Opinion of the Court. 327 U.S. Traditionally and for good reasons, statutes of limitation are not controlling measures of equitable relief. Such statutes have been drawn upon by equity solely for the light they may shed in determining that which is decisive for the chancellor's intervention, namely, whether the plaintiff has inexcusably slept on his rights so as to make a decree against the defendant unfair. See Russell v. Todd, supra, at 289. "There must be conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence, to call into action the powers of the court." McKnight v. Taylor, 1 How. 161, 168. A federal court may not be bound by a State statute of limitation and yet that court may dismiss a suit where the plaintiffs' "lack of diligence is wholly unexcused; and both the nature of the claim and the situation of the parties was such as to call for diligence . . ." Benedict v. City of New York, 250 U. S. 321, 328. A suit in equity may fail though "not barred by the act of limitations . . ." McKnight v. Taylor, supra; Alsop v. Riker, 155 U. S. 448. Equity eschews mechanical rules; it depends on flexibility. Equity has acted on the principle that "laches is not like limitation, a mere matter of time; but principally a question of the inequity of permitting the claim to be enforced-an inequity founded upon some change in the condition or relations of the property or the parties." Galliher v. Cadwell, 145 U. S. 368, 373; see Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U. S. 483, 488-89. And so, a suit in equity may lie though a comparable cause of action at law would be barred. If want of due diligence by the plaintiff may make it unfair to pursue the defendant, fraudulent conduct on the part of the defendant may have prevented the plaintiff from being diligent and may make it unfair to bar appeal to equity because of mere lapse of time. Equity will not lend itself to such fraud and historically has relieved from it. It bars a defendant from setting up 392 Opinion of the Court. such a fraudulent defense, as it interposes against other forms of fraud. And so this Court long ago adopted as its own the old chancery rule that where a plaintiff has been injured by fraud and "remains in ignorance of it without any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered, though there be no special circumstances or efforts on the part of the party committing the fraud to conceal it from the knowledge of the other party." Bailey v. Glover, 21 Wall. 342, 348; and see Exploration Co. v. United States, 247 U. S. 435; Sherwood v. Sutton, 5 Mason 143. This equitable doctrine is read into every federal statute of limitation. If the Federal Farm Loan Act had an explicit statute of limitation for bringing suit under § 16, the time would not have begun to run until after petitioners had discovered, or had failed in reasonable diligence to discover, the alleged deception by Bache which is the basis of this suit. Bailey v. Glover, supra; Exploration Co. v. United States, supra; United States v. Diamond Coal Co., 255 U. S. 323, 333. It would be too incongruous to confine a federal right within the bare terms of a State statute of limitation unrelieved by the settled federal equitable doctrine as to fraud, when even a federal statute in the same terms would be given the mitigating construction required by that doctrine. We conclude that the decision in the York case is inapplicable to the enforcement of federal equitable rights. The federal doctrine applied in Bailey v. Glover, supra, and in the series of cases following it, governs. When the liability, if any, accrued in this case, cf. Rawlings v. Ray, supra, at 98, and whether the petitioners are chargeable with laches, see Foster v. Mansfield, C. & L. M. R. Co., 146 U. S. 88, 99; Southern Pacific Co. v Bogert, supra, at 488, are questions as to which we imply no views. We RUTLEDGE, J., concurring. 327 U.S. leave them for determination by the Circuit Court of Appeals to which the case is remanded. Reversed and remanded. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE, concurring. I agree with the result and with the opinion, reserving however any intimation, explicit or implied, as to the full scope to which the doctrine of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S. 99, may be applied in diversity cases. Many of the considerations now stated by the Court for refusing to extend that doctrine to cases concerning federally created rights, relating to the flexibility of remedies in equity either to cut down or to extend the state statutory period of limitations, seemed to me to be applicable whenever a federal court might be asked to extend the aid of its equity arm, whether in its diversity jurisdiction or other. The ruling in the York case however may be accepted generally for diversity cases and, moreover, rejected for extension to cases of this sort, without indicating that there may not be some cases even of diversity jurisdiction to which federal courts may not be required to apply it. With this reservation I join in the Court's action. Opinion of the Court. POFF, EXECUTRIX, v. PENNSYLVANIA CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT. No. 484. Argued February 1, 1946. Decided February 25, 1946. The Federal Employers' Liability Act provides that the liability, of the carrier under the Act shall extend, in case of the death of the employee, "to his or her personal representative, for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and children of such employee; and, if none, then of such employee's parents; and, if none, then of the next of kin dependent upon such employee." Held, where a decedent left no spouse, children or parents, a cousin who was dependent on the decedent had a right of recovery, even though the decedent was survived also by nearer next of kin who were not dependent and could not recover. P. 401. 150 F. 2d 902, reversed. In a suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, the district court gave judgment for the plaintiff. 57 F. Supp. 625. The circuit court of appeals reversed. 150 F. 2d 902. This Court granted certiorari. 326 U. S. 712. Reversed, p. 402. Morris A. Wainger argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner. Ray Rood Allen argued the cause and filed a brief tor respondent. MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court. Congress provided in the Federal Employers' Liability Act (35 Stat. 65, 45 U. S. C. § 51) that the carrier's liability in case of the death of an employee runs "to his or her personal representative, for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and children of such employee; and, if none, then of such employee's Opinion of the Court. 327 U.S. parents; and, if none, then of the next of kin dependent upon such employee . The deceased, residing in Pennsylvania, was a railroad engineer employed by respondent and was killed while engaged in its service in interstate commerce. Respondent's negligence was conceded. The deceased left no widow, children, or parents. His nearest surviving relatives were two sisters and a nephew, none of whom was in any way financially dependent on him. But petitioner, who was his cousin, was a member of his household and wholly dependent on him for support. The district court rendered judgment for petitioner. 57 F. Supp. 625. The circuit court of appeals reversed, holding that petitioner was not entitled to recover since there were nearer relatives, though not dependent ones, who survived the deceased. 150 F. 2d 902. The case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted because of the importance of the question. We assume, without deciding, that the circuit court of appeals correctly concluded that members of the second or third class, irrespective of their need, are not entitled to recover if there survives a member of the prior class. Cf. Notti v. Great Northern R. Co., 110 Mont. 464, 104 P. 2d 7. The liability is not "to the several classes collectively" but in the alternative to one of the three classes. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Wells-Dickey Trust Co., 275 U. S. 161, 163. Thus to an extent, at least, the order of priority is determined by relationship, not by dependency. See New Orleans & N. E. R. Co. v. Harris, 247 U. S. 367. 'Cf. Lytle v. Southern R. Co., 152 S. C. 161, 149 S. E. 692. But the circuit court of appeals went further and applied that principle to determine which members of the third class (next of kin) were entitled to recover. It said that since parents or grandchildren, dependent on the deceased, are left without remedy if a widow or child survives, Congress could not have meant to recognize remote |