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MR. BALDWIN1

BY LORD BEAVERBROOK

So long as Bonar Law remained Prime Minister the Daily Express gave his Government unswerving support. This was not merely the result of personal friendship between Fleet Street and Downing Street, for this record has shown that I often disagreed with and opposed my greatest friend. The fact was that I agreed completely with what was in Bonar Law's mind at that period. His fundamental idea that internal peace and a freedom from external strife could alone heal the wounds of - arrived war was my own conviction at by different methods. I was in sympathy with his refusal to be rushed by the banking and moneyed interests into an attempt to force down wages and precipitate industrial warfare at home by an unnatural attempt to drive sterling up to the parity with the dollar.

It is true that the Daily Express fought the Ministry on the question of the settlement of the Anglo-American Debt in the spring of 1923. But we were not attacking Bonar Law, nor indeed the Cabinet as a whole. The Premier disliked the settlement as much as any man in England. And so, I may add, did Mr. Reginald McKenna. The agreement was the work of Mr. Baldwin and of no one else.

The story of the American Debt is quite a simple one. The European Allies owed us more money than we owed America. The solution, therefore, was an all-round settlement in — which, whatever its character, we must

1 From Politicians and the Press, by Lord Beaverbrook. London: Hutchinson, 1925

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Exchequer when the Bonar Law Ministry was formed, and his mission and instructions on going to America were exactly the same as Sir Robert's.

Bonar Law was from start to finish vehemently opposed to a separate Anglo-American settlement. On December 14, 1922, he had said in the House of Commons: 'I am convinced that to make this payment without receiving anything from outside sources would reduce the standard of living in this country for a generation.' In an interview he remarked: 'If I sign the terms suggested at Washington, I shall be the most cursed man in England.'

Suddenly a perturbed Premier and Cabinet discovered that Mr. Baldwin, fallen under potent American influences, was trying to do exactly what he had been told not to do

that is, to arrange the terms of a separate settlement between the British Empire and the United States. In fact he had got the American offer in black and white. He either hurried home with this or was hurried home-I am not quite sure which. At dinner in his company, at the house of one of his supporters, later in the year, no direct reference to the American Debt Settlement passed between us; but one of his entourage remarked to me that they had to hurry home because they learned they were being betrayed in England - presumably a reference to my consistent opposition to any direct deal with America. Anyhow, Mr. Baldwin landed at Southampton in the last week of January 1923, and, without consulting his colleagues or chief, published the American terms to the press interviewers and announced that in his opinion they were the best that could be got! It seems to me that the betrayed person was not Mr. Baldwin, but Bonar Law and the Cabinet, for after this the only choice was between the break-up of the Government and the acceptance of the

American terms. Bonar Law wanted passionately to resign rather than set his hand to the document, and he was only restrained with the greatest difficulty by the arguments of his friends and his sense of duty to the country. Mr. Baldwin is believed to have said subsequently that 'he would rather have bitten his tongue off' than made his statement before a meeting of the Cabinet had taken place. I accept that as an absolutely honest and truthful statement. But the mischief was done.

The Daily Express, the moment the interview was published, came out with its first attack on Mr. Baldwin and a protest against the proposed funding settlement.

But the truth was that the Daily Express was given no time to rouse public sentiment against the imposition of this one-sided and terrible burden.

I may add, for the benefit of those British statesmen and publicists who care to make any study of American psychology, before entering into dealings with the diplomatists and business men of the United States, that my vigorous attack on the American Debt Settlement was in no way resented across the Atlantic.

Since this was the first disagreement between Mr. Baldwin and myself, it will be convenient to deal here with the theory that the whole of my political action in recent years has been based

on

some obscure and inexplicable vendetta against Mr. Baldwin. To begin with, it is not true; and, in the second place, it can be refuted by patent facts. As a matter of fact I recommended Mr. Baldwin to Bonar Law as his Parliamentary Secretary- the first step in his upward career. I admit I did not foresee in any way the remarkable talents he was going to develop. He seemed simply a sound, steady man who could be absolutely depended upon

by his Parliamentary chief. In the Carlton Club battle we had been on the same side, if for slightly different reasons. My views on the American Debt had been formed and expressed long before there appeared to be the remotest chance of Mr. Baldwin being Chancellor of the Exchequer. Had the Coalition Ministry lasted longer, and Sir Robert Horne acted in the same manner as his Conservative successor, I should have assailed him in exactly the same way.

If there was any chance for a vendetta policy, it would have been when the late Lord Curzon and Mr. Baldwin seemed to possess equally balanced claims for the Premiership. As the next chapter relates, the Daily Express sup-. ported Mr. Baldwin. I came into no conflict with Mr. Baldwin whatever during his first tenure of the office of Premier, until he suddenly decided to end it by the Protection Election, and struck Imperial Preference out of the Conservative programme. Here again my views in favor of Preference had been proclaimed for years. In the General Election of 1924 the Daily Express fought hard for the Conservative Party with Mr. Baldwin as its leader. On the Budget issue I was fighting Mr. Churchill.

So that the 'vendetta' accusation resolves itself into this that in the

last three years I have frequently supported Mr. Baldwin both personally and politically, and have twice opposed him in public issues on which my views were well known long before Mr. Baldwin was in the least likely to have to take any decision, adverse or otherwise, on them.

It is, of course, impossible to avoid a reference to the celebrated 'interview' episode. I refer to it unwillingly. I met Mr. Baldwin afterward at his request and accepted completely his repudiation of the words placed in his mouth with reference to myself. In fact they were, on the face of them, incredible and absurd.

I saw Mr. Baldwin more than once after Bonar Law's resignation, and was able in fact to inform him of Bonar Law's intention on certain matters had he remained Premier. This was after Bonar Law had become too ill to talk politics. In dismissing as false the theory that I have any vendetta against Mr. Baldwin, I equally repudiate the suggestion, made in the famous interview, that Mr. Baldwin has any vendetta against me.

The plain fact is that I believe the Prime Minister to be a man of the utmost honesty of intention, but I am compelled by experience to think that he frequently errs in his judg

ment.

TROUBLE IN MUKDEN1

BY PAUL SCHEFFER

[THIS article was written shortly before General Kuo Sung-lin was defeated, captured, and executed by his former chief, Chang Tso-lin.]

AT Peking everything depended upon that great procrastinator, Feng Yuhsiang, whom everybody calls the Christian General. At Tientsin, nearer Manchuria, which was crowded with refugee adherents of Chang Tso-lin, the picture began to change. We were evidently approaching a fighting-zone. In fact, skirmishes had already been fought between the advancing troops of General Kuo, the revolting subordinate of General Chang Tso-lin, and those of his former commander. I noticed, too, that the foreigners here were betting on Chang.

Railway traffic from Tientsin to Mukden is suspended. Everything is in possession of the troops. Consequently I had to take a cranky little boat directly to Dairen - a miserable trip. Here the Japanese are running things. No extraterritoriality conference will drive them out. It is a relief to get here. Dairen was Japan's compensation for capturing Port Arthur. Her South Manchurian Railway Company, an imposing enterprise, is the net that the Island Empire has thrown over the mainland. Chang himself is more or less in its meshes.

The officials, when they examine my passport, inquire courteously whither I am bound. The Japanese are the film

1 From Berliner Tageblatt (Liberal daily), December 29

of oil over the waters of Mukden into which I wish to plunge. I am told that Chang was expected in Dairen yesterday. Kuo Sung-lin had won a victory halfway between Tientsin and Mukden

- Chinese strategy. The division that a few days ago deserted from Kuo to Chang went back to Kuo. Now it is reported that Chang will not come to Dairen after all. He is planning his defense farther upcountry. In the evening the luxurious express train leaves on schedule time for Mukden. It is more than luxurious - it is hyperAmerican.

The foreign quarter in Mukden Japanese and international - covers several square miles. It has a Russian spaciousness. But the old Manchu town is a dense cluster of buildings like a mediæval city. The Chinese veneer grows thinner, and rude, barbaric Manchu frontiersmen emerge from the picture. In fact, however, these husky fellows are under the slender, sensitive thumbs of the Chinese. The Japanese also will be there some day, as well as any other aliens who court too close contact with these marvelous people.

Beyond the town lies the arsenal. I ride for a couple of miles along a new, well-constructed wall built by Chang. The moment it is dark every shop closes. The deserted, unlighted streets have an atmosphere of foreboding. Everyone dreads bad news from the front, and a mob of defeated, mutinous, plundering soldiers sacking the city.

Only in Chang's yamen is there light and life. It is the centre of the city, and of a province twice as large as Germany the residence of the most absolute ruler China has seen for centuries. But he is slipping, and no one knows whether he will recover his footing. The inner history of the catastrophe is a secret that even the best informed do not profess to penetrate.

So I can only infer what has happened from externals, although personal factors are doubtless more important as well as more interesting. At the time Kuo deserted him, Chang's cause was looking up after its recent setback near Shanghai. General Sun had halted to reorganize his battalions and to drive back the Canton troops that were harrying him in the rear. Shantung and Chihli still seemed to be loyal. Feng Yu-hsiang was the only uncertain factor, and he had refused battle.

Chang saw that he must throw out ballast. He surrendered the Hankow district to Feng, whom he had hitherto kept isolated from the Yangtze as well as from the sea, thus cutting the Christian General off from communication with any foreign power but Russia. In fact, the two commanders even organized some sort of joint-staff office at Peking. But it lasted only three days. Then it was not abolished - it simply changed its name, in true Chinese fashion. For Kuo had deserted Chang with eighty thousand of his best soldiers, almost all of his famous artillery, and a large share of the equipment that had come out of his famous arsenal. Chang was left with one hundred and twenty thousand men, poorly equipped and unready for battle; but he had ample ammunition, which Kuo sadly lacked.

Kuo's desertion was first and foremost a personal matter, and a tragedy. Chang's son, twenty-seven years old and popularly called the 'Crown

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his own blood and kin. The young man had a care-free good time at Tientsin. He was shown great attention by Chinese and foreigners, often in the unbecoming ways that he particularly liked.

One day Chang Tso-lin's telephone messages to Kuo were not answered. A few hours later this was explained. Kuo's first demand was that Yang Huting be removed from his position, but almost immediately he announced that he was about to march on Mukden. The 'Crown Prince' was in the latter city. He and Kuo were equally enemies of Yang Hu-ting; for did not that officer have the whole technical department in his control, including the arsenal and all that went with it? Was n't he enjoying the huge squeeze that such a post ordinarily yields a man in China? Kuo, to be sure, had control of certain banks, but not of the heart of the whole organization. Besides, Yang was Chief of the General Staff, a post that the 'Crown Prince' coveted.

Chang Tso-lin has a quick temper. His son was at least implicated in Kuo's plot. He was conversant with all that Kuo was doing. He had taken part in it, and he had not warned his father. The old man threatened his son with a court-martial unless he brought Kuo back to Mukden. But the young man returned from his mission merely with the message that Kuo had deserted and was marching against his former

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