visions of this act, or other person, issue an order requiring such corporation, or other person, to appear before said Commission (and produce books, documents, and papers, if so ordered) and give evidence touching the matter in question, and any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by such court as a contempt thereof. The claim that any such testimony or evidence may tend to criminate the person giving such evidence shall not excuse such witness from testifying.

The testimony of any witness may be taken at the instance of a party in any proceeding or investigation pending before the Commission by deposition at any time after the inquiry is instituted. The Commission may also order testimony to be taken by deposition in any proceeding or investigation pending before it at any stage of such proceeding or investigation. Such deposition may be taken before any person authorized so to do by the the Commission and who has power to administer oaths. Any person may be compelled to appear and depose, and to produce documentary evidence, in the same manner as witnesses may be compelled to appear and testify and produce documentary evidence before the Commission as hereinbefore provided. Such testimony shall be reduced to writing.

Witnesses whose testimony is taken under the provisions of this act shall severally be entitled to the same fees as are paid for like service in the courts of the United States.

No person shall be excused from attending and testifying, or from producing books, papers, documents, or other things before this Commission or in obedience to the subpoena of the Commission whether such subpoena be signed or issued by one or more of the commissioners on the ground or for the reason that the testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise, required of him may tend to criminate him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture. But no natural person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he may testify under oath or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, before said Commission in obedience to a subpoena issued by it in a proceeding instituted upon its own initiative: Provided, That no person so testifying shall be exempt from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying. The purpose of this provision is to give immunity only to natural persons who under oath testify in response to a subpoena of the Commission in an inquiry instituted by the Commission.

SEC. 8. That the said Commission shall, on or before the first day of January in each year, make a report, which shall be transmitted to Congress. This report shall contain such information and data collected by the Commission as it may deem of value in the determination of questions connected with the regulation of commerce, together with such recommendations as to additional legislation relating thereto as the Commission may deem necessary.

SEC. 9. That any person willfully making or furnishing to said Commission any statement, return, or record required by this act, when knowing such statement, return, or record to be false in any material particular,

shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

SEC. 10. That in case a final decree shall be issued against any corporation under the act entitled "An act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies," approved July second, eighteen hundred and ninety, or under Sections seventy-three to seventy-seven, inclusive, of "An act to reduce taxation, to provide revenue for the government, and for other purposes," which became a law August twenty-seventh, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, the court entering such decree may, in its discretion, refer to the Commission its decree, with instructions to take evidence, consider such facts, and report to the court the findings as to method of dissolution or reorganization as the Commission shall consider best fitted to carry out such decree; if a reorganization takes place under a decree, the Commission shall inform itself respecting the reorganization, and if it is of the opinion that it is not in harmony with the decree it shall, through counsel, inform the court for such action as the court may take.

SEC. II. That the said Commission may at any time, upon complaint of any person or corporation, or upon its own initiative, or upon the request of the Attorney-General, or of the corporation affected, investigate any corporation subject to the provisions of this act for the purpose of determining whether such corporation has been guilty of a violation of the act entitled "An act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies," approved July second, eighteen hundred and ninety, or under Sections seventy-three to seventy-seven, inclusive, of an "Act to reduce taxation," and so forth, which became a law August twenty-seventh, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, or of any of the provisions of this act, and may hold such hearings and take such evidence as it may deem necessary; and in case the Commission shall find that such corporation has been guilty of a violation of the provisions of said acts or of this act it shall make a finding, stating the facts, and prescribing the acts, transactions, and readjustments necessary in order that said corporation may thereafter comply with the terms of said acts and of this act, and shall transmit a copy of the said finding in full to such corporation. If within sixty days after transmitting said finding, or such extension thereof as shall be given by the Commission, the corporation shall not have complied with the terms of the finding, and shall not have performed the acts prescribed as necessary to make it comply with the said acts or with this act, the Commission shall report the fact of noncompliance to the Attorney-General, together with a copy of such finding, for his action under the said acts or of this act. But the Commission may, if it deems it proper, report the facts to the Attorney General without calling upon such corporation for compliance with said acts or with this act.

Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to prevent or interfere with the Attorney-General in enforcing the provisions of the act to protect commerce, and so forth, approved July second, eighteen hundred and ninety.

MINORITY VIEWS.

The undersigned members of the Senate Committee on Intertate Commerce are unable to agree to the report of the majority of the committee on Senate resolution 98, as to "what changes are necessary or desirable in the laws of the United States relating to the creation and control of corporations engaged in interstate commerce and what changes are necessary or desirable in the laws of the United States relating to persons or firms engaged in interstate commerce."

While certain features of the report are commendable, there are several conclusions therein which do not accord with our views, and therefore we are prevented from approving the report as a whole.

W. M. CRANE.

FRANK B. BRANDEGEE.
GEORGE T. OLIVER.
HENRY F. LIPPITT.

MEMBERSHIP OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE.

Moses E. Clapp, of Minnesota, Chairman; Shelby M. Cullom, of Illinois; W. Murray Crane, of Massachusetts; George S. Nixon, of Nevada; Albert B. Cummins, of Iowa; Frank B. Brandegee, of Connecticut; George T. Oliver, of Pennsylvania; Henry F. Lippitt, of Rhode Island; Charles E. Townsend, of Michigan; Benjamin R. Tillman, of South Carolina; Murphy J. Foster, of Louisiana; Francis G. Newlands, of Nevada; James P. Clarke, of Arkansas; Thomas P. Gore, of Oklahoma; Clarence W. Watson, of West Virginia; Atlee Pomerene, of Ohio. Lee F. Warner, Clerk; G. B. Spaulding and R. J. McNeil, Assistant Clerks.

APPENDIX N.

REGULATION OF INJUNCTIONS; WITH HISTORY OF AND REMARKS UPON EXISTING LAW AND PRACTICE.1

[Extracts from House Report No. 612, Sixty-second Congress, second session, April 26, 1912, submitted by Mr. Clayton; contained in Senate Report No. 698, (Committee on the Judiciary), Sixty-third Congress, second session, July 22, 1914, submitted by Mr. Culbertson, pages 18 to 23, inclusive.]

The too ready issuance of injunctions or the issuance without proper precautions or safeguards has been called to the attention of the Congress session after session for many years. The bill now reported [House Committee's draft of Clayton Bill] seeks to remedy the evils complained of by legislation directed to those specific matters which have given rise to most criticism. These matters are so segregated in various sections of the bill that they may be separately discussed.

I.

[NOTICE.]

FORMER STATUTES.

In order to fully understand the subject of notice in injunction cases it is necessary to give an historical resumé of the subject. In the judiciary act of 1789 which was passed during the first session of that year, Congress having created the different courts according to the scheme outlined by Chief Justice Ellsworth, conferred upon the courts power to issue all writs, including writs of ne exeat (a form of injunction), according to legal usages and practice. In 1793, however, there was a revision of that statute, and among other things the same powers, substantially, were conferred upon the judges as before; but at the

I These extracts present only such portions of the report as relate to the general subject of injunctive relief. For the able discussion of the right to injunctive relief in labor disputes appearing at pages 25-35 and 51 thereof, and for discussions of other special phases, reference must be had to the report.

end of the section authorizing the issuance of injunctions, was this language: "No injunction shall be issued in any case without reasonable previous notice to the adverse party or his attorney."

The law stood thus until the general revision of 1873, during which period the law expressly required reasonable notice to be given in all cases. But the will of Congress as thus expressed was completely thwarted and the statute nullified by the peculiar construction placed upon it by the courts. The question frequently arose. The courts got around it in various ways, but usually by holding that it did not apply to a case of threatened irreparable injury, notwithstanding that its language was broad and sweeping, plainly covering all cases. Another form of expression often used is found in Ex parte Poultney (4 Peters C. C. C., 472):

Every court of equity possesses the power to mold its rules in relation to the time of appearing and answering so as to prevent the rule from working injustice, and it is not only in the power of the court, but it is its duty to exercise a sound discretion upon this subject.

The court found a similar method of evading the sweeping prohibition of the revision of 1793, with respect to notice in Lawrence v. Bowman (1 U. S. C. C., Alester, 230).

But the earliest provision requiring notice came before the Supreme Court in 1799, in New York v. Connecticut (4 Dall., 1). Its constitutionality was not questioned. The only issue was as to the sufficiency of the notice, Chief Justice Ellsworth, for the court, saying: "The prohibition contained in the statute that writs of injunction shall not be granted without reasonable notice to the adverse party or his attorney, extends to injunctions granted by the Supreme Court or the circuit court as well as to those that may be granted by a single judge. The design and effect, however, of injunctions must render a shorter notice, reasonable notice, in the case of an application to a court than would be so construed in most cases of an application to a single judge, and until a general rule shall be settled the particular circumstances of each case must also be regarded."

Here was a case in which, although no point was made by counsel on any question of constitutionality, the Supreme Court accepted the comprehensive requirement of the act of 1793 as binding on all the Federal courts.