699 VINSON, C. J., dissenting. the Fourth Amendment was intended to protect, serves only to open an avenue of escape for those guilty of crime and to menace the effective operation of government which is an essential precondition to the existence of all civil liberties. In reaching its result the Court relies on Taylor v. United States, 286 U. S. 1 (1932). There, federal agents broke into a garage and seized a quantity of illicit liquor. At the time of entry, "No one was within the place and there was no reason to think otherwise." Id. at 5. The agents acted without the authority of a search warrant, nor, unlike the present case, was lawful entry into the building made for the purpose of effecting a valid arrest. Under these circumstances the Court ruled that the seizure was unlawful. But to apply that holding in a situation like the present, where law-enforcement officers have entered a building to arrest a party openly engaged in the commission of a felony, is to disregard the very basis upon which the Taylor case was decided. We are told, however, that although the petitioner Antoniole was arrested while undeniably engaged in the commission of a felony, his presence in the building in which the contraband materials were located was a "fortuitous circumstance which was inadequate to legalize the seizure." We should suppose that any arrest of a party engaged in the commission of a felony is based in part upon an element of chance. Criminals do not normally choose to engage in felonious enterprises before an audience of police officials. We may well anticipate the perplexity of officers engaged in the practical business of law enforcement when confronted with a rule which makes the validity of a seizure of contraband materials as an incident to a lawful arrest dependent upon subsequent judicial judgment as to the "fortuitous" circumstances relating to the presence of the party arrested on the premises in which the illegal goods are located. VINSON, C. J., dissenting. 334 U.S. Nor are we free to assume that the agents in this case would have proceeded illegally to seize the materials in the barn in the absence of the justification of a valid arrest. A lawful seizure is not to be invalidated by speculations as to what the conduct of the agents might have been had a different factual situation been presented. The case of Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10 (1948), does not support the result which the Court has reached. For there the majority of the Court held that the arrest in question was an invalid one. Obviously, a search and seizure may not be held valid on the sole ground that it was an incident to an invalid arrest. Such is not the situation here. In Carroll v. United States, supra at 149, this Court observed: "The Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens." We believe that the result reached today is not consistent with judicial authority as it existed before the adoption of the Fourth Amendment nor as it has developed since that time. Nor do we feel that the decision commends itself as adapted to conserve vital public and individual interests. Heretofore it has been thought that where officers charged with the responsibility of enforcement of the law have lawfully entered premises and executed a valid arrest, a reasonable accommodation of the interests of society and the individual permits such officials to seize instrumentalities of the crime and contraband materials in open view of the arresting officer. The Court would now condition this right of seizure after a valid arrest upon an ex post facto judicial judgment of whether the arresting officers might have obtained a search warrant. At best, the operation of the rule which the Court today enunciates for the first time may be expected to confound confusion in a field already replete with complexities. Syllabus. WEST v. OKLAHOMA TAX COMMISSION. APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF OKLAHOMA. No. 489. Argued March 29-30, 1948.-Decided June 14, 1948. 1. An Oklahoma inheritance tax on the transfer of properties held in trust by the United States for the benefit of a restricted Osage Indian and his heirs, which properties had not been exempted by Congress from direct taxation, held valid. Pp. 718-728. 2. United States v. Rickert, 188 U. S. 432, and McCurdy v. United States, 264 U. S. 484, distinguished; Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. United States, 319 U. S. 598, followed. Pp. 724–727. 3. For the purpose of an estate tax, there is no substantial difference between restricted property and trust property. P. 726. 4. An inheritance or estate tax is not imposed upon the property of which an estate is composed, but rather upon the shifting of economic benefits and the privilege of transmitting or receiving such benefits. P. 727. 5. Whether legal title to the properties composing an estate is in the United States or in the decedent and his heir is of no consequence to the taxability of the transfer; nor is the fact that permitting the imposition of the inheritance tax on the transfer may deplete the trust corpus and create lien difficulties. P. 727. 200 Okla., 193 P. 2d 1017, affirmed. From an order of the Oklahoma Tax Commission imposing an inheritance tax on the estate of a restricted Osage Indian, appellant, sole heir of the decedent, appealed. The state supreme court affirmed the order. 200 Okla., 193 P. 2d 1017. On appeal to this Court, affirmed, p. 728. Frank T. McCoy argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were John R. Pearson and Frank Mahan. R. F. Barry and Joe M. Whitaker argued the cause for appellee. With them on the brief was C. W. King. Opinion of the Court. 334 U.S. MR. JUSTICE MURPHY delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal concerns the power of the State of Oklahoma to levy an inheritance tax on the estate of a restricted Osage Indian. Specifically, the problem is whether property held in trust by the United States for the benefit of the Indian may be included within the taxable estate. Charles West, Jr., was a restricted, full-blood, unallotted, adult Osage Indian. He died intestate in 1940, a resident of Oklahoma. No certificate of competency was ever issued to him. Surviving him was his mother, appellant herein, who is a restricted, full-blood Osage Indian. The entire estate passed to her as the sole heir at law.1 The Oklahoma Tax Commission entered an order levying a tax on the transfer of the net estate, valued at $111,219.18. With penalties, the total tax imposed was $5,313.35. Appellant made timely objection to the inclusion of certain items in the taxable estate. These items formed the bulk of the estate and had been held in trust for the decedent by the United States, acting through the Secretary of the Interior. Act of June 28, 1906, 34 Stat. 539, as amended, 41 Stat. 1249, 45 Stat. 1478, 52 Stat. 1034. The trust properties involved were as follows: (1) One and 915/2520ths Osage mineral headrights. This item represented the decedent's undivided interest in the oil, gas, coal and other minerals under the lands in Osage County, Oklahoma, said minerals having been 1 The decedent was also survived by a widow. But she was prohibited by law from inheriting any part of the estate unless she was of Indian blood, a matter which was in dispute. A settlement was reached whereby the widow received a certain amount from the estate, apparently in return for giving up her claim as an heir. 717 Opinion of the Court. reserved to the use of the Osage Tribe by the Act of June 28, 1906.2 (2) Surplus funds in the United States Treasury, representing accruals of income to the decedent from the headrights. (3) Stocks and bonds purchased by and in the name of the United States and held for the decedent by the Secretary of the Interior. These purchases were made with the surplus funds accruing from the headrights. (4) Trust funds in the hands of the Treasurer of the United States, representing decedent's share of the proceeds of the sale of the Osage Tribe's lands in Kansas. (5) Personal property purchased with surplus funds. Appellant claimed that these properties were immune from state taxation by virtue of the relevant provisions of the Constitution, treaties and laws of the United States; hence the Oklahoma Inheritance and Transfer Tax Act of 1939 (§§ 989-989t, Title 68, Okla. Stat. 1941) which authorized the assessment on the properties was invalid in this respect. The Oklahoma Tax Commission rejected this contention and the Supreme Court of Oklahoma affirmed. 200 Okla., 193 P. 2d 1017. It is essential at the outset to understand the history and nature of the arrangement whereby the United States 2 An Osage headright has been defined by one court as "the interest that a member of the tribe has in the Osage tribal trust estate, and the trust consists of the oil, gas, and mineral rights, and the funds which were placed to the credit of the Osage tribe, all fully set out in the above act [Act of June 28, 1906, 34 Stat. 539]." In re Denison, 38 F. 2d 662, 664. Another court has made this definition: "The right to receive the trust funds and the mineral interests at the end of the trust period, and during that period to participate in the distribution of the bonuses and royalties arising from the mineral estates and the interest on the trust funds, is an Osage headright." Globe Indemnity Co. v. Bruce, 81 F. 2d 143, 148-149. Headrights are not transferable and do not pass to a trustee in bankruptcy. Taylor v. Tayrien, 51 F. 2d 884; Taylor v. Jones, 51 F. 2d 892. |