ABANDONMENT.
See WATERS, 11.
See LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONE, 4
ACCIDENTS.
See INSURANCE, 15.
ACCOUNT BOOKS.
See EVIDENCE, 3, 12
ACCRETION.
See WATERS, 7, 8,
See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, &
1. MARITIME CONTRACTS-STATE JURISDICTION.-Contracts for the con
struction of vessels and water craft, and for the furnishing of materials
therefor, before they are launched, are non-maritime. Liens and pro-
ceedings to enforce them are under state control, and may be enforced
in state courts. Globe Iron Works Co. v. Steamer “John B. Ketcham,
2nd," 464.
2 STATE JURISDICTION-CONFLICT OF LAWS.-A state law providing a lien
and method for its enforcement in the state courts, for building vessels
or water craft, and furnishing materials and machinery therefor before
the vessel is launched, is not in conflict with the United States admiralty
law. Globe Iron Works v. Steamer "John B. Ketcham, 2nd,” 464.
See SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, 13.
1. MISTAKE AS to Boundary.—An adjoining owner who, by mistake, in-
closes or builds upon the land of his neighbor, intending to claim ad-
versely to the real or true boundary only, does not thereby acquire a
possession adverse or hostile to the true owner; but if he takes posses-
sion of the land under the belief and claim that it is his, he acquires an
adverse possession, even though the claim of title is the result of a
mistake as to the boundary line. Wilson v. Hunter, 63.
2 MISTAKE AS To Boundary-InTENT.—The nature of the possession of
an adjoining owner who incloses or builds upon the land of his neigh-
bor depends upon the intent with which such possession is taken and
held. To bar an action for the recovery of the land so held the pos-
session must be actual, open, continuous, hostile, exclusive, and accom-
panied by an intent to hold adversely to, and not in conformity with,
the rights of the true owner, and must continue for the full period pre-
scribed by the statute of limitations. Wilson v. Hunter, 63.
& NOTICE-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.—Undisturbed adverse possession of
land under color of title raises a presumption of notice thereof, and
constitutes a complete bar to an attack upon the title of the party in pos-
session after the period prescribed by the statute of limitations has
elapsed. King v. Carmichael, 303.
See CoTENANCY, 1; HUSBAND And Wife, 4.
AFFIDAVIT.
See BAIL; NEW TRIAL, 2.
1. POWERS OF ATTORNEY ARE STRICTLY InterpretED, and the authority is
never extended beyond that which is given in terms, or which is neces
sary and proper for carrying the authority so given into full effect.
Campbell v. Foster Home Assn., 818.
2 POWER OF ATTORNEY TO SELL-AUTHORITY TO MORTGAGE.-A letter of
attorney with naked authority to sell and convey, uncoupled with any
interest in the land or fund, does not authorize the attorney in fact to
execute a bond and mortgage in the name of the principal. Campbell
v. Foster Home Assn., 818.
& POWER OF Attorney to Sell—Authority to Mortgage.—A power of
attorney to sell and convey real estate, not coupled with an interest,
does not confer power to mortgage, and a mortgage executed under
such a power is void. Campbell v. Foster Home Assn., 818.
4 AUTHORITY OF AGENT TO Employ AttorneY.—A general agent, with
authority to make collections of cash and notes for his principal, has
power to direct an attorney at law to bring suit, and to give a bond of
indemnity in the name of such principal. Swartz v. Morgan, 786.
Bee BROKERS; Fraudulent CONVEYANCE, 2; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 2
See MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, 8-11.
ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS.
CONTRACT EXECUTED IN DUPLICATE.-If a lease is executed in duplicate,
both the landlord and tenant retaining a copy, both copies are origin-
als, and the fraudulent alteration by the tenant of the copy retained
by him does not annul the lease, because the remaining copy is suffi.
cient to sustain the contract between the parties. Jones v. Hoard, 17.
Seo APPEAL, 3; LES PENDENS, 7, 8.
1. QUESTIONS OF LAW NOT ARGUED IN THE SUPREME COURTt are Deemed
TO BE WAIVED. Gulick v. Webb, 720.
2 OBJECTION FIRST RAISED ON APPEAL. An objection that plaintiff
should have sued as administrator, instead of merely denominating
himself the administrator of deceased, and also that he failed to show
his official character by a proper profert of his letters of administra-
tion, cannot be raised for the first time in the appellate court, but
should be taken advantage of by way of motion in the lower court.
Texarkana Gas etc. Co. v. Orr, 30.
8. AMENDMENT TO CONFORM TO PROOF.-If an action by an administrator
for the death of his intestate, caused by negligence, is erroneously
brought for the benefit of the estate, instead of for the widow and next
of kin, the appellate court must, in the absence of demurrer, treat the
case as it was treated by the parties in the court below, as being a
claim by the administrator for injury to the deceased in his lifetime,
and consider the complaint as amended to correspond with the proof.
Texarkana Gas etc. Co. v. Orr, 30.
4. JURY TRIAL-ERRONEOUS CONDUCT OF COUNSEL IN ARGUMENT.—Lan-
guage used by counsel which evinces a studied purpose to arouse the
prejudice of the jury, based upon facts not in the case, is ground for
the reversal of the verdict and judgment. Cluett v. Rosenthal, 446.
5. JURY TRIAL-INSTRUCTIONS.-It is not error for the court to refuse to
give an instruction fully covered in the general charge. Gibson v.
Minneopolis etc. Ry. Co., 482.
6. A VERDICT will not be Disturbed on APPEAL if there is any evidence
to support it. Gibson v. Minneapolis etc. Ry. Co., 482. a
7. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT MODIFIED ON APPEAL.-An order of the trial
court modifying a judgment in accordance with the directions of the
supreme court made on a prior appeal, and the judgment as modified,
are both appealable, and appeals taken therefrom will not be dismissed
on the ground that they are frivolous, Randall v. Duff, 79.
See BILLS OF REVIEW; CERTIORARI; HABEAS Corpus, 1.
See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, &
APPROPRIATION.
See WATERS, 10, 11.
ARCHITECT.
See BUILDING Contracts.
L. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR EXISTS if there is such a state of facts as would
lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to believe, or entertain an
honest and strong suspicion, that the person about to be arrested is
guilty of the offense charged. People v. Kilvington, 73.
2. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR-SUBMISSION OF FACTS TO JURY.-In the event of
conflicting evidence as to the facts of an arrest, it is the duty of the
court to instruct the jury what facts, if established, will constitute
probable cause, and submit to them only the question as to such facts.
People v. Kilvington, 73.
& PROBABLE CAUSE-QUESTION OF LAW.-If a police officer, intending to
arrest a person, kills him the question whether he had probable cause
to believe, or reasonable grounds for suspicion, that the deceased had
committed a felony, is one of law for the court, where the facts are
undisputed. People v. Kilvington, 73.
4. A PEACE OFFICER HAS THE RIGHT, without a warrant, to arrest any per
son in the night, when he has reasonable ground to believe that such
person has committed a felony. People v. Kilvington, 73.
6. ARREST OF FLEEING PERSON-EVIDENCE-If a police officer not recog.
nizing a fleeing person, and not knowing any thing about his business,
shoots him while attempting to effect an arrest, evidence tending to
show that the deceased went on the particular night to the place near
where he was shot on lawful business is irrelevant and inadmissible.
People v. Kilvington, 73.
6. ARREST OF FLEEING PERSON CHARGED WITH THEFT.-The circumstance
that a person is fleeing at night from one who is shouting "stop thief "!
affords a police officer as much reason to suspect or believe that he may
have committed robbery, or burglary, or grand larceny, as that he may
have merely committed petit larceny, and justifies an attempt to ar
rest. People v. Kilvington, 73.
7. ARREST OF FLEEING PERSON — SHOOTING — Criminal Negligence—
Whether the act of a police afficer in shooting a fleeing person at night
in attempting to effect his arrest is or is not an act of criminal negli
gence is a question for the jury, who must give the officer, upon the
trial of an information for murder, the benefit of any reasonable doubt
arising upon the evidence. People v. Kilvington, 73.
See HOMICIDE, 5.
1. ASSIGNMENT OF PART OF CLAIM, DEMAND, OR OBLIGATION may be made,
and the courts will recognize and protect the equitable interest of the
assignee. Schilling v. Mullen, 475.
2. NOTICE OF AN ASSIGNMENT OF A DEMAND OR OBLIGATION, or a part
thereof, given to the debtor, fixes the rights of the parties, and pro-
tects the assignee. Schilling v. Mullen, 475.
3. GARNISHMENT.—AN ASSIGNMENT OF A DEMAND IS GOOD and sufficient
as against a subsequent garnishment, if such assignment was binding
upon the assignor. Metcalf v. Kincaid, 391.
4 ASSIGNMENT of Part of DeMAND-NOTICE-PAYMENT.—A debtor mak-
ing payment in full to his creditor after notice that a part of the obli
gation has been assigned is still liable to the assignee for his share of the
claim. Schilling v. Mullen, 475.
5. ASSIGNMENT OF PART OF CLAIM-ACTION.-If part of an obligation or de-
mand has been assigned the assignee can maintain an action to recover
his share by joining the assignor and assignee as plaintiffs; or, if the
former does not join, by making him a defendant, so that the whole
controversy may be settled in one suit. Schulling v. Mullen, 475.
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