without a general, and return to fight a general without an army." 26. The first conflict which he had with Afra'nius and Petrei'us was rather unfavourable. It was fought near the city of Ilerda', and both sides claimed the honour of the victory. But, by various stratagems, he reduced them at last to such extremities of hunger and drought, that they were obliged to yield at discretion. 27. Clemency was his favourite virtue; he dismissed them all with the kindest professions, and then sent them home to Rome loaded with shame, and with obligations to publish his virtues, and confirm the affections of his adherents. 28. Thus in the space of about forty days he became master of Spain, and returned again victorious to Rome. The citizens on this occasion received him with fresh demonstrations of joy, and created him dictator and consul. But the first of these offices he laid down when he had held it eleven days. Questions for Examination. 1. How did Cæsar conduct himself on the night previous to his intended journey to Italy? 2. Did he accomplish his journey in safety? 3. What rendered this little river of consequence? 4. Did Cæsar pass it without hesitation? 5. How did he determine ? 6. What effect was produced at Rome by this enterprise ? 7. How was Pompey affected by it? 8. What taunting expressions were used on this occasion? 9. What was Pompey's conduct in reply? 10. How did he represent the state of affairs? 11. What was the consequence of this statement? 12. How was Cæsar employed in the mean while? 13. What city first arrested his progress? 14. Did he succeed in his endeavour? 15. What attempt was made to incline Cæsar to mercy? 16. What was Cæsar's reply? 17. What was the consequence of this reply? 1 Now Lerida, in Catalonia. 18. Did he dismiss the soldiers likewise? 19. Whither did Pompey retreat, and with what view? 20. Did he succeed in his aims? 21. What was the consequence of his retreat? 22. Did Cæsar follow Pompey? 23. Was he opposed in his attempt? 24. What was his next enterprise? 25. What was Cæsar's opinion of these commanders? 26. Were they easily conquered? 27. What use did he make of his victory? 28. What was the duration of this campaign, and what were its consequences? SECTION III. O war!-what art thou, At once the proof and scourge of man's fall'n state! H. MORE. 2. Effective, a. fit for service, complete 3. Equivalent, a. equal in value. 5. O'verture, s. proposal, offer. 6. Ammuni'tion, 8. military stores. Depos'ited, part. laid up. 12. Intren'ch, v. to fortify by digging a ditch or trench. 14. Annoy', v. to injure. 16. Indefatigable, a. unwearied. 13. Redoubts, s. the outworks of a for- 23. Scaling, part. mounting the wall. tification, fortresses. 1. WHILE Cæsar was thus employed, Pompey was active in making preparations in Epi'rus and Greece to oppose him. 2. All the monarchs of the East had declared in his favour, and sent very large supplies. He was master of nine effective Italian legions, and had a fleet of five hundred large ships, under the conduct of Bib'ulus, an active and 1 Epirus, a district of North Greece Proper, and constituting part of what was called the Grecian Empire. The Romans reduced Epirus to a wilderness, because of the obstinate and frequent revolts of the people. It was famous for its large breed of cattle, (Homer, Virgil, and Ovid:) and also for its fertility, (Homer.) experienced commander. Added to these, he was supplied with large sums of money, and all the necessaries for an army, from the tributary provinces round him. 3. He had attacked Antony and Dolabella, who commanded for Cæsar in that part of the empire, with such success, that the former was obliged to fly, and the latter was taken prisoner. Crowds of the most distinguished citizens and nobles from Rome came every day to join him. He had at one time above two hundred senators in his camp, among whom were Ci'cero and Ca'to, whose approbation of his cause was deemed equivalent to an army. 4. Notwithstanding these preparations, Cæsar shipped off five of his twelve legions at Brundu'sium, and fortunately steered through the midst of his enemies, timing it so well, that he made his passage in one day. 5. Still, however, convinced that the proper time for making proposals for a peace, was after gaining advantage, he sent one Ru'fus, whom he had taken prisoner, to effect an accommodation with Pompey, offering to refer all to the senate and people of Rome; but Pompey once more rejected the overture, considering the people of Rome too much in Cæsar's interest to be relied on. 6. Pompey had been raising supplies in Macedonia when he was first informed of Cæsar's landing upon the coast of Epi'rus: he now resolved immediately to march to Dyrrach'ium, in order to cover that place from Cæsar's attempts, as all his ammunition and provisions were deposited there. 7. The first place where both armies came in sight of each other was on the opposite banks of the river Ap'sus; and as both were commanded by the two greatest generals then in the world; the one renowned for his conquests in the East, the other celebrated for his victories over the western parts of the empire, a battle was eagerly desired by the soldiers on either side. 8. But neither of the generals were willing to hazard it upon this occasion; Pompey could not rely upon his new levies; and Cæsar would not venture an engagement till he was joined by the rest of his forces. 9. Cæsar had waited some time with extreme impatience for the coming up of the remainder of his army; and even ventured alone in an open fishing-boat to hasten its arrival, but he was driven back by a storm1. 10. However, his disappointment was soon relieved, by an information of the landing of the troops at Apollo'nia'; he, therefore, decamped in order to meet them; and to prevent Pompey, with his army, from engaging them on their march, as he lay on that side of the river where the succours had been obliged to come on shore. 11. Pompey being compelled to retreat, led his forces to Aspara'gium3, where he was sure of being supplied with every thing necessary for his army, by the numerous fleets which he employed along the coasts of Epi'rus: there he pitched his camp upon a tongue of land (as mariners express it) that jutted into the sea, where also was a small shelter for his ships. 12. In this place, being most advantageously situated, he began immediately to intrench his camp; which Cæsar perceiving, and finding that he was not likely soon to quit so advantageous a post, began also to intrench behind him. 13. As all beyond Pompey's camp, towards the land side, was hilly and steep, Cæsar built redoubts upon the hills, stretching from shore to shore; and then caused lines of communication to be drawn from hill to hill, by which he blocked up the camp of the enemy'. 14. He hoped by this blockade to force his op 1 It was on this occasion that he encouraged the master of the vessel, to whom he had not before made himself known, with these memorable words-" Fear nothing, for thou carriest Cæsar and all his fortunes." 2 There was no less than fifteen towns of this name, but the one here mentioned was situated on the Adriatic, on the coast of Illyricum. It was famous for its learning. Its inhabitants were called Apolloniates. (Cicero, Livy, Cæsar.) It was here that Augustus was sent by his great uncle Cæsar, for his education. 3 A small town and citadel in Greek Illyricum, not far from Apollonia. (Cæsar.) These lines extended upwards of eighteen miles. 15. ponent to a battle, which he ardently desired, and which the other with equal industry declined. Thus both sides continued for some time employed in designs and stratagems, the one to annoy, and the other to defend. Cæsar's men daily carried on their works to straiten the enemy; those of Pompey, having the advantage of numbers, did the same to enlarge themselves, and severely galled the enemy by their slingers and archers. 16. Cæsar, however, was indefatigable; he caused blinds or mantelets to be made of the skins of beasts, to cover his men while at work; he cut off all the water that supplied the enemy's camp, and the forage from the horses; so that there remained no more subsistence for them. 17. But Fompey at last resolved to break through his lines, and gain some other part of the country more convenient for encampment. Accordingly, having informed himself of the condition of Cæsar's fortifications from some deserters who came over to him, he ordered the light infantry and archers on board his ships to attack Cæsar's intrenchments by sea, where they were least defended. 18. This was done with such effect, that though Cæsar and his officers used their utmost endeavours to hinder Pompey's designs, yet by means of reiterated attempts he at last effected his purpose of extricating his army from its present camp, and of encamping in another place, by the sea, where he had the convenience both of forage and shipping. 19. Cæsar being thus frustrated in his views of blocking up the enemy, and perceiving the loss he had sustained, resolved at last to force Pompey to a battle, though upon disadvantageous terms. 20. The engagement began by attempting to cut off a legion which was posted in a wood; and this brought on a general battle. The conflict was for some time carried on with great ardour and with equal fortune; but Cæsar's army being entangled in the entrenchments of the old camps lately abandoned, began to fall into disorder; upon which Pompey pressing his advantage, they at last fled |