3. The second battle was fought upon the banks of the river Tre'bia. 4. The Carthaginian general, being apprised of the Roman impetuosity, of which he availed himself in almost every engagement, had sent off a thousand horse, each with a foot soldier behind, to cross the river, to ravage the enemy's country, and provoke them to engage. The Romans quickly routed this force. Seeming to be defeated, they took to the river; and were as eagerly pursued by Sempro'nius, the consul'. No sooner had his army attained the opposite bank, than he perceived himself half-conquered, his men being fatigued with wading up to their arm-pits, and quite benumbed by the intense coldness of the water.

5. A total rout ensued; twenty-six thousand of the Romans were either killed by the enemy, or drowned in attempting to repass the river. A body of ten thousand men were all that survived; who, finding themselves enclosed on every side, broke desperately through the enemy's ranks, and fought, retreating, till they found shelter in the city of Placentia'.

The Balearians and light troops assailed the Roman infantry, while the elephants attacked and drove back the cavalry. Still the legionaries made a gallant defence, but they were taken in flank by a body of Carthaginians, commanded by Mago, who were placed in ambush for the purpose, and this unexpected attack threw them into confusion.

The accompanying plan will at once explain the circumstances of the engagement.

scrved in Scip'io's army, in the night, when all was quiet in the Roman camp, entered the tents next them, murdered the Romans while they were asleep, and cutting off their heads, went over to Hannibal, who, contrary to true magnanimity, gave them a kind reception.

1 Scipio, his colleague, was then ill of a wound received in the former battle.

2 Now Placenza, a town of Italy, at the confluence of the Trebia and the Po. (Livius.)

After this victory, Hannibal determined to penetrate farther into Italy. The route he chose was through the Fens, as being shorter and less likely to be occupied by the enemy, than any other; but the hardships his army encountered are almost incredible, being obliged to march three or four days and nights through mud and water,

Carthaginians under Mago, in ambush.

without sleep or rest. Many of the beasts were left dead in the mud, and the hoofs came off the feet of many horses. 6. The third defeat the Romans sustained was at the lake of Thrasyme'ne, near to which was a chain of mountains, and between these and the lake, a narrow passage leading to a valley that was embosomed in hills. It was upon these hills that Han'nibal disposed his best troops, and it was into this valley that Flamin'ius, the Roman general, led his men to attack him. 7. A disposition every way so favourable for the Carthaginians, was also assisted by accident; for a mist rising from the lake, kept the Romans from seeing their enemies; while the army upon the mountains being above its influence, saw the whole disposition of their opponents. 8. The fortune of the day was such as might be expected from the conduct of the two generals. The Roman army was slaughtered, almost before they could perceive the enemy that destroyed them. About fifteen thousand Romans, with Flamin'ius himself, fell in the valley, and six thousand more were obliged to yield themselves prisoners of war.

9. Upon the news of this defeat, after the general consternation was allayed, the senate resolved to elect a commander with absolute authority, in whom they might repose their last and greatest expectations. 10. The choice fell upon Fabius Max'imus, a man of great courage, with a happy mixture of caution. 11. He was apprised that the only way to humble the Carthaginians at such a distance from home, was rather by harassing than fighting. For this purpose, he always encamped upon the highest grounds, inaccessible to the enemy's cavalry. Whenever they moved, he watched their motions, straitened their quarters, and cut off their provisions'.

12. By these arts, Fa'bius had actually, at one time, enclosed Han'nibal among mountains, where it was impossible to winter; and from which it was almost impracticable to extricate his army without imminent danger. In this exigence, nothing but one of those stratagems of war, which only men of great abilities invent, could save him. 14. He ordered a number of small faggots and lighted torches to be tied to the horns of two thousand oxen, which should be driven towards the enemy. These tossing their heads, and running up the sides of the mountain, seemed to fill the whole neighbouring forest with fire; while the sentinels that were placed to guard the approaches to the mountain, seeing such a number of flames advancing towards their posts, filed in consternation, supposing the whole body of the enemy was in arms to overwhelm them. 15. By this stratagem Han'nibal drew off

1 Though this was the most judicious conduct that Fabius could have adopted, and such as, if followed, would have effectually destroyed Hannibal's army, yet it met with the disapprobation of the senate and the people, who had not sufficient wisdom to perceive its propriety.

2 Han'nibal had ordered his guides to conduct him to Cas'inum, but from the imperfect manner in which he spoke the Roman language, they understood him to mean Casil'inum. On entering the defile, Hannibal, who fancied himself betrayed, ordered one of the guides to be scourged and crucified, as a warning to the rest. (Plut. Liv.)

his army, and escaped through the defiles that led beneath the hills, though with considerable damage to his rear.

16. Fa'bius, still pursuing the same judicious measures, followed Han'nibal in all his movements, but at length received a letter from the senate, recalling him to Rome, on pretence of a solemn sacrifice requiring his presence. 17. On his departure from the army, he strictly charged Minu'tius, his general of the horse, not to hazard an engagement in his absence. This command he disobeyed, and Fabius expressed his determination to punish so flagrant a breach of military discipline. 18. The senate, however, favouring Minu'tius, gave him an equal authority with the dictator. 19. On the arrival of Fa'bius at the camp, he divided the army with Minu'tius, and each pursued his own separate plan. 20. By artful management, Han'nibal soon brought the troops of the latter to an engagement, and they would have been cut off to a man, had not Fa'bius sacrificed his private resentment to the public good, and hastened to the relief of his colleague. 21. By their united forces Han'nibal was repulsed, and Minu'tius, conscious of his rashness, resigned the supreme command into the hands of the dictator.

22. On the expiration of his year of office, Fa'bius resigned, and Teren'tius Varro was chosen to the command. 23. Varro was a man sprung from the dregs of the people, with nothing but confidence and riches to recommend him. 24. With him was joined Æmilius Paulus, of a disposition entirely opposite; experienced in the field, cautious in action, and impressed with a thorough contempt for the abilities of his plebeian colleague.

25. The Romans finding themselves enabled to bring a competent force into the field, being almost ninety thousand strong, now again resolved to meet Han'nibal, who was at this time encamped near the village of Cannæ',

1 Canna was originally a city of Apulia, but having been razed by the Romans, was at this time a poor village; it was afterwards rebuilt.