelve of your largest towns and cities, that five of them shall count as only equal to three, as to future growth; that five of their future increase of population are only equal to three in the medium towns. Therefore, I say, that we fail, in the first place, to remove these two evils to a degree which I wish to see them removed, and to a degree which I believe the people of the Commonwealth demand that they shall be removed, and to a degree which they have a right to require at our hands that they should be removed. And, Sir, it cures these evils to the extent that it does go, at the expense of your twelve large towns and cities. And the question which arises in the mind is, whether that is not a greater evil than that which it removes, in enfranchising so many towns, now deprived of representation?

Now, Mr. President, in a friendly spirit, I wish to say one word upon the principle. I will not call things by party names. I wish to use the word democratic, but I wish to use it in that sense in which we are all, every man of us, democrats; to wit, in the sense that the people have the right to govern themselves, to which we all agree. Now, I cannot assent to the plan of my friend from Lowell, as it stands at present, nor unless it can be amended so that these sixty-four towns which are now disfranchised, shall be released from that inequality. I want every inhabitant of Massachusetts represented constantly. I do not look upon any one as a full man until he is. Therefore, I say, you must adopt a system to accomplish that. What is the matter, Mr. President? Are you afraid of the people? Are we, democrats, every man of us, to the back bone, in the sense I have defined the word, afraid of the people, unless they are landholders? Are we afraid of the people when they are aggregated in numbers, as in the cities? Does not your Bill of Rights say that the people have a right to aggregate themselves anywhere, at any time, expressly to address and influence the government? I go for the people, and with my friend, (Mr. Haskell,) I say I will let the people go where they please, and the power shall go with them, and the blessing of God upon it. And because they choose to live in a city I will not sunder from them the power of self-government, or because they must live in a small town, I will not sunder from them the power of self-government. My friend has said that these small towns may be represented if they will unite. True, but it takes two to make a

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| bargain; and town A. may desire it, and its neighbor, town B., may decline; and though that power of uniting was in the Constitution of 1778, and in the amendment of 1836, and in the amendment of 1841, the towns have not availed themselves of it, because, practically, they cannot. This is the very thing we are sent here to do for them, to district them into representative districts, so that they may enjoy this right. A waiver, in law, is when a man has the sole right to decline and he does decline. That is not the case here; it requires an agreement to accomplish anything. Now, are we quite ready. Mr. President, to say that the increasing population in your large towns, your twelve largest cities and towns, and in your sixty-four smallest towns shall be considered in the ratio of five to three in the other towns. That is an ominous ratio. Look at congress. Representation in congress is for the purpose of taxation; and the apportionment of representation among the States is based upon population; but in some of them, in making up the number of the people, there is an ominous ratio. What is that ratio? Why, that "three-fifths of all other persons shall be added"--so that five men of a certain color are equal to three, and shall be counted as three, of a certain other color.

Mr. BUTLER. If the gentleman from Boston will allow me, I would like to ask him where he finds a ratio of three to five in my plan?

Mr. GILES. I allude to the growth in the population of the towns containing between one thousand and four thousand, compared with the growth in towns containing fifteen thousand. I am treating of it in that way for the purpose of not going over the ground which has been gone over so ably by my friend on my right, (Mr. Haskell). I am considering the matter looking to the future growth, and I take round numbers because fractions are not suitable to public debate.

Now, I do earnestly desire a plan, and will, with all my power, labor and coöperate with the most benevolent and yielding disposition, for any plan, coming from any quarter, that shall reduce the House to the neighborhood of three hundred members, and shall secure a constant representation to every inhabitant of this Commonwealth. I want this Convention to go before the people with a plan which shall accomplish those two objects, and if they do so, that plan will be triumphantly adopted. I greatly apprehend that if they do not, any plan will be rejected. Though, as I have said, condemning now, as I did in 1841, the existing plan, because it disfranchises a part of your citizens, and as I am compelled to choose between two evils, I will go for the plan of my friend from Lowell, if I shall conscientiously be

to

lieve it, when perfected, to involve the least of the evils, but I should, naturally, choose neither of them. Now my friend has said, and with great cogency-I hope the gentleman will not suppose that I wish to criticize his plan or the plan of any other person-that it is an easier matter to pull down than to build up. It is So. And that is the "facilis descensus" which our republican policy is tending. It is hard to build up, I admit; and if a proposition has been adopted without reason, it is very difficult to change it by reason. A custom which has grown up inch by inch, day by day, and year by year, must be changed in the same way. All that I admit, and yet I respond to my friend when he says, "Before you condemn, produce your plan ; do not say this will not do unless you have something that will; do not cry out stop in that direction unless you can point to a better course." That is just; he is right to say so.

Now, I have not turned my attention to the production of a plan until within a very short time, but I will indicate in the shortest possible outline what I would wish to see, and what I think will meet some of the desires expressed in this Convention, and avoid some of the evils. It is this: I would limit the House to three hundred and twenty. That should be a maximum, above which the House could never go. I would apportion your representation according to the inhabitants; or I am willing to say, as at present advised, according to legal voters; and I would district the State for that purpose, with no limit, except it is that you should not divide the towns having less than twelve thousand inhabitants. These should be the principles embraced in my plan, and it would not require this long agony of mathematics which we have had for three weeks past, striving to conceive and bring forth an impossibility. I say, limit your House and limit it so as to cure that evil and fix the limit so that the number shall never again rise. Then apportion your representation either upon the basis of inhabitants, which is a definite term in the Constitution, or upon legal voters. I can conceive an advantage in some instances in taking legal voters; for the people seeing that their power is apportioned upon legal voters, will take care that proper persons and none others are legal voters. Then, to save the town lines, I would put a limit incidentally, that no town having less than twelve thousand inhabitants should be divided, and that would secure your towns which have not a right to become cities, and the instant they became cities they will district themselves into wards and vote upon the principle of a general ticket.

Now, one word upon the size of the districts;

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and I believe these three principles, if we district the whole State, would preserve every town line, would give a convenient number of inhabitants in each district, and apportion the representatives to the entire satisfaction of the people, and to the entire justice of the case. I speak now of the substantial terms, for there always will be fractions of a hundred or so, perhaps more, in fixing the numbers. But, in looking at this document, if it should be printed, or if it should not, you will notice one or two things, which, in my judgment, have an important bearing on this matter. We have these 1,035 towns which have failed to be represented within the last thirteen years; and how has that failure ranged? I have counted up, and I will state the result very briefly. In 1840, there were thirty-nine towns which failed; in 1841, there were ten; in 1842, there were fiftyseven; in 1843, there were forty-four; in 1844, there were seventy-seven; in 1845 there were one hundred and seventeen; in 1846, there were one hundred and twenty-two; in 1847, there were one hundred and forty; in 1848, there were one hundred and twenty-six; in 1849, there were one hundred and thirty; in 1850, there were one hundred and ten; in 1851, there were thirtythree, and in 1852, there were thirty. And why did they fail? There were three causes, as I judge from these statistics, which I have had but a limited time to examine. The first and the general cause is, because the Constitution forbids them to send; it forbids a large number of these towns to send, and they cannot do it. That is an evil to which I object, and that is an evil which we must remove-we are under a political and moral necessity to remove it. The next reason why these towns have failed to send, so far as I can judge, is, that many of them voted not to send. That is a town right, but, is it one which the towns wish to preserve? Will you preserve the power of a majority of those who happen to be present in town-meeting at the moment such a vote is put and carried, to deprive the minority, or it may be the majority, of the actual voters of that town, of the right to be represented? I wish to see the Constitution so amended, that no citizen of this Commonwealth shall, behind my back, take from me the right of representation. That is wrong, and it is unjust in practice. My friend, (Mr. Wood,) shakes his head as though he thinks it is not unjust in practice. But the principle was established when the towns paid their representatives themselves, and it seemed to be no more than just, where they paid the expense themselves, that they should have the right to refuse to send if they saw fit, and thus save the money. The question was

merely whether the money should come out or stay in their purse. To be sure, the towns might be fined if they refused; but that is not material to this point. Now, a district cannot disfranchise itself in that way, nor any of its members.

The other reason was, for I find I must condense my remarks as much as possible,-that they could not elect. They tried to and could not succeed. Why could they not succeed? Because your small towns, which make up most of that roll of towns which failed to be represented; failed, before they were called upon to vote, to do certain things which must be done in order for them to have representative action. Public opinion must be conciliated and concentrated upon one man, in order to secure an election; and this must be done before the day of voting as well as at the polls. If you mean to elect a general ticket, you must conciliate and concentrate public opinion upon your candidates. If you have but one candidate, it is not so easy a matter to do that; where there is a general ticket, people of every class in the community are represented as far as possible by men of their own class, but in a small place every class wants its man, and thus they break up and divide upon so many candidates that it is a hard matter to elect a single ticket. A town which is large enough to district, is large enough to have two or three representatives; and your nominating caucus can concentrate and conciliate public opinion upon that ticket so as to carry it. Do you find Boston in that list? No! Here is a ticket of between thirty and forty. Here we go to the other extreme, from an excess the other way, because the ticket is too large, and the delegation is liable to have weak timber in it. My principle of districting, therefore, would be, to arrange it so that a ticket should not be less than three nor over five. That would give scope to arrange, and to concentrate, and to conciliate as much as was necessary before election; and it would very generally secure the success of the ticket.

I have thus hastily thrown out these views; and I think if I have accomplished nothing more, I have demonstrated a good disposition to get rid of these evils and to achieve this great boon for the people, viz., a reasonably sized House and constant representation; and I will strike hands with my friend from Lowell or any other gentleman who will submit a proposition that I can conscientiously believe involves an improvement, to any extent, upon our present system, which I do condemn, and feel a moral necessity to the extent of my power to amend. I should be in favor of recommittal, but I certainly do not desire to deprive any gentleman of the same privilege of

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which I have just availed myself of; and, therefore, unless my friend from New Bedford requires me to make the motion which he intended to make, I will leave it to the sense of the Convention to renew the motion for recommittal, whenever any gentleman pleases, and I will vote for it.

Mr. FRENCH, of New Bedford. If I was not understood to submit the motion, I will submit it now, that this whole subject be recommitted to a Committee of one from each county in the Commonwealth.

The PRESIDENT. The Chair did not understand the gentleman to make the motion before. The question is now on the motion to recommit.

Mr. HATHAWAY, of Freetown. I would inquire of the Chair, whether that motion is debatable?

The PRESIDENT. The motion is debatable, but the Chair will suggest, that it does not open the whole merits of the question. It is merely a motion to recommit the subject.

Mr. HATHAWAY. I will endeavor to confine my remarks to that point. I hope, Sir, that the motion of the gentleman from New Bedford will prevail. We have been almost drowned and smothered with propositions in reference to the basis of the House of Representatives. There are so many propositions, that I confess I am at a loss to know which of them all is the preferable one; but, Sir, I feel the force of a remark that was communicated to me by a friend, a few days since, which a distinguished individual, formerly President of the United States,-I allude to John Quincy Adams,-made upon a certain occasion. I feel that remark pressing upon me at this moment. Here, Sir, as to this very proposition before this Convention, I feel that there are a majority of the delegates who are opposed to us-that any proposition which may come from the small towns can be pressed here and carried, no matter how unjust. Yet here is a minority, Sir; and upon that topic I am happy to say, that a minority of delegates represent the majority of the people, and we have eternal justice upon our side, in reference to the matter of equal and fair representation. But yet I know what the vote is to be upon this question. Let me say, Mr. President, to gentlemen who press this motion to have the vote now taken, that there is behind us a power greater than them, or us; and let me say to them, that although a majority of the delegates upon this floor represent only about two-fifths of the people of this Commonwealth, while a minority here represent the other three-fifths, if this matter is pressed upon us, and a more unjust proposition in reference to representation than even the one before us is adopted by the Convention,

Wednesday,]

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them to judge whether it shall form a part of the Constitution of this Commonwealth or not.

Mr. President, the "Old Colony" has not been very forward in this debate. I have never before opened my mouth in reference to this subject; but, Sir, I wish gentlemen to be reminded that the "Old Colony," or Plymouth and Massachusetts Colony, which now constitute the State of Massachusetts, were once independent of each other. Jacob and Esau, however, were brethren in one family; and we happened to be the older brother. If gentlemen are disposed to press this proposition upon us to a vote now, however unjust the Commonwealth may have been towards us heretofore, they must remember that we shall not be content now to take up with a mess of pottage. I say it in a spirit of kindness, however, and a spirit of brotherly love towards other portions of the Commonwealth-I mean those which belonged to Massachusetts Colony. If this proposition is pressed upon us with too much severity, I give gentlemen notice, that all the blessing of Isaac upon his son may turn back upon them, and the yoke of Jacob may be broken. I hope, Sir, that this proposition will be recommitted, and at the same time, in reference to this matter, permit me to turn to my distinguished friend for Berlin, (Mr. Boutwell,) and refer to his argument the other day, that, although the present mode of representation and the principle upon which it rested, were unjust and unequal, yet that is no reason under heaven why it should not be continued. I am aware, Sir, that under our present Constitution it is unjust and unequal, but that is no reason why the inequality should be made greater; and unless I have very much miscalculated the proposition of the gentleman from Lowell, it carries us a step or two beyond the wrong which we are now suffering in that section of the State, so far as representation is concerned. Permit me to say, in short, that if a fair basis of representation can be adopted, upon which you will have your representatives approximating to equality,-for I do not expect that it can be entirely equal; that is impossible in the nature of things,-I shall be content with it, and will vote for it. But I shall vote against any system which, instead of approximating to equality, make it more unjust than the present system under our present Constitution.

There is one other thing which I wish to say now, as, perhaps, I shall not have another opportunity. I go against increasing the number of the members of the House. I am satisfied, however other gentlemen may feel in regard to that matter, that so far as the southern section of the

the people of that section are opposed to increasing the number of the House of Representatives; and the proposition of the gentleman from Lowell does increase it.

Mr. BUTLER, (in his seat). That is a mistake.

Mr. HATHAWAY. The gentleman from Lowell says that I am mistaken; but I think I can prove that I am correct. If gentlemen will turn to document No. 12, they will find that 299 towns in this Commonwealth are entitled to send representatives annually; and of course, in ten years, if they are fully represented, they would send 2,990. The towns which are entitled to send fractional representatives, or in other words, those which are not entitled to send a representative every year, would have a right, in ten years, to send 737. Then, according to my arithmetic, if you add these two sums together, 2,990 and 737, it makes 3,727, which is the maximum of representation in this house for ten years. I am aware that the valuation year is excluded. Then, if you will just divide it by ten, you will find that the representation, annually, from all those towns, averages 372.7. All that is perfectly plain and simple. Now, the proposition of the gentleman from Lowell, as I understand it, gives us 391, and gives us somewhere about 32 or 34 more in the valuation year. I am opposed to that, for I think that the people of this Commonwealth, generally, just as much believed that the number of the House of Representatives would be reduced, as they believed that this Convention was to come together. I am confident that such was the feeling in the southern section of the State.

If this matter is recommitted, as I hope it will be, gentlemen will have an opportunity to examine the practical operation of these systems, and to offer other propositions to remedy their defects. I have a proposition which, in that case, I shall wish to submit. I have eliminated it, and drawn it up, but I have no disposition to lay it before the Convention, to take its chance with the numerous others that have been submitted, upon a question of amendment. I know what the fate of it would be; it would stand no chance at all. My proposition, if carried out, would be this-to fix a general basis, and set the maximum of representatives at 320. I confess, that if it had been left to my own judgment, I would not have gone quite so high; but, yielding to what appeared to be the sense of the Convention, I should put it at 320, and have the House based upon the qualified voters of the Commonwealth. After basing it upon the qualified voters, I would have the representatives elected by districts; and I should have