And this is YOU who complain of the Clergy for "fubftituting Scurrility and Sophiftry, in the room of Reafon and Argu

cr ment.

You would make it appear, that this Doctrine is so much above the Power of Reafon, that therefore you cannot affent to it: But may we not more reafonably conclude, on the other Side, that as this Mystery is fo much above the Power of human Reason; therefore it cannot be of Man's Invention. The Reafon of Man could never have led him to imagine any thing about it, and confequently, if God had not been pleased to reveal it, it could n.ver have enter'd into any Man's Head to conceive it.

TM

d

You fay of Dr. n, that " he gives to, "and takes from Reafon, as he pleafes." And I tell you, that you give to Reason just what you please, and very ofte.. that which does not belong to Reason.

c P. 10.

F 2

d P. 7.

You

ce

You pretend to affirm, " on Principles of pure Reason, that God is an unoriginated, uncompounded, immaterial, and pure Spirit.", Does your natural Reafon teach you this? Alas! Without the Help of Divine Revelation, I cannot fee how your natural Reafon can arrive at any certain Knowledge concerning an immaterial Spirit; or indeed at any certain Truths relating to the Deity.

I freely confefs, my fhallow Reason has no Conception of Immateriality. Nor can I, from any Powers of my natural Reason, prefume to affirm, that the Deity has, or has not Organs of Senfation.

In all thefe Speculations, when I fet myself to work about Enquiries of this Sort, my Reason is at a Lofs, I can find no Place of Reft. Ought I not then to rejoice, that God hath been pleased to give me the Affiftance of Divine Revelation; ought I not thankfully to accept it, and make the best Use of it that I can, to fet me right, when I am thus

• P. 66.

in danger of being loft and bewilder'd in Perplexity and Doubting?

As Mr. Locke has faid, "I gratefully re"ceive and rejoice in the Light of Revelation, "which fets me at Reft in many Things; the "Manner whereof my poor Reafen can by no "Means make out to me."

Mr. Locke was as great a Master of Reason as this, or perhaps any other Age could ever boast of, and he has very learnedly and clearly proved, that we can have no adequate Ideas of an immaterial Spirit.

You will hardly deny Mr.Locke one of the firft Places among the rational Part of Mankind: I believe I may very fafely affirm, that that great Man has "done as much Honour to “human Nature," and that Reason shone as bright in him, as ever it did in any of the Deifts: And yet he has declared himself on the Side of revealed Religion; though he had no Interest to serve by it, nor any other Motive, but to do Justice to Truth.

f P. 5

If

If you would give yourself the Trouble to read his incomparable Effay on Human Understanding, with due Attention; and if the Line of your Understanding can reach to the Depth of his Reasonings, you may have an Opportunity of fetting yourself right in feveral Points, in which you appear at prefent to be mistaken.

But there are fome Parts of that excellent Work which I would more particularly recommend to your Confideration; as Book IV. Ch. 3. which treats of the Extent of human Knowledge And Ch. . of the fame Book, of Faith and Reason, and their diftinct Provinces. And if you are able to perceive the Strength of his Reasonings, you will foon difcover the Weakness of your own.

There you will find Mr.Locke arguing thus: "There being many Things, wherein we "have very imperfect Notions, or none at "all; and other Things, of whofe past, pre

sent, or future Existence, by the natural

"Ufe of our Faculties, we can have no "Knowledge

"Knowledge at all; thefe, as being beyond "the Discovery of our natural Faculties, and "above Reason, are, when revealed, the pro

per Matter of Faith. Thus, that Part of "the Angels rebelled against God, and thereby "loft their firft happy State; and that the "Dead fhall rife, and live again: Thefe, " and the like, being beyond the Discovery

1

of Reafon, are purely Matters of Faith; with which Reafon has, directly, nothing to "do."

This is Mr. Locke's Way of Reasoning.

And, if you will fet yourself to study this Point, you will find that there is a wide Difference between thofe Things which are beyond, or above the Power of Reason, and those Things which are repugnant to Reason : Whereas, you have all along endeavoured to confound thofe Things which are above Reafon, with those Things that are contrary to Reason; for you speak of every Point which you allow to be above Reason, as a Matter repugnant to Reason: I fay, which you allow to be above Reafon; for you endeavour to make