when advised that certain provisions of the act in question have been pronounced unconstitutional by the court to which the Constitution of the United States refers such questions, voluntarily refrain from enforcing such provisions; but we do not think it comports with well-settled principles of equity procedure to include them in an injunction in a suit in which they were not heard or represented or to subject them to penalties for contempt in disregarding such an injunction. (Fellows v. Fellows, 4 John. Chan. 25, citing Iveson v. Harris, 7 Ves. 257.)

The decree of the court below should therefore be amended by being restricted to the parties named as plaintiff and defendants in the bill, and this is directed to be done, and it is otherwise.

IV.

[PRACTICE IN RELATION TO INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IN TRADES DISPUTES.]1

Section 266c [see Section 20 of Clayton Law] is concerned with cases between "employer and employees, or between employers and employees, or between employees, or between persons employed and persons seeking employment, involving or growing out of a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment."

The first clause of the new section 266c relates to the contents and form of the complaint. It must disclose a threatened irreparable injury to property or to a property right of the party making the application for which there is no adequate remedy at law. And the property or property right must be described "with particularity.”

These requirements are merely those of good pleading and correct practice in such cases established by a long line of precedents, well understood by the profession and which should be but perhaps have not been uniformly applied. To show this it is only necessary to briefly state the applicable rules, citing some of the numerous authorities.

As the granting of an injunction rests in some degree in the discretion of the chancellor, allegations in the complaint should show candor and frankness. (Moffatt v. Calvert County Comm'rs, 97 Md., 266; Johnston v. Glenn, 40 Md., 200; Edison Storage Battery Co. v. Edison Automobile Co., 67 N. J. Eq., 44; Sharp v. Ashton, 3 Ves. & B., 144.)

I This portion of the report is broader than the sub-title indicates. It will be found to contain a statement of matters of general application in suits for injunctive relief.

The omission of material facts which, in the nature of the case, must be known to the plaintiff will preclude the granting of the relief. (Sprigg v. Western Tel. Co., 46 Md., 67; Walker v. Burks, 48 Tex., 206.)

An injunction may be refused if the allegations are argumentative and inferential. (Battle v. Stevens, 32 Ga., 25; Warsop v. Hastings, 22 Minn., 437.)

The allegations of the complaint must be definite and certain. (St. Louis v. Knapp Co., 104 U. S., 658.)

The complaint must set forth the facts with particularity and minuteness (Minor v. Terry, Code Rep. N. S. (N. S.), 384), and no material fact should be left to inference. (Warsop v. Hastings, 22 Minn., 437; Philphower v. Todd, 11 N. J. Eq., 54; Perkins v. Collins, 3 N. J. Eq., 482.)

Facts, and not the conclusions or opinions of the pleader, must be stated. (McBride v. Ross (D. C.), 13 App. Cas., 576.)

An injunction should not ordinarily be granted when the material allegations are made upon information and belief. (Brooks v. O'Hara, 8 Fed. Rep., 529; In re Holmes, 3 Fed. Rep. Cases No. 1, 562.)

The complaint must clearly show the threats or acts of defendant which cause him to apprehend future injury. (Mendelsohn v. McCabe, 144 Cal., 230; Ryan v. Fulghurn, 96 Ga., 234). And it is not sufficient to allege that the defendant claims the right to do an act which plaintiff believes illegal and injurious to him, since the intention to exercise the right must be alleged. (Lutman v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co., 56 Ohio St., 433; Attorney General v. Eau Claire, 37 Wis., 400.)

The bill must allege facts which clearly show that the plaintiff will sustain substantial injury because of the acts complained of. (Home Electric Light, etc., Co. v. Gobe Tissue Paper Co., 146 Ind., 673; Boston, etc., Ry. Co. v. Sullivan, 177 Mass., 230; McGovern v. Loder (N. J. Ch., 1890), 20 Atl. Rep., 209; Smith v. Lockwood, 13 Barb., 209; Jones v. Stewart (Tenn. Ch. App., 1900), 61 Sev., 105; Spokane St. R. Co. v. Spokane, 5 Wash., 634; State v. Eau Claire, 40 Wis., 533. And it is not sufficient to merely allege injury without stating the facts. Giffing v. Gibb, 2 Black, 519; Spooner v. McConnell, 22 Fed. Cases No. 13245; Bowling v. Crook, 104 Ala., 130; Grant v. Cooke, 7 D. C., 165; Coast Line R. Co. v. Caben, 50 Ga., 451; Dinwiddie v.

Roberts, I Greene, 363; Wabaska Electric Co. v. Wymore Co., Nebr., 199; Lubrs v. Sturtevant, 10 Or., 170; Farland v. Wood, 35 W. Va., 458.)

Since the jurisdiction in equity depends on the lack of an adequate remedy at law, a bill for an injunction must state facts from which the court can determine that the remedy at law is inadequate. (Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Tr. Co., 157 U. S., 429; Safe-Deposit, etc., Co. v. Anniston, 96 Fed. Rep., 661.)

If the inadequacy of the legal remedy depends upon the defendant's insolvency the fact of insolvency must be positively alleged. (Fullington v. Kyle Lumber Co., 139 Ala., 242; Graham v. Tankersley, 15 Ala., 634.)

An injunction will not be granted unless the complaint shows that a refusal to grant the writ will work irreparable injury. (California Nav. Co. v. Union Transp. Co., 122 Cal., 641; Cook County Brick Co., 92 Ill. App., 526; Manufacturers' Gas Co. v. Indiana Nat. Gas, etc., Co., 156 Ind., 679.) And it is not sufficient simply to allege that the injury will be irreparable, but the facts must be stated so that the court may see that the apprehension of irreparable injury is well founded. (California Nav. Co. v. Union Transp. Co., 122 Cal., 641; Empire Transp. Co. v. Johnson, 76 Conn., 79; Orange City v. Thayer, 45 Fla., 502.)

The plaintiff must allege that he has done or is willing to do everything which is necessary to entitle him to the relief sought. (Stanley v. Gadsley, 10 Pet. (U. S.), 521; Elliott v. Sihley, 101 Ala., 344; Burham v. San Francisco Fuse Mfg. Co., 76 Cal. 26; Sloan v. Coolbaugh, 10 Iowa, 31; Lewis v. Wilson, 17 N. Y. Supp., 128; Spann v. Sterns, 18 Tex., 556.)

It may be proper to notice, in passing, that the State courts furnish precedents frequently for action by the Federal courts, and vice versa, so that a pernicious rule or an error in one jurisdiction is quickly adopted by the other. It is not contended that either the Federal or the State courts have stood alone in any of the precedents which are disapproved.

APPENDIX O.

AN ACT TO REGULATE COMMERCE.1

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

COMMON CARRIERS SUBJECT TO ACT.

SEC. I. That the provisions of this act shall apply to any common carrier or carriers engaged in the transportation of passengers or property wholly by railroad, or partly by railroad and partly by water when both are used, under a common control, management, or arrangement, for a continuous carriage or shipment, from one State or Territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, to any other State or Territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, or from any place in the United States to an adjacent foreign country, or from any place in the United States through a foreign country to any other place in the United States, and also to the transportation in like manner of property shipped from any place in the United States to a foreign country and carried from such place to a port of transshipment, or shipped from a foreign country to any place in the United States and carried to such place from a port of entry either in the United States or an adjacent foreign country: Provided, however, That the provisions of this act shall not apply to the transportation of passengers or property, or to the receiving, delivering, storage, or handling of property, wholly within one State, and not shipped to or from a foreign country from or to any State or Territory as aforesaid.

I The text of the original Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 is presented for convenience of comparison with the provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act.

The jurisdiction and powers conferred upon the Interstate Commerce Commission, as well as the procedure established in connection therewith, were used as precedents and followed in numerous instances by the framers of the Federal Trade Commission Act.

The various amendments will be found in-24 Stautes at Large, 379; 25 id., 855; 26 id., 743; 28 id., 643; 34 id., 584; 34 id., 838; 35 id., 60; 35 id., 648; 36 id., 539; 37 id., 566; 37 id., 701; 38 id., 1196.

TERM "RAILROAD" DEFINED.

The term "railroad" as used in this act shall include all bridges and ferries used or operated in connection with any railroad, and also all the road in use by any corporation operating a railroad, whether owned or operated under a contract, agreement, or lease; and the term "transportation" shall include all instrumentalities of shipment or carriage.

CHARGES SHALL BE REASONABLE AND JUST.

All charges made for nay service rendered or to be rendered in the transportation of passengers or property as aforesaid, or in connection therewith, or for the receiving, delivering, storage, or handling of such property, shall be reasonable and just; and every unjust and unreasonable charge for such service is prohibited and declared to be unlawful.

SPECIAL RATES AND PRIVILEGES PROHIBITED.

SEC. 2. That if any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act shall, directly or indirectly, by any special rate, rebate, drawback, or other device, charge, demand, collect, or receive from any person or persons a greater or less compensation for any service rendered, or to be rendered, in the transportation of passengers or property, subject to the povisions of this act, than it charges, demands, collects, or receives from any other person or persons for doing for him or them a like and contemporaneous service in the transportation of a like kind of traffic under substantially similar circumstances and conditions, such common carrier shall be deemed guilty of unjust discrimination, which is hereby prohibited and declared to be unlawful.

PREFERENCES ILLEGALIZED.

SEC. 3. That it shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of this act to make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, company, firm, corporation, or locality, or any particular description of traffic, in any respect whatsoever, or to subject any particular person, company, firm, corporation, or locality, or any particular description of traffic, to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever.