ously incurred by the option holders, and also borrowed of them certain sums of money, debts and loans together amounting to $14,127; but that this sum, as well as the $6,000 paid for the option, was repaid out of the net earnings of the company; and also found that the original cost of the entire stock was $50,000, or 50 cents per share. On this basis 10,000 shares of stock were actually delivered to defendant, and plaintiff seeks to recover a portion thereof, claiming that the actual cost was 62 cents per share. Held, that the finding that the cost was 50 cents per share was a finding of fact, and not inconsistent with the other findings, and, in the absence of exceptions, conclusive as to defendant's right to the 10,000 shares.

2. Plaintiff averred that defendant, by a subsequent contract, had agreed to deliver to him the claimed excess of stock, but after returning 525 shares refused to turn over the rest. Defendant denied such agreement, and counter-claimed for the 525 shares. The court found that these shares were delivered at plaintiff's request to enable him to fill a sale which he had made, and to give 25 shares to another person, and was subject to the final adjustment of their stock account. Held that, in the absence of exceptions, this was conclusive of defendant's right to recover the stock. Affirming 13 Pac. Rep. 430.

Appeal from the supreme court of the territory of Utah.

shares of the face or par value of $100 each, making one-fourth interest in said mining property represent 25,000 shares; that the original cost of said stock was 62 cents per share, being $62,500 in the aggregate for such entire stock; that plaintiff was entitled under said agreement to 17,000 shares of such stock, and the defendant to 8,000 shares thereof, being together onefourth of the entire stock, and it being agreed by the two parties that such was the cost and proper division between them of such stock; but that in the articles of incorporation, by a mistake and inadvertence on the part of the draughtsman of the instrument, 15,000 shares were erroneously set down as subscribed by plaintiff, Egan, and 10,000 shares by defendant, Clasbey; that after said instrument was read to plaintiff he refused to sign the same as written on account of the mistake therein, but upon the distinct agreement and understanding between defendant and plaintiff that the mistake should be corrected, as between themselves, so that plaintiff should receive 17,000 and defendant only 8,000 shares of stock, the plaintiff, in consideration of the defendant's promise to turn over to him 2,000 shares of the 10,000 so allotted to him, signed said articles, and the stock was issued according to the terms of the articles of incorporation as executed; and that afterwards defendant did turn over to plaintiff 525 shares of said excess, leaving a balance of 1,475 shares, which the defendant retained, and refused to turn over, and still refuses, al

"Salt Lake City, 11th Sept., 1885. This agreement, entered into on this, the eleventh day of September, 1885, by and between Ed. D. Egan, party of the first part, and James T. Clasbey, party of the second part, and both of Salt Lake City and county, Utah territory: That said Ed. D. Egan, party of the first part, does hereby agree to deliver to James T. Clasbey, party of the second part. stock in the mining claim at present known as 'Martin's Horn Silver Mine,' and situated near Lava Beds, Idaho territory; the amount of said stock to be of the value of five thousand ($5,000) dollars, at its original cost; and it is further agreed that if said stock is not issued the said Ed. D. Egan, party of the first part, does agree to deliver to said James T. Clasbey, party of the second part, a deed for a portion of the aforesaid mining property, said deed to be equivalent to stock of the amount of five thousand ($5,000) dollars. E. D. EGAN. J. T. CLASBEY. Witness: H. J. LOVE."

"$5,000. Salt Lake City, 11th Sept., 1885. Received of James T. Clasbey the sum of five thousand ($5,000) dollars. This sum is in payment for the stock or deed mentioned in an agreement signed by me this day. E. D. EGAN."

The complaint alleged that on the 15th of September, 1885, said corporation was formed, as contemplated, between the owners of the other three-fourths of said mine, and the plaintiff and defendant as the owners of the remaining one-fourth; that the amount of the capital of said corporation was $10,000,000, divided into 100,000

same of him. The plaintiff further averred the value of the stock to be $3 per share at the date of the suit, and asked judgment against the defendant for $4,425, "with interest from the date hereof, at the rate of ten per cent. per annum."

The defendant denied on his part the making of any agreement with the plaintiff other than that first set forth in the complaint. He further denied that the original cost of said mining property, or of its equivalent, the capitalized stock, was $62,500, and averred that it was only $50,000. He denied that he ever agreed that such was the cost of said stock, and that the proper division thereof was as stated in the complaint. He denied that there was any mistake in drafting said articles of incorporation, or that there was any agreement between himself and plaintiff to transfer any portion of the stock allotted to him in said articles to plaintiff, and averred that at the time of making said contract plaintiff held an option to purchase one-fourth of said mining property, but that, being without means to perfect on his part the purchase under said option, plaintiff applied to defendant to contribute $5,000 to the purchase thereof, with the understanding that the defendant should share in such purchase in such proportion as the $5,000 should bear to the cost of such purchase, and thereupon he paid plaintiff the $5,000, and said contract of September 11, 1885, was executed; that thereupon the plaintiff perfected said purchase, and at once thereafter said corporation was formed, but that defendant did not then know the actual cost of said

property, or of such stock, and no agreement as to any definite number of shares had been made between them; that afterwards, and before defendant was aware of the cost of said property or of such stock, he delivered to the plaintiff 525 shares of said stock, not as a conceded right, or in settlement of any claim of plaintiff, but at plaintiff's request, in order to enable him to fulfill contracts of sale made by him; that after learning that the actual original cost of said property and stock was only $50,000, and that he, defendant, under his contract, was entitled to have 10,000 shares, and that plaintiff was entitled to 15,000 shares, he demanded of plaintiff 525 shares of stock, which plaintiff refused, and claimed that the original cost was 62%1⁄2 cents per share; that the claim of plaintiff is unjust; that the defendant is entitled to 525 shares, which plaintiff has converted to his own use; that the stock is worth $3 per share; and he, therefore, prayed judgment against the plaintiff for the sum of $1,575.

A jury having been waived, the case was tried by the court upon the pleadings and proofs, both oral and documentary. The following findings of fact and conclusions of law by the trial court clearly set forth the material facts in the case: "(1) | The plaintiff and defendant, on the 11th day of September, 1885, entered into the written contract exhibited in the complaint, whereby plaintiff, in consideration of the sum of $5,000, then delivered to him by the defendant towards the purchase of one-fourth undivided of the Martin's Horn silver mine, at Era, Idaho, agreed to deliver to the defendant stock in such mining claim in amount equal to $5,000, at its original cost; and, further, that if such stock was not issued, he would deliver to defendant a deed to be equivalent to stock of the amount of $5,000. (2) Plaintiff and others bought an option on said mine, paying therefor $6,000, from one Chambers, [such price including $5,000 paid by Chambers to Martin, the owner of the mine, on said option, and $1,000, expenses incurred by Chambers,] and on the 12th of September, 1885, paid to Martin $50,000, the balance of the purchase money. (3) On the 15th of September, 1885, a corporation was organized by the purchasers and others associated with them to work said mine, called the 'Bannock Gold and Silver Mining Company of Idaho,' on a basis of 100,000 shares of capital stock, one-fourth of which [25,000 shares] were to be allotted to plaintiff and defendant, to be divided between them according to their said contract. (4) Plaintiff contributed one-fourth of the $6,000 paid to Chambers and one-fourth of the $50,000 paid to Martin, using, with his own money, the said $5,000 delivered to him by defendant. (5) On the organization of the corporation the mine was conveyed to it, and plaintiff and four other corporators voluntarily loaned and advanced to the corporation $2,000, of which sum the plaintiff contributed $500. (6) Soon after the organization of the corporation, by consent, and on motion of the plaintiff, the corporation assumed and paid a debt of $5,000 to one McMasters, which

had been incurred by plaintiff and one Thum, the original holders of said option, and afterwards the corporation paid a claim forlabor on the mine pending the option, which claim was estimated at $1,500, but the amount actually paid thereon to Martin was $2,127, paid by the corpora tion through plaintiff, its superintendent. The corporation also, in November, 1885, out of its net earnings, refunded to the contributors the $6,000 paid to Chambers, and the $2,000 advanced as aforesaid, of which the plaintiff received $2,000, the portion advanced by him. The advances and loan thus repaid and debts assumed and paid by the corporation amount to $14,127, leaving the sum of $50,000 as the actual outlay by plaintiff and the other purchasers of the mine. (7) Of the $50,000 80 paid by the purchasers the plaintiff paid one fourth, or $12,500, [using for that purpose the $5,000 delivered to him by defendant.] (8) The actual original cost of the 25,000 shares of stock was fifty cents per share. (9) When the corporation was about to be organized, the plaintiff claimed that the cost of stock was 62% cents per share, and that he was entitled to subscribe for and hold 17,000 shares, and the defendant only 8,000 shares, but there was no agreement or settlement between defendant and plaintiff as to the claim, and the matter was left for future. adjustment by plaintiff and defendant. *(10) About the month of December, 1885, defendant, at request of plaintiff, delivered to plaintiff 500 shares of stock to enable the latter to fill a sale, and 25 shares which plaintiff desired to give to another person. This stock was delivered to plaintiff subject to the adjustment of their stock account. (11) The parties never agreed upon the cost of the stock. Plaintiff demanded 1,475 shares of stock from defendant, but defendant refused to comply, and plaintiff brought this action. After this, and before answering, defendant demanded of plaintiff the return of the 525 shares delivered as aforesaid, which was refused by plaintiff. (12) The value of said stock when the action was brought and when defendant made his said demand was and is now three dollars per share. As conclusions of law the court doth find: (1) That the plaintiff was entitled to subscribe for, and hold, 15,000 shares of said stock, and defendant was entitled to subscribe for, and hold, 10,000 shares; (2) that plaintiff is not entitled to recover in this action, but the defendant is entitled to judgment against the plaintiff; (3) that on his counter-claim the defendant is entitled to recover from the plaintiff the value of 525 shares of said stock, viz., $1,575, together with his costs to be taxed.' Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of the defendant for the sum of $1,575. That judgment having been affirmed by the supreme court of the territory of Utah, the present appeal was prosecuted.

J. L. Rawlius, for appellant. Samuel A. Merritt, for appellee.

Mr. Justice LAMAR, after stating the facts as above, delivered the opinion of the court.

We find no exceptions in the record, and

the only error assigned is that the court | erred in not giving judgment in favor of the plaintiff, as a necessary legal conclusion from the findings of fact, the plead ings, and the proper interpretation of the contract sued on. We think the findings of fact conclusively negative this contention. It seems that both parties agree, (and it is the only point on which they are agreed,) that according to the terms of the contract of the 11th of September, 1885, the share of Clasbey, the defendant, in the 25,000 shares of stock in the mining corporation was to be determined by the original cost of that stock. In other words, that if it was 62 cents per share, Clasbey was entitled to a subscription of only 8,000 shares, and the plaintiff Egan to 17,000, in which case the allotment to Clasbey in the articles of incorporation was put there by the mistake and inadvert ence of the draughtsman, and subject to correction in a future adjustment between those two parties; but if it was 50 cents a share, then the defendant Clasbey was entitled to 10,000 shares and the plaintiff to 15,000 shares, in which case the defendant was under no obligation, in any future adjustment of stock between them, to turn over any part of his said shares to plaintiff. The decisive question, therefore, to be determined is, what was the original cost of the 25,000 shares that, under the contract, were to be divided between the parties to this suit? The eighth finding of fact says: "The actual original cost of the 25,000 shares was fifty cents per share." This, in our opinion, is absolutely conclusive against the claim of the plaintiff. Such a finding cannot be twisted and turned into a conclusion of law.

Nor do we consider as well taken the proposition of counsel for the appellant, that as a finding of fact it is inconsistent, in effect, with the other findings, respecting the original cost of either the mining property or its equivalent, the capitalized stock of the company. It is insisted that these findings show that, in addition to the original price of $50,000, the plaintiff, with other members of the company, advanced divers sums that increased the amount upwards of $62,000. The reply to this is that the findings of fact show that those sums were advances and loans made to the corporation, were treated as such by the plaintiff and those who contributed with him, and were refunded to them out of the net earnings of said corporation, leaving the sum of $50,000 as the actual outlay by plaintiff and the others purchasers of the mine. They can. not, therefore, be included in the estimate of the original cost as between the two parties to this suit.

Equally conclusive, in our opinion, is the tenth finding of facts, taken in connection with the eighth, upon the question of the defendant's counter-claim. It appears from that finding that the defendant, at the request of the plaintiff, delivered to plaintiff 500 shares of stock to enable the latter to fill a sale, and 25 shares which the plaintiff desired to give to another person. This stock was delivered to plaintiff, subject to the adjustment of their stock account. We think the plead

ings and findings in this case fully sustain the judgment of the supreme court of Utah territory, and it is, therefore, af. firmed.

(137 U. S. 689)

MASSACHUSETTS BEN. Ass'n v. MILES.

(January 19, 1891.)

APPEALS JURISDICTIONAL AMOUNT-INTEREST ON

VERDICT.

Rev. St. U. S. § 966, which allows interest on judgments recovered in the federal courts at the rate allowed by law on judgments recovered in the state courts, does not exclude the idea of a power in the several states to allow interest on verdicts; and since Act Pa. 1859 provides for the entry of judgment for the amount of the verdict, with interest thereon from the day of its rendition, the supreme court of the United States has jurisdiction of an appeal from the circuit court of Pennsylvania where the amount of the verdict and the interest t'reon to the time of the entry of the judgment exceeds $5,000.

In error to the circuit court of the United States for the eastern district of Pennsylvania.

This was a motion to dismiss a writ of error upon the ground that the "matter in dispute "did not exceed the sum or value of $5,000, as required by Revised Statutes, § 691, as amended by section 3 of the act of February 16, 1875, (18 St. 315,) to give this court jurisdiction. Sarah G. Miles, the, plaintiff below, brought an action in the court of common pleas of Philadelphia. county, in the state of Pennsylvania, against the Massachusetts Benefit Association, to recover $5,000, with interest, due to her as beneficiary in a policy of insurance, issued by the defendant company upon the life of her husband, John S. Miles. The insured died on January 16, 1888. After the issue was made up, the defendant company removed the case to the circuit court for the eastern district of Pennsylvania, where it was duly called for trial October 16, 1889. Defendant set up no counter-claim, but denied all liability upon the ground that the policy had lapsed by non-payment of an assessment. Upon October 18th, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and assessed her damages at $5,000. Motion for new trial was made, and on October 31st the motion was denied, and judgment was entered in open court in the following words: "Motion for new trial denied, and judgment ordered to be entered in favor of the plaintiff, and against the defendant, on the verdict, whereupon judgment is entered accordingly." The defendant having taken out its writ of error, this motion was made to dismiss.

Richard P. White, for defendant in error. F. Carroll Brewster, for plaintiff in error.

BROWN, J. Our jurisdiction to review this case upon writ of error depends upon the amount of the judgment, and the sole question is whether, upon the face of this record, the judgment is for $5,000 or for that amount with interest from the date of the verdict. Under the peculiar practice obtaining in Pennsylvania, the judgment was not entered up for a definite amount in dollars and cents, but, generally, "in favor of the plaintiff, and against the de

fendant, on the verdict." As the verdict was rendered 13 days before this entry, the amount actually due at the date of the judgment, if interest be computed upon the verdict, was $5,010.83. At common law neither verdicts nor judgments bore interest: but by Revised Statutes, § 966, "interest shall be allowed on all judgments in civil causes, recovered in a circuit or district court, and may be levied by the marshal under process of execution issued thereon, in all cases where, by the law of the state in which such court is held, interest may be levied under process of execution on judgments recovered in the courts of such state, and it shall be calculated from the date of the judgment, at such rate as is allowed by law on judgments recovered in the courts of such state. Did the case rest solely upon this statute, it is difficult to see how interest could be computed upon this verdict, inasmuch as the specific allowance of interest upon judgments would seem to exclude the inference that interest should be allowed upon verdicts before judgment. But by an act of the legislature of Pennsylvania, passed in 1859, it is declared to "be lawful for any party or parties in whose favor any verdict may be rendered for a specific sum of money to collect and receive interest upon such sum from the date of the verdict; and every general judgment entered upon such verdict, whether by a court of original jurisdiction or by the supreme court, shall be deemed and held to be a judgment for the sum found by the verdict, with interest thereon from the date of such finding." We regard this statute as settling the question in favor of our jurisdiction. Section 966, while providing only for interest upon judgments, does not exclude the idea of a power in the several states to allow interest upon verdicts, and, where such allowance is expressly made by a state statute, we consider it a right given to a successful plaintiff, of which he ought not to be deprived by a removal of his case to the federal court. The courts of the state and the federal courts sitting within the state should be in harmony upon this point. Both in Holden v. Trust Co., 100 U. S. 72, and in Ohio v. Frank, 103 U. S. 697, it was held that the question of interest is always one of local law. This is also recognized in the twenty-third rule of this court, which allows interest upon the judgment of the inferior courts, at such rate as similar judgments bear interest in the courts of the state where such judgment is rendered, whenever upon writ of error from this court the judgment of such inferior court is affirmed. Where interest, antecedent to the judgment appealed from, is included in such judgment, and the amount, with the added interest, exceeds $5,000, jurisdiction will attach. The Patapsco, 12 Wall. 451; The Rio Grande, 19 Wall. 178; Zeckendorf v. Johnson, 123 U. S. 617, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 261; District of Columbia v. Gannon, 130 U. S. 227, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 508; New York Elevated Railroad v. Fifth Nat. Bank, 118 U. S. 608, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 23; Keller v. Ashford, 133 U. S. 610, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 494. The motion to dismiss will therefore be denied.

(138 U. S. 62)

BUTLER et al. v. GAGE et al.

(January 19, 1891.)

ERROR, WRIT OF-BY WHOM ISSUED — Waiver of FEDERAL QUESTION.

1. Since Const. Colo. art. 6, § 8, provides that the judge of the supreme court having the shortest term to serve, not holding his office by appointment or election to fill a vacancy, shall be the chief justice, and, in case of his absence, the judge having in like manner the next shortest term to serve shall preside in his stead, the allowance of a writ of error by one of the associate justices of that court, wherein he recites the absence of the chief justice, and styles himself the presiding justice, is a sufficient compliance with Rev. St. U. S. § 999, which provides for the issuance of writs of error by the chief justice of the court rendering the judgment, or by a justice of the supreme court of the United States.

2. The supreme court of the United States will not retain a case for the purpose of deciding whether or not Sess. Laws Colo. 1889, p. 444, appointing a supreme court commission, empowered to hear and decide causes, subject to the approval of the state supreme court, is in violation of Const. U. S. Amend. 14, providing that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, where plaintiffs in error acquiesced in the hearing of the cause by the commission, participated in the argument before that body, petitioned the supreme court for a rehearing, and did not moot the unconstitutionalty of the act until after the final judgment of the supreme court had been announced, and the petition for rehearing overruled. Affirming 23 Pac. Rep. 462.

In error to the supreme court of the state of Colorado.

This was an action brought in the name of William P. Linn and Lewis C. Rockwell against Hugh Butler and Charles W. Wright, in the district court in and for the county of Lake, and state of Colorado, upon a contract between Linn and Butler and Wright, subsequently assigned by Linn to Burrell, and by Burrell to Rockwell, as collateral security for money loaned by him to Linn. Linn subsequently died, and his executors were substituted. The defenses raised no federal question. Upon trial had, a verdict was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, and their damages were assessed at the sum of $9,008.33, and a motion for new trial having been overruled, judgment was rendered thereon January 17, 1888, whereupon the case was taken by appeal to the supreme court of the state of Colorado. Appellants assigned 43 errors, but these involved no federal question. September 13, 1889, the supreme court entered an order, reciting that "it appearing that this cause comes within the provisions of rule 51 of this court, it is ordered by the court that this cause be, and is hereby, advanced for hearing, and that the same is hereby assigned to the supreme court commission for consideration and report, and for oral, argument at such time as said commission shall order. September 27, 1889, it was* stipulated and agreed by and between the parties that the cause might be set down for oral argument on Wednesday, the 16th day of October, 1889. The cause was accordingly heard by the supreme court commission, which arrived at a decision and opinion and reported the same to the supreme court. 23 Pac. Rep. 462. On the 24th of December, 1889, the supreme court

entered the following order: "At this day, I tk's cause coming on to be heard, as well upon the transcript of proceedings and judgment had in said district court in and for the county of Lake as also upon the matters assigned for error herein, and the same having been heretofore argued by counsel, and submitted to the consideration and judgment of the court, and it appearing to the court that there is no error in the proceedings and judgment aforesaid of said district court, it is therefore considered and adjudged by the court that the judgment aforesaid of said district court be, and the same is hereby, affirmed and stand in full force and effect, and that this cause be remanded to said district court for such other and further proceedings according to law as shall be necessary to the final execution of the judgment of said district court in the cause, notwithstanding the said appeal. It is further considered and adjudged by the court that said appellees do have and recover of and from said appellants their costs in this behalf expended, to be taxed, and that they have execution therefor; and let the opinion of the court filed herein be recorded." And the opinion of the commission was then given upon the record, with these words attached: "PER CURIAM. For the reasons stated in the foregoing opinion the judgment is affirmed." On the 7th of January, 1890, appellants filed their petition for a rehearing in the cause, assigning various reasons, but suggesting no federal question, and taking no exception, so far as appears, to the fact that the case had been heard by the commission, which, on the 28th of March, the supreme court, upon consideration thereof, denied. May 16th, appellants filed their motion in words and figures as follows: "And now come the said appellants and move the court to grant an oral argument on the merits of this cause and appeal in and before this court, and that in the mean time no mandate, remittitur, or process issue herein to affirm or enforce in any way the judgment of the said district court of Lake county complained of and appealed from;" which motion was overruled May 23d. Thereupon appellants presented their petition for a writ of error from this court, addressed to "Hon. J. C. HELM, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado. In this paper it was claimed, after a recital of various steps taken in the case, that the motion and request of appellants that the supreme court should grant an oral argument on the merits of the appeal and of the cause, and the refusal of the court to grant the same and to hear an oral argument, "drew in question the constitutionality of the statutes of the state of Colorado entitled 'An act to regulate the practice in the supreme court, appointing commissioners therefor, fixing their salary, and defining their duties,' approved March 7, 1887, and a certain other act entitled 'An act providing for a supreme court commission,' approved April 1, 1889, in that, by the said statutes and the construction placed thereon and the practice adopted thereunder by said supreme court, litigants and suitors in said supreme court were deprived of their

right to have their appeals and writs of error and other judicial controversies to be tried before, heard, and decided by said supreme court, and because the same are repugnant to and inconsistent with and forbidden by the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States, which provides that 'no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws;' and that said decision in this cause in effect sustains the validity of said statutes so drawn in question." The writ of error was allowed as follows: "State of Colorado. Desiring to give petitioners an opportunity to test in the supreme court of the United States the question presented in the foregoing petition, it is ordered that a writ of error be allowed to said court, and that the same be made a supersedeas, the bond, in the penal sum of sixteen thousand dollars, herewith presented, being approved. In testimony whereof witness my hand this 27th day of May, A. D. 1890, the chief justice being absent. CHAS. D. HAYT, Presiding Judge of the Supreme Court of the State of Colorado." The writ of error having issued, and citation having been duly served, signed by and attested in the name of Judge HAYT, and the transcript having been filed in this court, the defendants in error moved to dismiss or affirm. Hugh Butler, for plaintiffs in error. L. C. Rockwell, for defendants in error.

Mr. Chief Justice FULLER, after stating the facts as above, delivered the opinion of the court.

The motion to dismiss is predicated upon two grounds-First, because the writ of error was not allowed, nor the citation signed, by the chief justice of the supreme court of the state of Colorado; second, because no federal question was involved in the case, or appeared or was raised upon the record.

It is essential to the exercise by this court of revisory jurisdiction over the final judgments or decrees of the courts of the states that the writ of error should be allowed either by a justice of this court, or by the proper judge of the state court, after ascertaining by an examination of the record that a question cognizable here was made and decided in the state court, and that such allowance was justified. Gleason v. Florida, 9 Wall. 779. Section 999 of the Revised Statutes provides that the citation shall be signed by the chief justice,. judge, or chancellor of the court rendering the judgment or*passing the decree com-* plained of, or by a justice of this court; and it was held in Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 14 Wall. 26, that when the supreme court of a state is composed of a chief justice and several associates, and the judgment complained of was rendered by such court, the writ could only be allowed by the chief justice of that court or by a justice of this court. Section 5 of article 6 of the constitution of the state of Colorado is as follows: "The supreme court shall con