number on the ballot papers.-Walker v. Mure & Saunders, 15th May 1873. He may also mark the consecutive numbers on counterfoils to the ballot papers.-Fraser v. Hislop, 20th June 1876. The voter may mark the ballot paper with Roman numerals, but not with the written names of figures.-Petition, Lawrie, 13th April 1873; Corbet v. Macintyre. The voter may use both figures and crosses.-Hope v. Macintosh, 30th May 1873. The presiding officer may take a declaration of identity.-Hay v. Kippen, March 27, 1876. The fact of identification by a mark may be proved by an objector to a marked paper.-Petition, Cecil, 1st April 1876. Obviously accidental marks do not render voters invalid.— Lowson v. Keddie, 13th April 1876; Troup v. Walker, 9th May 1876. Assistance may be given to blind or illiterate voters.Wright v. Smeaton, 9th June 1876; Fraser v. Hislop, 20th June 1876. Rules for Election in Burghs. If a ballot paper is marked with a straight line instead of a cross, or on the left-hand side of the candidate's name, or with any substantial mark unconnected with the voting mark, the vote is bad.-Haswell v. Stewart, 23d May 1874; Robertson v. Adamson, 5th July 1876. If the voter writes the candidate's name, the vote is bad.Woodward v. Sarsons, 9th July 1875. The power of determination conferred by Sect. 9 upon the Board of Education is not confined to the case of a parishi in which there is a burgh or a part of a burgh. The Board must decide, not arbitrarily, but according to the Their determination is final, but they must hear all parties. Board v. S. 1877. The school board of a quoad sacra parish applied, in terms of LochgilpSect. 9, to the Board of Education to settle whether, under the head decreet of disjunction and erection, certain lands were within the School area of the quoad sacra parish, or of a civil parish from which Knapdale part of the quoad sacra parish had been disjoined. Before the School school board for that civil parish was elected, the Board of Educa- Board. tion determined that the lands were within the area of the quoad Jan. 30, sacra parish. On a special case, presented by the two school First boards to the First Division of the Court, it was argued that the Division. power of determination conferred on the Board of Education by Sect. 9 was limited by the first portion of the section to parishes in which there was a burgh, or part of a burgh; or, if it applied to all parishes, it was limited to the mere settlement of boundaries; that the determination was not valid, as no opportunity of appearing had been given to the civil parish; that the determination was wrong on the merits. The Court held-(1) that they could not review the determination on the merits; (2) that the power conferred by Sect. 9 extended to all parishes and burghs; but (3) that the determination was bad, as no opportunity of appearing was given to the civil parish. Lord President (Inglis) suggested that it was the intention of Sect. 9 that when legal questions like this arose, they should be sent by the Board of Education to the sheriff. His Renfrew Board v. Parish School Board. Nov. 15, 1877. Second lordship added: "It may be doubted whether it does not appear "on the face of this deliverance that the Board of Education failed "to apply their minds to the true question before them-viz., "whether, according to the just construction of the decree of dis"junction and erection, the farms belonged to the one parish or "the other, and proceeded to a division on some view of expediency or mero arbitrio." Lord Deas observed that it was the duty of the Board of Education to apply their minds to the terms of the decreet, to hear parties concerned, and to consider whether they would send it to the sheriff. They had no arbitrary power to take from one parish and add to another. [It is understood that the determination of the Board of Education was given in accordance with the decreet of disjunction, and with the fact that the children from the disputed area were in use to attend school in the quoad sacra parish, that school being the most convenient.] Where the municipal and parliamentary boundaries have been adopted under Sect. 9, and a police assessment is afterwards levied for the first time, the school board. desiring an alteration of area must apply to the Board of Education. In 1873, the Board of Education, in terms of Sect. 9, fixed the area of the burgh of Renfrew to be the parliamentary and municipal boundaries of the same, there being then no police assessment in the burgh, and indeed no municipal assessment, except a small rate levied within the parliamentary boundaries for the expenses of making up a roll for municipal elections, under 31 & 32 Vict. cap. 108. The elections of 1873 and 1876, and the collection of the school rate for the burgh school board, were accordingly confined to the area of the parliamentary boundaries. Before the elections Division. of 1876, however, the magistrates and town council of the burgh obtained from the sheriff, under a Local Police Act, a decree defining the area of the ancient royalty of the burgh as the area of chargeability for police assessments; and in April 1876 they imposed a small police assessment. The district included in the ancient royalty (the limits of which had not been previously ascertained), but beyond the parliamentary boundaries, yielded a rental of £7000; and many children came from this district to the burgh public schools. In an action raised in 1877 for declarator that the area of the burgh for educational purposes extended to the ancient royalty, or boundaries of police assessment, and for reduction of the minute of the Board of Education obtained in 1873, of which both landward and burgh authorities had full notice, it was held by the Second Division, confirming the judgment of Lord Young, that if the burgh school board had any relevant case for an alteration of area, they must, in the first place, apply to the Board of Education, whose determination on such matters is final. [Cf. Education (Scotland) Act, 1878, Sect. 30.] United Parishes. Sect. 10. Annexations, whether quoad omnia or quoad sacra, are parts of the parish to which they are annexed. "I am of opinion that, where a part of a parish has been an- Friock"nexed to another parish quoad omnia, the part so annexed must heim Case. "be considered to be a part of the parish to which it is annexed. "This result would follow independently of Sect. 10. There is SolicitorOpinion of more difficulty in the case of an annexation quoad sacra; but I General "am of opinion, with hesitation, that where a part of a parish has Ruther"been annexed quoad sacra to another parish, it must be con- furd Clark. "sidered to be part of the parish to which it is annexed. It "seems to have been the policy of the Legislature to give to unions "quoad sacra the same effect as to unions quoad omnia; so that, "where parts of two parishes are united quoad sacra, they are "deemed one parish. I think the 10th section may be fairly con"strued to include the case of the union of a part of a parish with "another." II. ELECTION OF SCHOOL BOARDS AND MANAGEMENT. SECTIONS 3, 4, 5, 8, 12-22, 48, 52, 57, 58, 67, 70. Members. ELECTION OF SCHOOL BOARDS. Sect. 12. An inspector of the poor cannot act as a member of the school board, as a manager under Sect. 22, or as an officer sion. Division. This was an application by an inspector of the poor, who had Clark v. been elected member of a school board, for interdict against the Board of Board of Supervision dismissing him from his office in virtue of the Supervi powers conferred by Sect. 56 of 8 & 9 Vict. cap. 83, The Poor-Law Dec. 10, Amendment Act. The Board of Supervision had announced by 1873. general minute that it was in their opinion inexpedient that in- Second spectors should act under the Education Act in any of the ways specified, such union of office being incompatible with the due and independent discharge of the duties of inspectorship. They now pleaded that it had been their practice from 1845 to prohibit inspectors from holding offices the duties of which it seemed likely would conflict with those of inspectorship, as in the case of procurator-fiscal, governor of poorhouse, ground-officer on local estate, &c. It was held by the Second Division, affirming the judgment of Lord Shand, that the Board of Supervision having formed an opinion on the subject in accordance with their usual practice, this was final, and the Court could not review it on the merits. Edinburgh 1873. General furd Clark. Electors. Who are, and who are not, entitled to vote? The following classes of persons are entitled to vote in clections of school boards, if their names be entered in the valuation roll (1) Joint owners and joint occupants [where the value is Opinion of sufficient for all], though the interest of each is not entered, the Solicitor- interests being presumed equal; (2) Spinsters whose Christian names are not entered, the question being one of identity; (3) Husbands, entered as joint owners or joint occupants along with wives, if the annual value be not less that £8; (4) Persons having the requisite qualifications, though made up from several subjects separately entered. The following are not entitled to vote: (1) Corporations and joint-stock companies; (2) Mercantile and other firms; (3) Trustees, tutors, curators, judicial factors, and agents or factors, as such; (4) Tenants not being occupants; (5) Lodgers; (6) Undischarged bankrupts; (7) Persons entered as owners [or occupants] in right of their wives; (8) Married women, entered as owners or occupants, because they are under the curatory of their husbands. Lochwin Renfrew. Married women are not legally incapable of voting. In Ramsay v. Craig, Sheriff-Substitute Cowan said: "As to the noch Case. "votes tendered of married women, the general principles of law July 1876. " and the opinions of our institutional writers are against married Sheriff of 6 women having a right to vote. They are under the curatory of "their husbands, their persons sunk in his; and being under his "coverture during the subsistence of the marriage, they cannot "exercise legal rights otherwise competent to them. Instances "have occurred of their acting as members of a school board; but "that is an office of public trust to which, by the voice of the public and with the consent of their husbands, they have been "called; and married women obtaining such consent, expressly "or tacitly, have always been sustained in the office of trustee." On appeal, Sheriff Fraser reversed this judgment, holding that married women entered as owners are not subject to any legal incapacity to vote. The learned Sheriff points out that the exclusion of women from the parliamentary franchise was based on consuetudinary law; whereas under the Education Act women have been allowed by universal consent to vote in school-board elections and to be elected members of school boards. The numerous disabilities which the law puts on married women with reference to property, &c., do not imply that such women cannot exercise a public function, as voting under or administering the Education Act. A married woman is not under curatory in the sense in which a minor is. She may act as a testamentary trustee, a factor loco tutoris, or as the commissioner, agent, or factor of her husband. [In R. v. Harrald, L. R. 7 Q. B. 361, it was held that Sect. 9 of 32 & 33 Vict. c. 55, which confers the municipal fran |