Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic SanctionsPrinceton University Press, 16. jan. 1994 - 324 sider This innovative study shows that multilateral sanctions are coercive in their pressure on their target and in their origin: the sanctions themselves frequently result from coercive policies, with one state attempting to coerce others through persuasion, threats, and promises. To analyze this process, Lisa Martin uses a novel methodology combining game-theoretic models, statistical analysis, and case studies. She emphasizes that credible commitments gain international cooperation, and concludes that the involvement of international institutions and the willingness of the main "sender" to bear heavy costs are the central factors influencing the sanction's credibility. |
Innhold
Introduction | 3 |
The Study of Economic Sanctions | 4 |
The Study of International Cooperation | 7 |
Methodology | 10 |
THEORY AND DATA | 13 |
Model and Hypotheses | 15 |
A Model of Economic Sanctions | 16 |
Identifying Cooperation Problems | 25 |
Conclusion | 128 |
The Falkland Islands Conflict | 131 |
The Falklands Crisis 1982 | 132 |
The Falklands and the European Community | 138 |
The Case of Ireland | 153 |
Responses of the United States Latin America and Others | 159 |
Conclusion | 166 |
Western TechnologyExport Controls | 169 |
What Explains Cooperation? | 31 |
Bandwagoning | 40 |
Conclusion | 43 |
Measuring Cooperation and Explanatory Variables | 46 |
Explanatory Variables | 54 |
Conclusion | 59 |
Estimating Models of Cooperation | 61 |
Regression Analysis | 62 |
OrderedProbit Analysis | 67 |
EventCount Analysis | 74 |
The Effect of Declining Hegemony | 86 |
Conclusion | 90 |
CASE STUDIES | 93 |
Human Rights in Latin America Explaining Unilateral US Sanctions | 99 |
US HumanRights Policy 197376 | 101 |
The Carter Administration | 106 |
Economic Sanctions and the Multilateral Development Banks | 111 |
Attitudes and Responses to US HumanRights Sanctions | 119 |
US Leadership or Resistance? | 124 |
American European and Japanese Views on EastWest Technology Transfer | 171 |
CoCom | 185 |
Responding to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1980 | 191 |
Responding to Dissident Trials 1978 | 198 |
Conclusion | 202 |
The Polish Crisis and GasPipeline Sanctions | 204 |
Martial Law in Poland and the Siberian Gas Pipeline | 206 |
The Effect of Declining Hegemony | 225 |
Siberian Gas and European Preferences | 228 |
Why It Mattered | 234 |
Conclusion | 239 |
Conclusion | 241 |
Additional Findings | 247 |
Implications for Theories of International Cooperation and Economic Sanctions | 248 |
Notes | 253 |
Bibliography | 277 |
293 | |
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Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions Lisa L. Martin Begrenset visning - 1994 |
Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions Lisa L. Martin Ingen forhåndsvisning tilgjengelig - 1992 |
Vanlige uttrykk og setninger
action administration Afghanistan allies American analysis April Argentina argued assistance bandwagoning behavior bilateral Britain British called for sanctions Carter chapter Chile coadjustment CoCom coefficient coercion game COLDWAR Committee Congress COOP cooperation problems COSTD costs credibility decisions dependent variable dominant strategy economic sanctions effect Europe example expect explained export controls factors Falklands Falklands War Foreign Policy grain embargo Hufbauer human rights hypotheses Ibid impact impose sanctions increase INST interests international cooperation international institutions Ireland Irish issue linkage Latin America leading sender level of cooperation major sender measures military Minister NATO neoliberal nomic NONMAJ North European Service outcome payoff percent pipeline Player political potential sanctioners preferences probit probit model Reagan refused regression response Reuters Reuters North European role sanc Schott significant Soviet Union statistical threats tions U.S. government U.S. policy U.S. representatives U.S. sanctions U.S. Senate unilateral sanctions United West Germany Western