titles was never vested in these Military Governors, Mumford v. Wardwell, 6 Wall., 435 [73 U. S., XVIII., 760], nor in any person appointed by them.

It is contended, however, that Hawes' election by the people of the pueblo to the office of prefect on the retirement of the Mexican officials, gave him all the power a Mexican prefect would have had if the country had not been conquered. Is this position maintainable? Pueblos or towns, by the laws of Mexico, were en titled to a certain quantity of lands adjoining them, which were held in trust for the benefit of their inhabitants. The nature and extent of these pueblo rights have been the subject of a

great deal of controversy since the acquisition

par

of California, and came before this court for consideration in the case of Townsend v. Greeley. 5 Wall., 336 [72 U. S., XVIII., 549]. Mr. Justice Field, in delivering the opinion of the court in that case, says: "It may be difficult to state with precision the exact nature of the right or title which the pueblos held in these lands. It was not an indefeasible estate; ownership of the lands in the pueblos could not, in strictness, be affirmed. It amounted in truth to little more than a restricted or qualified right to alienate portions of the land to its inhabitants for building or cultivation and to use the remainder for commons, for pasture lands, or as a source of revenue or for other public purposes. This right of disposition and use was in all ticulars subject to the control of the government of the country.' Manifestly, if this right of disposition and use were subject to Mexican con trol while Mexican rule prevailed, it was equally subject to the control of our government when this rule was changed. It must be conceded that these pueblos had an equitable right to have their common lands confirmed to them, but they did not hold them as a private individual does his estate, and it needed legislative action to ripen this equitable right into a legal title. Congress has acted upon this subject and confirmed the lands of the pueblo of San Francisco, including the demanded premises, and this confirmation could not inure to the benefit of any one claiming under a grant by an American prefect, unless there were an express declaration to that effect. As there is no pretense that the grant in this case was protected by legislation, it follows that the plaintiff has no title of any sort to rest upon, and the judgment of the Circuit Court must be affirmed.

LUCY H. CARROLL, Admr'x of GEO. W. CARROLL, Deceased, Appt.,

v.

UNITED STATES.

(See S. C., 13 Wall., 151-153.)

Abandoned and Captured Property Act-right to proceeds when aid to the rebellion defeats.

1. Under the Abandoned and Captured Property Act of Mar. 12, 1863, the right to recover depends on proof of ownership of the abandoned or capt

ured property, of right to the proceeds and of the fact that the owner gave no aid or comfort to the rebellion. 2. The ownership thereby required to be proved is that which existed at the time of capture or which existed at the time of the petition filed in the abandonment, and the right to the proceeds is that Court of Claims.

3. Where a person claimed the ownership of the trix, and gave proof that she gave no aid or comproperty at the time of its capture, as administrafort to the rebellion, she is entitled to recover the proceeds of such property in the Court of Claims, although her intestate gave aid and comfort to the rebellion. [No. 289.]

Submitted Jan. 12, 1872. Decided Feb. 19, 1872, APPEAL from the Court of Claims.

The case is stated by the court.

Mr. R. M. Corwine, for appellant: The Court of Claims held that the claimant is not required to establish that the cotton was not at any time the property of a disloyal person. 4 Ct. of Claims, 426; also, Bates's case, same Vol., 569.

The proof of loyalty is confined to the claimant of the proceeds of the property when taken by the Government. Its then status is the subject of inquiry. If the title before that had passed out of the disloyal owner into a loyal owner, bona fide, the property is free from any trouble it may have labored under before then.

To make the property answerable for the political offense of the owner, proceedings to condemn it under the Confiscation Acts must be instituted in the lifetime of the owner, and while it is in his possession. After his death, new rights intervene and the property is free from whatever disability it might have labored under while in his possession. U. S. v. Anderson, 9 Wall., 66 (76 U. S., XIX., 617).

The title is cast on the administrator and relates to the moment of Carroll's death.

Johns v. Johns, 1 McCord, 132; 3 McCord, 371: Lawrence v. Wright, 23 Pick., 128; Hays V. Jackson, 6 Mass., 149; Jewett v. Stevens, 12 Mass., 309; 1 Will. Exrs., 528.

At the instant of the testator's death, the interest in all chattels vests in the executor or in the administrator, as the case may be, whether he has reduced them into his actual possession or not; and, however widely dispersed or remotely situated, they are regarded in law as assets in his hands.

Toll. Law of Exrs., 152; Lawrence v. Wright (supra).

He may maintain trover for them against all the world.

In like manner he is deemed to be in possession of a ship at sea.

The Court of Claims has said that the evidence of ownership required is at least equal to that necessary to sustain an action of trespass or trover. Margaret Bond's case, 2 Ct. of Claims, 522.

Tried by that rule, it is not difficult to determine that the title to this property was vested in the administratrix when it was taken; and if it was so, then the political status of George W. Carroll cannot prevail, but that of the administratrix must.

Mr. B. H. Bristow, Solicitor-Gen., for appellee.

Mr. Chief Justice Chase delivered the opinion of the court:

CHARLES REICHE ET AL., Piffs. in Err.,

residing in Arkansas, during the first years of the late civil war, raised and was owner of certain cotton. He died in September, 1863. During his life he had given aid to the rebellion.

The cotton, upon his death, came into the possession of the claimant as administratrix, and was in her possesssion at the time it was captured by the United States. She offered evi. dence, to establish her own loyalty and that she never gave aid or comfort to the rebellion, which seems to have been rejected by the court. The estate was insolvent. The creditors are numerous, and there is no proof in respect to their loyalty.

The Court of Claims decided, as a conclusion of law from these facts, that the claimant's rights as administratrix depended upon proof of the loyalty of the deceased, and it being shown that he voluntarily gave aid and comfort to the rebellion, dismissed the petition.

We think that the Court of Claims erred in the decision given by it. The Statute of March 12th, 1863 (12 Stat. at L., 820) makes the right to recover depend on proof of ownership of the abandoned or captured property, of right to the proceeds, and of the fact that the owner gave no aid or comfort to the rebellion. It is plain to us that the ownership to be proved was that which existed at the time of capture or abandonment, and that the right to the proceeds was that which existed at the time of the petition filed in the Court of Claims. These titles, in their nature, capable of separation, co-existed in the petitioner. True, her ownership was not absolute, nor was her right to the proceeds absolute. She could claim only in a representative capacity-first, in right of the intestate, and, second, as trustee for creditors and distributees. At the time of the death of the intestate the cotton was in his possession, unaffected by any proceeding in confiscation. After his death, and upon appointment of his widow as administratrix, the title vested in her unforfeited. It was a title upon which she could maintain trespass or trover. Redf. Wills, 114, 116; 1 Will. Ex. & Adm., 596; Mc Vaughters v. Elder, 2 Brev., 313; Lawrence v. Wright, 23 Pick., 129. And it was the only title to the property subsisting at the time of the capture and sale and payment of the proceeds into the Treasury. The statute does not make it the duty of the court to inquire whether the intestate who had been the owner gave aid and comfort to the rebellion, but whether such aid or comfort was given by the actual owner at the time of capture. This owner, within the sense of the statute, was the administratrix. It would be much more reason able to institute such inquiries in respect to the creditors and distributees than in respect to the intestate. But such an investigation might be endless, and could not, we think, have been contemplated by the Legislature.

We think, therefore, that the Court of Claims erred in not admitting the proof offered by the petitioner, and for this cause the decree must be reversed.

Cited-95 U. S., 417.

York, etc.

(See S. C., 13 Wall., 162-165.)

Construction of statutes-Acts in pari materia -duty Act.

1. The meaning of general words in a statute must be restricted, whenever it is found necessary to do so, in order to carry out the legislative intention.

2. Where two Acts of Congress are in pari materia, it will be presumed that, if the same word be used in both and a special meaning given it in the first Act, it was intended that it should receive the same interpretation in the latter Act. 3. The duty Act of 1866, does not impose duty on birds and fowls.

[No. 119.]

Mr. Justice Davis delivered the opinion of the court:

In September, 1856, the plaintiffs in error imported at the Port of New York certain lots of live birds, on which the collector exacted a duty of twenty per centum ad valorem, which was paid under protest. This suit is brought to recover back the money and the only inquiry is: whether the living birds, at the date of this importation, were dutiable.

It is claimed that they were, under the Act of May, 16, 1866, entitled "An Act Imposing a Duty on Live Animals" (14 Stat. at L., 48) which was in force at the period referred to, and which provides as follows: "That on and after the passage of this Act, there shall be levied, collected and paid on all horses, mules, cattle, sheep, hogs and other live animals imported from foreign countries, a duty of twenty per cen tum ad valorem: Provided, that any such animals now bona fide owned by resident citizens of the State, and now in any of the provinces of British America, may be imported into the United States free of duty, until the expiration of ten days next after the passage of this Act.

This Act, in its terms, is comprehensive enough to include birds and all other living things endowed with sensation and the power of voluntary motion, and if there had not been previous legislation on the subject, there might be some justification for the position that Congress did not intend to harrow the meaning of the language employed. If it be true that it is the duty of the court to ascertain the meaning of the Legislature from the words used in the statute and the subject-matter to which it relates, there is an equal duty to restrict the meaning of general words, whenever it is found nec

essary to do so, in order to carry out the legislative intention.

Brewer v. Blougher, 14 Pet., 178. And it is fair to presume, in case a special meaning was attached to certain words in a prior tariff Act, that Congress intended they should have the same signification when used in a subsequent Act in relation to the same subject matter.

The 23d section of the Act of Mar. 2, 1861, ch. 68, 12 Stat. at L., 193, provides that "the importation of the articles hereinafter mentioned and embraced in this section shall be exempt from duty. Animals living of all kinds. Birds, singing and other, and land and water fowls. *

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

This Act was in force when the Act of 1866 -the Act in controversy-was passed, and it will be seen that birds and fowls are not embraced in the term "animals," and that they are free from duty, not because they belong to the class of "living animals of all kinds," but for the reason that they are especially designated. It is quite manifest that Congress, adopting the popular signification of the word "animals," applied it to quadrupeds, and placed birds and fowls in a different classification. Congress having, therefore, defined the word in one Act, so as to limit its application, how can it be contended that the definition shall be enlarged in the next Act on the same subject, when there is no language used indicating an intention to produce such a result? Both Acts are in pari materia, and it will be presumed that if the same word be used in both, and a special meaning were given it in the first Act, that it was intended it should receive the same interpreta tion in the latter Act, in the absence of anything to show a contrary intention. Dwar. St., 701-766.

If it be used in a different sense in the Act of 1866, its meaning instead of being extended is narrowed, for all animals not ejusdem generis with horses, mules, cattle, sheep and hogs," are excluded from the operation of the revenue laws. By the Act of 1861, living animals of all kinds, whether domesticated or not, could be imported without paying a duty. The Law of 1866 steps in and imposes a duty on domestic quadrupeds, leaving the Act of 1861 applicable to all other quadrupeds, and to birds and fowls. The case of Homer v. Collector, 1 Wall., 486 [68 U. S., XVII., 688] is in principle not unlike this. The object of that suit was to ascertain whether, under the tariff Act of 1857, almonds were placed in the category of dried fruits, on which a small duty was imposed. It was contended as the article was popularly classed among the dried fruits of the table, with raisins, dates, etc., and as it was not named specifically in the changes in the Act of 1857, that it properly belonged to the schedule providing for dried fruits. But the court held that as a duty had been imposed on almonds, eo nomine, in previ ous tariff Acts, the article was not, for revenue purposes, within the general term of dried fruit, although in popular language and commercial usage such was its signification.

The judgment is reversed, and a venire de novo awarded.

This was an action in the court below by Nock, as an original inventor of a hinge for inkstands, for the infringement of his patent. The plaintiff laid his damages at $5,000. The defendants pleaded the general issue. The plaintiff obtained a verdict and judgment for $500, and the defendants sued out this writ of error. A motion is now made to dismiss for want of jurisdiction.

Mr. Geo. W. Paschal, for defendant in error, in support of the motion:

It is insisted for the plaintiffs in error that appellate jurisdiction is given under the Act of Feb. 18, 1861, 12 Stat. at L., 130, because it is a controversy in law, arising under a law of the United States, granting and confirming to an inventor the exclusive right to his invention, etc.

We submit that a suit against a naked infringer of a patent is not within the letter and certainly not within the spirit of that Act. That Act may well apply to the interference cases arising between rival patentees, or to contro. versies between such patentees, or those claiming under them, without allowing a naked trespasser the benefit of appeal, simply because he disputes the validity of the patent. The assumption really is, that the validity of every patent may be attacked by any trespasser, in a collateral way, which is wholly inadmissible. The grounds of defense which may be urged, as decided by this court, are embodied in sec. 51 of the Act of 1866.

See Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 9 Wall., 797 (76 U. S., XIX., 569); Eureka Co. v. Bailey Co. (ante, 209).

A careful reading of the cases under section 17 of the Act of 1836, leads to the conclusion that such appeals only lie in cases which properly involve the construction of the patent laws; where no amount can be said to be involved, but only the rights of inventors to the benefit of their discoveries, as against the government or

other inventors.

Hogg v. Emerson, 6 How., 478; Allen v. Blunt, 2 Wood. & M., 155; Wilson v. Sandford, 10 How., 101.

It is insisted, however, that all doubt upon the subject is removed by sec. 56 of the patent Law of July, 1870, 16 Stat. at L., 207.

This Act was not in force when the judg

S. (3 Pet.), 33.

The charters of the railroad companies are compacts or contracts by statute between the State and stockholders, and cannot be changed without the consent of each party; and such rights as are legally vested in the Companies, cannot be controlled or destroyed by any sub sequent statute, unless a power for that purpose be reserved in the Acts of incorporation. Wales v. Stetson, 2 Mass., 143; Enfield Toll Br. Co. v. Conn. Riv. Co., 7 Conn., 28; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87; Bk. v. Knoop, 16 How., 389; Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch, 292; Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43; Dart. Coll. v. Woodward, 4 Wheat., 518.

This has ever been the rule of construction for such charters in North Carolina.

Mills v. Williams, 11 Ired., 558; Bk. of the State v. Bk. of Cape Fear, 13 Ired, 75; AttyGen. v. Bk., 4 Jones, Eq., 287.

Where there is no stipulation by the sovereign against taxation, taxation may be laid. Bk. v. Billings, 4 Pet., 514; State v. Petway, 2 Jones, Eq., 396.

Where there is such a stipulation it is entitled to a sensible construction, so as to effect its obvious purpose, and shall be regarded as a contract if so intended.

Bk. v. Knoop (supra); Ohio Ins. & T. Co. v. Debolt, 16 How., 416, Taney's op., p. 427; Bk. v. Edwards, 5 Ired., 516; see op. Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court, 3 How., 148: Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, 8 Wall., 430 (75 U. S., XIX., 495).

Messrs. Will H. Battle and Kemp P. Battle for defendants in error:

It is admitted that a charter of incorporation granted by a State creates a contract between the State and its corporators, which the State cannot violate. It becomes, then, a matter of importance to ascertain the nature of such a contract and the number and extent of the rights which are conferred upon the Corporation. There are numerous cases on this subject, but it is unnecessary to refer to more than one, as in that one such rights are clearly stated and defined. In the Binghamton Bridge case, 3 Wall., 75 (70 U. S., XVIII., 143), it is said by the court: That all rights which are asserted against the State must be clearly defined, and not raised by inference or presump tion; and if the charter is silent about a power, it does not exist. If, on a fair reading of the instrument, reasonable doubts arise as to the proper interpretation to be given it, those doubts are to be solved in favor of the State; and where it is susceptible of two meanings, the one restricting and the other extending the powers of the Corporation, that construction is to be adopted which works the least harm to the State." See McRee v. R. R. Co., 2 Jones, 186. When a corporation claims exemption from taxation, it must show that the power to tax has been given up by the State, in the plainest and most explicit language. The reason is, that the taxing power is one of the highest and most important attributes of sovereignty. It is essential to the establishment and continued existence of the government. No government can, then, devest itself altogether of such a power; it cannot commit political suicide; but it

adequate consideration, bind itself for a longer or a shorter period, not to exercise its taxing power at all, or not beyond a certain extent, upon certain persons or things. This is, however, often a dangerous restriction upon its power, because the necessities of the government cannot always be foreseen. In the changes and chances of time and things, those who have charge of the administration may have need of all the possible resources of the country to save it from great disaster, if not from ruin. These considerations force upon the mind the propriety, nay, the absolute necessity, of the rule that every grant from the Legislature, by which the integrity of the power to raise revenue is impaired, must be construed strictly in favor of the public and against the grantee.

State v. Petway, 2 Jones Eq., 396; Bk. v. Commonwealth, 19 Pa., 144; Middleton v. Lambert, 1 Ad. & E., 401; Cooley, Const. Lim., 280, et seq.; Christ Ch. v. Co. of Phila., 24 How., 300 (65 U. S., XVI., 602).

The franchise is something entirely distinct from the property of the Corporation, and the distinction is clearly recognized by law. State v. Rives, 5 Ired., 297; Rev. Code of 1856, ch. 26, secs. 5 to 10; State v. Petway (supra); AttyGen. v. Bk., 4 Jones, Eq., 287.

In this case the tax is upon the franchise. The exemption extends only to the property, leaving the franchise or body politic itself liable to be taxed, just as an individual might have his property exempt, while the State might, where there was no constitutional restriction, tax his poll ad libitum. See Bk. v. State, 9 Yerg., 490.

Nothing less than the exemption of the franchise and all the property, real and personal, of the Corporation, from taxation, can or ought to relieve it from the burden of contributing its just proportion towards the support of the government.

See Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, 8 Wall., 430 (75 U. S., XIX., 495); Washington University v. Rouse, 8 Wall., 439 (75 U. S., XIX., 498).

Mr. Justice Davis delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State of North Carolina, and brings up the question, whether the recent legislation of the State concerning the collection of taxes is, as it affects the plaintiff in error, in violation of that provision of the Constitution of the United States which declares that no State shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts. As early as 1833, the General Assembly of North Carolina incorporated the Wilmington & Weldon Railroad Company, for the purpose of constructing a railroad in the State, and inserted a provision in the charter, “That the property of said Company and the shares therein shall be exempted from any public charge or tax whatsoever."

It has been so often decided by this court that a charter of incorporation granted by a State creates a contract between the State and the corporators, which the State cannot violate, that it would be a work of supererogation to repeat the reasons on which the argument is founded. It is true that when a corporation