Opinion of the Court. 334 U.S. matter of such great significance as the execution of insane persons. The jurisdiction of California courts to issue mandamus has its source in Art. VI, §§ 4, 4b, 5 of the state constitution. The writ can issue to any inferior tribunal or person to compel an act which the law specifically enjoins. Code of Civil Procedure of California, § 1085. It has been held that the writ may issue against the secretary of state, Hutchinson v. Brown, 122 Cal. 189, 54 P. 738, or even against the governor. Elliott v. Pardee, Governor, 149 Cal. 516, 520, 86 P. 1087, 1089. Petitioner contends, however, that mandamus would not be available under California law if there is another adequate remedy, see Kahn v. Smith, 23 Cal. 2d 12, 142 P. 2d 13, that here habeas corpus is available, and hence mandamus is not. This contention is fully answered by the State Supreme Court's opinion in this case, holding that neither habeas corpus nor any other remedy is available to test sanity of a condemned defendant, except that remedy under § 3701 which only the warden can institute. Hence, so far as it here appears, mandamus to compel action by the warden is the only available remedy. Petitioner contends that this remedy is inadequate because under California law no relief could be hoped for in a mandamus proceeding without a showing that the warden's non-action was arbitrary and capricious. We cannot know, of course, just what precise standards the State Supreme Court may hold must be met by petitioner in order to obtain the judicial inquiry provided in § 3701. We are persuaded by the attorney general's statements and brief, and by the state constitution, state statutes, and state decisions to which he referred, that mandamus is probably available, and that in a mandamus proceeding some issues of fact concerning petitioner's sanity can be drawn by the parties, resolved by the courts, 431 Opinion of the Court. and provide support for relief. Different language has been used in different opinions concerning the conditions upon which the writ will issue in California. Although it has been said that generally the writ will issue only to correct an abuse of discretion, Bank of Italy v. Johnson, 200 Cal. 1, 31-33, 251 P. 784, 795-796 and cases cited, it has also been pointed out that in some circumstances writs can issue to compel action in a particular way. Wood v. Strother, 76 Cal. 545, 549, 18 P. 766, 769; Landsborough v. Kelly, 1 Cal. 2d 739, 744, 37 P. 2d 93, 95. In considering what the issues may be in a mandamus proceeding, it must be borne in mind that the warden. is under a mandatory duty to initiate judicial proceedings, not when a defendant is insane, but when "there is good reason to believe" he is insane. We cannot say at this time that California's remedy by mandamus will be less than a substantial equivalent " of one which authorized him to apply directly to a court for a full hearing. For this Court held in Nobles v. Georgia, supra, that in the absence of sufficient reasons for holding a full hearing into the sanity of a defendant sentenced to death, a state judge may deny such a hearing consistently with due process. As previously pointed out, the decision in the Nobles case emphasized that due process of law had never necessarily envisioned a full court hearing every time the insanity of a condemned defendant was suggested. Applications for inquiries into sanity made by a defendant sentenced to death, unsupported by facts, and buttressed by no good reasons for believing that the defendant has lost his sanity, cannot, with any appropriate regard for society and for the judicial process, call for the delays in execution incident to full judicial inquiry. And a court can just as satisfac 11 See Edison Co. v. Labor Board, 305 U. S. 197, 234; Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U. S. 126, 152–153. FRANKFURTER, J., concurring. 334 U.S. torily determine by mandamus as by direct application whether there are good reasons to have a full-fledged judicial inquiry into a defendant's sanity. In this situation we find no federal constitutional question presented which is ripe for decision here. So here, as in Woods v. Nierstheimer, supra, being unable to say that the judgment denying habeas corpus may not rest on an adequate non-federal ground, the writ of certiorari is Dismissed. MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER, whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, MR. JUSTICE MURPHY, and MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE join, concurring. I's Where life is at stake one cannot be too careful. had better be dotted and t's crossed. And so I deem it proper to state my understanding of the opinion of the Court, on the basis of which I concur in it. We granted certiorari to review a decision of the Supreme Court of California which dismissed habeas corpus proceedings brought in that court. We did so on the assumption that the case raised questions under the Fourteenth Amendment-more particularly, whether an unreviewable determination by the superintendent of a State hospital, that one convicted of murder and found to have become insane after conviction had been restored to sanity and therefore was subject to execution, was consistent with the due process which the Fourteenth Amendment secures. The Court now finds that all that the California Supreme Court did was to hold that as a matter of California procedure the petitioner's claim could not be passed on by the direct remedy of habeas corpus, but that there is available a special local remedy, labeled mandamus, whereby the petitioner can judicially test his present sanity. In short, the Court dismisses the writ of certiorari because the decision of the court below rests on 431 FRANKFURTER, J., concurring. a purely State ground in that there is a State remedy available, which has not been pursued, by means of which he can secure the rights he claims under the United States Constitution. Of course I recognize the weight to be attached to the Attorney General's views regarding the law of California. But the controlling voice on California law is that of the Supreme Court of California. Whatever may be the elegancies of procedure by which the matter is to be determined, our decision declining to consider the grave constitutional issues which we thought we had before us, is contingent upon a determination by the Supreme Court of California that the law of that State is what our decision presupposes it to be, namely, that California by a remedy which California chooses to call mandamus enables the present petitioner to secure a judicial determination of his present sanity. This means, of course, not the very restricted scope of relief which is normally associated with the traditional remedy of mandamus. It presupposes that California affords petitioner the means of challenging in a substantial way the ex parte finding of the Superintendent of the State Hospital for the Insane and enables him to secure judicial determination of the claims he has made in his petition for habeas corpus which, so the Court now holds, is not the proper way to proceed. Upon this view I concur in the decision and opinion of the Court. BAY RIDGE OPERATING CO., INC. v. AARON ET AL. NO. 366. CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.* Argued January 12, 1948.-Decided June 7, 1948. It A collective bargaining agreement between a longshoremen's union and employers, affecting employment in interstate and foreign commerce, provided for "straight time" hourly rates for work done during certain daytime hours on weekdays and "overtime rates," approximately 150% of "straight time" rates, for work done during all other hours and on Sundays and holidays. made no provision for a differential in pay for work in excess of 40 hours per week. Longshoremen work irregular hours and frequently work for several different employers during a single week. Respondent longshoremen, some of whom had worked only outside "straight time" periods and had been paid "overtime rates," sued to recover additional overtime compensation allegedly due them under the Fair Labor Standards Act for work in excess of 40 hours per week. Held: 1. The "straight time" rate provided for by the agreement does not constitute the "regular rate" which § 7 (a) of the Fair Labor Standards Act requires to be used in computing the statutory minimum payment ("not less than one and one-half times the regular rate") for work in excess of 40 hours. Pp. 459-477. 2. Walling v. Belo Corp., 316 U. S. 624, distinguished. Pp. 462-463. 3. Contract declarations, even though the result of collective bargaining, are not conclusive as to what is the "regular rate" within the meaning of § 7 (a). Pp. 463-464. 4. Determination of the "regular rate" for each individual must be drawn from what happens under the employment contract. P. 464. 5. The "regular rate" is to be found by dividing the number of hours worked into the total weekly compensation received, less the amount of any "overtime premium." Pp. 464–465. 6. "Overtime premium," deductible from total compensation received in computing the "regular rate," is any additional sum *Together with No. 367, Huron Stevedoring Corp. v. Blue et al., also on certiorari to the same court. |