This rule has been followed by the majority of the cases in America, and may now be considered to be the law as regards the amount and quality of the mental derangement which must be shown in a criminal trial to rebut the presumption of sanity. Sometimes, however, the courts have departed from this test of the capacity to know the nature and moral character of the act and have laid down the broader is presumed to be sane and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes until the contrary be proved to their satisfaction, and that to establish a defense on the ground of insanity it must be clearly proved that at the time of the commitment of the act the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it that he did not know he was doing what was wrong." Again, in Moett v. People, 85 N. Y. 375, 380, the court, by Earl, J., said: "The laws of God and the land are the measure of every man's act, and make it right or wrong, and it is right or wrong as it corresponds with these laws. When it is said that a prisoner must at the time of the alleged criminal act have sufficient capacity to distinguish between right and wrong with respect to such act, it is implied that he must have sufficient capacity to know whether such act is in violation of the law of God or of the land or both. It is not the duty of the trial judge to present the matter to the jury in every possible phase and in every form of language which the ingenuity of counsel can devise." 1 Parsons v. State, 2 S. Rep. 854; 81 Ala. 577; State v. Hockett, 30 N. W. Rep. 742; 70 Iowa, 442; State v. Pagels, 92 Mo. 300; 4 S. W. Rep. 931; Leache v. State, 22 Tex. App. 279; State v. Mowry, 15 Pac. Rep. 282; 37 Kan. 369; Farris v. Com. (Ky., 1890). 1 S. W. Rep. 729; Giebel v. State, 28 Tex. App. 151; 12 S. W. Rep. 591; State v. Zoun (Oreg., 1892). 30 Pac. Rep. 517; Com. v. Gerade. 145 Pa. St. 289; 28 W. N. C. 261; State v. Alexander, 30 S. C. 74; State v. Harrison, 15 S. E. Rep. 982; 36 W. Va. 729; State v. Maier, 36 W. Va. 757; Dunn v. People, 109 Ill. 635; Hornish v. People (Ill., 1893), 32 N. E. Rep. 677; Maxwell v. State, 89 Ala. 150; People v. Foy, 34 N. E. Rep. 396; 138 N. Y. 664; Karney v. State (Miss., 1891), 8 S. Rep. 292. For cases of homicide in which this presumption of sanity was removed, see Reg. v. Layton, 4 Cox C. C. 149-155; Roswell v. State, 63 Ala. 307; State v. Hoyt, 46 Conn. 330; State v. Martin (N. J.), 3 Cr. L. Mag. 44; Com. v. Rogers, 48 Mass. (7 Metc.) 500; Armstrong v. State, 30 Fla. 170: Boswell v. Com., 20 Gratt. (Va.) 860; State v. Starling, 6 Jones' (N. C.) L. 366; State v. Hurley, 1 Houst. Cr. Cas. (Del.) 28; King v. State, 9 Fla. 617; People v. McDonell, 47 Cal. 134; State v. Stark, 1 Strobh. (S. C.) L. 479; People v. Finley, 38 Mich. 482; Caset v. State, 40 Ark. 511; Kriel v. Com., 5 Bush (Ky.), 362; Baldwin v. State, 12 Mo. 223; Loeffner v. State, 10 Ohio St. 599; Jamison v. People (Ill., 1894), 34 N. E. Rep. 48; Com. v. Lynch, 3 Pittsb. (Pa.) 412; Montgomery v. Com., 88 Ky. 509; Flanagan v. People, 52 N. Y. 467. rule that though the defendant may have known or had capacity to know the difference between right and wrong in the particular case, yet, if facts are shown from which the jury may infer that he was acting under some uncontrollable. impulse or influence which prevented him from making a choice between the right and wrong, the presumption of his sanity is rebutted and it becomes the duty of the jury to acquit the accused.1 The presumption of the continuance of a given condition of mental derangement depends entirely upon the nature of the mental malady itself. Thus while in the case of congenital mental infirmity as idiocy, or habitual or fixed insanity, it may require very clear evidence to rebut the presumption, in the case of a delirium which is the result of physical disease, it is doubtful if it can be said that a legal presumption of continued insanity exists at all. There is no presumption of law that once insane always so, but the circumstances of each case should be considered to ascertain how far the same mental condition may be presumed to exist at an earlier or later period.3 § 232. Presumptions as to jurisdiction.—It is a general rule that a court of superior or general jurisdiction will be presumed to have acted regularly and within its powers where 1 This is the doctrine of moral insanity as distinguished from mere mental disease per se, or from hallucinations or delusions constituting mania. See 3 Law Quar. Rev. 339; Taylor v. Com., 109 Pa. St. 270; Plake v. State, 121 Ind. 433; People v. Durfee, 62 Mich. 487; People v. Kerrigan, 14 Pac. Rep. 566; 73 Cal. 222, rejecting the doctrine of moral insanity. See, also, generally, State v. Reidel (Del., 1888), 14 Atl. Rep. 550; Williams v. State, 50 Ark. 511; 9 S. W. Rep. 5; Burgo v. State (Neb., 1889), 42 N. W. Rep. 701; People v. Barber, 15 N. Y. 475. Cf. State v. Jones, 50 N. H. 369; Leache v. State, 22 Tex. Cr. App., p. 279; 3 S. W. Rep. 539; Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577; 2 S. Rep. 854; Dacey v. People, 116 Ill. 555; 6 N. E. Rep. 165, in which the subject of emotional or moral insanity is further considered. 2 Johnson V. Armstrong (Ala., 1893), 12 S. Rep. 72; Manley v. Staples (Vt., 1893), 26 Atl. Rep. 630; Prentice v. Bates, 93 Mich. 234. 3 Schouler on Wills, § 187, citing Goble v. Grant, 2 Green Ch. 629; Cartwright v. Cartwright, 1 Phill. 100; Goodheart v. Ransley, 28 Wkly. L. Bul. 227; Hix v. Whittemore, 4 Met. 545; Halley v. Webster, 21 Me. 461; Staples v. Wellington, 58 Me. 453; McMasters v. Blair, 29 Pa. St. 298; Taylor v. Cresswell, 45 Md. 422; Townsend v. Townsend, 7 Gill, 10; Castor v. Davis (Ind., 1890), 20 N. E. Rep. 110. the record is silent and until the contrary is shown;' and for this reason, whenever the validity of its judgment is attacked collaterally, it will be presumed, where the record of the judg ment is silent on these points, that both the subject-matter and the parties were within its jurisdiction. If jurisdiction has once been acquired it will be presumed to continue until final judgment.3 When any fact or statement appears upon the record its correctness will be presumed, and all the necessary steps which are requisite to give the court jurisdiction will be presumed to have been taken in conformity therewith, even where the minor details appertaining thereto are not set forth in the record. Thus it will be presumed that pleadings have been properly amended or filed where amendment or filing was needed; that the rulings of the trial court 1 State v. Trounce, 5 Wash. St. 804; Ryder v. Roberts, 48 Mo. App. 132; Cape Girardeau v. Burrough, 112 Mo. 559; Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 350; Black v. Epperson, 40 Tex. 178; Nations v. Johnson, 24 How. (U. S.) 195; Slocum v. Prov. St. etc. Co., 10 R. I. 112. By some of the cases this presumption is based, not on the superior power of the court at common law, but upon the fact that a court has a record on which all its proceedings are inscribed. Davis v. Hudson, 29 Minn. 35. 2 See 152-155, ante; Pope v. Harrison, 16 Lea (Tenn.), 82; Doe v. Lindsey, 24 Ga. 225; Huntington v. Charlotte, 15 Vt. 46; Taylor v. Brily (Ind., 1892), 30 N. E. Rep. 369; Yaeger v. Henry, 39 Ill. App. 21; Markel v. Evans, 47 Ind. 326; Linton v. Allen, 154 Mass. 432; Emeric v. Alvaredo, 64 Cal. 529; Knox v. Bowersox, 6 Ohio Cir. Ct. 275; Carter v. State, 22 Fla. 553; United States v. Green, 6 Mackey, 562; People v. Kline, 83 Cal. 374; State v. Weaver, 101 N. C. 758. 3 Housch v. People, 66 Ill. 178; Osborn v. Sutton, 108 Ind. 443. 4 Kley v. Healy, 127 N. Y. 555; Sickles v. Look, 93 Cal. 600; McGarvey v. Ford (N. M.), 27 Pac. Rep. 415; Kent v. Insurance Co. (N. D., 1892), 50 N. W. Rep. 85; Parish v. Railroad Co., 28 Fla. 251; Scott v. Iron Co. (Ky., 1892), 18 S. W. Rep. 1012; Traders' Bank v. Parker, 130 N. Y. 415; Louisville, etc. Co. v. Orr, 10 S. Rep. 167; 94 Ala. 602; Duncan v. State, 88 Ala. 31; Garn v. Working (Ind., 1893), 31 N. E. Rep. 821. "Gridley v. College, 137 N. Y. 527; Rogers v. Burns, 27 Pa. St. 525; 2 Head, 253; Wright v. Douglass, 10 Barb. 97; Golden Gate Min. Co. v. Yuba Co., 65 Cal. 187; Wetherill v. Sullivan, 65 Pa. St. 105; Grignon's Lessee v. Astor, 2 How. (U. S.) 319. Where the party appears and defends it will be presumed that he was legally served. Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. 19; Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass. 462; Broder v. Conklin (Cal., 1893), 33 Pac. Rep. 211. 6 Tipton v. Warner, 47 Kan. 606; Miss. etc. Co. v. Smith (Tex., 1892), 19 S. W. Rep. 509; Dore v. Commonwealth, 82 Va. 301; Evansville, etc. Co. v. Maddox (Ind., 1893), 34 N. E. Rep. 511. are correct in the absence of exceptions thereto on the record,1 and that the verdict was justified by the evidence if the record is silent. But these presumptions are not conclusive. These presumptions are rebutted where the record shows that the court did not obtain jurisdiction because of the non-appearance, a failure to serve one of the parties, or for any other reason. Though in the case of inferior courts jurisdictional facts must appear of record, where they do so appear the court will be presumed to have properly acquired jurisdiction, and all subsequent proceedings will be presumptively regular.3 The rules governing the presumptions of the regularity of 1 Adams v. Main, 29 N. E. Rep. 792; 3 Ind. App. 232; Dunton v. Keel (Ala., 1892), 10 S. Rep. 333; Brown v. Lehigh, etc. Co., 40 Ill. App. 602; Kelly v. Kelley, 80 Wis. 490; Klink v. People, 16 Colo. 467; Crawford v. Neal, 144 U. S. 585; People v. Durfee, 62 Mich. 487; Pool v. Gramling, 88 Ga. 653; Richardson v. Eureka, 96 Cal. 443; Wilson v. Nelson, 40 Ill. App. 209. See § 367 et seq. 2 Ohio v. Sweeney, 43 La. Ann. 1073; Atchison, etc. Co. v. Howard, C. C. A. 229; Daly v. Wise, 132 N. Y. 306. 3 The correct view is not that the law presumes a record is always correct, but if on its face it is complete and regular, the party producing it is not compelled to prove it until its falsity is shown. Whart. on Ev., § 1302. 4 Gray v. Hawes, 8 Cal. 562; Murray v. Murray, 6 Oreg. 17; Baker v. Chapline, 12 Iowa, 204; Kilgour v. Gockley, 83 Ill. 109. The correctness of a return of personal service may be contradicted by parol. Zepp v. Hager, 70 Ill. 223. Lemert v. Shafer (Ind., 1893), 31 N. E. Rep. 1128; Church v. Crossman, 49 Iowa, 444; Brown v. Wood, 17 Mass. 68; Smith v. Engle, 44 Iowa, 265; Reeves v. Townsend, 2 Zab. (N. J.) 39. "Presumptions as to the judgments of superior courts only arise with respect to jurisdictional facts concerning which the record is silent. Presumptions are only indulged to supply the absence of evidence or averments respecting the facts presumed. They have no place for consideration when the evidence is disclosed or the averment is made. When, therefore, the record states the evidence or makes an averment with reference to a jurisdictional fact, it will be understood to speak the truth on that point; and it will not be presumed that there was other or different evidence or that the fact was otherwise than as averred. Were this not so it would never be possible to attack collaterally the judgment of a superior court, although a want of jurisdiction might be apparent upon its face. The answer to the attack would always be that notwithstanding the evidence or the averment the necessary facts to support the judgment are presumed. These presumptions are also limited to jurisdiction over persons within the territorial limits of the courts, who can be reached by their process, and also to proceedings which are in accordance with the course of the common law." Bank of United States v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 69, 70. judicial proceedings as above stated are subject to some limitations as respects superior courts exercising special statutory powers. Where the statutory or extraordinary judicial powers are to be exercised according to the usual common-law or chancery proceedings, the above prima facie presumptions of jurisdiction and of the conclusiveness of the judgment will obtain. When, however, judicial powers are to be exercised summarily or in a special manner not in conformity with the common law, no presumptions will be created, and the facts necessary to give jurisdiction must be shown by the record before a judgment or decree rendered in such statutory proceedings can be sustained.1 A person to whom a matter is submitted for arbitration must strictly confine himself in making his award within the limits of the submission, and if he shall exceed the authority delegated to him the award will be void. A presumption of law always exists that he has not exceeded his authority as arbitrator, and the burden of proof is upon the person seeking to set aside the award.2 If § 233. Presumptions of life, death and survivorship.— A man is presumed to be alive until his death is shown. a man is absent and is not heard from for seven years by those who would naturally have heard from him if he were alive, he will be presumed to be dead. A failure to hear 1 Haywood v. Collins, 60 Ill. 328; State v. Trounce (Wash., 1893), 32 Pac. Rep. 750; Harvey v. Tyler, 2 Wall. (U. S.) 328; Umbarger v. Chaboya, 49 Cal. 525; Gray v. Steamboat, 6 Wis. 59; Prentiss v. Parks, 65 Me 559; Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 350; Johnson v. Kettler, 84 Ill. 315; Thatcher v. Powell, 6 Wheat. 119; Clark v. Thompson, 47 Ill. 25; Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U. S. 274; Kansas, etc. Co. v. Campbell, 62 Mo. 585; Eaton v. Badger, 33 N. H. 228. 2 Hayes v. Foskoll, 31 Me. 112; Ebert v. Ebert, 5 Md. 353; Burns v. Hendrix, 54 Ala. 78; Byers v. Van Deusen, 5 Wend. 268; Richardson v. Huggins, 23 N. H. 106; Blair v. Wallace, 21 Cal. 317; Hubbard v. Firman, 29 Ill. 90; Hodges v. Hodges. 9 Mass. 320; Lamphire v. Cowan, 39 Vt. 420; Sheffield v. Clark, 73 Ga. 92. 3 In re Hall, 1 Wall, Jr. (U. S.) 85 ; Montgomery v. Beavans, 1 Sawy. (U. S.) 660; Watson v. Tyndall, 24 Ga. 494; Whitesides' Appeal, 23 Pa. St. 114; Bradley v. Bradley, 4 Wheat. 173; Eagle v. Emmett, 4 Brad. Sur. (N. Y.) 117; Stinchfield v. Emerson, 52 Me. 465; Brown v. Jewett, 18 N. H. 230; Com. v. Thompson, 11 Allen (Mass.), 25; Grey v. McDaniel, 6 Bush (Ky.), 480. 4 In re Miller, 9 N. Y. S. 639; Mathews v. Simmons, 49 Ark. 468; French v. McGinniss, 69 Tex. 129; Stockbridge v. Stockbridge, 145 Mass. 517; Badeau v. McKenny, 7 |