* she should not take off her glasses, and I casual- | [1] He testified that he was practicing ly spoke of my own healing; that I had worn Christian Science as laid down by the church. glasses for many years * and taken them off. * I told her I had trouble with my He denied that he was practicing medicine. eyes, and had several other diseases, and that I had been to a number of physicians, and that I had been healed by Christian Science." He further testified that on the second visit he told her It was conceded on the trial that Christian Science is a religion based upon the Scriptures and founded by Mary Baker Eddy in 1866, and that the church has about a million members. The alleged healing of moral, mental, and physical diseases by prayer was York for more than 20 years before the times mentioned in the indictment. It was also conceded that in order to obtain entry upon the list of practitioners of the Christian Science Church proof must be furnished satisfactory to the church of the character and qualifications of the applicant, but that the education and experience of the applicant is not an element in his qualifications. The church relies wholly upon the sincerity of the applicant and his reliance and faith in the power and efficacy of prayer to heal diseases. It appears from the statute that we have quoted that a person practices medicine when he "that Christian Science treatment was prayer to God. I told her that Christian Science real-practiced by Christian Scientists in New ized that God was omnipotent, or all powerful; that He was omniscient, or all-knowing; that he was omnipresent, or ever-present, and that because God was omnipotent and omniscient, and omnipresent, and God was good, it must follow that evil, disease, in harmony, sin, and discord were no part of His Being and had no real existence, and I told her that man was the image and likeness of God, and was entitled to dominion, and that his birthright was dominion, and that he had the right to affirm and secure immunity from discord of whatever name and nature, and that disease was like a shadow that flees before the light." He says he told her that this result would follow from spiritual understanding. He says he spoke to her about keeping her life pure and Christlike and loving and good, and just and free from error. He says he then prayed again, and that prayer is a synonym for treatment. He further testified that, at the first interview: "I told her I could not cure her; that I had no more power to cure her than any one else; that God was the only power, and the only healer ** I told her that she could cure herself just as much as I could if she would study and purify her life and her thoughts and cleanse from her consciousness fear and inharmony and false thoughts. I told her that by studying and gaining an understanding that she could apply the principle and law of Christian Science as well as any one else, as well as I could. "holds himself out as being able to diagnose, treat, operate or prescribe for any human distion, and who shall either offer or undertake, by ease, pain, injury, deformity or physical condiany means or method, to diagnose, treat, operate, or prescribe for any human disease, pain, injury, deformity or physical condition." The language of the statute is very general. It bears evidence in itself that the words were chosen for the express purpose of prohibiting, except upon registration and authorization of the practitioner, as by the statute provided, every means and method that could thereafter be used, or claimed to be used, to relieve or cure disease and infirmity by any person individually, or as a repreHis testimony as to what was said at the sentative of a school, religious body, or oththird interview is as follows: I told her that I was nothing, and that she was nothing, it was God." "To be 'present with the Lord' is to have, not mere emotional ecstasy or faith, but the actual demonstration and understanding of Life as revealed in Christian Science. To be 'with the Lord' is to be in obedience to the law of God, to be absolutely governed by Divine Love-by Spirit, not by matter. Become conscious for a single moment that Life and intelligence are purely spiritual-neither in nor of matter-and the body will then utter no conscious complaints. If suffering from a belief in sickness, you will find yourself suddenly well. Sorrow is turned into joy when the body is controlled by spiritual life, Truth and Love. * ** Entirely separate from the belief and dream of material living is the Life Divine, revealing spiritual understanding and the consciousness of man's dominion over the whole earth. This understanding casts out error and heals the sick, and with it you can speak 'as one having author er organization. It does not appear that the defendant attempted to diagnose the diseases which the investigator stated to him that she had; he not only in substance denied that she had any disease, but asserted that they rested in her imagination, or were mere evidence of a lack of true relation to her God. There was no inquiry on his part into the symptoms which the investigator claimed that she had as indicating the diseases. There was no laying on of hands, manipulation, massage, or outward ceremonial. His direction to her to remove her glasses and take off a porous plaster which she asserted she had upon her back were, as also asserted by him, simply to bring about complete reliance by her upon the power and willingness of God to heal her diseases. Such directions were not, he asserts, intended as a prescription or as advice. It was a test of her faith. He, however, testified that prayer was a synonym for treatment. He habitually termed his interposition by prayer a treatment, and such it would seem to have been in the ordinary meaning of the word. He had a place where inter by practical demonstration on the part of its sincere practitioners in securing the overthrow of moral, mental, and physical disease. It disclaims any reliance upon skill, education, or science. In view of the tenets of the Christian Science Church the exception to the prohibition in the statute is broader than the provision of the Constitution of this state, which we have quoted, and which permits the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship without discrimination or preference. through him at a price, either as a compensa- | influence and spreads knowledge of its power tion or as an honorarium. He asserts that he made interposition with God by prayer to take away diseases, or what he alleges to be wrong relationships between persons having diseases and their God. His interposition with God as explained by him was to obtain such Divine action that the inharmony between the Divine Being and the person who sought to be relieved of diseases and infirmities might be adjusted. The duties of the defendant as a practitioner would seem to have been to handle the claim of those that came to him with their ills with a view to obtaining a Divine cure. Such interposition under such circumstances was, in the language of the defendant himself, a "treatment." We are of the opinion that the defendant did "treat" the investigator by "any [some] means or method," as the word is used in the general prohibition contained in the statThe general and comprehensive definition of a person who practices medicine has an express exception. The descriptive words are preceded by the phrase "except as hereinafter stated." The exception concededly refers to the words in section 173 of the Public Health Law as follows: "This article shall not be construed to affect ** the practice of the religious tenets of any church." It The exception includes every person in the practice of the religious tenets of any church, and it is not in any way in conflict with the federal or state Constitution. The language quoted from said section 173 is not in any sense an affirmative license. is, we repeat, an exception to the general prohibition. Whether the practice of the religious tenets of any church should have been excepted from the general prohibition against the practice of medicine unless the practitioner is registered and authorized so to do, or whether the exception should be continued therein, is a question for the Legislature and not for the courts. The purpose of the general statute is to protect citizens and others of the state from being treated in their physical ailments and diseases by persons who have not adequate or proper training, education, or qualifications to treat them. The tenets of a church are the beliefs, doctrines, and creeds of the church. The exception relates to the tenets of the church as an organized body as distinguished from an individual. It does not relate to or except persons practicing in accordance with individual belief. It appears from the record that it is a tenet of the Christian Science Church that prayer to God will result in complete cure of particular diseases in a prescribed, individual case. Healing would seem to be not only the prominent work of the church and its members, but the one distinctive belief around which the church organization is founded and sustained. The exception in the statute is not confined to worship or belief, but includes the practice of religious tenets. If it was the intention of the Legislature to relieve members of the Christian Science and other churches from the provisions of sections 160 and 161 of the Public Health Law to the extent of permitting them within the rules, regulations, and tenets of a church to maintain an office and there offer prayer for the healing of the diseases of those that might come to such church members for treatment, and the defendant has in good faith acted in accordance therewith, he is not guilty of the crime alleged in the indictment. The Christian Science Church is in terms expressly excepted from the prohibition contained in the medical practice acts of many of the states. It is so expressly excepted in the statutes of Maine, New Hampshire, Massachussetts, Connecticut, North Carolina, North and South Dakota, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. We think the exception in the statute in this state is broad enough to permit offering prayer for the healing of disease in accordance with the recognized tenets of the Christian Science Church. It may be said that if the exception is so construed, it will lead to numberless persons assuming to cure diseases in the name of a church for the purpose of thereby maintaining a business and securing a livelihood. The religious tenets of a church must be practiced in good faith to come within the exception. When such practice is a fraud or pretense it is not excepted from the general prohibition. When wrong is practiced in the name of religion it is not protected by Constitution or statute. Reynolds v. U. S., 98 U. S. 145, 25 L. Ed. 244; Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333, 10 Sup. Ct. 299, 33 L. Ed. 637; Mormon Church v. U. S., 136 U. S. 1, 10 Sup. Ct. 792, 34 L. Ed. 481. Many of the decisions referred to by counsel may be explained by the fact that the persons therein severally considered were frauds and shams. See People v. Spinella, 150 App. Div. 923, 135 N. Y. Supp. 1133, affirmed 206 N. Y. 709, 99 N. E. 1114. [2] A person should not be allowed to assume to practice the tenets of the Christian Science or any church as a shield to cover a business undertaking. When a person claims to be practicing the religious tenets of any It is claimed that the church extends its church, particularly where compensation is taken therefor and the practice is apart from a church edifice or the sancitity of the home of the applicant, the question whether such person is within the exception should be left to a jury as a question of fact. In this case the court charged the jury: "If you find from the evidence in this case that this defendant did engage in the practice of medicine as alleged in the indictment, within the definition which I have given to you, it is no defense that he did what he did from any sense of duty, or that he did these acts in the practice of the religious tenets of the Christian Science Church." order was unreasonable in the sense of being unwise or inexpedient. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Gas, Dec. Dig. 1.] 2. APPEAL AND ERROR 120(3)-ORDERS APPEALABLE-ORDER OF APPELLATE DIVISIONDISCRETION. In such case, the Appellate Division's annulment of the order of the Public Service Commission and the granting of a rehearing, in the exercise of its discretion, would not be reviewable in the Court of Appeals. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 842, 864; Dec. Dig. 120(3).] We are of the opinion that the court was in error in so charging the jury. The exception was intended by the Legislature to exclude from the prohibition the practice of the religious tenets of the Christian Science and other churches. It was necessary, as we have seen, that the practice be of the tenets of a recognized church and the court, instead of charging the jury as stated, should have left to the jury the question whether the de-igable stream at a cost of between $60,000 and fendant was in good faith practicing the tenets of such a church within the meaning of the statutory exception. 3. GAS 1-PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION- The judgment should be reversed and a exercise of power that the Commission's order new trial ordered. for the extension would be annulled. CUDDEBACK and CARDOZO, JJ., concur. Dig. 1.] WILLARD BARTLETT, C. J. (concurring). I concur in Judge CHASE'S construction of the statute. But I would go farther. I deny the power of the Legislature to make it a crime to treat disease by prayer. Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department. Certiorari by the People, on the relation of the New York & Queens Gas Company, to review an order of Edward E. McCall and others, commissioners, constituting the Public Service Commission of the State of New COLLIN, J., not voting. HOGAN, J., ab- York for the First District, requiring the resent. SEABURY, J., not sitting. Judgment reversed, etc. (219 N. Y. 84) PEOPLE ex rel. NEW YORK & QUEENS (Court of Appeals of New York. Oct. 3, 1916.) lator to extend its mains and service to Douglaston and Douglas Manor. From an order of the Appellate Division (171 App. Div. 580, 157 N. Y. Supp. 707), sustaining the writ, and annuling its order, the commissioners appeal. Order reversed, and order of the Public Service Commission reinstated. Certain residents and property owners of ward of the borough of Queens, New York Douglaston and Douglas Manor in the Third city, applied to the Public Service CommisUnder Public Service Commissions Law sion of the First District for an order re(Consol. Laws, c. 48) § 66, subd. 2, empowering quiring the relator in this proceeding, the the Commission to order reasonable extensions of New York & Queens Gas Company, to exthe lines, etc., of gas companies, the Appellate tend its gas mains and services in such manDivision of the Supreme Court has no power to substitute its own judgment as to what was rea- ner as may be necessary reasonably to supsonable in place of the determination of the ply with gas the communities of Douglaston Commission, and could only annul its order for and Douglas Manor. On a review of the prothe violation of law or of the Constitution or ceedings by the Supreme Court at the Apwhen beyond the power granted to the Commission, when based on some mistake of law, when pellate Division, the order of the Public Servwithout evidence to support it or when so ar-ice Commission was annulled. From that debitrary as to be beyond the exercise of a reason- termination the residents and property ownable discretion; nor does Code Civ. Proc. § 2140, prescribing the questions to be determined by ers have appealed to this court. the court upon the hearing on a writ of cer- Douglaston and Douglas Manor are situattiorari, extend the power of the court to review ed in the northeast corner of the borough of such order; nor does subdivision 5 thereof, per- Queens near Little Neck Bay. To the southmitting the court to set aside a determination as against the weight of the evidence, authorize east of Douglaston and also within the third the court to determine that the Commission's ward of the borough is Little Neck, which extends to the borough line. To the west and not to exact therefor excessive charges. are the communities of Bayside and Flush- It was assumed perhaps, by the Legislature ing which are separated from Douglaston that the members of the Public Service Comby a salt marsh about half a mile or more missions would acquire special knowledge of wide, and extending a mile inland. Through the matters intrusted to them by experience the middle of the marsh runs a creek naviga- and study, and that when the plan of their ble for small boats and along each side of the marsh is a high hill. The relator is at present supplying gas to Flushing and Bayside, but its mains and pipes are not sufficient to meet the additional requirements of Douglaston and Douglas Manor. The company's gas plant is located in Flushing about six miles from Douglaston, and it will be necessary to lay a main from the plant to Bayside and carry it from there down the hill, over the marsh and up the hill on the other side to reach Douglaston. creation was fully developed they would prove efficient instrumentalities for dealing with the complex problems presented by the activities of these great corporations. It was not intended that the courts should interfere with the Commissions or review their determinations further than is necessary to keep them within the law and protect the constitutional rights of the corporations over which they were given control. The law governing the Commissions is well expressed by the Minnesota Supreme Court Douglaston and Douglas Manor are sup-in State v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 130 Minn. plied with electricity for lighting purposes, 57, 153 N. W. 247. It is there said: and gas is desired mainly for cooking during the summer months. The Appellate Division decided that upon the whole case it was unreasonable to require the relator to extend its services in compliance with the order of the public service commission. Further facts appear in the opinion. Arthur Du Bois, of New York City, for appellants. John A. Garver, of New York City, for respondent. CUDDEBACK, J. (after stating the facts as above). The Public Service Commissions are authorized by law "to order reasonable improvements and extensions of the works, wires, poles, lines, conduits, ducts and other reasonable devices, apparatus and property of gas corporations, electrical corporations and municipalities." Pub. Serv. Comm. Law [Cons. Laws, c. 48] § 66. "The order may be vacated as unreasonable if it is contrary to some provision of the federal the power granted to the Commission, or if it or state Constitution or laws or if it is beyond is based on some mistake of law, or if there is no evidence to support it, or if, having regard to the interests of both the public and the carrier, it is so arbitrary as to be beyond the exercise of a reasonable discretion and judgment." See, also, People ex rel. Town of Hempstead v. State Board of Tax Com'rs, 214 N. Y. 594, 108 N. E. 913; People ex rel. Morrissey v. Waldo, 212 N. Y. 174, 105 N. E. 829. In Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 215 U. S. 452, 470, 30 Sup. Ct. 155, 160 (54 L. Ed. 280), the Chief Judge, after stating the power of the court, continued: "It is equally plain that such perennial powers lend no support whatever to the proposition that we may, under the guise of exerting judicial power, usurp merely administrative functions Under the authority of this statute the by setting aside a lawful administrative order upon our conception as to whether the adminisPublic Service Commission for the First Dis-trative power has been wisely exercised. Power trict made the order requiring the relator to extend its gas mains and services to meet the reasonable requirements of Douglaston and Douglas Manor. [1] In applying the provisions of this statute the court at the Appellate Division said: "We have no doubt that under this law the question remains for the court to determine upon the review of the determination of the Public Service Commission whether the extension ordered was a reasonable extension." to make the order, and not the mere expediency or wisdom of having made it, is the question.' The court at the Appellate Division did not therefore have the power to determine that the extension of the relator's gas mains and pipes ordered by the Public Service Commission was unreasonable in the sense that it was an unwise or inexpedient order, but only that it was unreasonable if it was an unlawful, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power. This statement of the law is quite likely The relator argues, in support of the powto create a misapprehension as to the power of the court. The court has no power to sub-er of the Appellate Division to review genstitute its own judgment of what is reason-erally the reasonableness of the order of the able in place of the determination of the Public Service Commission, and it can only annul the order of the Commission for the violation of some rule of law: Public Service Commission that the necessary authority is given by the provision with regard to the writ of certiorari contained in section 2140 of the Code of Civil Procedure. That section reads as follows: The Public Service Commissions were created by the Legislature to perform very im-its, to be determined by the court upon the hear"Sec. 2140. The questions, involving the merportant functions in the community, namely, ing, are the following, only: to regulate the great public service corpora- "1. Whether the body or officer had jurisdictions of the state in the conduct of their tion of the subject-matter of the determination business, and compel those corporations adequately to discharge their duties to the public under review. "2. Whether the authority, conferred upon the body or officer, in relation to that subject-mat determination. "3. Whether, in making the determination, any rule of law, affecting the rights of the parties thereto, has been violated, to the prejudice of the relator. "4. Whether there was any competent proof of all the facts, necessary to be proved, in order to authorize the making of the determination. ter, has been pursued in the mode required by | The court at the Appellate Division in its law, in order to authorize it or him to make the opinion summed up the proof on the subject. The court said that the cost of the extension would be between $60,000 and $70,000, and that the increased return to the relator from the consumption of gas would be about $1,660 per year, which is only one-half of the interest at 5 per cent. upon the extension. This is very far from showing that the order of the Public Service Commission was simply an arbitrary and capricious exercise of power. Indeed it was not asserted to be so by the court. The court in annulling the order claimed and exercised the right to review the "5. If there was such proof, whether there was, upon all the evidence, such a preponderance of proof, against the existence of any of those facts, that the verdict of a jury, affirming the existence thereof, rendered in an action in the Supreme Court, triable by a jury, would be set aside by the court, as against the weight of evidence." I do not understand that this section of the Code extends the power of the court beyond the rules laid down in State v. Great Northern Ry. Co. and Interstate Com. Comm. v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., supra. It is urged that under the provisions of subdivision 5 of section 2140 the court may set aside the determination of the Commission as against the weight of evidence, regarding it the same as the verdict of a jury. The court had occasion to say in People ex rel. Smith v. Hoffman, 166 N. Y. 462, 476, 60 N. E. 187, 191 (54 L. R. A. 597) in construing section 2140 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as applied to the determination of the board of examination under the Military Code (Laws 1898, c. 212): "The review authorized does not substitute the judgment of the civil court for that of the military court upon the evidence or the merits, but inquires into jurisdiction of the subject-matter, the exercise of authority in relation to the subject-matter according to law, the violation of any rule of law to the prejudice of the relator, and the like." action of the Public Service Commission and pass generally upon its wisdom and expediency. In Douglaston and the neighboring territory in the Third ward of the borough of Queens covered by the relator's franchise, there are some 332 houses. The occupants of these houses can get no gas unless they of the relator to supply their needs if pracare supplied by the relator. It is the duty ticable. Wisconsin, M. & P. R. R. v. Jacobson, 179 U. S. 287, 21 Sup. Ct. 115, 45 L. Ed. 194; People ex rel. Woodhaven Gas Light Co. v. Deehan, 153 N. Y. 528, 47 N. E. 787. The cost of the extension is not the only matter for consideration. Oregon R. R. & N. Co. v. Fairchild, 224 U. S. 510, 529, 32 Sup. Ct. 535, 56 L. Ed. 863. The court at the Appellate Division substituted its own judgment for that of the Public Service Commission in determining that the latter's order was unreasonable. This decision, if allowed to stand, will seriously hamper the Commissions in the dis[2] Of course, if the court at the Appel- charge of their duties, and go far toward late Division had annulled the order of the defeating the efforts of the Legislature to Public Service Commission and granted a re-establish agencies to regulate the great pubhearing in the exercise of discretion, its order would not be reviewable in this court (Barrett v. Third Ave. R. R. Co., 45 N. Y. 628), but that is not the case. The court sustained the writ of certiorari, and finally annulled the order of the Public Service Commission without granting a rehearing. lic service corporations. The order should therefore be reversed, and the order of the Public Service Commission reinstated, with costs in the Appellate Division and in this court. WILLARD BARTLETT, C. J., and CHASE, HOGAN, CARDOZO, and POUND, JJ., concur. HISCOCK, J., not voting. Order reversed, etc. [3] The question now is whether or not there was any evidence to show that the order of the Public Service Commission was an unlawful and arbitrary exercise of power. Acme Realty Co. v. Schinasi, 215 N. Y. 495, 109 N. E. 577, L. R. A. 1916A, 1176; People ex rel. Manhattan Ry. Co. v. Barker, 165 N. (Court of Appeals of New York. Oct. 3, 1916.) Y. 305, 59 N. E. 137, 151; Otten v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 150 N. Y. 395, 44 N. E. 1033. There was no dispute as to the basic facts of the case. There was some variation in the estimates of the witnesses as to the cost of iron pipe and the expense of engineering supervision and like matters, but there was no real disagreement as to the cost of the extension of the relator's system of gas distribution, and the increase in revenue that the relator would probably receive therefrom. (219 N. Y. 76) CITY OF NEW YORK v. APPLEBY et al. 1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 975- TRANSFER OF TAX LIEN-DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY -MAP. Description of the lands affected by the tax lien, which Greater New York Charter, & 1030, as added by Laws 1908, c. 490, provides that the transfer of tax lien shall contain, with reference for certainty, to the designation on the tax map, and such other identifying description as the collector may deem proper to add, held sufficient, notwithstanding a dotted line, characterized in no way, across the middle of the lot on the map; and though an "old description," added under |