condition to exercise perfect independence of mind and action, it was provided that their removal should only take place for actual incapacity or infidelity to the trust, and to be followed by the president with an exposition of the causes of such removal, should it occur. It was proposed to establish subordinate boards in each of the states, under the same limitations and restrictions of the power of removal, which, with the central board, should receive, safely keep, and disburse, the public moneys; and in order to furnish a sound paper medium of exchange, the exchequer should retain of the revenues of the government a sum not to exceed five millions of dollars in specie, to be set apart as required by its operations, and to pay the public creditor, at his own option, either in specie or treasurynotes of denominations not less than five, nor exceeding one hundred dollars, which notes should be redeemed at the several places of issue, and to be receivable at all times and everywhere in payment of government dues; with a restraint upon such issue of bills that the same should not exceed the maximum of fifteen millions of dollars. In order to guard against all the hazards incident to fluctuations in trade, the secretary of the treasury was invested with authority to issue five millions of dollars of government stock, should the same at any time be regarded as necessary, in order to place beyond hazard the prompt redemption of the bills which might be thrown into circulation; thus in fact making the issue of fifteen millions of dollars of exchequer bills rest substantially on ten millions of dollars; and keeping in circulation more than one and one half dollars for every dollar in specie. When to this it is added that the bills are not only everywhere receivable in government dues, but that the government itself would be bound for their ultimate redemption, no rational doubt can exist that the paper which the exchequer would furnish would readily enter into the general circulation, and be maintained at all times at or above par with gold or silver; thereby realizing the great want of the age, and fulfilling the wishes of the people. In order to reimburse the government the expenses of the plan, it was proposed to invest the exchequer with a limited authority to deal in bills of exchange, unless prohibited by the state in which an agency might be situated, having only thirty days to run, and resting on a fair and bonafide basis. The legislative will on this point might be so plainly announced, as to avoid all pretext for partiality or favoritism. It was furthermore proposed to invest this treasury agent with authority to receive on deposite, to a limited amount, the specie funds of individuals, and to grant certificates therefor, to be redeemed on presentation, under the idea, which is believed to be well founded, that such certificates would come in aid of the exchequer bills in supplying a safe and ample paper circulation. Or, if in place of the contemplated dealings in exchange, the exchequer should be authorized, not only to exchange its bills for actual deposites of specie, but for specie or its equiva lent to sell drafts, charging therefor a small but reasonable premium, Ì can not doubt but that the benefits of the law would be speedily manifested in the revival of the credit, trade, and business of the whole country. Entertaining this opinion, it becomes my duty to urge its adoption upon Congress, by reference to the strongest considerations of the public interests, with such alterations in its details as Congress may in its wisdom see fit to make.

I am well aware that this proposed alteration and amendment of the laws establishing the treasury department has encountered various objections, and that among others it has been proclaimed a government bank

of fearful and dangerous import. It is proposed to confer upon it no extraordinary powers. It purports to do no more than pay the debts of the government with the redeemable paper of the government-in which respect it accomplishes precisely what the treasury does daily at this time, in issuing to the public creditors the treasury-notes which, under law, it is authorized to issue. It has no resemblance to an ordinary bank, as it furnishes no profits to private stockholders, and lends no capital to individuals. If it be objected to as a government bank, and the objection be available-then should all the laws in relation to the treasury be repealed, and the capacity of the government to collect what is due to it, or pay what it owes, be abrogated.

This is the chief purpose of the proposed exchequer; and surely if, in the accomplishment of a purpose so essential, it affords a sound circulating medium to the country, and facilities to trade, it should be regarded as no slight recommendation of it to public consideration. Properly guarded by the provisions of law, it can run into no dangerous evil, nor can any abuse arise under it but such as the legislature itself will be answerable for, if it be tolerated; since it is but the creature of the law, and is susceptible at all times of modification, amendment, or repeal, at the pleasure of Congress. I know that it has been objected that the system would be liable to be abused by the legislature, by whom alone it could be abused, in the party conflicts of the day. That such abuse would manifest itself in a change of the law which would authorize an excessive issue of paper for the purpose of inflating prices and winning popular favor. To that it may be answered, that the ascription of such a motive to Congress is altogether gratuitous and inadmissible. The theory of our institutions would lead us to a different conclusion. But a perfect security against a proceeding so reckless would be found to exist in the very nature of things. The political party which should be so blind to the true interests of the country as to resort to such an expedient, would inevitably meet with a final overthrow in the fact, that the moment the paper ceased to be convertible into specie, or otherwise promptly redeemed, it would become worthless, and would, in the end, dishonor the government, involve the people in ruin, and such political party in hopeless disgrace. At the same time, such a view involves the utter impossibility of furnishing any currency other than that of the precious metals; for, if the government itself can not forego the temptation of excessive paper issues, what reliance can be placed in corporations upon whom the temptation of individual aggrandizement would most strongly operate? The people would have to blame none but themselves for any injury that might arise from a course so reckless, since their agents would be the wrongdoers, and they the passive spec

tators.

There can be but three kinds of public currency. 1st, gold and silver; 2d, the paper of state institutions; or, 3d, a representative of the precious metals, provided by the general government, or under its authority. The sub-treasury system rejected the last in any form; and, as it was believed that no reliance could be placed on the issues of local institutions, for the purposes of general circulation, it necessarily and unavoidably adopted specie as the exclusive currency for its own use. And this must ever be the case unless one of the other kinds be used. The choice, in the present state of public sentiment, lies between an exclusive specie currency on the one hand, and government issues of some kind on the other. That these issues can not be made by a chartered institution, is supposed to be

conclusively settled. They must be made, then, directly by government agents. For several years past they have been thus made in the form of treasury-notes, and have answered a valuable purpose. Their usefulness has been limited by their being transient and temporary; their ceasing to bear interest at given periods, necessarily causes their speedy return, and thus restricts their range of circulation, and, being used only in the disbursements of the government, they can not reach those points where they are most required. By rendering their use permanent, to the moderate extent already mentioned, by offering no inducement for their return, and by exchanging them for coin and other values, they will constitute, to a certain extent, the general currency so much needed to maintain the internal trade of the country. And this is the exchequer plan, so far as it may operate in furnishing a currency.

I can not forego the occasion to urge its importance to the credit of the government in a financial point of view. The great necessity of resorting to every proper and becoming expedient in order to place the treasury on a footing of the highest respectability, is entirely obvious. The credit of the government may be regarded as the very soul of the government itself -a principle of vitality without which all its movements are languid, and all its operations embarrassed. In this spirit the executive felt itself bound by the most imperative sense of duty to submit to Congress, at its last session, the propriety of making a specific pledge of the land fund, as the basis for the negotiation of the loans authorized to be contracted. I then thought that such an application of the public domain would, without doubt, have placed at the command of the government ample funds to relieve the treasury from the temporary embarrassments under which it labored. American credit has suffered a considerable shock in Europe, from the large indebtedness of the states and the temporary inability of some of them to meet the interest on their debts. The utter and disas trous prostration of the United States bank of Pennsylvania, had contribu ted largely to increase the sentiment of distrust by reason of the loss and ruin sustained by the holders of its stock, a large portion of whom were foreigners, and many of whom were alike ignorant of our political organi zation, and of our actual responsibilities. It was the anxious desire of the executive that, in the effort to negotiate the loan abroad, the American negotiator might be able to point the money-lender to the fund mortgaged for the redemption of the principal and interest of any loan he might contract, and thereby vindicate the government from all suspicion of bad faith or inability to meet its engagements. Congress differed from the execu tive in this view of the subject. It became, nevertheless, the duty of the executive to resort to every expedient in its power to negotiate the authorized loan. After a failure to do so in the American market, a citizen of high character and talent was sent to Europe with no better success; and thus the mortifying spectacle has been presented, of the inability of this government to obtain a loan so small as not in the whole to amount to more than one fourth of its ordinary annual income; at a time when the governments of Europe, although involved in debt, and with their subjects heavily burdened with taxation, readily obtained loans of any amount at a greatly reduced rate of interest. It would be unprofitable to look further into this anomalous state of things, but I can not conclude without adding that, for a government which has paid off its debts of two wars with the largest maritime power of Europe, and now owing a debt which is almost next to nothing when compared with its boundless

resources, a government the strongest in the world, because emanating from the popular will, and firmly rooted in the affections of a great and free people, and whose fidelity to its engagements has never been questioned; for such a government to have tendered to the capitalists of other countries an opportunity for a small investment of its stocks, and yet to have failed, implies either the most unfounded distrust in its good faith, or a purpose, to obtain which the course pursued is the most fatal which could have been adopted. It has now become obvious to all men that the government must look to its own means for supplying its wants; and it is consoling to know that these means are altogether adequate for the object. The exchequer, if adopted, will greatly aid in bringing about this result. Upon what I regard as a well-founded supposition that its bills would be readily sought for by the public creditors, and that the issue would in a short time reach the maximum of fifteen millions of dollars, it is obvious that ten millions of dollars would thereby be added to the available means of the treasury without cost or charge. Nor can I fail to urge the great and beneficial effect which would be produced in aid of all the active pursuits of life. Its effects upon the solvent state banks, while it would force into liquidation those of an opposite character, through its weekly settlements, would be highly beneficial; and with the advantages of a sound currency, the restoration of confidence and credit would follow, with a numerous train of blessings. My convictions are most strong that these benefits would flow from the adoption of this measure; but if the result should be adverse, there is this security in connexion with it, that the law creating it may be repealed at the pleasure of the legislature, without the slightest implication of its good faith.

I recommend to Congress to take into consideration the propriety of reimbursing a fine imposed on General Jackson at New Orleans at the time of the attack and defence of that city, and paid by him. Without designing any reflection on the judicial tribunal which imposed the fine, the remission at this day may be regarded as not unjust or inexpedient. The voice of the civil authority was heard amid the glitter of arms, and obeyed by those who held the sword, thereby giving additional lustre to a memorable military achievement. If the laws were offended, their majesty was fully vindicated; and although the penalty incurred and paid is worthy of little regard in a pecuniary point of view, it can hardly be doubted that it would be gratifying to the war-worn veteran, now in retirement and in the winter of his days, to be relieved from the circumstances in which that judgment placed him. There are cases in which the public function aries may be called on to weigh the public interest against their own personal hazards, and if the civil law be violated from praiseworthy motives, or an overruling sense of public danger and public necessity, punishment may well be restrained within that limit which asserts and maintains the authority of the law, and the subjection of the military to the civil power. The defence of New Orleans, while it saved the city from the hands of the enemy, placed the name of General Jackson among those of the greatest captains of the age, and illustrated one of the brightest pages of our history. Now that the causes of excitement, existing at that time, have ceased to operate, it is believed that the remission of this fine, and whatever of gratification that remission might cause the eminent man who incurred and paid it, would be in accordance with the general feeling and wishes of the American people.

I have thus, fellow-citizens, acquitted myself of my duty under the con

stitution, by laying before you, as succinctly as I have been able, the state of the Union, and by inviting your attention to measures of much importance to the country. The executive will most zealously unite its efforts with those of the legislative department in the accomplishment of all that is required to relieve the wants of a common constituency, or elevate the destinies of a beloved country.

SPECIAL MESSAGE.

DECEMBER 14, 1842.

To the House of Representatives of the United States :—

Two bills were presented to me at the last session of Congress, which originated in the house of representatives, neither of which was signed by me, and both having been preseuted within ten days of the close of the session, neither has become a law.

The first of these was a bill, entitled, "An act to repeal the proviso of the sixth section of the act entitled, 'An act to appropriate the proceeds of the sales of the public lands, and to grant pre-emption rights,' approved September 4th, one thousand eight hundred and forty-one."

The bill was presented to me on Tuesday, the 30th August, at twentyfour minutes after four o'clock in the afternoon. For my opinions relative to the provisions contained in this bill, it is only necessary that I should refer to previous communications made by me to the house of rep resentatives.

The other bill was entitled, "An act regulating the taking of the testimony in cases of contested elections, and for other purposes.' This bill was presented to me at a quarter past one o'clock, on Wednesday, the 31st day of August. The two houses, by concurrent vote, had already agreed to terminate the session by adjournment at two o'clock on that day; that is to say, within three quarters of an hour from the time the bill was placed in my hands. It was a bill containing twenty-seven sections, and, I need not say, of an important nature.

On its presentment to me, its reading was immediately commenced, but was interrupted by so many communications from the senate, and so many other causes operating at the last hour of the session, that it was impossi ble to read the bill understandingly, and with proper deliberation, before the hour fixed for the adjournment of the two houses; and this, I presume, is a sufficient reason for neither signing the bill nor returning it with my objections.

The 17th joint rule of the two houses of Congress declares, that "no bill or resolution that shall have passed the house of representatives and the senate, shall be presented to the president of the United States for his approbation, on the last day of the session.

This rule was evidently designed to give to the president a reasonable opportunity of perusing important acts of Congress, and giving them some degree of consideration, before signing or returning the same.

It is true that the two houses have been in the habit of suspending this rule, toward the close of the session, in relation to particular bills; and it appears by the printed journal, that, by concurrent votes of the two houses, passed on the last day of the session, the rule was agreed to be