time to time, without any departure from the principle now asserted, until the state governments shall derive all the funds necessary for their support from the treasury of the United States; or, if a sufficient supply should be obtained by some states and not by others, the deficient states might complain, and to put an end to all further difficulty, Congress, without assuming any new principle, need go but one step further and put the salaries of all the state governors, judges, and other officers, with a sufficient sum for other expenses, in their general appropriation bill.

It appears to me that a more direct road to consolidation can not be devised. Money is power, and in that government which pays all the public officers of the states, will all political power be substantially concentrated. The state governments, if governments they might be called, would lose all their independence and dignity-the economy which now distinguishes them would be converted into a profusion, limited only by the extent of the supply. Being the dependants of the general government, and looking to its treasury as the source of all their emoluments, the state officers, under whatever names they might pass, and by whatever forms their duties might be prescribed, would in effect be the mere stipendiaries and instruments of the central power.

I am quite sure that the intelligent people of our several states will be satisfied, on a little reflection, that it is neither wise nor safe to release the members of their local legislatures from the responsibility of levying the taxes necessary to support their state governments and vest it in Congress, over most of whose members they have no control.

They will not think it expedient that Congress shall be the tax-gatherer and paymaster of all their state governments, thus amalgamating all their officers into one mass of common interest and common feeling. It is too obvious that such a course would subvert our well-balanced system of government, and ultimately deprive us of all the blessings now derived from our happy Union.

However willing I might be, that any unavoidable surplus in the treasury should be returned to the people through their state governments, I can not assent to the principle that a surplus may be created for the purpose of distribution. Viewing this bill as in effect assuming the right, not only to create a surplus for that purpose, but to divide the contents of the treasury among the states without limitation, from whatever source they may be derived, and asserting the power to raise and appropriate money for the support of every state government and institution, as well as for making every local improvement, however trivial, I can not give it my

assent.

It is difficult to perceive what advantages would accrue to the old states or the new, from the system of distribution which this bill proposes, if it were otherwise objectionable. It requires no argument to prove that, if three millions of dollors a year, or any other sum, shall be taken out of the treasury by this bill for distribution, it must be replaced by the same sum collected from the people through some other means. The old states will receive annually a sum of money from the treasury, but they will pay in a larger sum, together with the expense of collection and distribution. It is only their proportion of seven-eighths of the proceeds of land sales which they are to receive, but they must pay their due proportion of the whole. Disguise it as we may, the bill proposes to them a dead loss, in the ratio of eight to seven, in addition to expenses and other incidental losses. This assertion is not the less true because it may not at first be palpable.

Their receipts will be in large sums, but their payments in small ones. The governments of the states will receive seven dollars for which the people of the states will pay eight. The large sums received will be palpable to the senses; the small sums paid, it requires thought to identify. But a little consideration will satisfy the people that the effect is the same as if seven hundred dollars were given them from the public treasury, for which they were at the same time required to pay in taxes, direct or indirect, eight hundred.

I deceive myself greatly if the new states would find their interests promoted by such a system as this bill proposes. Their true policy consists in the rapid settling and improvement of the waste lands within their limits. As a means of hastening those events, they have long been looking to a reduction in the price of public lands upon the final payment of the national debt. The effect of the proposed system would be to prevent that reduction. It is true, the bill reserves to Congress the power to reduce the price, but the effect of its details, as now arranged, would probably be for ever to prevent its exercise.

With the just men who inhabit the new states, it is a sufficient reason to reject this system, that it is in violation of the fundamental laws of the republic and its constitution. But if it were a mere question of interest or expediency, they would still reject it. They would not sell their bright prospects of increasing wealth and growing power at such a price. They would not place a sum of money to be paid into their treasuries, in competition with the settlement of their waste lands, and the increase of their population. They would not consider a small or a large annual sum to be paid to their governments and immediately expended, as an equivalent for that enduring wealth which is composed of flocks and herds, and cultivated farms. No temptation will allure them from that object of abiding interest, the settlement of their waste lands, and the increase of a hardy race of free citizens, their glory in peace, and their defence in war.

On the whole, I adhere to the opinion expressed by me in my annual message of 1832, that it is our true policy that the public lands shall cease as soon as practicable to be a source of revenue, except for the payment of those general charges which grow out of the acquisition of the lands, their survey and sale. Although these expenses have not been met by the proceeds of sales heretofore, it is quite certain they will be hereafter, even after a considerable reduction in the price. By meeting in the treasury so much of the general charge as arises from that source, they will hereafter, as they have been heretofore, be disposed of for the common benefit of the United States, according to the compacts of cession. I do not doubt that it is the real interest of each and all the states in the Union, and particularly of the new states, that the price of these lands shall be reduced and graduated, and that after they have been offered for a certain number of years, the refuse remaining unsold shall be abandoned to the states, and the machinery of our land system entirely withdrawn. It can not be supposed the compacts intended that the United States should retain for ever a title to lands within the states which are of no value, and no doubt is entertained that the general interest would be best promoted by surrendering such lands to the This plan for disposing of the public lands impairs no principle, violates no compact, and deranges no system. Already has the price of those lands been reduced from two dollars per acre to one dollar and a quarter, and upon the will of Congress, it depends whether there shall be a further reduction. While the burdens of the east are diminishing by the reduction of the duties upon imports, it seems but equal justice that the chief burden of the west should be lightened in an equal degree at least. It would be just to the old states and the new, conciliate every interest, disarm the subject of all its dangers, and add another guaranty to the perpetuity of our happy Union.

states.

Sensible, however, of the difficulties which surround this important subject, I can only add to my regrets, at finding myself again compelled to disagree with the legislative power, the sincere declaration that any plan which shall promise a final and satisfactory disposition of the question, and be compatible with the constitution and public faith, shall have my hearty concurrence.

Alabama admitted to the Union.. 1508, 551 Arkansas admitted into the Union. {197