§ 209. Incomplete and collateral writings.- Where on inspecting a written contract it appears incomplete, so that it does not represent the final intention of the parties in language chosen by them, parol evidence is admissible to supply omissions and ascertain the actual intention on those particular points regarding which the written agreement is silent.1 So parol evidence is admissible to supply a date in an acknowledgment of a debt; to show the purpose of certain minor stipulations; to fix the time of performance, or to show a parol contract or a conversation referred to in the writing. But an omission cannot be supplied in a writing which is required by the statute of frauds. And the opera 54 N. W. Rep. 1094; Guidery v. Green, 95 Cal. 630; Dorsey v. Hagard, 5 Mo. 420; Miller v. Fechtborn, 31 Pa. St. 252; Macomb v. Wilkinson (Mich., 1890), 47 N. W. Rep. 336; Finlayson v. Finlayson, 17 Oreg. 347; Goodwin v. Fox, 129 U. S. 601; Bruce v. Slemp, 82 Va. 352; Rankin v. Wallace (Ky., 1890), 14 S. W. Rep. 79; Halpin v. Stone, 78 Wis. 183; 47 N. W. Rep. 177; Nichols v. Burch, 128 Ind. 324; 27 N. E. Rep. 737. In McCrea v. Purmort, 16 Wend. (N. Y.) 473; 30 Am. Dec. 103, Justice Cowan thus expounds the true rule on this subject: "A party is estopped by his deed. He is not permitted to contradict it so far as the deed is intended to pass a right, or to be the exclusive evidence of a contract. The principle goes no further. A deed is not conclusive evidence of everything it may contain. For instance, it is not the only evidence of the date of its execution, nor is its omission of a consideration conclusive evidence that none passed; nor is its acknowledgment of a particular consideration an objection to other proof of another and consistent consideration." 1 Smith v. Wood (Ind., 1893), 32 N. E. Rep. 921; Woolworth v. Mc Pherson, 55 Fed. Rep. 558; McGrath v. Mongels, 20 N. Y. S. 869; Kreuzberger v. Wingfield, 96 Cal. 251; Chapin v. Cambria S. Co., 145 Pa. St. 578; Ostrander v. Snyder, 26 N. Y. S. 263; Edwards Co. v. Baker, 2 N. D. 289; Bretts v. Levine (Minn., 1892), 52 N. W. Rep. 525; Work v. Beach, 129 N. Y. 651; Crane v. Library Ass'n, 29 N. J. L. 302; Barclay v. Hopkins, 59 Ga. 562; Bank v. Cooper, 137 U. S. 473; Brown v. Bowen, 90 Mo. 184; Webster v. Hodgkins, 25 N. H. 128; Winn v. Chamberlain, 32 Vt. 318; Equator M. & S. Co. v. Gunella (Colo., 1893), 33 Pac. Rep. 613; Holmes v. Anderson, 59 Tex. 481; Donlin v. Daeglin, 80 Ill. 608; Sivers v. Sivers (Cal., 1893), 32 Pac. Rep. 571; Hawkins v. Lee, 8 Lea (Tenn.), 42. The question whether the contract is complete is for the jury. Thomas v. Barnes, 31 N. E. Rep. 683; 56 Mass. 581. 2 Manchester v. Brodner, 107 N. Y. 349. 3 Equator Co. v. Gunella (Colo., 1893), 33 Pac. Rep. 613. 4 Sivers v. Sivers (Cal., 1893), 32 Pac. Rep. 571. 5 Nork v. Beach, 129 N. Y. 621. 6 Runger v. Holtzclaw, 112 Mo. 519. See post, § 214. tion of this rule is strictly confined to unintentional omissions, and does not permit the introduction of parol evidence to effectuate a writing which is wholly void because of uncertainty. Nor is parol evidence admissible if the writing can by construction be given a reasonable meaning though some words have been omitted. So it has been held that the oral portion of the contract is only admissible if the writing describes the subject-matter with binding force, and the oral part refers to collateral matters alone. The existence of a memorandum of a transaction, as a bill of parcels, will not exclude parol evidence of the real contract where the memorandum is not meant to be regarded as a contract containing the complete intention of the parties.1 § 210. Parol evidence to connect and explain contemporaneous writings. Two or more instruments evidencing the same transaction should be construed together. To enable the court to do this, parol evidence is admissible to show which was adopted as binding by the parties, or to connect them if the connection does not appear upon their face; and particularly if they are contradictory in terms, or if on comparison of the instruments certain clauses are found to be omitted from either. If a writing clearly refers to another, the latter will be admissible to explain it. The earlier deed or instrument by such reference becomes incorporated in the later to the same extent as though inserted in the subsequent 8 1 McGuire v. Stevens, 42 Miss. 474; Walrath v. Whitlekind, 26 Kan. 482; Harvey v. Lumber Co., 39 Mo. App. 214. 2 Looney v. Rankin, 15 Oreg. 617. 3 Chapin v. Dobson, 78 N. Y. 74. 4 Deshon v. Insurance Co., 11 Met. (Mass.) 199; Perrine v. Cooley, 39 N. J. L. 449; Kreuzberger v. Wingfield, 96 Cal. 251; Thomas v. Barnes, 156 Mass. 581; Robinson v. Mulder, 81 Mich. 75; Chapin v. Cambria Iron Co., 145 Pa. St. 478; Millet v. Marston, 62 Me. 477; Cone v. Cone, 107 Mass. 285; Smith v. Coleman, 77 Wis. 343. 5 Hill v. Miller, 76 N. Y. 32; Nor. M. Co. v. McAlister, 40 Mich. 84. 61 Greenl. Ev., § 283; Wichita University v. Schweiter, 50 Kan. 672; Thomson v. Beal, 48 Fed. Rep. 614; Myers v. Munson, 65 Iowa, 423; Tuley v. Barton, 79 Va. 387; Lee v. Church, 52 Barb. (N. Y.) 116; Gilbert v. Duncan, 29 N. J. L. 133, 521; Eager v. Crawford, 76 N. Y. 97; Cullen v. Benim, 37 Ohio St. 326. deed. The same principle is applicable to a deed containing references to maps or plats, which must be consulted and are admissible to ascertain the location of the monuments which constitute the boundaries of the land conveyed. In the case of documents referred to in wills, which are required to be attested, it has been held that to admit their incorporation in the will they must be referred to as in existence when the will is executed, and the document may then be shown by parol evidence to be identical with that referred to." § 211. Receipts.-"A receipt may be defined as such a written acknowledgment by one person of his having received. money or goods from another as will be prima facie evidence of that fact in a court of law."5 Parol evidence is generally admissible to explain or vary the meaning or purpose of a simple written receipt. If the writing, however, constitutes 1 Tiedeman on R. P., § 841; Whitehead v. Rogers, 106 Mo. 231; Campbell v. Morgan, 68 Hun, 490; Perry v. Binney, 103 Mass. 153; Vance v. Fare, 24 Cal. 444; Overend v. Menezer, 83 Tex. 152; McAfee v. Arline, 83 Ga. 645; Knight v. Dyer, 57 Me. 176; Lippitt v. Kelly, 46 Vt. 523; Rupert v. Penner, 35 Neb. 587. The deed referred to need not be recorded. Simmons v. Johnson, 14 Wis. 526; Caldwell v. Center, 30 Cal. 543. ? Tiedeman on R. P., § 841; Chamberlain v. Bradley, 101 Mass. 191; St. Louis v. Miss. P. R. Co. (Mo., 1893), 21 S. W. Rep. 202; Fox v. Union Co., 109 Mass. 292; Bohier v. Lange, 44 Minn. 281; Redd v. Murry, 24 Pac. Rep. 341; 93 Cal. 48; Whitehead v. Ragan, 106 Mo. 231; Birmingham v. Anderson, 48 Pa. St. 253; Plummer v. Gould, 92 Mich. 1; Spiller v. Scribner, 36 Vt. 247: Chapman v. Polack, 70 Cal. 487; Frost v. Cattle Co., 81 Tex. 505. 3 Newton v. Seamen's Fr. Soc., 130 Mass. 91; Brown v. Clark, 77 N. Y. 360; Baker's Appeal, 107 Pa. St. 381; Tonnele, etc. v. Hall, 4 Comst. 145; In re Soher, 78 Cal. 477; Chambers v. McDaniel, 3 Rich. Eq. 305; Harvey v. Chouteau, 14 Mo. 587; Johnson v. Clarkson, 3 Rich. Eq. 305; Thayer v. Wellington, 9 Allen, 283; In re Lambert's Estate, 10 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 10; In re Sunderland, 1 P. & D. 198; Allen v. Maddock, 11 Moore P. C. 427, 454; Von Stanbenzee v. Monck, 32 L. J. Prob. 21; In re Barber, W. N. 1879, p. 141. Pollock v. Glassell, 2 Gratt. 439; Barley v. Barley, 7 Jones, 44; Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 23 Pa. St. 375; Crosby v. Mason, 32 Conn. 482; Fesler v. Simpson, 58 Ind. 83. 5 Grimke, J., in Kegg v. State, 7 Ohio St. 79. As to the conclusiveness of receipts per se as evidence, see State v. Branch, 112 Mo. 661. 6 Schwersenski v. Vineberg, 19 Can. S. C. R. 243; Osborn v. Stringham (S. D., 1894), 57 N. W. Rep. 776; Oakley v. State, 40 Ala. 392; Hancock v. Moody, 39 Ill. App. 17; State v. McDonald, 43 N. J. L. 591; Buswell v. Pioneer, 37 N. Y. 312; Fire Ass'n v. Wickham, 141 U. S. 564; or contains a complete contract, as when it contains stipulations prescribing how the money is to be expended, parol evidence is inadmissible to vary its terms, so far as it is a contract, though it may assume the form of a receipt. § 212. Independent parol contracts and conditions precedent. These generally may be shown by parol when contemporaneous and consistent with the writing, and founded on a distinct consideration, or when the consideration of the oral collateral contract is the performance of the written one. Richardson v. Beede, 43 Me. 161; Lane v. Johnson, 59 Vt. 237; Hill v. Durand, 58 Wis. 160; Prairie Sch. Twp. v. Haselen (N. D., 1893), 55 N. W. Rep. 938; Bell v. Utley, 17 Mich. 508; Chapman v. Sutton, 68 Wis. 657; Catoe v. Catoe, 32 S. C. 595; Lowe v. Thompson, 86 Ind. 503; Texas M. L. Ins. Co. v. Davidge, 51 Tex. 244; McKinnie v. Harvey, 38 Minn. 18; Dunn v. Pipes, 20 La. Ann. 276; Badger v. Jones, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 371; McFadden v. Railway Co., 92 Mo. 343; Chapin v. Chicago, etc. Co. (Iowa, 1890), 44 N. W. Rep. 820; Marse v. Rice (Neb., 1893), 54 N. W. Rep. 308; Dunagan v. Dunagan, 38 Ga. 554; Calhoun v. Richardson, 30 Conn. 210; Knox v. Barbee, 3 Bibb (Ky.). 526; Edgerly v. Emerson, 23 N. H. 555. Whether the receipt is an official acknowledgment or a receipt under seal, as in a deed of conveyance, is immaterial. Brown v. Cabalin, 3 Oreg. 45. 1 Smith v. Holland, 61 N. Y. 635. 2 Fossack v. Moody, 39 Ill. App. 17; Thompson v. Williams, 30 Kan. 114; Carpenter v. Jamieson, 75 Mo. 285; Alcorn v. Morgan, 77 Ind. 184; Tarbell v. Farmers' Mut. El. Co., 44 Minn. 471; Goodwin v. Goodwin, 59 N. H. 548: Van Etten v. Newton, 8 N. Y. S. 478; Young v. Cook, 15 La. Ann. 126; James v. Bligh, 11 Allen (Mass.), 4; Fowler v. Richardson, 32 Ill. App. 252; Harrison v. Bank, 17 Wis. 340; Wood v. Whiting, 21 Barb. 190; Egleston v. Knickerbocker, 6 Barb. 458; Graves v. Dudley, 20 N. Y. 76; Querry v. White, 1 Bibb (Ky.), 271; Sessions v. Gilbert, 1 Vt. 75. Thus, for example, a receipt for goods on storage or deposited as collateral for a loan, constituting a contract of bailment, cannot be varied by parol. Wadsworth v. Alcott, 6 N. Y. 64; Stapleton v. King, 33 Iowa, 28. 3 Michigan M. L. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 155 Pa. St. 405; Bagley & Sewall Co. v. Saranac R. P. Co., 135 N. Y. 626; Guidery v. Green, 95 Cal. 630; Babcock v. Deford, 14 Kan. 408; Whitney v. Shippen, 89 Pa. St. 22; Andrews v. Brewster, 124 N. Y. 433; Buzzell v. Willard, 44 Vt. 44; Lamphire v. Slaughter, 61 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 36; Snow v. Allen, 151 Mass. 51. This exception is thus stated by Sir James Stephen: "The existence of any separate oral agreement as to any matter on which a document is silent, and which is not inconsistent with its terms, may be shown, if from the circumstances of the case the court infers that the parties did not intend the document to be a complete and final statement of the whole of the transaction between them." See Dig. Ev., art. 90. 4 Kelly v. Carter, 55 Ark. 112. Thus, a verbal warranty in connection with a sale in writing;1 an agreement to pay a commission for procuring a sale of land, or for obtaining a charter for a vessel; or a condition that a written agreement shall not go into effect unless a certain event shall happen, or that a policy taken in a party's name was only a security for a debt; a verbal contract to rebuild in connection with a written lease; an agreement that a mortgagor may continue in possession under a chattel mortgage, or an agreement by the obligee in a deed to receive in payment a note of a third party, or an agreement by a grantor to grade a street,' may all be shown by parol where such independent oral contract does not contradict the language of the written agreement. But where the effect of the collateral parol agreement is to make an entirely new contract out of the written contract, parol evidence is not admissible.10 But a contemporaneous independent parol contract, the performance of which is a condition precedent to the creation of a binding obligation under a written agreement, may be shown." 1 Collette v. Weed, 68 Wis. 428. 2 Huckabee v. Shepherd, 75 Ala. 342. 3 Weber v. Kingsland, 8 Bosw. 415. 4 Humphreys v. Railroad Co., 88 Va. 431. 5 Zabel v. Nyenhuis, 83 Iowa, 750. 6 Cumming v. Barber, 99 N. C. 332. 7 Pierce v. Stevens, 30 Me. 184. 8 Murchie v. Cook, 1 Ala. 41. 9 Durkin v. Cobleigh, 30 N. E. Rep. 474. 10 Miller Ins. Co. v. Kinneard, 35 Ill. App. 105; Blair v. Buttolph, 72 Iowa, 31; Timms v. Sherman, 19 Md. 296; Keeley v. Oliver (N. C., 1893), 18 S. E. Rep. 698; Hubbard v. Greeley, 84 Me. 340; Gerard v. Cowperthwait, 21 N. Y. S. 1092; Lathrop v. Foster, 51 Me. 367; Still v. Tompkins, 154 Pa. St. 43; Richards v. Day, 63 Hun, 635; Haworth v. Norris, 28 Fla. 763; Frost v. Blanchard, 97 Mass. 155; Woodward v. Foster, 18 N. Y. S. 827; McLeod v. Skiles, 8 81 Mo. 595; Trent v. Fletcher, 100 Ind. 105; Bishop v. Dillard, 49 Ark. 285; Barclay v. Pursley, 110 Pa. St. 13. So oral evidence will not be received to attach a condition to an absolute promise to pay in writing. Allen v. Furbish, 4 Gray, 504; Billings v. Billings, 10 Cush. 178, 182; Ridgway v. Bowman, 7 Cush. 268. 11 Corn v. Rosenthal (N. Y., 1893), 1 Misc. Rep. 168; Black v. Shreve, 13 N. J. Eq. 455; Badcock v. Steadman, 1 Root (Conn.), 87; IInmphreys v. Railroad Co., 13 S. E. Rep. 985; Benton v. Martin, 52 N. Y. 570; Juillard v. Chaffee, 92 N. Y. 535; Michels v. Olmstead, 14 Fed. Rep. 219; Pierce v. Tedwell, 81 Ala. 299; Jordan v. Loftin, 13 Ala. 547; Minchin v. Minchin (Mass., 1893), 32 N. E. Rep. 164; Watkins v. Bowers, 119 Mass. 383; Wilson v. Powers, 131 id. 539; Westman v. Krumweide, 30 Minn. 313; Sweet v. Steveus, 7 R. I. 375; Cuthrell v. Cuthrell, 101 Ind. 375; Robinson v. Evans, 3 S. C. 335; |