compose this extensive confederacy, must be admitted. Those diversities arising from situation, climate, population, and pursuits, are doubtless, as it is natural they should be, greatly exaggerated by jealousies, and that spirit of rivalry so inseparable from neighboring communities. These circumstances make it the duty of those who are intrusted with the management of its affairs, to neutralize their effects as far as practicable, by making the beneficial operation of the federal government as equal and equitable among the several states as can be done consistently with the great ends of its institution.

It is only necessary to refer to undoubted facts, to see how far the past acts of the government upon the subject under consideration have fallen short of this object. The expenditures heretofore made for internal improvements amount to upward of five millions of dollars, and have been distributed in very unequal proportions among the states. The estimated expense of works, of which surveys have been made, together with that of others projected and partially surveyed, amounts to more than ninety-six millions of dollars.

That such improvements, on account of particular circumstances, may be more advantageously and beneficially made in some states than in others, is doubtless true; but that they are of a character which should prevent an equitable distribution of the funds among the several states, is not to be conceded. The want of this equitable distribution can not fail to prove a prolific source of irritation among the states.

We have it constantly before our eyes, that profession of superior zeal in the cause of internal improvement, and a disposition to lavish the public funds upon objects of this character, are daily and earnestly put forth by aspirants to power, as constituting the highest claims to the confidence of the people. Would it be strange, under such circumstances, and in times of great excitement, that grants of this description should find their motives in objects which may not accord with the public good? Those who have not had occasion to see and regret the indication of a sinister influence in these matters in past times, have been more fortunate than myself in their observations of the course of public affairs. If to these evils be added the combinations and angry contentions to which such a course of things gives rise, with their baleful influences upon the legislation of Congress, touching the leading and appropriate duties of the federal government, it was but doing justice to the character of our people to expect the severe condemnation of the past, which the recent exhibition of public sentiment has evinced.

Nothing short of a radical change in the action of the government upon the subject can, in my opinion, remedy the evil. If, as it would be natural to expect, the states which have been least favored in past appropriations should insist on being redressed in those hereafter to be made, at the expense of the states which have so largely and disproportionately participated, we have, as matters now stand, but little security that the attempt would do more than change the inequality from one quarter to another.

Thus viewing the subject, I have heretofore felt it my duty to recommend the adoption of some plan for the distribution of the surplus funds, which may at any time remain in the treasury after the national debt shall have been paid, among the states, in proportion to the number of their representatives, to be applied by them to objects of internal improvement.

Although this plan has met with favor in some portions of the Union, it has also elicited objections which merit deliberate consideration. A brief

notice of these objections here, will not therefore, I trust, be regarded as out of place.

They rest, as far as they have come to my knowledge, on the following grounds: 1st, an objection to the ratio of distribution; 2d, an apprehension that the existence of such a regulation would produce an improvident and oppressive taxation to raise the funds for distribution; 3d, that the mode proposed would lead to the construction of works of a local nature, to the exclusion of such as are general, and as would consequently be of a more useful character; and last, that it would create a discreditable and injurious dependence on the part of the state governments upon the federal power. Of those who object to the ratio of representation as the basis of distribution, some insist that the importations of the respective states would constitute one that would be more equitable; and others again, that the extent of their respective territories would furnish a standard which would be more expedient and sufficiently equitable. The ratio of representation presented itself to my mind, and it still does, as one of obvious equity, because of its being the ratio of contribution, whether the funds to be distributed be derived from the customs or from direct taxation. It does not follow, however, that its adoption is indispensable to the establishment of the system proposed. There may be considerations appertaining to the subject which would render a departure, to some extent, from the rule of contribution proper. Nor is it absolutely necessary that the basis of distribution be confined to one ground. It may, if, in the judgment of those whose right it is to fix it, it be deemed politic and just to give it that character, have regard to several. In my first message, I stated it to be my opinion that "it is not probable that any adjustment of the tariff upon principles satisfactory to the people of the Union will, until a remote period, if ever, leave the government without a considerable surplus in the treasury beyond what may be required for its current service." I have had no cause to change that opinion, but much to confirm it. Should these expectations be realized, a suitable fund would thus be produced for the plan under consideration to operate upon; and if there be no such fund, its adoption will, in my opinion, work no injury to any interest; for I can not assent to the justness of the apprehension that the establishment of the proposed system would tend to the encouragement of improvident legislation of the character supposed. Whatever the proper authority in the exercise of constitutional power shall at any time hereafter decide to be for the general good, will, in that as in other respects, deserve and receive the acquiescence and support of the whole country; and we have ample security that every abuse of power in that regard by the agents of the people will receive a speedy and effectual corrective at their hands. The views which I take of the future, founded on the obvious and increasing improvement of all classes of our fellowcitizens, in intelligence, and in public and private virtue, leave me without much apprehension on that head.

I do not doubt that those who come after us will be as much alive as we are to the obligation upon all the trustees of political power to exempt those for whom they act from all unnecessary burdens; and as sensible of the great truth, that the resources of the nation, beyond those required for the immediate and necessary purposes of government, can nowhere be so well deposited as in the pockets of the people.

It may sometimes happen that the interests of particular states would not be deemed to coincide with the general interests in relation to improvement within such state. But, if the danger to be apprehended from this source

is sufficient to require it, a discretion might be reserved to Congress to direct, to such improvement of a general character as the states concerned might not be disposed to unite in, the application of the quotas of those states, under the restriction of confining to each state the expenditure of its appropriate quota. It may, however, be assumed as a safe general rule, that such improvements as serve to increase the prosperity of the respective states in which they are made, by giving new facilities to trade, and thereby augmenting the wealth and comfort of their inhabitants, constitute the surest mode of conferring permanent and substantial advantages upon the whole. The strength, as well as the true glory of the confederacy, is founded on the prosperity and power of the several independent sovereignties of which it is composed, and the certainty with which they can be brought into successful active co-operation, through the agency of the federal government.

It is, moreover, within the knowledge of such as are at all conversant with public affairs, that schemes of internal improvement have from time to time been proposed, which, from their extent and seeming magnificence, were regarded as of national concernment; but which, upon fuller consideration and further experience, would now be rejected with great unanimity.

That the plan under consideration would derive important advantages from its certainty; and that the moneys set apart for these purposes would be more judiciously applied and economically expended under the direction of the state legislatures, in which every part of each state is immediately represented, can not, I think, be doubted. In the new states particularly, where a comparatively small population is scattered over an extensive surface, and the representation in Congress consequently very limited, it is natural to expect that the appropriations made by the federal government would be more likely to be expended in the vicinity of those members through whose immediate agency they were obtained, than if the funds were placed under the control of the legislature, in which every county of the state has its own representative. This supposition does not necessarily impugn the motives of such congressional representatives, nor is it so intended. We are all sensible of the bias to which the strongest minds and purest hearts are, under such circumstances, liable. In respect to the last objection, its probable effect upon the dignity and independence of the state governments, it appears to me only necessary to state the case as it is, and as it would be if the measures proposed were adopted, to show that the operation is most likely to be the very reverse of that which the objection supposes.

In the one case, the state would receive its quota of the national revenue for domestic use upon a fixed principle, as a matter of right, and from a fund to the creation of which it had itself contributed its fair proportion. Surely there could be nothing derogatory in that. As matters now stand, the states themselves, in their sovereign character, are not unfrequently petitioners at the bar of the federal legislature for such allowances out of the national treasury as it may comport with their pleasure or sense of duty to bestow upon them. It can not require argument to prove which of the two courses is most compatible with the efficiency or respectability of the state governments.

But all these are matters for discussion and dispassionate consideration. That the desired adjustment would be attended with difficulty, affords no reason why it should not be attempted. The effective operation of such mo

tives would have prevented the adoption of the constitution under which we have so long lived, and under the benign influence of which our beloved country has so signally prospered. The framers of that sacred instrument had greater difficulties to overcome; and they did overcome them. The patriotism of the people, directed by a deep conviction of the importance of the Union, produced mutual concession and reciprocal forbearance. Strict right was merged in a spirit of compromise, and the result has consecrated their disinterested devotion to the general weal. Unless the American people have degenerated, the same result can be again effected, whenever experience points out the necessity of a resort to the same means to uphold the fabric which their fathers had reared. It is beyond the power of man to make a system of government like ours, or any other, operate with precise equality upon states situated like those which compose this confederacy; nor is inequality always injustice. Every state can not expect to shape the measures of the general government to suit its own particular interests. The causes which prevent it are seated in the nature of things, and can not be entirely counteracted by human means. Mutual forbearance, therefore, becomes a duty obligatory upon all; and we may, I am confident, count upon a cheerful compliance with this high injunction on the part of our constituents. It is not to be supposed that they will object to make such comparatively inconsiderable sacrifices for the preservation of rights and privileges which other less-favored portions of the world have in vain waded through seas of blood to acquire.

Our course is a safe one, if it be but faithfully adhered to. Acquiescence in the constitutionally-expressed will of the majority, and the exercise of that will in a spirit of moderation, justice, and brotherly kindness, will constitute a cement which would for ever preserve our Union. Those who cherish and inculcate sentiments like these, render a most essential service to their country; while those who seek to weaken their influence are, however conscientious and praiseworthy their intentions, in effect, its worst enemies.

If the intelligence and influence of the country, instead of laboring to foment sectional prejudices, to be made subservient to party warfare, were in good faith applied to the eradication of causes of local discontent, by the improvement of our institutions, and by facilitating their adaptation to the condition of the times, this task would prove one of less difficulty. May we not hope that the obvious interests of our common country, and the dictates of an enlightened patriotism, will, in the end, lead the public mind in that direction.

After all, the nature of the subject does not admit of a plan wholly free from objection. That which has for some time been in operation, is, perhaps, the worst that could exist; and every advance that can be made in its improvement is a matter eminently worthy of your most deliberate attention.

It is very possible that one better calculated to effect the objects in view may yet be devised. If so, it is to be hoped, that those who disapprove of the past, and dissent from what is proposed for the future, will feel it their duty to direct their attention to it, as they must be sensible that, unless some fixed rule for the action of the federal government in this respect is established, the course now attempted to be arrested will be again resorted to. Any mode which is calculated to give the greatest degree of effect and harmony to our legislation upon the subject-which shall best serve to keep the movements of the federal government within the sphere intended by those

who modelled, and those who adopted it-which shall lead to the extinguishment of the national debt in the shortest period, and impose the lightest burdens upon our constituents, shall receive from me a cordial and firm support.

Among the objects of great national concern, I can not omit to press again upon your attention that part of the constitution which regulates the election of president and vice-president. The necessity for its amendment is made so clear to my mind by the observation of its evils, and by the many able discussions which they have elicited on the floor of Congress and elsewhere, that I should be wanting in my duty were I to withhold another expression of my deep solicitude upon the subject. Our system fortunately contemplates a recurrence to first principles, differing in this respect from all that have preceded it, and securing it, I trust, equally against the decay and the commotions which have marked the progress of other governments. Our fellow-citizens, too, who, in proportion to their love of liberty, keep a steady eye upon the means of sustaining it, do not require to be reminded of the duty they owe to themselves, to remedy all essential defects in so vital a part of their system. While they are sensible that every evil attendant upon its operation is not necessarily indicative of a bad organization, but may proceed from temporary causes, yet the habitual presence, or even a single instance of evils which can be clearly traced to an organic defect, will not, I trust, be overlooked through a too scrupulous veneration for the work of their ancestors. The constitution was an experiment committed to the virtue and intelligence of the great mass of our countrymen, in whose ranks the framers of it themselves were to perform the part of patriotic observation and scrutiny: and if they have passed from the stage of existence with an increased confidence in its general adaptation to our condition, we should learn from authority so high, the duty of fortifying the points in it which time proves to be exposed, rather than be deterred from approaching them by the suggestions of fear, or the dictates of misplaced reverence.

A provision which does not secure to the people a direct choice of their chief magistrate, but has a tendency to defeat their will, presented to my mind such an inconsistency with the general spirit of our institutions, that I was induced to suggest for your consideration the substitute which appeared to me, at the same time, the most likely to correct the evil, and to meet the views of our constituents. The most mature reflection since, has added strength to the belief that the best interests of our country require the speedy adoption of some plan calculated to effect this end. A contingency which sometimes places it in the power of a single member of the house of representatives to decide an election of so high and solemn a character, is unjust to the people; and becomes, when it occurs, a source of embarrassment to the individuals thus brought into power, and a cause of distrust of the representative body. Liable as the confederacy is, from its great extent, to parties founded upon sectional interests, and to corresponding multiplication of candidates for the presidency, the tendency of the constitutional reference to the house of representatives, is to devolve the election upon that body in almost every instance; and, whatever choice may then be made among the candidates thus presented to them, to swell the influence of particular interests to a degree inconsistent with the general good. The consequences of this feature of the constitution appear far more threatening to the peace and integrity of the Union, than any which I can con