it is that if a creditor agrees with his debtor to postpone the day of payment, or in any other way to change the terms of the contract, without the consent of the surety, the latter is discharged, although the change was for his advantage. The material point decided in that case was, that a compact between two states was a contract within the constitutional prohibition. The terms "contract" and "compact" were synonymous; and a contract is an agreement of two or more parties to do be legitimate alterations of the remedy, if they did not seriously impair the remedy. Something to the same extent was said by Ch. J. Marshall, in Sturges v. Crowninshield; but the admission is rather dangerous, from its liability to misconstruction and abuse; and still more so is the language of the court in the case of Evans v. Montgomery, 4 Watts & Serg. 218. In the case of Woodfin v. Hooper, 4 Humph. (Tenn.) 13, it was held that the right of the creditor to imprison a debtor, existing at the time of the formation of the contract, was no part of the contract, and that remedy might afterwards be repealed, and the defendant even discharged from prison, under an execution upon the contract. But to take away by legislative act the existing remedies for enforcing the obligation of the contract, so as to leave the creditor without redress, would be a mockery of justice, and repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. The courts do not undertake to go so far, nor do they undertake to draw the line between remedies that may and remedies that may not be taken away. The danger is, that the permission may be used so as to abolish all efficient remedies- · Utor permisso — et demo unum, demo etiam unum; dum cadat. It is unfortunate that the loose language, in some cases, of the Supreme Court of the United States has encouraged the state legislatures to deal in discretion with lawful remedies existing when contracts were made. The better doctrine is, that all effectual remedies affecting the interests and rights of the owner, existing when the contract was made, become an essential ingredient in it, and are parcel of the creditor's right, and ought not to be disturbed. The constitution of New Jersey of 1844 (art. 4, sec. 7), declares that the legislature shall not deprive a party of any remedy for enforcing a contract which existed when the contract was made. This is a wise provision, giving additional and material securities to the sanctity and efficacy of contracts. All suspension by statute of remedies, or any part thereof, existing when the contract was made, is more or less impairing its obligation. The true doctrine of the Constitution on this subject is to be found in Bronson v. Kinzie, McCracken v. Haywood, and Lancaster Saving Institution v. Reizart, infra, iv. 434, n. (c). In the case of Chadwick v. Moore, 8 Watts & Serg. 49, it was held that a statute of Pennsylvania, in 1842, suspending for a year a sale on execution for less than two thirds of the appraised value, was not unconstitutional. Mr. Ch. J. Gibson, who delivered the opinion of the court, seemed to hold that a temporary restraint on the remedy, when not to an unreasonable degree, was within the sound discretion of the legislature, and he preferred such a qualified doctrine to one that went for the absolute integrity of the constitutional principle in the entire existing remedy. Vide infra, 455, 456. And see James v. Stull, 9 Barb. 482; Baugher v. Nelson, 9 Gill, 299; Stocking v. Hunt, 3 Denio, 274; Smith v. Morse, 2 Cal. 524. The sounder state doctrine, as it seems to me, is that declared by Ch. J. Bronson, in the case of Quackenbush v. Danks, 1 Denio, 128; for, as he observes, laws which in form go only to the remedy, may have the practical effect of nullifying the contract. or not to do certain acts. The court declared that the doctrine had been already announced and settled, that the Constitution embraced all contracts executed and executory, and whether between individuals, or between a state and individuals; and that a state had no more power to impair an obligation into which she herself had entered, than she had to impair the contracts of individuals.1 1 (a) What impairs the Obligation of a Contract? - In the prolonged litigation as to the validity of certain western county bonds, the Supreme Court have gone very far in their efforts to uphold the sanctity of contracts. It is said that if bonds are executed or contracts made after and in reliance upon a construction of the laws and constitution of the state by the highest state court, in accordance with which such bonds or contracts would be valid, "their validity and obligation cannot be impaired" by a subsequent contrary decision. Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175; Havemeyer v. Iowa County, 3 Wall. 294; Thomson v. Lee County, ib. 327; Lee County v. Rogers, 7 Wall. 181; Chicago v. Sheldon, 9 Wall. 50. This principle, if sound, seems to stand, not on the Constitution, as the above language might indicate, but on the general grounds of justice on which it was put by Taney, C. J., in Ohio Life Ins. Co. v. Debolt, 16 How. 416, 431. But as Mr. Justice Miller points out, 1 Wall. 211, the legal doctrine is that the law was always the same as expounded by the later decision, not that the state court makes a new law (see Stockton v. Dundee Manuf. Co., 7 C. E. Green (22 N. J. Eq.) 56); and if, as admitted, the United States court would follow the later state decision as to contracts made after it, it is hard to see how they can logically avoid doing so as to those made before. However, in the above cases there were prior decisions of the state courts which were made the ground for disregarding their subsequent determinations. In a later case this element was wanting. For when a city issued bonds and afterwards the state courts construed a statute in force at the time of issue so as practically to take away the remedy of the creditors, the Supreme Court overruled the construction, although there were no state decisions in accordance with their view. Butz v. Muscatine, 8 Wall. 575; ante, 342, n. 1. A more obvious decision is that a declaratory law cannot modify the settled construction of a statute as to contracts already made under it. Post, 456, n. (e); Reiser v. William Tell Savings Ass., 39 Penn. St. 187; ib. 154; Dundas v. Bowler, 3 McL. 397; [Koshkonong v. Burton, 104 U. S. 668; McNichol v. U. S. Rep. Agency, 74 Mo. 457.] See Lambertson v. Hogan, 2 Barr, 22. And it is equally clear that a change of constitution cannot release a state from contracts made under a constitution which permits them to be made. Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331; Railroad Co. v. McClure, 10 Wall. 511; White v. Hart, 13 Wall. 646, 652. Another case on a state constitution is Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, stated ante, 409, n. 1. Another case, which led to a very extensive inquiry into the operation and effect of the constitutional prohibition upon the imous. Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, 8 Wall. 430; ib. 441; Wilmington R. R. v. Reid, 13 Wall. 264; Wright v. Sill, 2 Black, 544; Jefferson Bank v. Skelly, 1 Black, 436; State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 16 How. 369; Ohio L. Ins. Co. v. Debolt, ib. 416; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331; McGee v. Mathis, 4 Wall. 143; Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, ib. 535, 554. x1 And see Christ Church v. Philadelphia, 24 How. 300, stated below. So, a provision in the charter of a bank, the stock of which is owned by the state, that the bills of the bank shall be received in payment of debts due the state, is a contract, and cannot be repealed as to bills already issued. [Keith v. Clark, 97 U. S. 454;] Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. 190. See Paup v. Drew, ib. 218; Trigg v. Drew, ib. 224; Furman v. Nichol, 8 Wall. 44. So, a statute making the stock of the shareholders in a railroad liable for the debts of the corporation cannot be repealed as to existing creditors. Hawthorne v. Calef, 2 Wall. 10. z University v. People, 99 U. S. 309. For the origin and history of the clause found in most state statutes reserving the power to alter, amend, or repeal charters, see Greenwood v. Freight Co., 105 U. S. 13. Such reservation does not give the right to impose taxes which were provided against in the charter. Asylum v. New Orleans, 105 U. S. 362. See also Railroad Co. v. Georgia, 98 U. S. 359; Weidenger v. Spruance, 101 Ill. 278. The extent of this reserved power was considered in the Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700. The question arose under the acts incorporating the Union Pacific Railroad Company, in which the power was reserved to Congress at any time to "alter, amend, or repeal this act." It was admitted that such reserved power did not include a power to take away property which had been acquired under See Curran v. Arkansas, 15 How. 304; below. So, the lien of one who has lent money for a canal, on the faith of an act pledging the same with its tolls, &c., cannot be devested or postponed by a subsequent act. Wabash & Erie Canal Co. v. Beers, 2 Black, 448. So, the power of local taxation, given to a city by a statute authorizing it to issue bonds and to use this power to pay them, cannot be abridged as to those who have bought bonds issued under the act. Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535; x2 see 10 Wall. 653; but see Gilman v. Sheboygan, 2 Black, 510. On the other hand, an appointment to a public office for a definite term at a fixed salary is not a contract within the protection of the constitution, Butler v. Pennsylvania, 10 How. 402; Conner v. Mayor of New York, 1 Seld. 285; People v. Devlin, 33 N. Y. 269; Swann v. Buck, 40 Miss. 268, 302; Coffin v. State, 7 Porter (Ind.), 157; Barker v. Pittsburgh, 4 Barr, 49; nor is a limited exemption from the act. Nor could amendments be made which were contrary to the original scope and object of the incorporation. Railroad Co. v. Maine, 96 U. S. 499; Shields v. Ohio, 95 U. S. 319. r2 Louisiana v. Pillsbury, 105 U. S. 278; Durkee v. Board of Liquidation, 103 U. S. 646; Saloy v. New Orleans, 33 La. Ann. 79; State v. Brown, 29 La Ann. 863. See New Orleans v. Morris, 105 U. S. 600. A statute passed as an execution of the police power of a state may be repealed at any time. Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814; Crescent City, &c. Co. v. New Orleans, 33 La. Ann. 934. But a contract made by a state with an individual, whereby the state is to pay a certain sum for definite services, is within the protection of the Constitution. Hall v. Wisconsin, 103 U. S. 5; infra, n. 4, at end. states not to pass laws impairing the obligation of contracts, was that of Sturges v. Crowninshield. (c) The defendant was sued (c) 4 Wheaton, 122. taxation for service in the volunteer militia, People v. Roper, 35 N. Y. 629; nor, it seems, are legislative grants of power to public municipal corporations, The People v. Pinckney, 32 N. Y. 377. So, the grant of a ferry right to such a corporation may be repealed at any time. East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., 10 How. 511. See further, Darlington v. Mayor of New York, 31 N. Y. 164. But see Atkins v. Randolph, 31 Vt. 226. (Otherwise, of a like grant to a private person. McRoberts v. Washburne, 10 Minn. 23.) Again, the mere incorporation of a turnpike company without any express agreement not to charter another in its neighborhood, does not preclude a state from doing so. Turnpike Co. v. State, 3 Wall. 210; Hartford Bridge Co. v. Union Ferry Co., 29 Conn. 210; post, iii. 459, n. (a). (Otherwise, where there is an express contract. The Binghamton Bridge, 3 Wall. 51.) A simple enactment without consideration that “the real property now belonging to Christ Church Hospital, so long as the same shall continue to belong to said hospital, shall be and remain free from taxes," is not a contract Any law which lessens or impairs the efficacy of the remedy to enforce the obligation of a contract as it existed when the contract was entered into, is void. Louisiana v. New Orleans, 102 U. S. 203; Memphis v. United States, 97 U. S. 293; Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595; McClain v. Easley, 4 Baxt. 520; Hillebert v. Porter, 28 Minn. 496. So a law which adds a new condition precedent to the enforcement of the contract. Olmstead v. Kellogg, 47 Iowa, 460. But a law which merely changes the form of the remedy, or destroys one of two or more equally effective remedies, is valid. protected by the Constitution, Christ Church v. Philadelphia, 24 How. 300; nor is a state bounty law, Salt Company v. East Saginaw, 13 Wall. 373; nor is a state license (e.g. to sell liquors), although a fee was paid for it, Calder v. Kurby, 5 Gray, 597; State v. Holmes, 38 N. H. 225; Metropolitan Board of Excise v. Barrie, 34 N. Y. 657. A statute allowing a state to be sued may be modified by a subsequent act imposing further conditions, even as to suits already begun. Beers v. Alabama, 20 How. 527; Bank of Washington v. Arkansas, ib. 530. Of course, when, as is now usual, a power to repeal or alter the charter of a company is reserved by general law or the special act of incorporation, a subsequent repeal or alteration will be constitutional. In re Oliver Lee & Co.'s Bank, 21 N. Y. 9; In re Reciprocity Bank, 22 N. Y. 9; State v. Mayor of Jersey City, 2 Vroom (31 N. J.), 575; State v. Miller, ib. 521; Comm. v. Eastern R. R., 103 Mass. 254. See, as to state insolvent laws, 422, n. 1. As to marriage, see ii. 107, n. 1. (c) Distinction between the Contract and the Remedy. See ii. 463, n. 1; Haw Tennessee v. Sneed, 96 U. S. 69; Munday v. Rahway, 43 N. J. L. 338; Long's App., 87 Pa. St. 114; Watts v. Everett, 47 Iowa, 269; Newark Savings Inst. v. Forman, 33 N. J. Eq. 436 (see note of reporter). A law limiting the time within which suits may be brought on existing causes of action is valid, if a reasonable time after the passage of the act be allowed to begin such suits. Koshkonong v. Burton, 104 U. S. 668; Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628; Sohn v. Waterson, 17 Wall. 596. So a statute of limitations may be repealed. Pearsall v. Kenan, 79 N. C. 472. It has also been held that where a in one of the federal courts upon two promissory notes given in March, 1811, and he pleaded his discharge under an insol thorne v. Calef, 2 Wall. 10; Von Hoffman v. Quincey, 4 Wall. 535, stated above. In the last named case it is said that if these doctrines were res integræ, the soundness of the reasoning which maintains a distinction between the contract and the remedy might perhaps well be doubted. But they are regarded as settled. (4 Wall. 554.) See the remarks of Cockburn, C. J., as to the statute of limitations. Harris v. Quine, L. R. 4 Q. B. 653, 657. But see Aust. Jurisp. Lect. 45, 3d ed. 788; Pomeroy's Const. Law, § 609 et seq. The objections to the distinction, if sound, are diminished by the decisions in which Bronson v. Kinzie, supra, n. (b), is followed. Butz v. Muscatine, 8 Wall. 575, 583, stated above. To take away all remedy is of course unconstitutional, White v. Hart, 13 Wall. 646; and it has been held that a statute of Alabama, authorizing a redemption of mortgaged property in two years after a sale under a decree, was void as to sales made under mortgages executed before the act was passed. Howard v. Bugbee, 24 How 461. So a state law depriving the creditors of a bank of all legal process against its real property, affects the remedy in such a way as to impair the obligation of the contract. Curran v. Arkansas, 15 How. 304, 319. See Hawthorne v. Calef, 2 Wall. 10, stated above; Danks v. Quackenbush, 1 Comst. 129. But see Morse v. Goold, 1 Kern. 28; Mede v. Hand, 5 Am. L. Reg. N. S. 82; Rockwell v. Hubbell, 2 Dougl. right has been given without any means to enforce it (e.g. a right to sue a state without any right of execution), the right itself may be taken away. Railroad Co. v. Tennessee, 101 U. S. 337. See generally on subject, Oliver v. McClure, 28 Ark. 555; United States v. Lincoln Co., 5 Dill. 184; National Bank v. Sebastian Co., ib. 414. (Mich.) 197; Cusic v. Douglas, 3 Kansas, 123; Root v. McGrew, ib. 215. So the stay laws passed in many southern states in consequence of the late war have been generally held unconstitutional. Wood v. Wood, 14 Rich. (S. C.) 148; State v. Carew, 13 id. 498; Coffman v. Bank of Kentucky, 40 Miss. 29; Burt v. Williams, 24 Ark. 91; Bennett v. Worthington, ib. 487; White v. McKee, 19 La. Ann. 111; Barnes v. Barnes, 8 Jones (N. C.), 366; Taylor v. Stearns, 18 Gratt. 244; Penrose v. Erie Canal Co., 56 Penn. St. 46, 49. But see Ex parte Pollard, 40 Ala. 77; Watson v. Stone, ib. 451. On the other hand, an act limiting the time for suits on judgments obtained in the courts of other states before its passage to two years is valid. Bank of Alabama v. Dalton, 9 How. 522. See Bacon v. Howard, 20 How. 22; Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 290; Curtis v. Whitney, 13 Wall. 68; see further, as to statutes of limitations, Bruce v. Schuyler, 4 Gilm. (Ill.) 221; Edwards v. McCaddon, 20 Iowa, 520; Berry v. Ransdall, 4 Met. (Ky.) 292. It has even been held that an act prohibiting any action on a promise to pay a debt from which the debtor had been discharged in bankruptcy, unless such promise was in writing, was valid as to promises made before the act, but sued on afterwards. Kingley v. Cousins, 47 Maine, 91. So an act abolishing imprisonment for debt may be made applicable to existing contracts. Bronson v. Newberry, 2 Dougl. |