res must have been actually seized to confer jurisdiction,1 though if jurisdiction has once been obtained it will continue until final judgment, even though the res has been removed." § 156. Criminal judgments.- A judgment in a prosecution for crime may be shown by the record to prove the fact that it was rendered. Such a judgment is not admissible as evidence in a civil suit to prove any fact or circumstance which was found by the jury in the criminal trial. Aside from the rule of evidence that, in a criminal trial, the jury must be convinced of the guilt of the prisoner beyond a reasonable doubt, while in a civil action they may decide according to the weight of evidence, the absence of any identity of the parties in the two transactions precludes the employment of the criminal judgment as evidence in a subsequent civil action. On the other hand, a civil judgment is upon like principles inadmissible in a criminal trial. A judgment rendered in a criminal action is competent evidence of the facts determined in another prosecution of the same person for another or for the same crime." - § 157. Proof of judgments as facts and their use in proving ulterior facts distinguished. As already explained, a judicial record is admissible to prove those matters of fact recited in it only in subsequent proceedings between the same parties or their representatives in privity But where only the fact of the rendition of a judgment is to be proved, a different rule is recognized. The record of a judgment is the evidence of a public transaction, and it is conclusive evidence in any subsequent proceedings between any persons whatsoever where the point in issue is, was a certain judgment rendered or not. So the record of the plaintiff's acquittal or convic 'Taylor v. Carryl, 20 How. (U. S.) v. Beetle (Mass., 1890), 26 N. E. Rep. 883. 429. 2 The Rio Grande, 23 Wall. (U. S.) 348; Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wall. 317. Landa v. Obert, 14 S. W. Rep. 297; 78 Tex. 33; Schreiner v. Order of Foresters, 35 Ill. App. 576. 4 See ante, §§ 5, 6. 5 Com. v. Horton, 9 Pick. 206; Bradley v. Bradley, 2 Fairf. 367; Bradley 6 Com. v. Evans, 101 Mass. 25; Dennis' Case, 110 id. 18. Bensimer v. Fell (W. Va., 1891), 12 S. E. Rep. 1078. A judgment may be considered in evidence, though not formally introduced and read, where counsel admit its existence and witnesses testify to the facts therein without objection by either party. tion is admissible to show these facts in a subsequent suit brought by him to recover for false imprisonment though the parties are not identical. Again, where the party against whom the judgment was rendered is suing to be exonerated, or when the judgment, as in the case of a certain decree in chancery, partakes of the nature of a muniment of title, or furnishes the source of one's title acquired under a sheriff's deed, or the basis of a claim against an official for negligence in enforcing it, the existence of the judgment may be shown res inter alios acta, neither the parties nor the cause of action being the same." § 158. Validity and effect of foreign judgments.— The judgment in rem of a foreign court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter is universally conclusive and binding if the land or other property, movable or immovable, is located in its jurisdiction. Its decision, whatever may be its nature, will be held binding in every country whether the same question is directly or only incidentally involved. The English rule is followed in some of the states, and the judgment is binding as to all facts whether directly or incidentally decided. In others the judgment is not conclusive except as to the property directly involved, and other facts adjudicated may be relitigated." Of course the rule as thus stated is to be taken with the limitations that the cause in rem has been tried and the judgment rendered bona fide, that the foreign judge was impartial," that the decision is consist 10 Zieverink v. Kempner (Ohio, 1893), 3 Sumn. 600; The Mary, 9 Cranch, 34 N. E. Rep. 250. 1 Barhyt v. Valk, 12 Wend. (N. Y.) 145; Garvey v. Wayson, 22 Md. 178. 2 Kip v. Brigham, 6 Johns. 158; Weld v. Nichols, 17 Pick. 538. 3 Barr v. Gratz, 4 Wheat. 213. 4 Jackson v. Wood, 3 Wend. 27, 34; Witmer v. Schlatter, 2 Rawle, 359; Fowler v. Savage, 3 Conn. 90, 96. 5 Adams v. Balch, 5 Greenl. 188. 6 Fiscus v. Guthrie, 125 Ind. 598. 7 See ante, § 155. 8 Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U. S. 187; Williams v. Armroyd, 7 Cranch, 423; Bradstreet v. Neptune Ins. Co., 126; Peters v. Warren Ins. Co., 3 Sumn. 389; Propellor Commerce, 1 Black, 580; Crodson v. Leonard, 4 Cranch, 433; Averill v. Smith, 17 Wall. 95; Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wall. 316321, cited in 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 541. 9 Graham v. Whitely, 2 Dutcher, 254; Robinson v. Jones, 8 Mass. 536; Maley v. Shattuck, 8 Cranch, 488; Gelston v. Hoyt, 3 Wheat. 246. 10 White v. Read, 24 N. Y. S. 290; Bradstreet v. Insurance Co., 3 Sumn. 600; Magoun v. N. E. Ins. Co., 1 Story, 157. 11 Price v. Dewhurst, 8 Sim. 279. ent with the law of nations, and that all parties having any interest in rem had notice and an opportunity to appear and to be heard personally or by a proper representative.1 In regard to that class of judgments which are analogous to judgments in rem in that they are binding upon all persons within the jurisdiction, that is to say, judgments or decrees fixing the personal status of an individual, it has been held that where a judgment of this sort has been rendered in a foreign court or in the court of one state of the United States, it ought to be binding, so far as the person is concerned, in every country and in all the states of the Union. So far as guardians, executors, administrators and others occupying similar positions are concerned, the decree of the court appointing them has in the United States no extraterritorial efficacy, and these quasi-fiduciaries are regarded as purely local matters. For this reason a judgment appointing a person an executor, administrator, guardian or trustee in one state is not evidence in the courts of another to show that he possesses any power as such over property in the latter state. The judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction confirm ing or annulling a marriage which had been contracted within its jurisdiction by residents or non-residents, or which had been contracted outside of its jurisdiction by persons who were at the time of the marriage or of the suit domiciled. within its jurisdiction, is valid everywhere. The same rule is applied to a valid foreign decree granting a divorce in a suit conducted bona fide by persons actually domiciled in the jurisdiction of the court.3 The effect as evidence of foreign judgments in personam has been much discussed from early times by the authorities and in the decided cases. In spite of the contrariety of the cases, it may be safely said, in the first place, that a foreign judgment regular on its face, rendered in an action in per 1 Gelston v. Hoyt, 3 Wheat. 246; Williams v. Armroyd, 7 Cranch, 423. 2 Kraft v. Wickey, 4 Cr. & J. 332; Dixon v. Ramsay, 3 Cranch, 319; In re Mintzer's Estate, 2 Pa. Dist. R. 584; In re Johnson (Iowa, 1893), 54 N. W. Rep. 69. 3 James v. James, 81 Tex. 373; Glaude v. Post, 8 S. Rep. 884; 43 La. Ann. 861; Davis v. Davis, 22 N. Y. S. 191; 2 Misc. R. 549; Hammond v. Hammond (Ga., 1893), 16 S. E. Rep. 265. sonam in a foreign court, is conclusive evidence between the parties or their privies of all facts which are directly or indirectly involved. This proposition, it will be seen, leaves the foreign judgment to be impeached and set aside if upon the face of the record of the foreign court its decision appears to be grossly repugnant to natural justice,' or was obtained by fraud, or if it appears that the court had no jurisdiction, or misapprehended or refused to recognize the law of the country in which the subject-matter is situated. Thus, if a French court, construing a contract made in England, decides a question of English law which is an essential element in the ultimate judgment rendered, the judgment itself will be invalid as evidence in an English court if the foreign court misapprehends the true import of the English rule of law. If the foreign court has no jurisdiction, then its judgment is of course invalid." In some proceedings in personam the decree of the foreign court is effectual to transfer the title of the property not only as against the parties but against all persons, and this conclusively. Such proceeding are analogous to proceedings in rem, and a party who accepts the express or implied permission or invitation to intervene and submits his claim to the court will not be permitted to have the judgment re-opened in another court on the plea that he only intervened to save his property from forfeiture." 4 Boston I. R. Co. v. Hoit, 14 Vt. 92. 2 Goulding v. Hoyt, 34 N. H. 143. 3 Scott v. Pilkington, 2 B. & S. 11; 8 Jur. 557; Crispin v. Daglioni, 9 id. 653; Simpson v. Fogo, 9 id. 403; Bank of Australasia v. Nias, 16 Q. B. 717; Ricardo v. Garcias, 12 Cl. & Fin. 368; Dunstan v. Higgins, 63 Hun, 631, cited in 1 Greenl. on Evid., § 546. 4 Novelli v. Rossi, 2 B. & Ald. 757. 5 Vanquelin v. Bouard, 9 L. T. (N. S.) 582. Cf. Wood v. Watkinson, 17 Conn. 500. 6 De Casse Brissac v. Rathbone, 6 H. & Nor. 301; Imrie v. Castrique, 8 C. B. (N. S.) 406; Frayes v. Worms, 10 C. B. (N. S.) 149; Simpson v. Fogo, 6 Jur. 403; Woodruff v. Taylor, 20 Vt. 65. In Holmes v. Gratz (U. S. C. C., 1892), 50 Fed. Rep. 869, the court in refusing to allow defendant to plead a foreign judgment as a bar in a suit for an injunction held that foreign adjudications as respects torts are not conclusive, and that, as granting an injunction depends largely upon circumstances which differ in each case, neither public policy nor international comity requires that the right to the protection of a court of equity against fraud should depend on the law of a foreign tribunal. § 159. Judgments of sister states.- By virtue of the constitutional provision that full faith and credit shall be given to the judicial proceedings of each state in the courts of every other state, a judgment rendered in any state or territory will, when duly authenticated, have exactly the same effect and operation as a domestic judgment. Still it is competent for the court, in such a case, to inquire whether the judgment is tainted with fraud or whether the court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter or of the parties. So a court of one state may inquire whether a federal court situated in another state had jurisdiction to render a judgment offered as evidence in its courts; and in New York it has been held that the validity of a judgment rendered in another state may be attacked upon the sole ground that the cause of action was based on a contract without consideration and obtained under duress,' or that the judgment has been allowed to become dormant in the other state. On the other hand, the validity of a judgment of another state cannot be impeached by showing that the cause of action was barred by the statute of limitation, or that the parties were not legally served.' 1 Bright v. Smitten, 10 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 647; Fitzsimons v. Johnson, 90 Tenn. 416 (probate court); Caughran v. Gilman, 81 Iowa, 442; 46 N. W. Rep. 1005; Semple v. Glenn, 91 Ala. 245; 9 S. Rep. 265; Hall v. McKay, 78 Tex. 248; Carpenter v. Strange, 141 U. S. 87; Chicago & A. B. Co. v. AngloAmerican Packing Co., 46 Fed. Rep. 584; McGarvey v. Darnall, 134 Ill. 367; 25 N. E. Rep. 1005; Kingman v. Paulsen, 126 Ind. 507; Bowersox v. Gitt, 12 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 81; Sannis v. Wightman (Fla., 1893), 12 S. Rep. 526; Hammond v. Hammond (Ga., 1893), 16 S. E. Rep. 365. See, also, ante, § 148. 2 Taylor v. Bryden, 8 Johns. 173; First Nat. Bank v. Cunningham, 48 Fed. Rep. 515; Teel v. Yost, 128 N. Y. 387; Renier v. Hurlburt (Wis., 1892), 50 N. W. Rep. 783; Henry v. Allen, 82 Tex. 35; Rand v. Hansen, 154 Mass. 87; 28 N. E. Rep. 6; Caughran 3 Hovey v. Elliott, 21 N. Y. S. 108; Southern Ins. Co. v. Wolverton Hd. Co. (Tex., 1892), 19 S. W. Rep. 615. 4 Trebilcox v. McAlpine, 62 Hun, 317. But cf. contra, Ambler v. Whipple, 139 Ill. 311; 28 N. E. Rep. 841. 5 Chapman v. Chapman, 48 Kan. 636; 29 Pac. Rep. 1074. 6 Fitzsimons v. Johnson, 90 Tenn. 416; Reed v. Chilson, 61 Hun, 623. 7 Hall v. McKay, 78 Tex. 248; Semple v. Glenn, 9 S. Rep. 265; 91 Ala. 245. But cf. N. Y. L. Ins. Co. v Aitkin, 125 N. Y. 660; Hoffman v. Newell, 20 N. Y. S. 432; 21 id. 912. |