334 U.S. FRANKFURTER, J., dissenting. Court set forth its reasons for making this transfer.? After the transfer of the criminal case, the court granted the motion now before us, dismissing the equity suit "in the interest of justice, just as the same facts in the companion criminal prosecution required its transfer to another district." 7 F. R. D. 456, 465. Is it not incongruous that that which "the interest of justice" demanded in the criminal prosecution is beyond the power of a court in a civil suit against the same. defendants on the same transactions? 3 Of course Congress may leave no choice to a court to entertain a suit even though it is vexatious and oppressive for the plaintiff to choose the particular district in which he pursues his claim. But such limitation upon the power of courts to administer justice ought not to be lightly drawn from language merely conferring jurisdiction. The manner in which jurisdictional provisions are appropriately to be read is illustrated by our decision in Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U. S. 1, where this Court recognized "considerations of convenience, efficiency and justice" even when a State invoked the Court's original jurisdiction in what was concededly a justiciable controversy. 308 U. S. at 19. I do not find in the 2 "I do not question the motive of the Government in instituting the prosecution in this district. "But I am satisfied that a trial here would impose unnecessary hardships on the defendants and entail unjustifiable expense which it is the object of the new rules of criminal procedure, and especially of the rule under discussion, to avoid. Altogether the facts spell out the vexatiousness and oppressiveness which the Supreme Court has warned us to eschew in matters of this character." 7 F. R. D. 393, 402-403. 3 Cf. L. Hand, J., in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416, 429: "In United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219, 61 S. Ct. 463, 85 L. Ed. 788, a later statute in pari materia was considered to throw a cross light upon the Anti-trust Acts, illuminating enough even to override an earlier ruling of the court." 573 FRANKFURTER, J., dissenting. scheme of the anti-trust acts and of their relevant legislative history the duty to exercise jurisdiction so imperative as to preclude judicial discretion in refusing to entertain a suit where “the interest of justice" commands it. Defendants in an anti-trust suit may no doubt attempt to resort to delaying tactics by motions claiming unfairness of a particular forum. Neither must we be indifferent to the potentialities of unfairness in giving the Government a wholly free hand in selecting its forum so long as technical requirements of venue are met. See, e. g., The Railway Shopmen's Strike Case (United States v. Railway Employees), 283 F. 479. All parties to a litigation tend to become partisans, and confidence in the fair administration of justice had better be rested on exacting standards in the quality of the federal judiciary. Federal judges ought to be of a calibre to be able to thwart obstructive tactics by defendants and not be denied all power to check attempted unfairness by a too zealous Government. I find nothing in the anti-trust acts comparable to the considerations which led this Court to conclude that the provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act were designed to give railroad employees a privileged position in bringing suits under that Act. See, especially, concurring opinion in Miles v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 315 U. S. 698, 705. I am of opinion that the District Court had power to entertain the motion on the basis of which it entered the judgment. Mr. Justice BURTON joins this dissent. 792588 O-48- -43 Syllabus. 334 U. S. UNITED STATES v. ZAZOVE. CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT. No. 432. Argued April 19, 1948. Decided June 14, 1948. 1. Section 602 (h) (2) of the National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940 provides that insurance payable to a beneficiary who is over 30 at the time of the insured's death shall be paid in equal monthly installments for 120 months certain, with such payments continuing during the remaining lifetime of the beneficiary. Regulation 3450 of the Veterans' Administration, issued as a construction of § 602 (h) (2), provides that the amount of the monthly installments so payable shall be calculated in accordance with a schedule based upon the beneficiary's age and the American Experience Table of Mortality. The beneficiary of a National Service Life Insurance policy, who was over 30 at the time of the insured's death in 1943, sued to obtain monthly payments in an amount which, over a period of 120 months, would equal the face amount of the policy plus interest. She contended that Regulation 3450 was not a proper construction of § 602 (h) (2). Held: The regulation is valid. Pp. 604-624. 2. Read in its entirety and with regard to the specialized, technical sense in which some of its wording is generally employed in the insurance field, § 602 (h) (2) is not so clear and free from ambiguity as to preclude the construction adopted by the Veterans' Administration in Regulation 3450. Pp. 608-610. 3. In construing the provisions of an Act of Congress setting up a system of national life insurance, only the intent of Congress need be ascertained; the layman understanding of the policy holder does not have the relevance that it has in the case of an ordinary commercial insurance contract. Pp. 610-611. 4. It is not enough, however, that the regulation is not plainly interdicted by the statute, for in § 608 of the Act, as amended, Congress manifested an intent that regulations of the Veterans' Administration be subjected to more than casual judicial scrutiny to determine whether they are "not inconsistent" with the statute, whether they are "necessary or appropriate" to carry out its purposes, and whether they are "properly" issued. Pp. 611-612. 5. But when the respective assumptions and consequences of each of the two alternative interpretations of § 602 (h) (2) presented 602 Statement of the Case. in this case are tested against the legislative history and the statute viewed in its entirety, it is clear that the one incorporated in Regulation 3450 is that intended by Congress. Pp. 612–624. (a) Under a contrary interpretation of the statute, a beneficiary over 30 would in most cases receive a far greater aggregate amount than a beneficiary under 30. There is no indication that Congress intended this sharp disparity of treatment, and it does not result under the regulation. Pp. 612-616. (b) Congress contemplated that the reserve fund to meet the liabilities of National Service Life Insurance policies was to be self-supporting, sustained by the premiums paid and by the yield of premiums invested, except as to those exceptional items of cost as to which the statute specifically provided that the Government would bear the financial burden. Under the construction advanced by the beneficiary in this case, however, the Government's total liability would be increased to an extent requiring either special Congressional appropriations or a substantial increase in premium rates. The statute nowhere specifies that the Government should bear this huge cost, nor is there any basis for assuming that Congress envisaged premium rates high enough to meet an added liability of such proportions. Pp. 616–617. (c) The practice in effect under United States Government Life Insurance for World War I veterans and the long-established practice of commercial insurance companies, which must be viewed as part of the background of experience which the draftsmen of § 602 (h) (2) had in mind, both accord with the construction embodied in Regulation 3450. Pp. 617-619. (d) The juxtaposition of § 602 (h) (2) with other provisions indicating that actuarial principles were to be followed is also significant. P. 620. (e) The subsequent legislative history of the statute clearly indicates Congressional approval of the construction put on § 602 (h) (2) by Regulation 3450. Pp. 620-624. 162 F.2d 443, reversed. In a suit by a beneficiary, the District Court sustained the validity of Regulation 3450 of the Veterans' Administration as being in accord with § 602 (h) (2) of the National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940. Court of Appeals reversed. 162 F. 2d 443. The Circuit granted certiorari. 332 U. S. 835. Reversed, p. 624. Opinion of the Court. 334 U.S. Oscar H. Davis argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, H. Graham Morison, Paul A. Sweeney, Melvin Richter and Philip Elman. Edward H. S. Martin argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was John B. King. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE VINSON delivered the opinion of the Court. We are called upon in this case to determine whether Regulation 3450 of the Veterans' Administration is in accord with a proper construction of § 602 (h) (2) of the National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940.2 Respondent, Tillie Zazove, was designated beneficiary in a $5,000 contract of National Service Life Insurance. The insured died in 1943, and the named beneficiary filed her claim for the insurance in the Veterans' Administration. Upon denial of the claim, suit was instituted in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The District Court ruled, on its view of the facts, that Mrs. Zazove did not stand in loco parentis to the soldier and hence was not one of the persons who could be made a beneficiary as provided by the statute. On appeal, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled to the contrary and remanded for further proceedings. 156 F.2d 24. The issue remaining for determination by the District Court upon remand was the validity of Regulation 3450. It sustained the regulation as properly issued pursuant to 16 Fed. Reg. 1162, 1166, 38 C. F. R. 1941 Supp. § 10.3450. 2 Part I, Title VI of the Second Revenue Act of 1940, Act of Oct. 8, 1940, c. 757, 54 Stat. 974, 1008, 38 U. S. C. §§ 801, 802 (h) (2). 3 Pursuant to § 617 of the Act, 38 U. S. C. § 817. |