tention, which may be very small, but that which belongs to the common nature of the fpecies. The final caufe of that regulation will appear upon confidering, that were reparation to depend upon perfonal circumstances, there would be a neceffity of enquiring into the character of individuals, their education, their manner of living, and the extent of their understanding; which would render judges arbitrary, and fuch law-fuits inextricable. But by affuming the common nature of the species as a standard, by which every man in confcience judges of his own actions, law-fuits about reparation are rendered eafy and expeditious.

SECT.

VIII.

Liberty and Neceffity confidered with respect to Morality.

HAving in the foregoing fections afcer

tained the reality of a moral fenfe, with its fentiments of approbation and difapprobation,

approbation, praife and blame; the purpose of the prefent fection is, to fhew, that these sentiments are confiftent with the laws that govern the actions of man as a rational being. In order to which, it is first neceffary to explain thefe laws; for there has been much controverfy about them, especially among divines of the Arminian and Calvinift fects.

Human actions, as laid down in the first fection, are of three kinds : one, where we act by inftinct, without any view to confequences; one, where we act by will in order to produce fome effect; and one, where we act against will. With respect to the first, the agent acts blindly, without deliberation or choice; and the external act follows neceffarily from the instinctive impulse *. Actions

A ftonechatter makes its neft on the ground or near it; and the young, as foon as they can shift for themselves, leave the neft inftinctively. An egg of that bird was laid in a swallow's neft, fixed to the roof of a church. The fwallow fed all the young equally, without distinction. The young ftone

chatter left the neft at the ufual time before it could fly; and falling to the ground, it was taken up dead. Here is instinct in purity, exerting itself

blindly

It is

Actions done with a view to an end, are in a very different condition: into thefe, defire, and will, enter: defire to accomplish the end goes firft; the will to act in order to accomplish the end, is next; and the external act follows of courfe. the will then that governs every external act done as a mean to an end; and it is defire to accomplish the end that puts the will in motion; defire in this view being commonly termed the motive to act. Thus, hearing that my friend is in the hands of robbers, I burn with defire to free him: defire influences my will to arm my fervants, and to fly to his relief. Actions done against will come in afterward.

But what is it that raifes defire? The answer is ready: it is the prospect of attaining fome agreeable end, or of avoiding one that is difagreeable. And if it be enquired, What makes an object agreeable or difagreeable; the answer is equalblindly without regard to variation of circumstances. The fame is obfervable in our dunghill-fowl. They feed on worms, corn, and other feeds dropt on the ground. In order to difcover their food, nature has provided them with an inftinct to scrape with the foot; and the inftinct is fo regularly exercised, that they fcrape even when they are fet upon a heap of corn.

ly

ly ready, that our nature makes it fo. Certain vifible objects are agreeable, certain founds, and certain fmells: other objects of these fenfes are difagreeable. But there we must stop; for we are far from being fo intimately acquainted with our own nature as to affign the causes. These hints are fufficient for my present purpofe if one be curious to know more, the theory of defire, and of agreeableness and disagreeablenefs, will be found in Elements of Criticism (a).

་

With respect to instinctive actions, no person, I prefume, thinks that there is any freedom: an infant applies to the nipple, and a bird builds a neft, no lefs neceffarily than a stone falls to the ground. With respect to voluntary actions, done in order to produce fome effect, the neceffity is the fame, tho' lefs apparent at firft view. The external action is determined by the will the will is determined by defire: and defire by what is agreeable or difagreeable. Here is a chain of caufes and effects, not one link of which is arbitrary, or under command of the agent: he cannot will but according to his defire: he cannot defire but

(a) Chap. 2.

according

according to what is agreeable or disagreeable in the objects perceived: nor do thefe qualities depend on his inclination or fancy; he has no power to make a beautiful woman ugly, nor to make a rotten carcafe fmell fweetly.

Many good men apprehending danger to morality from holding our actions to be neceffary, endeavour to break the chain of caufes and effects above mentioned, maintaining, "That whatever influence "defire or motives may have, it is the a

gent himself who is the cause of every CC action ; that defire may advife, but 66 cannot command; and therefore that a

man is ftill free to act in contradiction

to defire and to the strongest motives." That a being may exist, which in every cafe acts blindly and arbitrarily, without having any end in view, I can make a fhift to conceive: but it is difficult for me even to imagine a thinking and rational being, that has affections and paffions, that has a defirable end in view, that can easily accomplish this end; and yet, after all, can fly off, or remain at reft, without any cause, reafon, or motive, to fway it. If fuch a whimfical being can poffibly ex