voured by the wind, or which, when his attempt at invasion was ascertained by the British, had made the greatest progress towards the coasts of Sicily. Another corps had embarked at Rezzio, and had already reached the shore before the larger division was descried stretching across the channel. Such judicious and effectual arrangements had been made by sir John Stuart, that reinforcements were held in reserve ready to move with the utmost celerity, according to circumstances, and to sustain the posts at the invaded point at the first moment of alarm. These reinforcements were already in motion, when information was brought that the vigilance and courage of the troops stationed at the extremity of the British defences had' rendered their presence and assistance unnecessary. Major-general Campbell, who commanded in this part of the island, was informed about four o'clock in the morning of the 18th of September, that 40 of the enemy's large boats were disembarking troops between St. Stephano and Galati. He immediately repaired to the spot. The enemy by this time occupied the whole of the rising ground in the immediate vicinity of the place where they landed. No time was to be lost. Lieutenant-colonel Fischer with the second light infantry hung upon his rear and left, and threatened him in such a serious manner, that he already began to hesitate whether he should continue to occupy the heights. Major-general Campbell perceived and took advantage of this hesitation, by directing the 21st regiment, with two six-pounders, to advance: such of the enemy's troops as had not reached the heights immediately retreated in a most rapid and disgraceful manner, leaving those who had reached them to their fate. The whole of this portion of the invading army consisted of about 3,500 men; of which, one of the Corsican battalions with a stand of colours, a major of division, a lieutenant-colonel commandant, forty inferior officers, and upward of 800 soldiers, surrendered prisoners of war at discretion. Thus terminated the long threatened attempt to invade Sicily, in a manner by no means honourable to the Italian soldiers of Murat, or flattering to the wishes which he must entertain of acquiring the title of king of the Two Sicilies. It is but justice to the Sicilian peasantry to subjoin what sir John Stuart says respecting their beha viour on this occasion. "The zeal, the warmth exemplified by the neighbouring peasantry on our behalf, and which were not manifested without a loss, and the judgement as well as alacrity with which I have since learned that those in remoter districts made immediate dispositions to obstruct the progress of the enemy in their possible attempt to penetrate into the country, were far beyond what could have been hoped or expected from their peaceful habits; and so strongly was their animosity marked to wards their invaders, that the interposition of our escorts was fre quently necessary to protect our prisoners from their fury in conducting them, after their surrender, to the citadel of Messina." There are few subjects in history so involved and intricate as the dispute between this country and America. It has existed upwards of three years; and at present there is almost as little probability as ever there was of its terminating either in actual hostility or in an amicable U 2 arrangement. arrangement. In this "war of words," the subjects of dispute, though important, present so little that is grand or interesting, and the manner in which it has hitherto been conducted displays so much more prolixity than clearness, so much more industry and minuteness than talent; and on the side of the Americans, so much more of paltry subtlety than of manly defence of what they deem to be their right; that the summary of its leading points will be amply sufficient both for the instruction and the patience of our readers. It may at first sight appear strange that the Americans, the descendants of Englishmen, speaking the same language, and having nearly the same manners, habits, and code of laws, should be so much more amicably disposed towards France than towards this country. This sur prise will be rather heightened than diminished when we reflect on the grand and leading feature in the American character,-a regard to their own interest more strict, selfish, and narrow, and less tied down or kept in check or in awe by principles of honour, than ever distinguished any other commercial people. That such a nation should quarrel with those who not only are their best customers, but who have it most in their power to benefit or injure them, will be matter of wonder till the causes are laid open. These are many, and some of them very powerful. The war in which they were engaged against this country, and which accomplished their independence, still rankles in their hearts; and while the remembrance of it turns the affections of many aside from this country, it naturally attaches them to France. In the second place, "merica has suffered from the war now carrying on betwixt Great Britain and France. The latter power has certainly shown no greater regard to the interests or property of America, when they interfered with her views, than Great Britain is accused of having done; but the latter power, from her maritime superiority, can carry her threats into more effectual execution; and the American government, which is as much swayed by popular feelings and prejudice as the vulgar of most other countries, is not capable, or does not choose to distinguish between the desire and the power to injure. Because Bonaparte cannot carry his threats and decrees into perfect and regular execution, and we can, the American government and people give him credit for an amicable regard to their independence and interests, which they totally deny to us. Another cause for the partiality manifested by the Americans towards the French, may be traced in the very nature of their government. In America, the mob,-not the respectable and well-informed part of the people, but those who are constantly under the dominion of intrigue, and at the disposal of whoever will lower himself to gain their applause and support,-give the tone to the government. They are omnipotent: if their wishes, however extravagant, are not complied with, they change the majori ty in their house of representatives: their influence and what they are capable of effecting are known, and the leading men in order to keep their places pay their court to the populace. But the populace in their turn are at the disposal of every intriguer; and there can be little or no doubt that Bonaparte knows how to make use of the powerful engine of an American popu lace lace to work upon the American government. At the same time it must be acknowledged that many acts of Britain have given them plausible grounds for complaint. The affair of the Chesapeak; the right which we claim of searching their ships, and taking from them what the captains of our men of war may deem British seamen : our orders in council, which compelled all American vessels, previously to trading with the continent, to visit a British port and pay a transit duty: all these causes tended to exasperate the American government and people. It is probable too, that with the common but strange blindness which generally accompanies too great an eagerness after wealth, they envied Britain her commerce: not reflecting, that in proportion to our wealth was our ability to purchase what they had to sell, and to sell what they needed at the cheapest rate. They envied us our commerce, partly perhaps because it is one of the supports of our maritime greatness; and yet they must be strangely blind, if they are not convinced that the day of America's subjugation will not be far distant when the flag of Britain shall be struck to the flag of France. They rail at us because we occasionally capture some of their vessels, or press some of their seamen : for these petty outrages they would quarrel with us; they would perceive with pleasure our maritime superiority at an end, and France occupying our place on the ocean; as if in that case their complaints would be confined to their present grievances, or the shores of the new world would be long untrodden and unconquered by a French army. Such is the relative disposition and feeling of the American government towards Great Britain, and France, that the same action, as it is performed by the one or the other country, is regarded as a venial or a heinous offence. In our last volume we briefly and cursorily adverted to the complaints which the American government brought forward against our minister Mr. Jackson. The language and tone of his diplomatic and official communications might not perhaps be perfectly consistent with that dig. nified decorum and forbearance which ministers and ambassadors preserve even in their most hostile correspondence. But, if that were any excuse, the American diplomatists were not more temperate in their language or more amicable in their tone. When, however, America took such offence at the behaviour of Mr. Jackson, as almost to interdict him, by an act of their legislature, the common rights of hospitality, they assuredly forgot what indignities they had endured with calm and patient silence from more than one ambassador of France. The allegations against Mr. Jackson were loudly proclaimed by the French party in America; and they served as an additional pretext to the government to lengthen out and entangle the disputes between the two countries. Mr. Jackson was recalled; but the Americans were angry,' first, because he was not repri manded by his own court, and then because we did not immediately send out another ambassador of equal rank. The American government were not indeed disposed to proceed to extremities: they thought they could bring Great Britain to their own terms without having recourse to the hazardous experiment of making U 3 making war against her. A nonintercourse act was passed; but the consequences were more injurious 'to America than to Britain: in some respects they were indeed beneficial to both countries: America having cut herself off from our manufactures, turned her attention and part of her capital to the establishment of the most simple and necessary within her own dominions: and Britain, no longer able to supply her West India islands with provisions and lumber from the United States, had recourse to her own settlements in the new world, where in Canada and Nova Scotia she found every thing that her islands needed. Bonaparte, always watchful to profit by any circumstance that could widen the breach between this country and America, and who sacrificed or yielded little or nothing when he revoked decrees he seldom could act upon, took advantage of the fresh cause of dispute between the two countries. The American government had declared that their defensive and retaliative measure (as they were pleased to term the non-intercourse act) should cease with regard to that nation which should rescind its decrees, while it should continue in force and operation against the other; that it should cease with respect to France whenever the Berlin and Milan decrees were repealed; and with respect to Great Britain, whenever the orders in council should be revoked. In the beginning of August, Bonaparte announced that "the decrees of Berlin and Milan were revoked (with respect to America), and that from the first of November they should cease to be in force; it being understood that in consequence of this declaration the English shall revoke their orders in council, and renounce the new principles, of blockade which they have attempted to establish:" or that the United 'States shall cause their rights to be respected by the English. the very ambiguity and provisional It might have been expected that nature of this declaration, independently of the notorious character of the government from which it issued for chicanery and subterfuge, would have induced the president of the American states (with whom the power of repealing the nonintercourse act was vested) to hesitate and delay acting upon it. Had it proceeded from the English been discovered and remarked, that cabinet, it doubtless would have a remote time was fixed for the ac tual cessation of the operation of the Berlin and Milan decrees; and that when they really ceased to operate, it would be abundantly soon enough to revoke the retaliative measures of America. Besides, the resolution of Bonaparte declares that he expects America will cause her rights to be respectonly revoke their orders in council, ed by the English, unless they not but also renounce the new principles of blockade which they have attempted to establish. But America had declared that the repeal of the non-intercourse act depended solely, with respect to Great Britain, council. Could not the American on the revocation of the orders in president then have discovered, that the decrees of Bonaparte would not actually cease against American vessels unless to operate America continued her non-intercourse act against Britain, even after the revocation of the orders in council; and that the efficient repeal of them depended on the very ambiguous and sweeping condition required required of Britain, "that she should renounce the new principles of blockade which she had attempted to establish?" The president, however, as soon as Bonaparte's declaration of his intentions to revoke the Berlin and Milan decrees reached America, officially announced, "that the restrictions imposed by the act of the 1st of May should be discontinued as relative tó France and her dependencies;" that is, so much of this act for the interdiction of armed vessels as related to France, was officially repealed. Immediately the Americans, trusting implicitly to Bonaparte's revocation of the Berlin and Milan decrees, so far as regarded them, re-commenced their commerce with France. Several of their vessels were captured by our ships, as violating the orders in council; and most of those which reached their destined ports in safety were detained by the French government under various pretexts; either because their cargoes were suspected of being British, or because they had strictly and regularly complied with the regulations which Bonaparte had established for the admission of American cargoes. As soon as Mr. Pinckney, the American ambassador here, was informed of the detention of the American vessels under our orders in council, he remonstrated strongly against the measure; alleging, that as the Berlin and Milan decrees were recalled by Bonaparte, we ought, consistently with the avowed cause and object of our orders in council, and with our repeated declarations and promises since they were issued, to revoke them. There can be no doubt that we are bound to revoke our orders in council whenever Bonaparte shall actually have recalled his decrees. Our orders in council were had recourse to solely for the purpose of retaliation, and of protecting our-selves against the violent and unjustifiable measures of the enemy. But we must ascertain that Bonaparte has blotted his decrees not merely from his statute book, but also from his practice, before it. would be either safe or proper for us to rescind our orders in council. The fact must be notorious that American vessels have free and unmolested ingress to the ports of the continent under the power of Bona. parte, even though they have touched in the British dominions, before we are bound to alter our maritime code; and then we are bound to alter it only so far as regards the operation of our orders in council; there is, and can be no obligation on us to renounce the new principles of blockade (as Bonaparte thinks proper to name them) which we have attempted to establish.Bonaparte, however, has served his own purpose by this ambiguous and conditional revocation of the Berlin and Milan decrees: he has rendered the dispute between this country and America more involved and intricate; he has afford, ed her government an additional pretext for charging us with a breach of faith, and with a desire to establish a maritime tyranny.But after all, the dispute will probably not terminate in war: the policy and the interest of America, even according to their narrow and short-sighted views on these points, will prevent her from going to war with a nation who could easily seal the ruin of her commerce and shipping, and to an intercourse with whom she has been mainly indebt. ed for her prosperity and wealth. Since Bonaparte gained the suU 4 preme |