Commonwealth vs. Adams, &c. July, September, and November, each year, and to pay it over; and it was the duty of the county court to record such report and have it forwarded through its clerk to the Auditor. The previous liability of Brewer, therefore, for the State revenue for the year 1865, should have been ascertained at the July and September terms of the Henry county court. Whether this had been done or whether he had paid it over, does not appear in this record, nor is it material in the solution of this legal question now under consideration. For it is evident that these sureties did not propose to become responsible for liabilities then accrued, nor to give a bond securing past defalcations, but contemplated only future responsibilities; and their letter only authorized their agent to execute such a bond, not being authorized to sign the old bond and fix his principal's responsibilities for liabilities already incurred by Brewer. The agent transcended his authority, and his act in putting their names to said bond, is not obligatory on them, and the judgment must be affirmed as to R. C. Adams, G. W. Barton, and W. R. Harford. But the other sureties having themselves signed said bond, other legal considerations must govern their rights. The authority for the county court's proceeding to require additional security, is predicated on section 25, article 1, chapter 91, Revised Statutes, 2 Stanton, 344, which makes it the duty of the county court, "at the January term next after the sheriff shall give his official bond, and oftener or sooner, as they may deem proper, to examine into the sufficiency of the sureties therein; and if the same be found insufficient, to rule him to give other sureties; and upon his failure to do so, the court shall enter up an order suspending him from acting until he gives such sureties, or vacates his office." Commonwealth vs. Adam, &c. It is insisted that this section only authorizes the court to rule him to new security on the general official bond, and not upon the revenue or county levy bonds; and, therefore, that these latter received sureties are not liable on this bond. By section 1, article 9, chapter 83, Revised Statutes, 2 Stanton, 261, "the sheriff, by virtue of his office, shall be collector of the revenue. If he fail or refuse to execute bond, with surety, as required by law, for the collection of the revenue, he shall forfeit his office." By section 2, article 1, chapter 91, Revised Statutes, 2 Stanton, 339, the sheriff, "before he enters upon the duties of his office, shall, in addition to the oath prescribed in the Constitution, take the following oath." And by section three, "he shall also give an obligation to the Commonwealth, in substance as follows." Here follows the covenant, which appellees style the official bond, but which the statute nowhere designates as the official bond. By section 9, article 6, New Constitution of Kentucky, it is provided that sheriffs, "and such other officers as the General Assembly may, from time to time, require, shall, before they enter upon the duties of their respective offices, and as often thereafter as may be deemed proper, give such bond and security as may be prescribed by law." In pursuance of this power, the Legislature has prescribed three bonds for the sheriff to execute-one securing the State revenue, another for the county levy, and another general bond, securing every individual who may be injured by his official acts. But who can say that one of these, to the exclusion of the others, is the official bond? Are they not really and legally all official bonds? As the statute forfeits the office unless he shall execute the revenue bond, if any one, to the exclusion of the others, should Commonwealth vs. Adams, &c. be deemed an official bond, might it not appropriately be so styled? But however this may be, both in contemplation of the Constitution and the statute, any bond required by law to be executed by the sheriff, should be deemed an official bond. And this would seem to be fortified by the provisions of chapter 97, Revised Statutes, 2 Stanton, 396, which was intended to provide a comprehensive remedy for the relief of sureties of all classes and in all obligations, and which provides for the relief of sureties "in the official bond of any officer; and which, we doubt not, affords a remedy for the sureties in either or all these three bonds required by law for the sheriff to execute. As the non-payment of the revenue due the State, as required by law, is made a cause of forfeiture of the office by section 1, article 9, chapter 83, Revised Statutes, we have no doubt but the county court could rule the sheriff to secure, by new bond, the money then in his hands; at least, if the sureties should voluntarily sign such a bond, we know of no authority to pronounce it illegal; and if a new bond, with such stipulations, would be obligatory, we see no reason why their voluntary signatures to the old bond, which would only incur the same responsibilities, should not be obligatory. It would doubtless be good as a common law bond according to the principles settled by this court in Commonwealth vs. Teal et al. (14 B. Mon.); but as this is a statutory and not a common law proceeding, an affirmance would be the result if this bond imposes on these sureties common law liabilities only; but we are of opinion it was fully within the legal power of the county court, as often as it deemed proper, and might regard the previous sureties insufficient, to rule the sheriff to the giving additional sureties, and that their signatures to the same or a new Commonwealth vs. Pullan. bond would make it, as to them, an official bond; and that the court erred in dismissing the proceedings as to George C. Adams and Joseph Elston; and as to them the judgment is reversed, with directions for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. CASE 16-INDICTMENT-DECEMBER 12. Commonwealth vs. Pullan. APPEAL FROM GRAVES CIRCUIT COURT. "The following named persons were empanneled as grand jurors for the county aforesaid for the present term of the court"-who are named-and the order concludes, "who were ——————— and charged by the court as directed by law." The circuit court erred by setting aside an indictment on account of a substantial error in the formation of the grand jury, and because the above order did not state that they were sworn. Held "The law requires that a certain prescribed oath shall be administered to the grand jury. (2 Rev. Stat., 76.) In the absence of evidence to the contrary, this court will presume that the court below did all that was required by law to be done. It does not appear in the order aforesaid that one of those empanneled as grand jurors was appointed by the judge as foreman thereof, which the law requires to be done, and yet we will presume, as it was the duty of the judge to make such appointment, that he did it; and for the same reason we will presume that the requisite oath was administered to the grand jury." The structure of the order shows conclusively that the grand jury were sworn. JOHN RODMAN, Attorney General, CITED For Appellant, Criminal Code, 1st subsec. of sec. 159, and sec. 160. Commonwealth vs. Pullan. CHIEF JUSTICE PETERS DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT: Appellee was indicted in the Graves circuit court for a breach of the peace, and at a subsequent term of the court moved to set aside the indictment on account of a substantial error in the formation of the grand jury, which motion was sustained, and the indictment dismissed, because, in the language of the judgment, the order empanneling the grand jury does not state that they were sworn. There is copied in the record the order of the court at the May term, 1866, thereof, empanneling the grand jury who found the indictment, in which it is stated, "the following named persons were empanneled as grand jurors for the county aforesaid for the present term of the court"-who are named-and the order concludes, "who were -, and charged by the court as directed by law." The law requires that a certain prescribed oath shall be administered to the grand jury. (2 Rev. Stat., 76.) In the absence of evidence to the contrary, this court will presume that the court below did all that was required by law to be done. It does not appear in the order aforesaid that one of those empanneled as grand jurors was appointed by the judge as foreman thereof, which the law requires to be done, and yet we will presume, as it was the duty of the judge to make such appointment, that he did it; and for the same reason we will presume that the requisite oath was administered to the grand jury. Moreover, the implication is very strong, from the language and the structure of the sentence, that such was the fact, from the conjoining word "and" immediately preceding the word "charged "-showing very conclusively that something else was done before they were charged, and that, we are fully authorized, was the |