§ 8. Collateral facts, how far admissible.- This rule of relevancy does not permit the introduction of wholly collateral facts which are not part of the same transaction and throw no light upon the truth or even the probability of the fact in issue, but which, if they were introduced in evidence, would only distract and confuse the minds of the members of the jury by withdrawing their attention from the main point in issue.1 The question whether a fact is or is not too remote, and consequently irrelevant, is a preliminary question for the judge, and on this subject no rule can be laid down further than the very general one which in practice is of little value and which is implied in the definition of the word relevant itself. If the collateral fact introduces or will explain a fact in issue or a relevant fact, or will rebut or support any inference which may be drawn by the jury from a fact which is in issue or from a relevant fact, it is admissible. In every case great care is demanded of the judge, that by the employment of a wise discrimination he may admit as relevant all evidence which sheds any light upon the issue, though weak and uncertain, rejecting that which by its remoteness cannot be connected with the facts. Thus, where the value of land is involved, evidence of recent sales of land under similar conditions in the neighborhood is relevant to show the value of the land in question. Evidence to show that the sales of land which have been proved were made under different cir 11 Greenl. on Evid., § 52. 2 Truesdale v. Hoyle, 39 Ill. App. 532; Clarke v. Van Court, 51 Neb. 756. 3 Butler v. Cornell (Ill., 1893), 35 N. E. Rep. 767; Wallace v. Kennedy, 47 N. J. L. 246; Reeve v. Dennett, 145 Mass. 23; Collins v. Glass, 46 Mo. App. 297. 4 Davis v. Getchell, 32 Neb. 792; Cadwallader v. Zeh, 14 S. Ct. 288 (U. S., 1894); Bransen v. Kitchenman, 148 Pa. St. 541; 24 Atl. Rep. 61; McCulloch v. Dobson, 30 N. E. Rep. 641; 133 N. Y. 114; Faivre v. Daily, 93 Cal. 664; Lanter v. Simpson, 2 Ind. App. 273; North Chi. S. R. Co. v. Cotton, 140 Ill. 486; 29 N. E. Rep. 899. If the relevancy of a fact depends upon the proof of another fact upon which the evidence is contradictory, the proper course is to submit the proof of both facts to the jury. Day v. Sharp, 4 Whart. 339. 5 Huntington v. Attrill, 118 N. Y. 365; Miller v. Windsor W. Co., 30 W. N. C. 85; Prov. etc. Co. v. Worcester, 29 N. E. Rep. 56; 155 Mass. 35; Chicago, etc. Co. v. Emery (Kan., 1893), 32 Pac. Rep. 631; Cross v. Wilkins, 43 N. H. 332; Sanford v. Peck (Conn., 1894), 27 Atl. Rep. 1057; Melvin v. Bullard, 35 Vt. 368; Atchison cumstances is then relevant. Thus the land-owner whose property is to be taken in condemnation proceedings may show that his land is of a superior quality. So, also, if the situation and condition of the land sold, which is used as a standard of comparison, be not substantially identical with the land in dispute, or if the sales were not recent in point of time, it may become a question for the exercise of judicial discretion whether such evidence should not be rejected as remote and hence irrelevant.2 Under the rule above pointed out, evidence of collateral facts is sometimes held to be admissible where the fact in issue is the character of the result of a certain continued course of action which it is alleged evinces such a lack of care or skill on the part of the actor as to constitute negligence. So where the question hinges upon the proper performance of official or private duty in providing or caring for public structures or private buildings, or for machinery, or any material or mechanical device requiring the exercise of personal care and diligence, evidence of its condition, or of accidents which occurred in its use, prior to the time when the fact in issue occurred, is admissible. The decisions, however, are not harmonious on this point, and the cases in which such evidence has been excluded as irrelevant are extremely numerous.* Where the issue involves negligence caused by the alleged defective condition of a highway, evidence showing its con R. R. Co. v. Harper, 19 Kan. 529; 1 Chicago, K. & W. R. Co. v. Emery (Kan., 1893), 32 Pac. Rep. 631. 2 May v. Boston (Mass., 1893), 32 N. E. Rep. 902; Packard v. Bergen Neck R. Co., 54 N. J. L. 533; Laing v. United N. J. R. & Can. Co., 54 id. 576; Seattle, etc. Co. v. Gilchrist, 4 Wash. St. 509. 3 Legg v. Bloomington, 40 Ill. App. 185; Mixter Coal Co. v. Smith, 152 Pa. St. 395; Chicago, etc. Co. v. Lewis (Ill., 1893), 33 N. E. Rep. 960; Ohio Val. Ry. Co. v. Watson's Adm'r (Ky., 1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 244; Darling v. Westmoreland, 52 N. H. 401; McCullough v. Dobson, 133 N. Y. 114; House v. Metcalf, 27 Conn. 632; Glasier v. Hebron, 62 Hun, 137; Toledo, etc. Co. v. Milligan, 2 Ind. App. 578; Chicago v. Powers, 42 Ill. 169; Presly v. Grand T. Ry. Co. (N. H., 1892), 22 Atl. Rep. 554; Indianapolis Ry. v. Boetcher, 131 Ind. 82; 28 N. E Rep. 551; Augusta v. Hafers, 61 Ga 48; Topeka v. Sherwood, 39 Kan. 690; Goshen v. England, 119 Ind. 368; Magee v. Troy, 1 N. Y. S. 24; Masters v. Troy, 50 Hun, 485. 4 Fordyce v. Withers, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 540; Baxter v. Doe, 142 Mass. 558; Early v. Lake Shore, etc. Co., 30 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 163; Smith v. Railroad Co., 25 id. 546; Wise v. dition, and the existence of defects in it at a short distance from the place in issue, or evidence which shows the condition of the road at the point where the accident occurred a short time before or after, is relevant. The test of relevancy in all such cases, and the principle upon which the decisions may perhaps be reconciled, is the proximity in time or place of the facts testified to, whether they relate to the condition of the highway or other object causing damage or to repairs to it. If the evidence, whether before or after, is too remote in point of time or place, it should be rejected. And evidence that defendant, after the accident, repaired the place where plaintiff was injured is generally irrelevant and inadmissible.* Upon the question whether, in an action alleging the negligence of defendant, evidence that he is a man of careful and prudent demeanor in that line of activity in which he is alleged to have been negligent is admissible, the authorities are divided. By some of the cases it is held that evidence is relevant to show that he is competent and skilful and that no similar accident had ever before happened. The contrary proposition has also been held." Ackerman, 51 Md. 937; 26 Atl. Rep. 424; Hudson v. Chicago Ry. Co., 59 Iowa, 581; Hatt v. Nay, 144 Mass. 186; North Chicago, etc. Co. v. Hudson, 44 Ill. App. 60; State v. Raymond, 29 Pac. Rep. 732. Where negligence is alleged, evidence that no accident of the nature of that alleged has ever before occurred is irrelevant. Lewis v. Smith, 107 Mass. 334. 1 Woodcock v. Worcester, 138 Mass. 268; Bailey v. Trumbull, 31 Conn. 581; Propson v. Leathem, 80 Wis. 608; Leonard v. So. P. Ry. Co., 21 Oreg. 555; Haley v. Jump River L Co. (Wis., 1892), 51 N. W. Rep. 321. Contra, Standard Oil Co. v. Tierney (Ky., 1892), 17 S. W. Rep. 1025; Fordyce v. Chaney (Texas, 1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 181; Thompson v. Railroad Co., 91 Mich. 255; 57 N. W. Rep. 995. 3 Skattowe v. Railway Co., 22 Oreg. 430; 30 Pac. Rep. 222; Mahaney v. Railway Co., 108 Mo. 191; 18 S. W. Rep. 895; Walker v. Westfield, 39 Vt. 246; White v. Graves, 107 Mass. 325; Sherman v. Kortright, 52 Barb. (N. Y.) 267. 4 Schulte v. Cunningham, 14 Daly, 404; Hodges v. Percival, 152 Ill. 53; 23 N. E. Rep. 423; Lang v. Sanger, 76 Wis. 71; 44 N. W. Rep. 1085; Terre Haute R. Co. v. Clem, 123 Ind. 15; 23 N. E. Rep. 965. 5 Toledo, St. L. etc. Co. v. Bailey (Ill., 1893), 33 N. E. Rep. 1089; International, etc. Co. v. Kuehn (Tex., 1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 58; Railway Co. v. Selby, 47 Ind. 471; Chicago, etc. Co. v. Spelker (Ind., 1893), 33 N. E. Rep. 280. 6 Ft. Worth, etc. Co. v. Thompson (Tex., 1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 137; Chris 2 Salladay v. Dodgeville (Wis., 1893), tensen v. Union Trunk Line (Wash., 55 N. W. Rep. 696. 1893), 32 Pac. Rep. 1018. So, generally, collateral facts are relevant where they show the situation or condition of the parties,' or identify them,2 or explain the reason or motive that led to a relevant act,3 fix the time or place of a relevant action or show an opportunity for its commission.5 4 9. Evidence of intention, motive, good faith, etc., when relevant. Evidence of facts which are seemingly collateral, and which at first glance appear to have no relevancy to the issue or direct connection with it, is receivable in many cases where the party's intent, knowledge or good faith is a material element of a transaction which is proved aliunde. Thus, proof of the possession or of the utterance of forged documents at any time is relevant on the trial of one accused of forgery for the purpose of showing the guilty knowledge or intent of the accused." 1 Woodward v. Buchanan, 5 Q. B. 285; Mobile, etc. Co. v. Worthington (Ala., 1893), 10 S. Rep. 839; Schuman v. Expert (Mich., 1893), 51 N. W. Rep. 198; Berry v. Kowatsky (Cal., 1893), 30 Pac. Rep. 202; Long v. Straus (Ind., 1890), 24 N. E. Rep. 664; Bohrer v. Stump, 31 Ill. App. 139; Com. v. Campbell, 155 Mass. 127. 2 James v. Ford, 9 N. Y. S. 127; Edmansen v. Andrews, 35 Ill. App. 223; McLane v. State, 30 Tex. App. 482; Com. v. Campbell, 155 Mass. 127. 3 Bruner v. Wade (Iowa, 1892), 51 N. W. Rep. 251; Weinberg v. Kram, 17 N. Y. S. 535; Miller v. State, 68 Miss. 221; Johnson v. State, 29 Tex. App. 150; State v. Hulse, 106 Mo. 41; State v. Lentz, 45 Minn. 377. “The possibility of error goes to the weight of evidence and is not a ground for rejecting it. The spirit of the law permits a resort to every reasonable source of information upon a disputed question of fact. Unless excluded by some positive exception, everything relative to the issue is admissible, and this is extended to every hypothesis pertinent to the issue." Bell v. Brewster, 44 Ohio St. 696, 697. 4 Rollins v. Clement, 25 S. C. 601; Martin v. Victor, etc. Co., 19 Nev. 180; Orr Water Ditch, etc. Co. v. Jones, 19 Nev. 60; Beakes v. Da Cunla, 12 N. Y. S. 551; 58 Hun, 609; 27 N. E. Rep. 251. Evidence of events or acts which are clearly remembered, or which are notorious, is always relevant to fix the date of a relevant fact which has been forgotten. Ritter v. First Nat. Bank, 30 Mo. App. 652. 5 State v. Stubbs (N. C., 1892), 13 S. E. Rep. 90; Engle v. Smith (Mich., 1892), 46 N. W. Rep. 21; Dowell v. Guthrie, 99 Mo. 653; McCoy v. Tucks, 121 Ind. 292; Tabor v. N. Y. E. R. Co., 58 N. Y. Super. Ct. 579; McCulloch v. Dobson, 133 N. Y. 114; State v. Lentz, 45 Minn. 177. 6 See § 8. 7 State v. Minton (Mo., 1893), 22 S. W. Rep. 808; Bridge v. Eggleston, 14 Mass. 245; Com. v. White, 145 Mass. 392; Bottomley v. United States, 1 Story, 143, 144; Devere v. State, 5 Ohio Cir. Ct. 509; Smith v. State (Fla. 1892), 10 S. Rep. 894; It may be well to remark in this place that the general rule is that facts which are distinct from the fact in issue, but which may resemble it in character, are not relevant to prove or show the probability of the fact in issue. So no one is presumed to be guilty of crime because he has committed similar though distinct crimes at some other time.1 In civil cases the rule is often relaxed to let in seemingly irrelevant facts to strengthen the probability of some doubtful fact by showing to the jury that the doubtful fact alleged might have happened, because under circumstances somewhat similar, if not identical, a similar fact actually did happen.3 In criminal cases the rule excluding evidence of transactions not specifically connected with the fact in issue is very strictly observed. Still it has been held that evidence of other distinct crimes is relevant, not for the purpose of proving directly the act for which the prisoner is on trial, but, that act or transaction being shown by other evidence, evidence of a similar crime will be received as showing or tending to show that the act was done with a criminal intent on the part of the accused." Com. v. Russell (Mass., 1892), 30 N. E. Rep. 763. Evidence that defendant was seen to practice writing the name forged is also relevant. Insurance Co. v. Phila. Ry. Co., 11 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 482. 1 People v. O'Brien, 96 Cal. 171; Com. v. Saulsbury, 152 Pa. St. 554; Nixon v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. App. 205; People v. Drake, 65 Hun, 331; State v. Bronson, 49 Kan. 758; State v. Sterrett, 71 Iowa, 386. Cf. State v. Martin, 74 Mo. 547; People v. Rogers, 71 Cal. 565; Kernan v. State, 65 Md. 253. "Proof of a general disposition to do a thing is not proof of that thing. Thus, proof of a habit of gambling when drunk is not proof that the person gambled when drunk on a particular day. Nor will proof of a habit of loaning money at usurious interest prove that a loan was made in a particular instance." Thompson v. Bowie, 4 Wall. 471. 2"If the evidence relates to the transaction under consideration, or is connected with it and is not too remote, it is competent. It is relevant to put in evidence any circumstance that tends to make the proposition at issue more or less improbable." Fee v. Taylor, 83 Ky. 264. 3 Dwyer v. Bassett, 1 Tex. Civ. App. 513. Contra, Hartman v. Evans (W. Va., 1894), 18 S. E. Rep. 810; Palmer v. Hamilton (Ky., 1894), 24 S. W. Rep. 613. 4 Copperman v. People, 56 N. Y. 591; People v. Mead, 50 Mich. 228; State v. Myers, 82 Mo. 558; People v. Gibbs, 93 N. Y. 473; Kramer v. Com., 87 Pa. St. 299; State v. Stice (Iowa, 1893), 55 N. W. Rep. 17; Card v. State, 109 Ind. 420; Brown v. State, 26 Ohio St. 176; State v. Porter (La., 1895), 12 S. Rep. 832; State v. Place, 32 Pac. Rep. 736; 5 Wash. St. 773; Courtney v. State (Ind., 1893), 32 N. E. |