curate. It is as much the duty of the Government as of individuals to fulfill its obligations. Before the establishment of the Court of Claims claimants could only be heard by Congress. That court was established in 1855 (10 Stat. at L., 612), for the triple purpose of relieving Congress, and of protecting the Government by reg. ular investigation, and of benefiting the claim ants by affording them a certain mode of examining and adjudicating upon their claims. It was required to hear and determine upon claims founded upon any law of Congress, or upon any regulation of an executive department, or upon any contract, express or implied, with the Gov ernment of the United States. 10 Stat. at L., 612. Originally it was a court merely in name, for its power extended only to the preparation of bills to be submitted to Congress. In 1863 the number of judges was increased from three to five, its jurisdiction was enlarged and, instead of being required to prepare bills for Congress, it was authorized to render final judgment, subject to appeal to this court and to an estimate by the Secretary of the Treasury of the amount required to pay each claimant. 12 Stat. at L., 765. This court being of opin ion that the provisions for an estimate was in consistent with the finality essential to judicial decisions, Congress repealed that provision. Gordon v. U. S., 2 Wall., 561 [69 U. S., XVII., 92]. 14 Stat. at L., 9. Since then the Court of Claims has exercised all the functions of a court, and this court has taken full jurisdiction on appeal. 14 Stat. at L., 44. The Court of Claims is thus constituted one of those inferior courts which Congress authorizes, and has jurisdiction of contracts between the Government and the citizen, from which appeal regularly lies to this court. that court and on appeal, of the Act recited; and on proof of pardon or acceptance, summarily made on motion or otherwise, the jurisdiction of the court shall cease and the suit shall be forthwith dismissed. It is evident from this statement that the denial of jurisdiction to this court, as well as to the Court of Claims, is founded solely on the application of a rule of decision, in causes pending prescribed by Congress. The court has jurisdiction of the cause to a given point; but when it ascertains that a certain state of things exists, its jurisdiction is to cease and it is required to dismiss the cause for want of jurisdiction. It seems to us that this is not an exercise of the acknowledged power of Congress to make exceptions and prescribe regulations to the appellate power. The court is required to ascertain the existence of certain facts and thereupon to declare that its jurisdiction on appeal has ceased, by dismissing the bill. What is this but to prescribe a rule for the decision of a cause in a particular way? In the case before us, the Court of Claims has rendered judgment for the claimant and an appeal has been taken to this court. We are directed to dismiss the appeal, if we find that the judgment must be affirmed, because of a pardon granted to the intestate of the claimants. Can we do so without allowing one party to the controversy to decide it in its own favor? Can we do so without allowing that the Legislature may prescribe rules of decision to the Judicial Department of the Government in cases pending before it? We think not; and thus thinking, we do not at all question what was decided in the case of Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge Company, 18 How., 429 [59 U. S., XV., 436]. In that case, after a decree in this court that the bridge, in the then state of the law, was a nuisance and must be abated as such, Congress passed an Act legalizing the structure and making it a post-road; and the court, on a motion for process to enforce the decree, held that the bridge had ceased to be a nuisance by the exercise of the constitu Undoubtedly, the Legislature has complete control over the organization and existence of that court and may confer or withhold the right of appeal from its decisions. And if this Act did nothing more, it would be our duty to give it effect. If it simply denied the right of appeal in a particular class of cases, there could be no doubt that it must be regarded as an exercise of the power of Congress to make "such exceptional powers of Congress, and denied the motions from the appellate jurisdiction" as should seem to it expedient. But the language of the proviso shows plainly that it does not intend to withhold appellate jurisdiction except as a means to an end. Its great and controlling purpose is to deny to par dons granted by the President the effect which this court had adjudged them to have. The proviso declares that pardons shall not be consid ered by this court on appeal. We had already decided that it was our duty to consider them and give them effect, in cases like the present, as equivalent to proof of loyalty. It provides that, whenever it shall appear that any judgment of the Court of Claims shall have been founded on such pardons, without other proof of loyalty, the Supreme Court shall have no further jurisdiction of the case and shall dismiss the same for want of jurisdiction. The proviso further declares that every pardon granted to any suitor in the Court of Claims and reciting that the person pardoned has been guilty of any act of rebellion or disloyalty, shall, if accepted in writing without disclaimer of the fact recited, be taken as conclusive evidence in tion. No arbitrary rule of decision was prescribed in that case, but the court was left to apply its ordinary rules to the new circumstances created by the Act. In the case before us no new circumstances have been created by legis lation. But the court is forbidden to give the effect to evidence which, in its own judgment, such evidence should have, and is directed to give it an effect precisely contrary. We must think that Congress has inadvertently passed the limit which separates the legis lative from the judicial power. It is of vital importance that these powers be kept distinct. The Constitution provides that the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and such inferior courts as the Congress shall from time to time ordain and establish. The same instrument, in the last clause of the same article, provides that in all cases other than those of original jurisdiction "the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress shall make." Congress has already provided that the Su The rule prescribed is also liable to just exception as impairing the effect of a pardon, and thus infringing the constitutional power of the Executive. preme Court shall have jurisdiction of the judgers should be construed, by seeking the inten ments of the Court of Claims on appeal. Can it tion of its framers, and the intention to restore prescribe a rule in conformity with which the the proceeds of such property to the loyal citicourt must deny to itself the jurisdiction thus zen, and to transfer it absolutely to the Governconferred, because and only because its decis- ment in the case of those who had given active ion, in accordance with settled law, must be support to the rebellion, is to me too apparent adverse to the Government and favorable to the to be disregarded. In the one case the Governsuitor? This question seems to us to answer it- ment is converted into a trustee for the former self. owner; in the other it appropriates it to its own use as the property of a public enemy captured in war. Can it be inferred from anything found in the statute that Congress intended that this property should ever be restored to the disloyal? I am unable to discern any such intent. But if it did, why was not some provision made by which the title of the Government could at some time be made perfect, or that of the owner established? Some judicial proceeding for confiscation would seem to be necessary if there remains in the disloyal owner any right or interest whatever. But there is no such provision, and unless the Act intended to forfeit absolutely the right of the disloyal owner, the proceeds remain in a condition where the owner cannot maintain a suit for its recovery, and the United States can obtain no perfect title to it. It is the intention of the Constitution that each of the great co ordinate departments of the Government-the Legislative, the Execu| tive and the Judicial-shall be, in its sphere, independent of the others. To the Executive alone is intrusted the power of pardon; and it is granted without limit. Pardon includes amnesty. It blots out the offense pardoned and removes all its penal consequences. It may be granted on conditions. In these particular pardons, that no doubt might exist as to their character, restoration of property was expressly pledged; and the pardon was granted on condition that the person who availed himself of it should take and keep a prescribed oath. Now, it is clear that the Legislature cannot change the effect of such a pardon any more than the Executive can change a law. Yet this is attempted by the provision under consideration. The court is required to receive special pardons as evidence of guilt, and to treat them as null and void. It is required to disregard pardons granted by proclamation on condition, though the condition has been fulfilled, and to deny them their legal effect. This certainly impairs the executive authority, and directs the court to be instrumental to that end. We think it unnecessary to enlarge. The simplest statement is the best. We repeat that it is impossible to believe that this provision was not inserted in the appropriation bill through inadvertence; and that we shall not best fulfill the deliberate will of the Legislature by denying the motion to demiss and affirming the judgment of the Court of Claims; which is accordingly done. Mr. Justice Miller, dissenting: I cannot agree to the opinion of the court just delivered in an important matter; and I regret this the more because I do agree to the proposition that the proviso to the Act of July 12, 1870, is unconstitutional, so far as it at tempts to prescribe to the judiciary the effect to be given to an act of pardon or amnesty by the President. This power of pardon is confided to the President by the Constitution, and whatever may be its extent or its limits, the legislative branch of the Government cannot impair its force or effect in a judicial proceed ing in a constitutional court. But I have not been able to bring my mind to concur in the proposition that, under the Act concerning captured and abandoned property, there remains in the former owner, who had given aid and comfort to the rebellion, any interest what ever in the property or its proceeds when it had been sold and paid into the Treasury or had been converted to the use of the public under that Act. I must construe this Act, as all oth This statute has recently received the attentive consideration of the court in two reported cases. In the case of The U. S. v. Anderson, 9 Wall., 65 [76 U. S., XIX., 617], in reference to the relation of the Government to the money paid into the Treasury under this Act, and the difference between the property of the loyal and disloyal owner, the court uses language hardly consistent with the opinion just read. It says that Congress, in a spirit of liberality. constituted the Government a trustee for so much of this property as belonged to the faithful Southern people, and while it directed that all of it should be sold and its proceeds paid into the Treasury, gave to this class of persons an opportunity to establish their right to the proceeds. Again, it is said, that the measure, in itself of great beneficence, was practically important only in its application to the loyal Southern people, and sympathy for their situation, doubtless, prompted Congress to pass it." These views had the unanimous concurrence of the court. If I understand the present opinion, however, it maintains that the Government, in taking possession of this property and selling it, became the trustee of all the former owners, whether loyal or disloyal, and holds it for the latter until pardoned by the President, or until Congress orders it to be restored to him. The other case which I refer to is that of United States v. Padelford, 9 Wall., 531 [76 U. S., XIX., 788]. In that case the opinion makes a labored and successful effort to show that Padelford, the owner of the property, had secured the benefit of the amnesty Proclamation before the property was seized under the same statute we are now considering. And it bases the right of Padelford to recover its proceeds in the Treasury on the fact that before the capture his status as a loyal citizen had been restored, and with it all his rights of property, although he had previously given aid and comfort to the rebellion. In this view I concurred with all my brethren. And I hold 1571. BOYDEN V. U. S. 602, 603; 17-25 B. Allen and Duncan Ferguson, as citizens of the State of Illinois. The second bill describes the plaintiff as a MASON V. ROLLINS, ETC. now that as long as the possession or title of property remains in the party, the pardon or the amnesty remits all right in the Government to forfeit or confiscate it. But where the prop-citizen of the State of Illinois and the defenderty has already been seized and sold, and the ants, S. S. Mann, William B. Allen and Dunproceeds paid into the Treasury, and it is clear can Ferguson, as citizens of the State of Illithat the statute contemplates no further pro- nois; and the defendant, Columbus Delano, as ceeding as necessary to devest the right of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, without former owner, the pardon does not and cannot averring that he be a citizen of any State. restore that which has thus completely passed away. And if such was not the view of the court when Padelford's case was under consideration, I am at a loss to discover a reason for the extended argument in that case, in the opinion of the court, to show that he had availed himself of the amnesty before the seizure of the property. If the views now ad vanced are sound, it was wholly immaterial whether Padelford was pardoned before or after the seizure. The third bill describes the plaintiff as a citizen of the State of Illinois, and does not aver that any of the defendants are citizens of any other State. It is manifest that the averments of citizenship in neither of the bills are sufficient to give the Circuit Court jurisdiction under the Judiciary Act of 1789; and all were filed subsequently to the 13th of July, 1866, when the Act of 1833, which gave jurisdiction to the courts of the United States of suits under the Internal Revenue Act against the collectors and Mr. Justice Bradley concurred in the fore- others, without regard to citizenship, was regoing dissenting opinion. Cited 13 Wall., 155; 16 Wall., 152; 20 Wall., 470; 22 Wall., 94; 92 U. S., 194; 95 U. S., 153; 19 Blatchf., 568, 569. LEMUEL W. MASON, Appt., V. EDWARD A. ROLLINS, COMR. OF INT. PARKER R. MASON, Appt., v. S. S. MANN, DEPUTY-COLL. OF INT. REV., AND PARKER R. MASON, Appt., v. R. W. HART, DEPUTY-COLL. OF INT. REV. (See S. C., 13 Wall., 602, 603.) Averments of citizenship, when necessary—repeal of Act. When the averments of citizenship in bills are not sufficient to give the Circuit Court jurisdiction under the Judiciary Act of 1789, and if, when the suits were brought, the special Act giving jurisdiction without regard to citizenship was repealed, the bills will be dismissed. [Nos. 79, 80, 81.] pealed. Ins. Co. v. Ritchie, 5 Wall., 544 (72 U. S., XVIII., 542). When these suits were brought, therefore, there was no Act in force giving jurisdiction, in cases such as those made by the records, to the courts of the United States. The Circuit Court was obliged, therefore, to dismiss the bill in each case for want of jurisdiction, and the judgment of the court in the several cases must be affirmed. NOEL BYRON BOYDEN ET AL., Piff's. in v. UNITED STATES. (See S. C., 13 Wall., 17-25.) Robbery of public moneys, no defense to action on receiver's bond-liability of receiver. 1. Where a receiver of public moneys has given bond for the faithful performance of his duties as required by law, proof that he has been robbed of the public money received by him, is no defense to a suit on such bond. 2. His liability is to be measured by his bond, and where that binds him to pay the money, a cause which renders that impossible is of no importance. [No. 4.] Argued, No. 79, Nor. 21, 1871, and Nos. 80, 81, Submitted Oct. 16, 1871. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois. Mr. Chief Justice Chase delivered the opin ion of the court: The records in these cases are of proceed ings in equity against the defendants. The first bill describes the plaintiff as a citizen of the State of Illinois, and the defendant, Rollins, as of the District of Columbia, and a citizen of the State of and the defendants, Wm. IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Wisconsin. This was a suit commenced in the court be low, against Boyden and his sureties, on his official bond, as receiver of public moneys for the district, of lands subject to sale, at Eau Claire, Wisconsin. The bond was given pursuant to the 6th section of the Act of May 10, 1800, 2 Stat., 75, and has the condition that, NOTE.-Liability of bailee, for loss by theft or rob bery. A warehouseman is not liable for goods stolen by his servant, without negligence on his part. Schmidt v. Blood, 9 Wend., 268; S. C., 24 Am. Dec., 143. any neglect or want of care of the hirer, the latter If a thing let to hire perishes or is stolen without will not be responsible for the loss. Williams v. if the said Boyden has truly and faithfully exe- | Court of N. Y., and the decision affirmed by cuted and discharged and shall continue truly the Court of Errors, in which it was held that and faithfully to discharge all the duties of said it was no defense to an action against a town office according to law, then the obligation shall collector and his sureties on the official bond, be void. The breach alleged is, that said Boy. that the money had been stolen from the dwellden received, as such receiver of the moneys of ing house of the principal "Without any fault. the United States, the sum of $5.088.16, which want of care or omission of duty on his part." he has not paid over to the United States. The 1 Den., 233. defendants pleaded: first, the general issue; second, performance of the conditions; third, that said Boyden was violently robbed of said sum of money. The plaintiffs join issue on the first plea, and reply to the second and third, that Boyden received said money as receiver, and has not paid it to the plaintiffs as required by law, on which it seems that issues are joined. The defendants upon the trial offered to prove that, Dec. 23, 1859, at the Village of Eau Claire, N. B. Boyden, the receiver of public moneys, was beset by some person or persons to him unknown, and thrown down, and, against all defense that he could make, was gagged and bound and the moneys described in the complaint, violently and without his fault, taken from him and carried away. To the introduction of this evidence the District Attorney objected, upon the ground that the said facts, as offered to be proved, constituted no defense. The court sustained the objection, and the defendants excepted. Judgment having been rendered for the plaintiff, the defendants brought the case to this court by writ of error. Messrs. Matt. H. Carpenter and Cothren, for plaintiffs in error: M. M. At the common law an officer was not responsible for loss of public or private funds, except upon the ground of negligence or default. V. Lane v. Cotton, 1 Ld. Raym., 646; Whitfield In the case of Albany Co. v. Dorr, 25 Wend., 440, it was held that "A public officer, intrusted with the receipt and disbursement of public funds, is not responsible for moneys stolen from his office, where there is no impu tation of negligence or other default on his part." Chief Justice Nelson, in giving the opinion, places emphasis upon the condition of the bond, being for the faithful execution of the duties of his office, and says that this condition recognizes the common law rule. Browning v. Hanford, 5 Hill, 589. The case of Albany Co. v. Dorr was affirmed by the Court of Errors in 1844. 7 Hill, 583. In May, 1845, the case of Muzzy v. Shattuck, 1 Den., 233, was decided by the Supreme Lloyd, W. Jones, 179; Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 B. & S., 836: 22 L. J. Q. B., 164; Coggs v. Bernard, Raym., 909; Finacue v. Small, 1 Esp., 315; Butt v. Great Western Ry. Co., 7 Eng. L. & E., 448; S. C., 11 C. B., 140. Unless he is negligent, a warehouseman is not liable for goods stolen while under his charge, by bis servants or others. Moore v. Mayor, etc., of Mobile, 1 Stew., 284; Williams v. Holland, 22 How. | Pr., 137; Schwerin v. McKie, 51 N. Y., 180; S. C., 10 Am. Rep., 581; Cincinnati &c. R. R. Co. v. McCool, 26 Ind., 140; Claflin v. Meyer, 75 N. Y., 280; S. C., 31 Am. Rep., 467; Lamb v. Western R. R. Co., 7 Allen, 98; Cass v. Boston,etc., R. R. Co., 14 Allen, 448; Neal v. R. R. Co., 8 Jones L., 482; Pike v. Chicago,etc., R. R. Co., 40 Wis., 583. Warehouseman must do more than show that But the decision in this case is placed solely upon the construction of the statute, which was peculiar in its provisions, and in the opinion of the court rendered the collector a debtor for the amount by him collected, and his sureties guarantors for the payment of the debt. It does not conflict with the case of Albany Co. v. Dorr, nor with the common law rule as to official liability; but only interprets and gives effect to a particular statute. It is, therefore, only authority for the construction of a similar statute. The surety of an official bond is not bound beyond the terms of the bond. U. S. v. Boyd, 15 Pet, 187. In every Act of Congress, receivers are spoken of and regarded as public agents and depositaries. Nowhere do they seem to be regarded as insurers against inevitable accident or irresistible force, or as debtors merely of the government. The judgment should be reversed for two reasons: First. That the court erred in refusing to allow the defendants to introduce any evidence to establish the facts by them offered to be proved. Second. Because the declaration does not contain averments which constitute any cause of action. Messrs. A. T. Akerman, Atty-Gen., C. H. Hill, Asst. Atty-Gen., and Bristow, SolicitorGen., for the United States: The plea of the plaintiffs in error constituted no defense to the suit of the United States to recover the money which Boyden had cove nanted to pay by his bond. It is a settled principle of law, that an express contract to do a certain thing is not discharged by its becoming subsequently impossible to do it by unforseen occurrences, no matter how much beyond the contractor's control they may be. This rule of law has been applied to many cases of as great seeming hardship as that of the plaintiffs in error. 3 Kent, Com., 6th ed.,465, et seq.; Met. Cont., 213. and cases cited; Dermott v. Jones, 2 Wall., 1 (69 U. S., XVII., 762); The Harriman, 9 Wall., 161 (76 U. S., XIX., 629); Paradine v. Jane, Aleyn, 26. It has been applied, by this and other courts, to the cases of official bonds, under circum. goods might have been stolen. Thomas v. Daiden, 22 La. Ann., 413. If warehousemen exercise ordinary care, and a loss occurs by burglary, without their negligence, they are not responsible for it. Schwerin v. McKie, 51 N. Y., 180; S. C., 10 Am. Rep., 581. A loss by theft or robbery will generally excuse a gratuitous bailee from liability. Fay v. Steamer New World, 1 Cal., 348. A private carrier for hire is not liable for a loss by robbers, nor for a taking from him or his servants by force. Coggs v. Bernard, Raym., 909; Brind v. Dale, 8 Carr. & P., 207. In an action against a collector for the non-payment of money collected by him, it is not a defense that the money was stolen from him without his fault. New Providence v. McEachron, 33 N. J., 339. stances undistinguishable in principle from the | liver letters, and the defendants were held not present. U. S. v. Prescott, 3 How., 578: U. S. v. Dashiel, 4 Wall., 185 (71 U. S., XVIII., 321); U. S. v. Keehler, 9 Wall, 83 (76 U. S., XIX., 574); Com. v. Comly, 3 Pa. St., 372; State v. Harper, 6 Ohio St., 607. (A brief for the United States was also filed at the preceding term by Messrs. E. R. Hoar, Atty-Gen., and W. A. Field, Asst. Atty-Gen). Mr. Justice Strong delivered the opinion of the court: liable for money stolen, even by their subordinates in office. At most the Postmaster General was a mere bailee, and no question was raised respecting the effect of a bond to secure the performance of his duties. But, whatever may have been the ruling in the case of Supervisors of Albany v. Dorr, it is no longer authority, even in the State of New York. Muzzy v. Shattuck, 1 Den., 233, subsequently decided, and affirmed unanimously in the Court of Appeals, is utterly irreconcilable with it, and it has settled the law otherwise in that State. Were a receiver of public moneys, who has So in Pennsylvania, in Com. v. Comly, 3 Pa. given bond for the faithful performance of his St., 372, it was ruled that the responsibility of duties as required by law, a mere ordinary bailee, a public receiver depends on his contract, when it might be that he would be relieved by proof there is one, and not on the law of bailments. that the money had been destroyed by fire, or There the condition of the bond was to account stolen from him, or taken by irresistible force. and pay over, and it was held no defense by He would then be bound only to the exercise the surety of the receiver that the money was of ordinary care, even though a bailee for hire. stolen, though it was kept as a prudent man The contract of bailment implies no more ex- would keep his own funds. It was said by Chief cept in the case of common carriers and the duty Justice Gibson, in delivering the judgment of of a receiver, virtute officii, is to bring to the the court, after referring to the fact that a lessee discharge of his trust that prudence, caution is not relieved from payment of rent by destrucand attention which careful men usually bring tion of the demised premises by fire, "A loss by to the conduct of their own affairs. He is to a visitation of Providence, which no vigilance pay over the money in his hands as required by could prevent, would present a more meritolaw, but he is not an insurer. He may, how-rious claim for relief, one would think, than ever, make himself an insurer by express con- a loss by robbery, which is always preceded by a tract, and this he does when he binds himself greater or less degree of negligence. A receiver, in a penal bond to perform the duties of his or his surety, would come before a chancellor office without exception. There is an established with an ill grace on that ground, even if there difference between a duty created merely by was a power to relieve him. The keepers of law and one to which is added the obligation the public moneys, or their sponsors, are to be of an express undertaking. The law does not held strictly to the contract, for if they were to compel to impossibilities; but it is a settled rule be let off on shallow pretenses, delinquencies, that if performance of an express engagement which are fearfully frequent already, would be becomes impossible by reason of anything oc- incessant. A chancellor is not bound to concurring after the contract was made, though un- trol the legal effect of a contract in any case; foreseen by the contracting party, and not within and his discretion, were he at liberty to use it, his control, he will not be excused. Met. Cont., would be influenced by considerations of gen213; The Harriman, 9 Wall., 161 [76 U. S., eral policy.” State v. Harper,6 Ohio St., 607, is XIX., 629]. The rule has been applied rigidly to the same effect. This is precisely the ground to bonds of public officers intrusted with the which this court has taken. In The United care of public money. Such bonds have almost States v. Prescott, 3 How., 578, it was decided invariably been construed as binding the ob- that the felonious taking, stealing and carrying ligors to pay the money in their hands when away the public money in the hands of a rerequired by law, even though the money may ceiver of public money, without any fault or have been lost without fault on their part. negligence on his part, does not discharge him It is true that in the case of Supervisors of or his sureties, and that it cannot be set up Albany v. Dorr, 25 Wend., 440, in the Su- as a defense to an action on his official bond. preme Court of New York, it was decided in The condition of the receiver's bond in that case, a suit on a bond of a county treasurer, con- it is true, was that the receiver should pay ditioned for the payment of all money that promptly when orders for payment should be should come into his hands as treasurer, that he received, while the bond in the case before us is was not responsible for the public money felon- conditioned that Boyden, the receiver, had truly iously stolen from his office without any negli- executed and discharged, and should continue gence, want of due care, or other blame or truly and faithfully to execute and discharge fault whatever on his part; and this decision all the duties of said office according to law. was affirmed in the Court of Appeals of that But the Acts of Congress respecting receivers State, only, however, by an equal division. Su- made it their duty to pay the public money repervisors of Albany v. Dorr, 7 Hill., 583. It ceived by them when ordered by the Treasury was rested upon the supposed liability of the Department, and that department, by its genofficer, virtute officii, which it was thought his eral orders of 1854, required payment to be bond did not increase, and it was supposed to made before this suit was brought. No excepbe sustained by Lane v. Cotton, 1 Ld. Raym., 646; tion was made; no contingency was contemand Whitfield v. Le Despencer, Cowp., 754. It plated. The bond, therefore, was an absolute is quite plain, however, that those cases do not obligation to pay the money, and differing not sustain it. They were actions upon the case at all, in legal effect, from the bond in Prescott's against the Postmaster General, brought not by case. A similar ruling was made in United the Government, but by private individuals to States v. Dashiel, 4 Wall., 182 [71 U. S., recover damages for the negligent failure to de- XVIII., 319]. What the condition of the bond |