Statement of case.

5 Paige, 521; High on Receivers, § 112; Baker v. Admr. of Backus, 32 Ill. 79; Gravestein's Appeal, 49 Penn. St. 310; Young v. Rollins, 85 N. C. 485; Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183.) The operating contract made with the Twenty-third Street Railway Company is a valid and continuing claim. (Whitney Arms Co. v. Barlow, 63 N. Y. 62; Rider Raft Co. v. Roach, 97 id. 378; Kent v. Quicksilver Mining Co., 78 id. 159; People ex rel. Twenty-third Street Co. v. Squire, 53 N. Y. Supr. Ct. 536.) The act of 1839 has never been repealed, and has been held to confer the most extensive power upon railroad corporations in the use of their respective roads. (Woodruff v. Erie R. Co., 93 N. Y. 609.) Repeals by implication are not favored. (Hankins v. Mayor, etc., 64 N. Y. 18, 21; People ex rel. Woods v. Crissey, 91 id. 616, 629; In re Curser, 89 id. 401; Mark v. State, 97 id. 572, 578; Mongeon v. People, 55 id. 616; People ex rel. Kingsland v. Palmer, 52 id. 83, 88; In re D. & H. C. Co., 69 id. 209; People ex rel. Stiner v. Morrison, 78 id. 84; People v. Brooklyn F. & C. I. R. Co., 89 id. 75; In re Gilbert Elevated Road, 70 id. 361, 372.) Should the act of 1839, for any reason, be deemed not to confer the authority to make the contract in question, special authority is found for it in the act of 1873. (II. B. & M. F. R. R. Co. v. Southern Boulevard Co., 41 Hun, 553; McKenna v. Edmonstone, 91 N. Y. 234; People v. Quigg, 59 id. 33, 88; Van Denburgh v. Village of Greenbush, 66 id. 1; Whipple v. Christian, 80 id. 523.) A contract of this character always survives the death of the corporation. It is only personal contracts which are terminated by death, whether of individuals or corporations. All others are open and subsisting contracts. (People v. Nat. Trust Co., 82 N. Y. 283; T. & B. R. R. Co. v. B. H. T. &W. R. R. Co., 86 id. 107; Great Northern Railway Co. v. Manchester, etc., R. Co., 10 Eng. L. & Eq. 11; 2 Redf. on Rys. 372; Columbus, P. & 1. R. R. Co. v. I. & B. R. R. Co., 5 McLean, 450; Wilson v. Furness R. Co., L. R., 9 Eq. 28; Stover v. Gt. W. R. Co., 2 Y. & C. Ch. 48.)

SICKELS-VOL. LXVI. 3

Statement of case.

S. P. Nash for bondholders, respondents, and Lyman Rhoades for mortgagee in trust respondent. The act "to annul and dissolve the Broadway Surface Railroad Company" is unconstitutional and void. (Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700, 720, 721; 2 Kent's Com. 206, 207; Constitution of 1846, art. 8, § 1; People v. Albertson, 55 N. Y. 50.) The windingup act (Laws of 1886, chap. 310) is void on several grounds: (1.) It makes the receiver a judicial officer to take all the evidence upon which the court is to allow or reject claims. (2.) It imposes on the court the duty of rejecting claims which might be open to contest. (3.) It requires bondholders, whose bonds may be deemed valid, to take a present payment in discharge of a long bond. (Empire City Bank, 18 N. Y. 199, Fisk v. Jeff. Police Jury, 116 U. S. 131.) The rights, privileges and consents dealt with by the "Consent" act were rights of property growing out of grants and contracts, and so protected by the Constitution. (Nicoll v. N. Y. & E. R. R. Co., 12 N. Y. 121; 2 Kent, 307, note a; Ang. & Ames on Corp. § 307; Curran v. State of Arkansas, 15 How. 304.) The alleged irregularities in the organization of the Broadway Surface Railroad Company have no relevancy to the questions now presented to the court, and furnished no ground for annulling its corporate existence by legislative act. (Kent v. Quicksilver Co., 78 N. Y. 159; Davidson v. Westch. Gaslight Co., 99 id. 558.) This case is governed by the doctrine, that where the corporate act is in its external aspect within the general powers of the company, and is only unauthorized because it is done with a secret unauthorized intent, this wrongful intent is no defense against a stranger who dealt with the company without notice of such intent. (Ellsworth v. St. L., Alt. & T. H. R. R. Co., 98 N. Y. 553; New Providence v. Halsey, 117 U. S. 336.)

Edward Winslow Paige for Mr. Palmer, trustee, etc., respondent. By the contract made by the resolution of the common council of the 5th of December, 1884, and the various instruments of acceptance by the Broadway Surface Railroad

Statement of case.

Company, a right for valuable consideration was granted to run passenger railroad cars perpetually upon Broadway. That right was a hereditament which is real estate and, of course, property. (Mayor, etc v. Second Ave. R. R. Co., 32 N. Y. 261, 271, 273; Brooklyn Cent. R. R. Co. v. Brooklyn City R. R. Co., 32 Barb. 358, 364; State v. Mayor, etc., 3 Duer, 119, 130-132, 145-151; Davis v. Mayor, etc., 4 Kern. 506, 532; People Sturtevant, 5 Seld. 263, 273; Milhau v. Sharp, 27 N. Y. 611, 620-622; Howlet v. Belden, Gen'l Term, 4th Dept.; Sixth Ave. R. R. Co. v. Kerr, 72 N. Y. 330, 332; New Orleans, etc., R. R. Co. v. Delamore, 114 U. S. 501.) The instrument in question in this case is a grant of a right of way for a railroad, an incorporeal hereditament, i. e., property. (People v. Sturtevant, 5 Seld. 263, 273; Sixth Ave. R. R. Co. v. Kerr, 72 N. Y. 330, 332; New Orleans, etc., R. R. v. Delamore, 114 U. S. 501.) It could not be revoked nor in any way changed by the grantor, i. e., the city. (Mayor, etc. v. Second Ave. R. R. Co., 32 N. Y. 261, 271, 273; Brooklyn Cent. R. R. Co. v. Brooklyn City R. R. Co., 32 Barb. 358, 364; Milhau v. Sharp, 27 N. Y. 611, 622; State v. Mayor, etc., 3 Duer, 119, 145, 151; New Orleans, etc., R. R. Co. v. Delamore, 114 U. S. 501.) Nor by the state, so far as the state was interested in the real estate granted. (Beekman v. S. & S. R. R. Co., 3 Paige, 45, 72; Danolds v. State, 89 N. Y. 36; Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87, 136-139.) The thing granted was not an interest personal merely to the Broadway Surface Railroad Company, but it was and is an interest assignable, like any other interest in real estate. People v. Brooklyn, F. & C. I. R. Co., 89 N. Y. 75, 83, 84, 85, 90, 91; Metz v. Buffalo, C. & P. R. R. Co., 58 id. 61; New Orleans, etc., R. R. Co. v. Delamore, 114 U. S. 501.) The grant being irrevocable by the grantor not personal to the Broadway Surface Company — assignable, and containing no words of limitation, is perpetual. (State v. Mayor, etc., 3 Duer, 119, 130, 131, 145-150; Davis v. Mayor, etc., 14 N. Y. 506, 532; People v. Sturtevant, 9 id. 263, 273; Milhau v. Sharp, 27 id. 611, 620-622; Brooklyn Cent. Co.

Statement of case.

v. Brooklyn City Co., 32 Barb. 358, 364.) By the provision of the general street act (Chap. 252, Laws of 1884), put into effect by the resolution of the common council of the 5th of December, 1884, the various instruments of acceptance and the order of the General Term, there was granted, for a valuable consideration, the franchise to perpetually use the right of way upon the street Broadway for the operation of a railroad. That franchise is property. (Mayor, etc. v. Second Ave. R. R. Co., 32 N. Y. 261, 271, 273; Brooklyn Cent. R. R. Co. v. Brooklyn City R. R. Co., 32 Barb. 358, 363; Davis v. Mayor, etc., 4 Kern, 506, 523, 524; Milhau v. Sharp, 27 N. Y. 611, 618, 620.) The mortgages executed by the Broadway Surface Company were valid and effectual to bind all the property of that company, including the right of way and the franchise over the street Broadway. (Van Cott v. Vun Brunt, 82 N. Y. 535, 539-541.) Sections 2 and 3 of chapter 271, Laws of 1886, which provide for the resale of the right of way and the franchise, for the benefit of the city of New York; and the provision in section 5 of chapter 310, Laws of 1886, to the effect that no claim or demand "shall be allowed for any greater amount than the money value of the consideration therefor," are unconstitutional and void. (Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700; Comm. v. Essex Co., 13 Gray, 239, 253; Albany Northern Co. v. Brownell, 24 N. Y. 345, 350–353; Chap. 140, Laws of 1850, § 28, sub. 10, as amended by chap. 133, Laws of 1880; Chap. 444, Laws of 1857, § 1; New Orleans, etc., R. K. Co. v. Delamore, 114 U. S. 501, 510.) The contracts made with the Broadway and Seventh Avenue Company and the Twenty-third Street Company are valid and still subsisting. (People v. B. F. & R. R. Co., 89 N. Y. 75, 91; Woodruff v. Erie R. Co., 93 id. 609; Day v. Ogdens burg & L. C. R. R. Co., 13 N. E. Rep. 765; Fisher v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co., 46 N. Y. 664.) The act of 1884 deals with "leases" and "transfers" only. At the time of its passage there was no law in New York authorizing the lease of a railroad, and there is none now but this. (T. . B. R. R. Co. v. B., II. T. & W. R. Co., 86 N. Y. 107; Chicago

Statement of case.

R. R. Co. v. Iowa, 4 Otto, 155, 162; Day v. Town of New Lots, 13 N. E. Rep. 915, 918; Wright v. Delafield, 25 N. Y. 266; Neudecker v. Kohlberg, 81 id. 296, 301; Edmonstone v. McLoud, 16 id. 543.) There is no one here who is in a posi tion to raise the question as to the validity of the contract. (Att'y-Gen. v. Reynolds, 1 Eq. Cas. Ab. 131; Att'y-Gen. v. Utica Ins. Co., 2 J. C. R. 370; Att'y-Gen'l v. Bank of Niagara, Hopk. 354; U. S. Trust Co. v. N. Y., W. S. & B. R. Co., 101 N. Y. 478, 483; Att'y-Gen. v. Tudor Ice Co., 104 Mass. 239; Bissell v. M. S. & N. I. R. R. Co., 22 N. Y. 258, 281; Whitney Arms Co. v. Barlow, 63 id. 62, 68-70; At. State Bk. v. Savery, 82 id. 291, 307; Woodruff v. Erie R. Co., 93 id. 609, 618, 619; Rider Life Raft Co. v. Roach, 97 id. 378, 381.) The tacit approval of the stockholders is equivalent to the vote and the filing of the certifi cate. (Kent v. Quicksilver Mining Co., 78 N. Y. 159; Zabriskie v. Cleveland, C. & C. R. R. Co., 23 How. 381, 396, 398; G. W. R. Co. v. Oxford, W. & W. R. Co., 3 De G., M. & G. 341; Greenpoint Sugar Co. v. Whiton, 69 N. Y. 328, 333; Rochester Savings Bk. v. Averell, 96 id. 467, 473, 475, 476; Veeder v. Mudgett, 95 id. 295, 310.) The agreements to pay the bonds are valid. (Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 9.) The death of the Broadway Surface Company has no effect upon the contracts. An artificial being can make a contract affecting its property, outlasting in time its own life, just as a human being can. (Nicoll v. N. Y. & E. R. R. Co., 12 N. Y. 121, 128.)

Thomas Allison for the Mayor, etc., respondent. The right to operate a railroad in any public street is a franchise which can be conferred only by the legislature. (Davis v. Mayor, etc., 14 N. Y. 506; People v. Kerr, 27 id. 188; Milhau v. Sharp, Id. 611, 619.) The agreements were leases within the meaning of section 15 of the act of 1884. (Langdon v. Mayor, etc., 93 N. Y. 129; Mayor, etc. v Broadway and Seventh Ave. R. R. Co., 97 id. 275; Burchfield v. Northern Cent R. R. Co., 57 Barb. 582; Hunt v. Comstock, 15 Wend.