representing one interest. The grant to both being treated as an undivided grant, and the lands withdrawn under it equally liable to selection on account of either line. The lands so certified will be patented upon proper application to this Department. This action was, I think, required by the law, and the same principle should govern the future adjustment of the grant throughout the entire length of the branch road. I am very clear that a withdrawal for the main line should not be construed as a reservation against its branch. What would be the result were the roads separate and distinct, claiming under separate grants, is another question which is not necessary to consider in this connection.

The partition of interests and management of the two roads, and the appointment of a receiver for the branch line by the U. S. circuit court for the district of Minnesota by order of August 1, 1873, is immaterial for the purposes of this case.

I think this point well taken by counsel, and that it is decisive of the case: that if the lands in dispute have been selected in accordance with the principle herein indicated, the lists must be approved and the lands in due course patented to the State for the company.

Your decision is accordingly reversed and the papers in the case transmitted with your letter of June 11th, 1875, are herewith returned.

It was after this decision was made that much of the branch line, so called, extending northwesterly toward the Canadian province of Manitoba, was built. The rule so laid down has from that time until the present governed the adjustment of the grant, invited the expenditure of money for construction, and, having remained unchallenged in any particular, must be regarded as having been taken into account in every estimate of the aid given by the government to induce the fulfilment of the project, so that it fairly comes within the principle which for bids the change of a construction that has been accepted as a rule of property.

In considering the question which you have submitted to me for advice upon, I am compelled, therefore, to recognize at the outset that it is presented at such a time and under such conditions as impose limitations upon judgment which would not affect its examination as an original question. It has been twice ruled upon by my predecessors in this office, and the radical difference disclosed in their opinions must be accepted as proof that the interpretation of the statute is not plain, and that different views might well be taken of its extent and effect. Again, one of these judgments was rendered in reference to the identical railroad now under consideration, and in favor of the identical right now claimed while the other, though relating to the same statute, and therefore equal authority as an opinion, did not adjudicate the same right which is now involved. The decision of Secretary Chandler is an express adjudication that the branch line to St. Vincent is entitled to take lands within the indemnity limits of the main line of which it is a branch, and directed the issuance of patents to the State in aid of the branch line from selections made within the indemnity limits of the main line, and in pursuance of that judgment patents have been issued accordingly. It was also by him further adjudged that "the same principle should govern the future adjustment of the grant throughout the entire length of the branch road.”

At the time when this opinion was rendered, there had been built, as I understand the facts, only about one hundred and forty miles of the branch line, and there remained for construction, and subsequently were constructed, about one hundred and seventy-seven miles of the branch line. It is therefore obvious that, if this decision were to be changed, not only would it follow that the certifications and patents which have been issued in pursuance of it were illegal and the title wrongfully conveyed to the patentee, but that the rights which the parties interested in the construction of this road were entitled to by reason of it, and upon belief of the possession of which they undoubtedly did build the remaining portion of the road, would be defeated. In view of the fact, which you state in your communication, that the indemnity limits of the branch line are insufficient to afford lands equal to the full measure of the quantity purported to be given, and of the fact that this road was built through a new and remote country, it can hardly be doubted that the expectation that the quantity of the grant would not be less than the indemnity limits of the whole road afforded, must be taken to have been directly operative in securing its complete construction. This decision has remained unquestioned by the Department for thirteen years. Upon the faith of it, not only have lands been patented, but loans have been made upon mortgages which embrace this right as security, the stock of the corporation has been bought and sold, and all those transactions which necessarily inhere in such a business operation and which have been carried on in connection with it for many years, have been affected. To now change this adjudication would necessarily be retroactive in its effect upon all the transactions which have been based upon it, and would constitute little less than a breach of faith on the part of the government. In the case of the United States against Moore (95 U. S., 763), the supreme court said that "the construction given to a statute by those charged with the duty of execution it is always entitled to the most respectful consideration and ought not to be overruled without cogent reasons."

In the United States v. Burlington & Missouri R. R. Co. (98 U. S., 341), the court, speaking of a construction of a similar graut, said:

Such has been the uniform construction given to the acts by all departments of the government. Patents have been issued, bonds given, mortgages executed, and legislation had upon this construction. This uniform action is as potential, and as conclusive of the soundness of the construction, as if it had been declared by judicial decision. It cannot at this day be called in question.

Numerous decisions of similar purport have been made by that court, and the rule and its obligation are too well established in reason and authority to require elaborate citation. It is true that the construetion of this act by the Department has not been uniform, by reason of the opinion referred to of Secretary Thompson. But it appears to me that this does not alter the application of the rule in this case. The very fact that the first opinion was overruled upon a later consideration, tends to show and inust have been accepted by persons interested as

proving that the reasons for the later decision were so cogent as to require the change of rule and thus justified its acceptance with greater confidence; and in view of the fact that this was an adjudication of the particular right and has remained so long unquestioned, the application of the general principle decided by the court is as plain as it could be in any case. The decision of Secretary Chandler became a rule of property and is entitled to all the recognition which such a consequence neces sarily gives it.

The effect of a change of decision in reference to a question of interpretation, when property rights have arisen, has been fully determined by the supreme court. That tribunal has recognized the right of the supreme court of a State to interpret the constitution of the State and the validity of laws enacted thereunder; but it held in the case of municipal bonds that where, at the time of the loan and issue of such bonds, the decisions of the State court upheld the validity of the law which authorized them, a later decision, denying the constitutionality of such law cannot be admitted to destroy the obligation in the hands of parties who have bought them upon the faith of the earlier decision. Thompson c. Lee County (3 Wall., 327); Kenosha v. Lamson (9 Wall., 477); Gelpecke v. Dubuque (1 Wall., 175); Mitchell . Burlington (4 Wall., 270). The doctrine of these cases is applicable to the question now under consideration, and must be taken in connection with the other principle referred to as rendering it obligatory upon the Department to respect the later adjudication of the Department affecting the right now involved, to the same extent as if it were the only opinion ever promulgated by the Department, because all the consequences in destruction of property rights upon the faith of a decision attach only to the latter.

These decisions show, therefore, that if this question were now presented to the court as a question of law, instead of to the Department, the court would feel bound by the decision of the Department, which has stood as a rule of property for thirteen years, unless, at least, “cogent reasons" demanded of the court a reversal of that determination. But while, perhaps, the power may exist in the Secretary now to reverse the adjudication of this case in 1875, yet the familiar canons of limitation upon judicial discretion stand opposed to such action. With certain proper exceptions, the rule is well settled, as a rule of adminis tration, that the final decisions of the head of a Department must, in proper discharge of duty, be accepted as binding upon his successor in the same Department in the same case. The opinions of the AttorneysGeneral have been uniform to this effect. "If not," said Mr. AttorneyGeneral Toucey, "and this decision without any new grounds might be reversed, then the reversal might be reversed, and so on in endless confusion, according to the whim or caprice of successive incumbents." (See references collated in the State of Oregon, 3 L. D., 595). This rule stands in part upon the same principles and reasons which support the

familiar rule of all courts of error and appeal, that upon a second appeal or writ of error the court will not hear argument upon any point decided by it on the former appeal, because it will not correct alleged errors so made in the same case. Said Mr. Justice Grier in Roberts v. Cooper (20th Howard, 481):

But we cannot be compelled on a second writ of error in the same case to review our own decision on the first. It has been settled by the decisions of this court, that after a case has been brought here and decided, and a mandate issued to the court below, if a second writ of error is sued out it brings up for revision nothing but the proceedings subsequent to the mandate. There would be no end to a suit if every obstinate litigant could, by repeated appeals, compel a court to listen to criticism on their opinions, or speculate on chances from changes in its members.

In recent cases the rule has been again re-affirmed. Supervisors v. Kennicott (94 U. S., 498); Chaffin v. Taylor (116 U. S., 567).

Whatever might be my own opinion, therefore, I should feel bound by this rule of administrative law not to interpose that opinion to reverse an adjudication in this particular case, which has so long subsisted, and when the consequences of such reversal must inevitably be so great a disturbance of property interests, and such extensive and harmful litigation. No case can well be conceived in which this rule rises against the reckless presumption which destroys adjudications from extreme confidence in one's own opinion, with more power and effect.

I base my conclusion, therefore, upon this ground, as denying the right in me to re-consider the former adjudication of the particular interest upon which such rights have grown up. But if we turn to the original question and seek for the "cogent reasons" which should require the reversal of the decision of Secretary Chandler, are they to be found? I have attentively considered this legislation, and it seems to me that the reasons which support his interpretation of the act of Congress, must be conceded to possess great strength.

In the first place, it corresponds with the view which has been taken by the Land Office and the Department of all other similar grants. It was the rule of administration of the first railroad grant by Congress, which was made to the State of Illinois for a railroad "from the southern termination of the Illinois and Michigan canal to a point at or near the junction of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers, with a branch of the same to Chicago, on Lake Michigan, and another, via the town of Galena, in said State, to Dubuque, in the State of Iowa." In respect to this, it was decided by the Commissioner of the General Land Office on the 5th of August, 1852, in answer to the question whether the road was allowed to make up the deficiency which there might be on the main stem or either of its branches, by selecting land on any other portion of the road" that "there was no distinction made between lands selected for the main stem and for the branches, id est, no separate lists on account were made."

The same rule was applied to the grants made to the States of Ar

kansas and Missouri by the act of February 9, 1853 (10 Stat., 155), for a railroad" from a point on the Mississippi opposite the mouth of the Ohio, in the State of Missouri, via Little Rock, to the Texas boundary line, near Fulton, in Arkansas, with branches from Little Rock, in Arkansas, to the Mississippi River, and to Fort Smith."

It was also applied in the administration of the grant of May 15, 1856, to the State of Iowa, made in almost similar terms, so far as the point in question goes, with the present, for a road from Lyon City, etc., "with a branch from the mouth of the Tete des Morts to the nearest point on said road" (11 Stat., 9).

This interpretation and administration of the first two grants preceded by some years the passage by Congress of the grant in question to the State of Minnesota, and it is to be presumed that the fact was known to Congress, and the peculiar use of similar language in the grant to Minnesota, and especially the collocation of the words of defi nition or description of the roads, tend strongly to prove that the same rule of interpretation was distinctly contemplated.

Limiting the view to the act making the grant to the State of Minnesota, it is first to be noted that, irrespective of the question of whether the branch" could be treated as a part of the "road", it is plain that it was the purpose of Congress that any deficiency in the granted limits should be made up from the indemnity limits without restriction to selection of lands within the limits of coterminous sections. In other words, there can be no doubt that Congress intended that if a deficiency occurred at any point in the granted limits and there were lands within the indemnity limits sufficient to supply all the deficiencies in the granted limits, selections might be made of lands wherever found in the indemnity limits longitudinally, to an extent sufficient to supply such deficiencies. This is now the well-settled interpretation of the language used in such grants as that of March 3, 1857, wherever it was employed. It has been in several cases recognized and enforced by the courts and is not, I believe, questioned in the Department. (United States v. Burlington & Missouri R. R. Co., (98 U. S., 334). Moreover, in the particular case, there is no opportunity for doubt that such was the understanding of Congress, because of the expressions in the later acts. Thus in the sixth section of the act of March 3, 1865, after providing that lands shall be granted not exceeding ten sections. per mile, situated opposite to and within a limit of twenty miles of the line of each section of ten miles as completed, it is further expressly provided that when

the Secretary of the Interior shall be satisfied that the whole of any one of said roads and branches is completed in a good, substantial, and workmanlike manner, as a first-class railroad, the said Secretary of the Interior shall issue to the said State patents to all the remaining lauds granted for and on account of said completed road and branches in this act, situated within the said limits of twenty miles from the line thereof, throughout the entire length of said road and branches.